TIDC
20 TIDC argued the correct approach to s 56(1)(a) and s 55(a) requires the determination of the value of the interest acquired. Section 4 of the Just Terms Act defines "land" to include an interest in land. This definition envisages that there will be an acquisition of interest in land which is less than the estate in fee simple. This definition applies in Pt 3 of the Just Terms Act which concerns entitlement to compensation. "Land" means freehold land or the interest in land acquired under Pt 2 of the Act. It is the "land" or "interest in land" vested in the acquiring authority upon publication of the acquisition notice in the Government Gazette: s 20(1). The argument that "land" in s 56(1) has a different meaning and must mean the freehold interest in physical land only is incorrect.
21 The Court must, under s 55(a) and s 56(1) of the Just Terms Act, determine the amount of compensation for the acquisition of the land by determining the amount that the hypothetical lessor who was willing but not anxious to lease would have accepted and the hypothetical willing but not anxious lessee would have been prepared to pay for the interest in land acquired, that is, the six year lease of land for car parking for 14 car spaces in the case of Lot 12. This was the approach adopted, according to TIDC, by the Court in Prince Alfred Park Reserve Trust v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (1997) 96 LGERA 75 at 82 and 84, and Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales v Hurstville City Council (2001) 112 LGERA 223. Unlike Prince Alfred Park and Hurstville City Council, which both involved the acquisition of leasehold estates in land in public ownership and use, the present case involves two relatively small areas of private land used for airspace, parking, landscaping and access. In this case, it has been possible to assess rental value of comparable commercially leased areas used for car parking. In Prince Alfred Park and Hurstville there was no acceptable evidence of commercial value because the statutory restrictions on use under the community land provisions of the Local Government Act 1993 (in the Hurstville City Council case) and of the Crown Lands Act 1989 (in the Prince Alfred Park case) denied significant commercial exploitation.
22 This means that the valuation in the present case can and should be undertaken by reference to comparison with comparable commercial lease transactions in a conventional manner. That approach is the preferred method; River Bank Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia (1974) 48 ALJR 483 at 484, Redeam Pty Ltd v South Australia Land Commission (1977) 40 LGERA 151 at 156.
(ii) Planning evidence on highest and best use
23 A principle of valuation is to value land in accordance with its highest and best use (see Alan Hyam, The Law Affecting Valuation of Land in Australia (3rd ed), The Federation Press Sydney, 2004, p 122). AMP relied on the evidence of Mr James Harrison, town planner, who swore a statement of evidence dated 11 February 2004 (exhibit U), and two statements in reply dated 26 May 2004 (exhibit V) and 24 November 2005 (exhibit W). TIDC relied on the evidence of Mr Anthony Rowan, town planner, who swore three statements of evidence, dated April 2004 (exhibit 3), September 2005 (exhibit 4) and an amended report of 31 January 2006 dated 1 February 2006 (exhibit 6). Mr Harrison and Mr Rowan produced two joint reports dated 7 June 2004 (exhibit AF) and 12 May 2006 (exhibit AG).
24 The planners Mr Rowan and Mr Harrison gave evidence about what were the highest and best uses of Lot 12 and Lot 3. At the date of acquisition under the Ryde Planning Scheme Ordinance 1979 the land is zoned 3(a) Business General. A wide range of commercial uses are permitted subject to obtaining development consent. These include shops and retail activities up to 1000m2 which are permissible with consent from the Ryde City Council. A key issue to consider is the extent to which the lots should be regarded as separate or part of the Macquarie Centre in determining highest and best use. They have been created as separate lots and Lot 12 in particular could, in theory, be sold.
Rowan evidence
25 In relation to the highest and best use of the property, Mr Rowan stated that the Macquarie Centre, including Lot 12 (and Lot 3), has been fully developed pursuant to the 1998 development consent. At the time of acquisition and under the planning controls existing at that time it was highly improbable that any further extension would be permitted. In his opinion, any development that sought variation of the planning controls, especially the FSR provisions, would be unlikely to be supported by the council or the Department because:
(i) the 1998/9 extension achieved the maximum FSR ratio,
(ii) the traffic and parking implications on the Macquarie Park Corridor,
(iii) the scale of a retail extension would have wider regional implications,
(iv) an increase in floor area would be inconsistent with the provisions of State Environmental Planning Policy No 1 - Development Standards (SEPP 1).