AKD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

The Federal Circuit Court proceedings 19 The appellant applied for a review of the Tribunal's decision, and relied on the following grounds of review: 1. The Applicant is a citizen of Bangladesh. 2. The Applicant claimed that Australia owed protection obligations in respect of him. 3. That the decision of the Second Respondent … was affected by legal error. 4. Relevant information not considered. 20 The primary Judge found that there was no jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal and dismissed the application for judicial review. His Honour observed that the submissions of the appellant did not address the findings of the Tribunal, and that the real complaint of the appellant was that the Tribunal did not believe him. 21 His Honour continued: 37. He approached this hearing as if it were a review of the decision itself, rather than a judicial review trying to determine a jurisdictional error. This mistake by the Applicant is understandable, given that these sorts of differences really are lawyers' differences and laypersons, especially those for whom English is not their first language, would have great difficulty understanding the difference. 38. The problem here for the Applicant is that he is really seeking a merits review. He has no grounds upon which to find an error by the Tribunal. 39. The Applicant has fixated on conclusions that have been made by the Tribunal, has put together other evidence and now says that the Tribunal should have believed him. He has consistently asked this Court to simply just review his matter, to give him another turn and that he thinks that this time a Tribunal would definitely believe him, if I were to give him "another go". 40. That is not what I am here to do. My job is to decide whether or not there has been a jurisdictional error established. In this case, there has simply been no jurisdictional error. 41. When I asked the Applicant for any submissions in reply, he spoke in English about the problem that he had with interpretation, and that a lot of the things that he was trying to say were not interpreted properly. 42. This seemed to me to be a matter that had not been raised before and it certainly has not been particularised at all. The explanations or clarifications that the Applicant has given in his written submission again don't detract from the conclusions made by the Tribunal. 43. There was still vagueness on the part of the Applicant but that was probably attributable to his not really understanding the purpose of the hearing. 44. Notwithstanding that there has to be certain liberties given by the Tribunal because of the fact that we are dealing with a person who does not have English as their first language, and who is making an application for protection, the overall evidence given to the Tribunal was such that the Tribunal was of the view that they could not accept the evidence of the Applicant. 45. Whether I would do so or not, is not the question. The fact is that the Tribunal has said what it is that it has concluded and such a view was indeed open on the evidence before it. 46. For those reasons, I cannot find that there is any jurisdictional error. 47. I will now address the Applicant formally. I have gone through the decision of the Tribunal. I have looked at all of the things that you have said today and especially what you have said in your written submissions. Whilst you may be able to be upset that the Tribunal did not believe you, that conclusion was a conclusion that was open to the Tribunal. If the conclusion was open to the Tribunal, then there is no jurisdictional error. 48. Therefore, if there is no jurisdictional error, then I must dismiss this application.

The grounds of appeal 22 The appellant seeks to rely on the following grounds of appeal: 1. The Administrative Appeal Tribunal's decision affected by jurisdictional error. Particulars: The Administrative appeal tribunal failed to consider a claims or integer of claims and failed to consider whether the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution in the reasonable foreseeable future upon return to his own country of origin. The Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make such a decision because its reasonable satisfaction was not arrived in accordance with the provisions of the Migration Act 1958. The Tribunal denied the applicant procedural fairness by reaching conclusions that the applicant is not a credible witness and his claims were implausible. The Tribunal member in his decision records did not ask conventions relation questions whether the applicant had a fear of persecution in his own country of residence. 2. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal made findings without evidence. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal rejected the applicant's evidence before the Tribunal and failed to believe the applicant as a credible witness, such failure constituted a breach of s 425 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). Particulars: The tribunal in the decision records and interview failed to consider any evidence put by the applicant as credible, believable without any evidence. The honourable member has discredited the evidence by reason of the applicant's inability to remember or recall various issues at the time of hearing. This is disputed, this information was available and dismissed without fair hearing. 23 The appellant seeks the following orders: 1. The order of Federal Circuit Court of Australia dated on 30 October 2017 is set aside. 2. An order that the First Respondent pay the applicant's costs of these proceedings. 3. Such further or other orders as the Court seem fit.

Consideration 24 The appellant has not filed written submissions in support of his grounds of appeal but made oral submissions at the hearing on 16 May 2018. The appellant made the following statements: There were errors in the Tribunal's decisions. The Tribunal should not have thought that the appellant would be safe if he relocated to another district in Bangladesh and the appellant did not understand how the Tribunal could make this wrong decision. The appellant did not have documentation with him when he came to Australia because he arrived by boat. The appellant asked his brother in Bangladesh to get some documentation for him, but his brother was killed as a result of doing this. The appellant would not have come to Australia if he was safe in Bangladesh. The fact that appellant's brother had had problems in Bangladesh meant that the appellant would also have problems if he returned. 25 At the hearing the Minister responded to the two points of substance made by the appellant, being the Tribunal's consideration of whether the appellant would be safe if he relocated and the relevance of the request for documentation from his brother. The Minister submitted: As to the issue of relocation, the Tribunal did not have to go so far as to consider whether the appellant would be safe if he relocated because the Tribunal had simply found that there was no risk of harm to the appellant. As to the issue of information to be provided by the appellant's brother, any such documentation would not be admissible in this appeal as it was not before the Tribunal. 26 I do not accept the Minister's submission on the issue of relocation. Contrary to what was said by the Minister, at [48] of the record of decision the Tribunal found that the appellant would not be at risk of harm from JI because of his attempts to distance himself from the party. However, the Tribunal did accept at [50] that the appellant would face a real risk of persecution at the hands of the AL if he returned to his home district. At [51], the Tribunal accepted that there were substantial grounds for believing that there was a real risk that the appellant would suffer significant harm in his home district at the hands of the AL. The Tribunal then went on to consider the likelihood of harm if the appellant relocated, on the basis of the appellant's circumstances and the country information available to the Tribunal. Ultimately, the Tribunal found that it would be reasonable for the appellant to relocate to a different area where he would not be at risk. 27 Notwithstanding this, I do not consider that the appellant has substantiated his claim that the Tribunal's decision was wrong because of its conclusion that it was reasonable for the appellant to relocate. Further, the appellant has not demonstrated any error on the part of the primary Judge in finding that there was no jurisdictional error by the Tribunal. At the hearing of the appeal, the statements by the appellant as to the error on the part of the Tribunal appeared to be an attempt to have the Court reconsider the factual findings of the Tribunal regarding whether the appellant would be safe is he relocated to a different district. I am not permitted to engage in that manner of review in this appeal. 28 Further, in written submissions, the Minister identified three perceived problems with the appellant's grounds of appeal: The grounds do not assert the existence of appellable error in the primary decision, but refer only to the Tribunal's decision. The appellant did not rely on these grounds in the Federal Circuit Court and therefore requires leave to raise them in this appeal. The grounds are template grounds which are so broad and unparticularised in nature that they do not disclose the existence of any discernible error. 29 The Minister submitted that the appeal was liable to be dismissed for these reasons alone, but nonetheless proceeded in written submissions to respond to the substantive grounds of appeal "cast in their best light". 30 In relation to ground 1 and the relevant "particulars", the Minister submitted: Having regard to the Tribunal's record of decision, there was no reasonable basis to believe that the Tribunal overlooked any essential component of the appellant's claims. The appellant's submission that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make its decision because its reasonable satisfaction was not arrived in accordance with the provisions of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) was misconceived and otherwise vague. A finding by the Tribunal that an applicant is not credible, or a finding that an applicant's claims are implausible, does not result in there having been a denial of procedural fairness by the Tribunal. The Tribunal had no obligation to ask any particular questions of the applicant relating to the Convention and, in any event, the Tribunal's record of decision demonstrated that the Tribunal explored at length whether the appellant had a genuine fear of persecution. 31 With to ground 2 and its particulars, the Minister submitted: The appellant provided no basis on which he asserted that the Tribunal made findings without evidence. Section 425 of the Act requires the Tribunal to invite an applicant to a hearing before it and that invitation must be real and meaningful. In these circumstances, the appellant was invited to and attended a hearing at the Tribunal. Section 425 of the Act is not breached because the Tribunal rejects evidence or otherwise does not accept the claims of an applicant. The Tribunal is not obliged to accept the evidence that it put to it. Further, the Tribunal is not required to be presented with evidence contradicting a claim by an applicant before holding that a particular assertion is not made out. The Tribunal's decision did not appear, on the face of the record of decision, to turn on the appellant's lack of recall of any particular matters. In any event, the weight the Tribunal puts on such considerations is a matter entirely for the Tribunal. 32 In my view, the grounds of appeal should fail for the reasons given by the Minister. They do not disclose any discernible error by the primary Judge, nor of the Tribunal. Further, these grounds were not agitated before the Federal Circuit Court and I do not consider that it would be appropriate to grant the appellant leave to rely on these fresh grounds of appeal, largely because they do not have any reasonable prospects of success (see VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158; (2004) 238 FCR 588 at [46], [48]; BTM15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 888 at [21]), for the reasons identified in the substantive submissions of the Minister. 33 It is therefore appropriate to dismiss the appeal with costs. I certify that the preceding thirty-three (33) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Collier.