An v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship
[2007] FCAFC 97
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Federal Court of Australia (Full Court)
Decision date
2007-06-29
Before
Emmett J, Finkelstein J, McHugh J, Finkelstein JJ, Lindgren J
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Judgment (20 paragraphs)
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT LINDGREN J: 1 I have had the benefit of reading drafts of the separate reasons for judgment of Emmett J and Finkelstein J. Their Honours' reasons for judgment deal with the background facts, the relevant legislation, Departmental guidelines, the reasons for decision of the Migration Review Tribunal, the reasons of the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia from which the present appeal is brought, and the submissions made on the appeal. I can therefore proceed immediately to address the issues on the appeal. 2 I agree in substance with Emmett J's reasons and conclusions. However, having drafted the following reasons for judgment that take a different approach in certain respects before reading those of his Honour, I publish them also as my reasons for agreeing with his Honour's conclusion that the appeal should be dismissed. 3 The first respondent supported the Federal Magistrates Court's view that the Tribunal's conclusion that the "appointment" was not "exceptional" was properly a finding of fact. I think that the position is, however, more complex, as the following propositions demonstrate. 4 First, although the ordinary meaning or common understanding that a simple non-technical English word conveys in the community is a matter of fact (Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Cohen (2001) 177 ALR 473 at [35] per McHugh J and cases there cited), indeed, a matter of fact of which judicial notice may be taken, this is often an insufficient proposition on which cases can be decided. The reason is that associated questions of law often arise, such as whether the word is used in its ordinary non-technical sense, and, most importantly, whether, and if so how, the meaning of the word in a particular case is affected by the statutory context in which it occurs: see the discussion in Collector of Customs v Agfa-Gevaert Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 389 at 395ff. The "statutory context" refers not only to the immediately surrounding text, but also to the piece of legislation as a whole, and its purpose or object. Context provides a sound starting point for construction in all cases, even though the conclusion may ultimately be reached that the word is hardly influenced by context at all. 5 Second, whether facts fully found answer a statutory description or statutory criteria, properly construed, may be exclusively a question of law: Hope v Bathurst City Council (1980) 144 CLR 1 at 7; Vetter v Lake Macquarie City Council (2001) 202 CLR 439 at [24]-[27]. In other words, it may be the case that the facts fully found are necessarily (as a matter of law) within or outside the statutory description. 6 Third, minds may, without legal error, differ on the question whether facts that are at law capable of doing so, fall within or outside words that are used in a statute according to their ordinary or common understanding. Whether they do so will be a question of fact: Vetter 202 CLR 439, at [24]-[26]; Brutus v Cozens [1973] AC 854. Prime examples are ordinary English words that betoken evaluation according to current community standards, such as "offensive", "unreasonable", "oppressive", "unfair" and "unjust". 7 The word "exceptional" is a simple non-technical word. It means "unusual" or "out of the ordinary" and is used in that sense in Sch 2, cl 856.213(c) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations). The word is not, however, of the obviously evaluative kind referred to above. It is necessary to carry out the legal task of exploring the meaning of the word in the particular regulatory context in which it occurs with a view to identifying, if it can be done, what is the "usual" or "ordinary" case that was in contemplation against which exceptionality is to be measured. As will appear, once this task is completed, it becomes clear that it was open to the Tribunal, if not required of it, to find that the position in question was not exceptional. 8 Under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act), a non-citizen in the migration zone who holds a visa that is in effect is a lawful non-citizen, and any other non-citizen in the migration zone is an unlawful non-citizen (ss 13, 14). The Minister may grant a non-citizen permission, known as a visa, either to travel to and enter Australia, to remain in Australia, or to do both of those things (s 29). Section 31 of the Act provides that there are to be prescribed classes of visas, and that the regulations may prescribe the criteria for a visa or visas of a specified class (s 31). 9 The present case turns largely on the Regulations and the Schedules to the Regulations. It is noteworthy at this point that while cl 856.213(c) in Sch 2 to the Regulations refers to "vocational English" (an expression that is defined in reg 1.15B), s 5(2) of the Act and reg 5.17 define a different expression, "functional English". The two expressions must not be confused. Functional English, which does not bespeak as great a knowledge of English as vocational English does, is required for several classes of visas, such as Subclass 134 - Skill Matching (cl 134.212); Subclass 462 - Work and Holiday (cl 462.215); and Subclass 857 - Regional Sponsored Migration Scheme (cl 857.213(b)(ii)(B)). 10 A suggestion was made that the Departmental guidelines contained in the Procedures Advice Manual (III) confused the expressions "functional English" and "vocational English". The guidelines did no such thing. They addressed two situations: the situation "[i]f the nominee does not have vocational English", and the situation "[i]f the applicant does not [even] have functional English". In substance, the former addresses what the employer would be required to demonstrate in order to show that the appointment was exceptional in a case where the visa applicant does not have vocational English, and the latter addresses what the employer would be required to demonstrate in order to show that the appointment was exceptional where the visa applicant does not even have functional English. In the former case it is stated that even if there were otherwise exceptional circumstances, "the applicant would still be expected to have English ability approaching functional". 11 I turn now to the meaning of the expression "exceptional" in cl 856.213(c) in Sch 2 to the Regulations. 12 The starting point is reg 5.19, which provided in subreg (1): "An employer may apply to the Minister for approval of a nominated position as an approved appointment". (Emphasis in original). In this subregulation the employer is the applicant and it is a "position" that is an "appointment". The employer nominates a position, and if approval is granted the position nominated becomes an "approved appointment". 13 Subregulation (1C) of reg 5.19 provided, relevantly, that the Minister must approve an application if the nominated position is the subject of an employer nomination that met the requirements of subreg (2). Subregulation (2) of reg 5.19 provided that an employer nomination met the requirements of that subregulation if: "(a) the employer nomination is made by an employer in respect of a need for a paid employee in a business: (i) located in Australia; and (ii) operated by that employer; and (b) the work to be performed requires the appointment of a highly skilled person (within the meaning of subregulation (3)); and (c) the appointment will: (i) provide the employee with full-time employment; and (ii) be for a fixed term of at least 3 years; and not subject to any express exclusion of the possibility of renewal; and (d) the Minister is satisfied: (i) that the employer has made, and continues to make, adequate provision for training existing employees in work relevant to the business; or (ii) if the business is newly established, that the employer is making adequate provision for future training of employees in work relevant to the business; and (e) the Minister is satisfied that: (i) an Australian citizen or Australian permanent resident cannot be found who is suitable for the appointment; or (ii) in the circumstances of the case, the employer should not be required to seek a suitable employee in Australia; and (f) the employee is to be employed or engaged in Australia in accordance with the standards for wages and working conditions provided for under relevant Australian legislation and awards."