Preliminary hearing not appropriate
27 The application for a preliminary hearing in relation to the production and disclosure relief implicitly entailed an application for an adjournment of the hearing of the present contempt charges.
28 In my opinion, even if the production and disclosure relief were otherwise unobjectionable, a preliminary hearing was unjustified. The relief sought was unnecessary for the disposition of the contempt charges, yet the preliminary application would inevitably occasion the loss of the hearing date fixed for those charges and cause subsequent uncertainty. If the preliminary relief were granted, Alpha would require time for compliance with the orders, the respondents would need to consider any matters revealed in the material produced and frame any relief sought in consequence, and it would be necessary to fix a new hearing date. Any material produced pursuant to the orders might not, in any event, disclose grounds for new charges. If the relief were not granted, the present hearing date for the current contempt charges would be lost for no good reason.
29 The loss of the current hearing date in order to pursue processes of uncertain outcome in an indefinite timeframe was, in my view, a sufficient reason to refuse the application for a preliminary hearing.
30 Further, although it was not the subject of extensive submissions, significant doubt attended the grant of the production and disclosure relief in contempt or other criminal or penal matters.
31 Assuming, as the respondents submitted, that the court had power to make such orders as incidental to its power under s 31 of Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (invoking the powers of the High Court to punish contempts of the High Court under s 24 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)), relevant authority indicated that in a criminal or penalty proceeding, defendants should not be compelled to make admissions or give discovery or production.
32 In Refrigerated Express Lines (A/asia) Pty Ltd v Australian Meat & Livestock Corp (1979) 42 FLR 204 ("Refrigerated Express"), Deane J stated:
It is a well‑established principle that a defendant in proceedings which are solely for the recovery of a pecuniary penalty should not be ordered to disclose information or produce documents which may assist in establishing his liability to the penalty (see, generally, per Isaacs J. in R. v Associated Northern Collieries; Naismith v McGovern and Martin v. Treacher). Even where, as in the present case, the proceedings are not for recovery of a penalty but to prevent and redress civil injury, a party to litigation ought not to be compelled to provide information or produce documents for inspection by the other party if the result thereof will be to provide evidence against him which may be used to establish his liability to a penalty in other proceedings (Mayor of the County Borough of Derby v. Derbyshire County Council).
In the former case, that is to say in a mere action for a penalty, a court should, in the absence of statutory provision to the contrary, refuse to make any order at all against the defendant for discovery or production of documents or provision of information for the reason that the whole and avowed object of the proceedings being the imposition and the recovery of a penalty, an order for the production of documents or provision of information against the defendant can, so far as the prosecutor of the action is concerned, properly have no other intended consequence (see R. v. Associated Northern Collieries). This is a broad and unqualified rule whose origins are apparently to be found in a reluctance on the part of the Court of Chancery to lend the aid of its discovery proceedings to the common informer (see Mexborough (Earl of) v. Whitwood Urban District Council and Heimann v. Commonwealth).
(Footnotes omitted.)
33 The respondents submitted that privilege against self‑incrimination constituted no impediment because, s 187 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) abolished the privilege against self‑incrimination for bodies corporate, and the other respondents had not formally objected pursuant to s 128(1).
34 In Microsoft Corporation v CX Computer Pty Ltd (2002)116 FCR 372 ("Microsoft"), a case which did not involve the imposition of a criminal or civil penalty, Lindgren J stated (at [45]):
Deane J accepted that whereas, in the absence of statutory provision or waiver, a court should not order a defendant to give discovery or to produce documents for inspection in a proceeding which is itself criminal or for the imposition of a civil penalty, ordinarily, in other proceedings the privilege should not excuse a party in limine from giving discovery, and the party should be left to object to producing particular documents for inspection. But his Honour also accepted that it would be appropriate to excuse in limine in the rare case where that course is the only means of protecting against self-incrimination or self-exposure to a civil penalty.
35 In Microsoft, Lindgren J noted that an individual defendant's privilege against self‑incrimination was unqualified save by statute or waiver and, in a criminal case, was a complete answer. His Honour stated (at [39]):
In Reid v Howard (1995) 184 CLR 1 … [t]he High Court held that the privilege against self-incrimination was unqualified except by statute or waiver and provided a complete answer to the application. Reid v Howard was followed in this court by Heerey J in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v J McPhee & Son (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 2) (1997) 77 FCR 217 ; 148 ALR 601 (ACCC v McPhee), a case in which the privilege was held to excuse respondent individuals from any obligation to file witness statements in a proceeding for civil pecuniary penalties. [The officer] relies on these cases, but they are distinguishable: neither was concerned with the question of the giving of discovery in a proceeding such as the present one which is not a proceeding for the imposition of a criminal or civil penalty.
36 Lindgren J stated that under s 187 of the Evidence Act, a company could not assert the privilege on the ground that discovery or production would tend to incriminate its officer, but noted the possibility that the company's compliance should not be compelled if it would require the officer to incriminate himself in making the relevant affidavit of documents.
37 It was unnecessary to determine that issue, however, as it was not established that the relevant officer was the only person who could swear the affidavit on behalf of the company. His Honour concluded that, on the evidence, the officer's privilege against self‑incrimination did not relieve the company from compliance, because he was not satisfied that it would require the officer to engage in self‑incriminating conduct of any kind (at [37]).
38 Lindgren J observed at [40] that the privilege operates to prevent a person from being compelled "to answer any question, or to produce any document or thing, if to do so may tend to bring him into the peril and possibility of being convicted as a criminal".
39 In Television Broadcasts Ltd v Choi Wan Cheung T/A ABM Video [1998] FCA 1318 ("Television Broadcasts"), Lindgren J set aside a notice to produce served on a respondent charged with contempt of court orders. The sole relief sought in the applicants' notice of motion was the imposition of a penalty on the respondent for contempt of court.
40 Lindgren J referred to O 33 r 12(1) of the Federal Court Rules and observed that it had been "interpreted as giving a notice to produce the same coercive effect as a subpoena for production and making compliance mandatory unless production is excused by the Court: CCOM Pty Ltd v Jiejing Pty Ltd (1992) 37 FCR 1 at 3; Trade Practices Commission v Abbco Iceworks Pty Ltd (1994) 52 FCR 96 at 132".
41 Lindgren J noted that O 33 r 11(1) of the Federal Court Rules provided that where the court by subpoena or otherwise ordered a person to produce any document or thing, if a person made a substantiated sufficient lawful objection to production on grounds of privilege, production should no be compelled except for the purpose of ruling on the objection.
42 Lindgren J stated:
In this case the sole object of the applicants' motion is to impose a penalty for contempt and the sole object of their notice to produce is to compel production of documents "for the purpose of evidence" to aid them in achieving that result. I think that in accordance with the authorities the notice should be set aside: The King v Associated Northern Collieries (1910) 11 CLR 738 at 741-743; Pyneboard Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1983) 152 CLR 328 at 335-336; Refrigerated Express Lines (Australasia) Pty Ltd v Australian Meat and Livestock Corporation (1979) 42 FLR 204 (FCA/Deane J) at 207-208; Master Builders Association of New South Wales v Plumbers and Gasfitters Employees' Union of Australia (1987) 14 FCR 479 at 483.
Counsel for the applicants submits that the documents should be produced to the Court at this stage and that claims for privilege against self-incrimination should be made in respect of the individual paragraphs in the notice to produce (there are ten such paragraphs). He refers to the principle that in claiming the privilege against being compelled to answer questions in the witness box, the claim must be made in respect of each question rather than en globo. However, I think that the position is different here. In the ordinary case of oral testimony the answering of some questions may not incriminate and may merely relate to the issues involved in the substantive proceeding in which the evidence is given. In the present case, however, the only purpose of production of the documents is to aid in the imposition of a penalty for contempt of court, since this is the only purpose of the applicants' motion.
43 His Honour noted that the respondent, in her affidavit, put a positive case, as well as denying breach of the relevant orders, but it was not yet known whether testing of the respondent's evidence should be permitted. It was therefore inappropriate to require production of documents which would be held by the court until the respondent's evidence on the hearing of the contempt motion was identified, and pending a decision as to whether she should be compelled to produce documents to assist in testing that evidence. Lindgren J concluded that:
In the circumstances, it cannot be said at present that the applicants are entitled to production of the documents on the hearing "for the purpose of evidence"; cf O33 r12(1).
44 Lindgren J concluded that a notice to produce should not be used to compel production of documents for the purpose of evidence to aid in achieving the imposition of a penalty for contempt, as it was premature, even in relation to pending charges.
45 The reasoning in Television Broadcasts indicates that in the ordinary course, an alleged contemnor would be compelled to produce documents for the purpose of gathering evidence to support future possible charges. While in the present case the parties made no submissions on whether the alleged contempt was civil or criminal, contempt charges are always of a grave and penal nature, and the application for the production and disclosure orders did not appear soundly based. The unavailability to corporations of the privilege against self‑incrimination does not resolve difficulties posed by the antecedent question of whether the relevant orders be made.
46 Hearne v Street,on which the respondents relied, is not, in my opinion, authority for making wide‑ranging preliminary orders for compulsory production and inspection of documents, and a statement of disclosure aimed at eliciting evidence of further contempts by charged parties.
47 In Hearne v Street, while the answers to the interrogatories exposed much of the factual material relied on in the contempt proceeding, as the High Court plurality (Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ) observed, the interrogatories were not ordered for that purpose and the information was obtained in an "adventitious" way (at [77]).
48 In summary, a preliminary hearing would entail indefinite delay and uncertain consequences. It was unnecessary to the determination of the current charges for which the present hearing date was fixed. Further, no precedent for the production and disclosure relief in the context of pending contempt charges, whether on a preliminary basis or otherwise, was identified.
49 In the circumstances, I refused the application for a preliminary hearing.