19 There was no issue raised about the retroactive effect of the alteration of the terms of condition 8202. Although the relevant change occurred after the applicant's visa had been issued, the relevant non-compliance of condition 8202 occurred at a time when the amended Act had come into force. In any event, the retrospectivity issue has been dealt with previously by this Court in Zou v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 1126 and Ciddeque v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 1226.
20 The cancellation of the applicant's visa was mandatory under the Act, the regulations, and condition 8202 as it stood at the time of cancellation. Counsel for the respondent described the provisions as essentially "strict liability" provisions at one point in the hearing. How these provisions operate was discussed by Emmett J in Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Nguyen [2002] FCA 460 at [7] - [8]:
Section 116(1)(b) of the Act relevantly provides that the Minister may cancel a visa if he or she is satisfied that its holder has not complied with a condition of the visa. Under s 116(3), if the Minister may cancel a visa under s 116(1), the Minister must do so if there exist prescribed circumstances in which a visa must be cancelled. Regulation 2.43(2)(b) relevantly provides that, for s 116(3) of the Act, the circumstances in which the Minister must cancel a visa are that the Minister is satisfied that the visa holder has not complied with condition 8202.
For the purposes of review of the decision of the Minister's delegate, the Tribunal exercised the power of the Minister. Accordingly, if the Tribunal was satisfied that the applicant had not complied with condition 8202, s 116(3) required that the visa be cancelled. The Tribunal, in its reasons, recorded that the circumstances of the cancellation of the applicant's visa fell within the ambit of s 116(3) and r 2.43.
21 Despite the mandatory effect of these provisions, the Tribunal in this matter considered whether the applicant's non-compliance with condition 8202 was due to circumstances beyond his control. Counsel for the respondent suggested that the Tribunal may have thought, incorrectly, that the principles discussed by Madgwick J in Shrestha v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 359 were applicable. That matter concerned the previous form of condition 8202, and was set aside by consent by a Full Court of this Court. The consideration by the Tribunal of these matters in relation to the new form of condition 8202 was discussed by Emmett J in Nguyen (supra) at [11]:
I consider that the Tribunal based its decision on a misapprehension. The matter was not governed by the decision in Shrestha's Case. Section 116(3) is clearly mandatory in using the word "must". Section 116(1), on the other hand, uses the word "may". There can be no discretion for the Minister, or the decision maker making a decision as the Minister's delegate, as to the cancellation of a visa where s 116(3) applies. The Tribunal found that the applicant had not satisfied condition 8202, as that condition was imposed by Item 4 of the schedule to the Overseas Student Act. Accordingly, the Tribunal was bound to cancel the visa.
22 The matter was considered more recently by Gyles J in Iftikhar v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1123, where he said, at [8]:
It is, to say the least, arguable that the Tribunal fell into error in taking the view that the approach taken by Madgwick J in Shrestha was still available for use by decision makers in the appropriate case. However, if there were an error, it was an error to the advantage of the applicant. It seems to me that the Tribunal in par [27] did direct its mind to the principle applied in that decision and, despite the valiant efforts of the counsel for the applicant, I cannot see any arguable basis upon which that principle, even if it exists, could apply in the present case.
23 It follows that in the present circumstances, the Tribunal was obliged to affirm the cancellation decision. If anything, an error of law in favour of the respondent, of the type described by Gyles J in Iftikhar (supra), was made by the Tribunal in considering the circumstances of the applicant.
24 It is unnecessary to consider the operation of s 474. I order that the application be dismissed, and the applicant pay the respondent's costs.
I certify that the preceding twenty-four (24) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Moore.