Relevant principles
7 The relevant principles in determining this application were conveniently summarised by the Respondents in their submissions as follows.
8 Pursuant to r 16.02(1) of the Rules, a pleading must (relevantly) state the material facts on which a party relies that are necessary to give the opposing party fair notice of the case to be made against that party at trial.
9 Pursuant to r 16.02(2) of the Rules, a pleading must not:
(a) be evasive or ambiguous;
(b) be likely to cause prejudice, embarrassment or delay in the proceeding;
(c) fail to disclose a reasonable cause of action or defence; or
(d) otherwise be an abuse of the process of the Court.
10 In the context of a claim for misuse of confidential information, it has often been said that it is vital that the information which is said to be confidential is defined with precision, and the disclosure or use of that information which is said to constitute a misuse of that information is specified with particularity. In Pioneer Concrete Services Limited v Galli (1985) VR 675 (Pioneer) at 711, the Court observed:
What is important in the present case, as in all other cases of this kind, is that the court should be able, both, to define the precise nature of the confidential information which it is sought to protect and to identify with some particularity the disclosure or use which is alleged against the defendants.
11 One of the reasons the courts insist on such specificity is to avoid the bringing of actions that are merely speculative in character, and to prevent a former employer from using a generally worded claim to stifle the right of an employee to use the skill and experience of that employee (or their "know-how"): see Creative Brands Pty Ltd v Franklin [2001] VSC 338 (Creative Brands) at [16] per Warren J; Liberty Financial Pty Ltd v Scott (No 4) (2005) 11 VR 629 (Liberty Financial) at [12]-[13] per Harper J.
12 In Reinforced Plastics Applications (Swansea) Limited v Swansea Plastics & Engineering Co Limited [1979] FSR 182 at 182, Whitford J identified the risk of abuse arising from a generally worded claim for misuse of confidential information as follows:
It is, I think, a matter of great concern in relation to confidential information cases that actions should not be brought which are no more than speculative in character. It is altogether too easy when employees leave and are employed by a rival firm to harass that rival firm upon the basis that the employees who have left the plaintiffs and joined them have taken away trade secrets of great value, and to bring an action which may involve the expenditure of an enormous amount of time and money and include disclosure of information which is going to be alleged to be confidential on either side with consequent troubles and worries. It is not really to be contemplated that proceedings of this kind should be allowed to go forward on nothing more than a speculative basis; and, unless the plaintiff can show that he has some basis for a reasonable belief in his assertion that the defendants are making use of his confidential information, then the action can only be characterised as speculative and fishing, and ought not, in my judgment, to be allowed to proceed. There must be something more than a mere assertion.
13 If the claim amounts in substance to little more than that the defendants left their former employer, established their own business, and are now competing in a market place against their former employer that will not be sufficient to make out even an arguable case of misuse of confidential information: Creative Brands at [22].
14 Even where there is some attempt to identify the information, if it is merely expressed in wide and general terms, it can still be used as "an instrument of oppression or harassment against a defendant": Ocular Sciences Ltd v Aspect Vision Care Ltd [1997] RPC 289 (Ocular Sciences) at 360 per Laddie J. In Ocular Sciences, Laddie J explained why a failure to give proper particulars of such a claim is "a particularly damaging abuse of process":
The requirement of particularity may impose a heavy burden on the plaintiff. In a case where the plaintiff has a large quantity of confidential information and much of it has been taken by the defendant, the obligation to identify all of it might involve a great deal of work and time. ... The normal approach of the court is that if a plaintiff wishes to seek relief against a defendant for misuse of confidential information it is his duty to ensure that the defendant knows what information is in issue. This is not only for the reasons set out by Edmund Davies LJ in Zink (John) & Co Ltd v Lloyds Bank Ltd [1973] RPC 717 but for at least two other reasons. First, the plaintiff usually seeks an injunction to restrain the defendant from using its confidential information. Unless the confidential information is properly identified, an injunction in such terms is of uncertain scope and may be difficult to enforce ... Secondly, the defendant must know what he has to meet. He may wish to show that the items and information relied on by the plaintiff are matters of public knowledge. His ability to defend himself will be compromised if the plaintiff can rely on matters of which no proper warning was given. It is for all these reasons that failure to give proper particulars may be a particular damaging abuse of process.
15 The Applicants accepted that there can be no doubt as to the soundness of the Full Court's statement in Pioneer that, in a case of this nature, the confidential information must be identified with precision: Pioneer at 709-712. However, the Applicants submit that this statement must be understood within the context in which it was given. The Applicants submit that in Pioneer the pleading contained only general descriptions of the confidential information which was in dispute, and this, in the Applicants submission, cannot be said to be the case here.
16 The Applicants submit that Laddie J in Ocular Sciences emphasised the importance of identifying the confidential information in dispute. However, the Applicants submit that Ocular Sciences is in a different context to the present case. The Applicants submit that the observations of Laddie J take place within the context of a matter where his Honour described the confidential information that was before him as encompassing "more or less everything": Ocular Sciences at 361.
17 The Applicants submit that the context in which the confidential information was pleaded in Creative Brands may also be distinguished from the present case. The Applicants submit that in Creative Brands the alleged confidential information was not identified at all, let alone with sufficient particularity: Creative Brands at [12]-[14] and [22]. The Applicants submit that despite this, leave was granted to allow the plaintiff in that case to re-plead.
18 The Applicants submit that in relation to Liberty Financial, that case must also be understood in context. In that case, the pleading being considered by Harper J had been produced after the plaintiff had obtained an Anton Piller order from the Federal Court of Australia (Court) and after the plaintiff had had the benefit of some discovery. This, it was submitted, was to be contrasted with the present case, where the relevant confidential information is an identified body of information relating to a specific product. The Applicants submit, that despite Harper J rejecting the pleading as insufficient, leave was granted to allow the plaintiff in that case to re-plead.
19 The Applicants, with the qualifications which I have identified above, substantially agreed with the Respondents' summary of relevant principles.