Putting it another way, it is a term of each offer that it does not remain open after the first to occur of those times. According to ordinary usage, that is not a withdrawal of the offer. Rather, it is a termination of the offer by lapse of time, in the first case, and by the occurrence of a condition, in the second case.
54 However, Aevum and the Commission contended, in effect, that s 1019G(2) should be construed so as to require that an offer to which Division 5A applies must remain open for at least one month. They say that s 1019G(2) is ambiguous, in so far as it does not clearly state that effect and, accordingly, resort may be had to extrinsic materials to resolve the ambiguity. In particular, they draw attention to the Explanatory Memorandum circulated in connection with the Financial Services Reform Amendment Bill 2003, pursuant to which Division 5A was inserted in the Act. That Explanatory Memorandum relevantly said the following in relation to Division 5A:
'Section 1019G introduces a timeframe for which offers are to remain open (at least one month but not more than 12 months). In addition, this provision specifies the way in which an offer can be withdrawn.'
55 It is important to bear in mind, when construing a statute, that the task of the Court is to determine what is meant by the words used by Parliament, not what Parliament intended to say. Even an explicit statement of intention by the Minister in the speech on the second reading of the bill for an enactment cannot prevail over the words actually used in the statute subsequently enacted. It may be that, through oversight or inadvertence, the intention of Parliament fails to be translated into the text of a statute. However unfortunate that may be when it happens, the task of the Court remains to give effect to the statute according to its ordinary meaning. Extrinsic material cannot be used to construe a statute unless the construction of the provision suggested by that material is reasonably open: Re Bolton; Ex parte Beane (1987) 162 CLR 514 at 518.
56 On the other hand, the propriety of departing from the literal interpretation of a statute is not confined to situations where literal interpretation leads to an extraordinary, capricious, irrational or obscure result. It extends to any situation in which, for good reason, the operation of the statute on a literal reading does not conform to the legislative intent as ascertained from the provisions of the statute, including the policy that may be discerned from those provisions. Once a Court concludes that the literal or grammatical meaning of a provision does not conform to the legislative purpose, as ascertained from the statute as a whole, including the policy that may be discerned from its provisions, the Court is entitled to give effect to that purpose by addition to, omission from or clarification of, the particular provision: Saraswati v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 1 at 22.
57 The question is whether s 1019G(2) prohibits an offer from containing a term that the offer will lapse after a specified period of time of less that one month or upon the occurrence, within one month, of a particular condition, if not accepted before that time. There is nothing in s 1019G(2) that says, in express terms, that an offer may not terminate for one of the other reasons indicated above, such as rejection, supervening incapacity or death. Nor is there anything in s 1019G(2) that, in terms, restricts the right of an offeror to specify a time within which an offer must be accepted, other than the provision of s 1019G(1). In particular, there is nothing that says expressly that an offer must remain open for any minimum period of time, such as one month.
58 However, there are indicators in the Corporations Act that suggest that, when s 1019G(2) refers to an offer being withdrawn, the intention is to refer to an offer ceasing to remain open. That is to say, the underlying assumption of s 1019G(2), in the light of the other provisions to which I shall refer, may be that an offer must remain open for at least one month.
59 For example, Chapter 6 of the Corporations Act deals with takeovers. Part 6.4 deals with the formulation of takeover offers and Division 3 of Part 6.4 deals with the offer period. Under s 624(1) the offers under a takeover bid must remain open for the period stated in the offer. That period must last for at least one month and not more than 12 months. That provision recognises the importance of an offeree having a reasonable opportunity to consider an offer before deciding whether or not to accept the offer. It assumes that a period of at least one month is necessary for that purpose.
60 The same assumption is made in s 766A of the Corporations Act, which corresponds with s 12BAB of the ASIC Act. Thus, s 766A(1)(f) provides that, for the purposes of Chapter 7 of the Corporations Act, a person provides a financial service if the person engages in conduct of a kind prescribed by regulations made for the purposes of that provision. Under s 766A(2)(b), the regulations may set out the circumstances in which persons are taken to provide, or are taken not to provide, a financial service. Regulation 7.1.33C, made under the Corporations Act, came into force on 8 April 2003. It was repealed with effect from 14 January 2004, the day on which Division 5A came into force. Regulation 7.1.33C was relevantly identical to reg 2C made under the ASIC Act. It is clear that the legislature contemplated that, when Division 5A commenced, there would be no need to provide any further for the regulation of the deemed provision of a financial service by reason of making an unsolicited offer that does not remain open for a period of at least one month.
61 Thus, the policy that underlies s 624 of the Corporations Act is to be gleaned from the scheme of the definition of financial service for the purposes of s 766A(1) of the Corporations Act. That policy is that offers to buy shares are to remain open for at least one month. It is possible to see good reason why such a policy should be applied to an offer to which Division 5A applies. Such offers should be required to remain open for a minimum period of one month in order to afford the offeree an adequate opportunity to consider the merits of an offer and to obtain advice in relation to the offer.
62 There is good reason why s 1019G(2) should be construed in accordance with that policy of the Corporations Act, and the same policy in the ASIC Act, so as to provide that an offer to which Division 5A applies must remain open for at least one month. That is to say, s 1019G(2) is to be construed as requiring that an offer may not close within one month of the date of offer. The effect of s 1019G(4) is that a purported earlier termination of an offer would be ineffective. It would follow that the provision in the offer document purporting to provide for close of the offer, at the earlier of the two times specified, is ineffective.
63 The claim by Aevum was that National Exchange contravened s 1019G(2) by representing that the offer would be withdrawn upon the earlier of the two times specified. Even if there were such a representation as alleged, that would not be a contravention of s 1019G(2). Any prohibition in the section is against withdrawal, not against making representations. Of course, making a false or misleading representation may attract some other remedy, but it would not attract the remedy of s 1019G(4), which provides that a purported withdrawal contrary to s 1019G(2) is ineffective.
64 Aevum also contended that the provision in the offer document that, if the offer closes earlier than 10 November 2004, National Exchange will place a notice in The Australian newspaper as soon as practical, contemplates a withdrawal otherwise than by sending a withdrawal document as provided in s 1019G(3). However, termination of an offer by lapse of time or occurrence of a condition is not a withdrawal of the offer. The placing of a notice in The Australian newspaper would not be a withdrawal. It is simply a method whereby National Exchange will notify offerees that the offers have terminated, by lapse of time or occurrence of a condition, according to the terms of the offers themselves.
65 There was no representation in the offer document that the offer could be withdrawn in a particular way. Even if there were a representation to that effect, that would not be a contravention of s 1019G(3). Further, any prohibition in s 1019G(3) is against withdrawal except in the way prescribed in the section. Section 1019G(4) provides that a purported withdrawal contrary to the section is ineffective.
66 The Commission also complained that the offer document did not contain a statement to the effect that, the offer would be withdrawn by sending a withdrawal document to the offeree, and that such withdrawal would generally not be within one month of the date of offer. In fact, as can be seen in Schedule 1, the offer document contained a statement almost precisely in those terms. The substance of the Commission's complaint is similar to that made by Aevum. The Commission contended that, by providing that the offer would remain open only until the earlier of the two times specified, there was a failure to comply with s 1019I(2)(e). Whatever might be the effect of s 1019G(2), there was no failure by the offer document to comply with s 1019I(2)(e).
67 Since I have concluded that there has been a contravention of s 1019E, it is not strictly necessary to form a final view concerning the operation of s 1019G(2). However, I consider, on balance, that the construction of s 1019G(2) contended for by Aevum and the Commission is to be preferred. Nevertheless, it would clearly be desirable for the legislation to be amended to provide, in express terms, that an offer must remain open for at least one month, if that is the intention.