Proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court
21 The appellant sought review of the decision of the Tribunal in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The appellant was self-represented at the time of filing the application for review and later sought leave to file an amended application. The primary Judge noted that the "grounds of review [contained in the amended application] were expansive and combined claims of fact and alleged legal error". At [10] his Honour observed that the key issue in contention concerned the finding by the Tribunal that "the Applicant is not permitted to change his nominated skilled occupation during the processing of the visa application."
22 The primary Judge noted that, to resolve this question, he was guided by the principles in Patel v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 1220; (2011) 198 FCR 62 (Patel) and Pavuluri v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 502; (2014) 221 FCR 74 (Pavuluri) on one hand, and the distinguishing features of the facts in the current matter on the other.
23 In particular, the primary Judge considered Patel at [53]-[61] and Pavuluri at [33] and [46]-[49]. His Honour noted the following observation of Mortimer J in Pavuluri at [47]:
In my opinion, those provisions cannot have the kind of operation which the appellants seek to give them in this case, which is as some freestanding opportunity for a visa applicant to alter information on a visa after an application is lodged, where the alteration and new information will improve the likelihood of the visa being granted, because the visa applicant has subsequently realised a problem existed with the application as lodged.
24 The primary Judge also observed at [34] of the primary judgment that Patel and Pavuluri were binding, however at [36]-[40] referred to the following features of this case:
36. First, the Tribunal accepted (and the Minister has never denied) that the Applicant changed his nominated skilled occupation precisely, and only, because of the advice given to him by the 'relevant assessing authority'.
37. Secondly, for both of the "nominated skilled occupations" the formal qualifications accepted by the assessing authority were identical. It was not as if the Applicant was, as in Pavuluri, changing occupations from "finance manager" to "market research analyst." Here, the skilled occupations are both in ICT (information and communication technology), and the formal qualifications accepted in each instance were identical.
38. Thirdly, accepting everything that Mortimer J said in Pavuluri at [47], nonetheless, the form made available by the Department for it to be kept advised of "changes in circumstances", in my view, is potentially misleading. On its face, it informs the reader that if the information to be "updated" relates to an "email address, residential address" and the like "do not use this form, instead select the relevant form from the Update us list."
39. The Form goes on to specify that the reader/Applicant "Give details of the information in this application that is no longer current." This is precisely what the applicant here did. However, the Form gives no warning or caution, at least as far as I can see from the Form, as reproduced in the Court Book, that even if "change in circumstances" information is provided, that this information cannot and will not affect the detail of things like the "nominated skilled occupation" in the original application. In this sense, especially having regard to the persons who are intended to use such Forms as provided by the Department, and who would not usually be expected to trawl through judgments of this Court or the Federal Court to check as to how such forms are interpreted, as I say, in my view, the Form is potentially misleading.
40. Put another way: absent any caution or warning that any "change in circumstances" information will not necessarily affect, in any relevant way, the original information provided in the Application before the Department/Delegate/Tribunal, in my view, a reasonable "bystander" (or reasonable Applicant) would reasonably expect that any information provided via this particular Form would (or will) be used, or properly considered, by the appropriate person or body.
25 In light of these distinctions, the primary Judge concluded at [41]:
The view that I have just expressed regarding the said "Form" was not actually argued before me. It may be that the three factual distinctions to which I have referred, if/when considered by a superior Court, are sufficient to warrant judicial intervention. However, in all of the circumstances of the present Application, until there is some relevant review of the matters I have raised, I am bound by the comments of Robertson J in Patel and equally so by Mortimer J in Pavuluri, such that the Application cannot succeed albeit that, on one view, it might reasonably be considered to be a "near run thing" to have succeeded. The concerns I have raised are sufficient, in my view, to warrant an Order for each party to pay their own costs.