The disqualification order
14 The stay now sought by Mr Adler would have wider effect than the stay sought in the original notice of motion. It would permit Mr Adler to manage Adler Corporation in all its activities, as distinct from for the limited purposes of prosecution of the appeal and satisfaction of the penalty and compensation orders. The latter purpose should be fulfilled by 6 December. The appeal has been fixed for hearing commencing on 17 March next year, but it will occupy a significant time and realistically the result is unlikely to be known until the middle of the year.
15 ASIC had no objection to a stay as sought in the original notice of motion pending determination of the appeal, but opposed the wider stay.
16 The evidence in support of the wider stay was through the affidavit of Ms Colleen Platford of Mr Adler's solicitors. She said that she had been informed by Mr Adler that, after seeking appropriate advice, he had been "working towards reorganising his affairs so that his business affairs and activities can be conducted without involving him in the management of a corporation", and that in relation to Adler Corporation he was "considering the various available structures including a partnership structure through which the affairs, which would have previously been carried out by Adler Corporation can be conducted". She continued -
"I am informed by the First Appellant [Mr Adler] and verily believe that Adler Corporation is the entity through which almost all of the First Appellant's business activities are conducted. The restructuring of the affairs of Adler Corporation into a partnership will involve, I am informed, a significant re-structuring of the First Appellant's structures and financial arrangements and the possibility of the transfer of legal ownership in a number of assets to the partnership. This restructuring will incur considerable costs and may have tax consequences. In the event that the First Appellant is successful in his appeal against Justice Santow's judgment, the First Appellant will be in a position of desiring to re-transfer such assets in a relatively short period of time. For this reason that [sic] the First Appellant seeks a stay of Justice Santow's order disqualifying him from managing a corporation in so far as it relates to Adler Corporation only."
17 Santow J made serious findings against Mr Adler. His Honour considered that Mr Adler's conduct was designed to advance his own interests and those of Adler Corporation, to the detriment of the companies to which he owed obligations as a director or officer, and found that his "semi-covert by-passing of proper corporate safeguards" and failure even at the end of 2000 fully and frankly to disclose his involvement in what had occurred reflected a consciousness of impropriety on his part. These findings are caught up in the challenges in the appeal, but they can not be overlooked in considering how matters should stand pending the hearing of the appeal.
18 Mr Adler had submitted to Santow J that any disqualification order should permit him to be involved in the management of Adler Corporation and its wholly owned subsidiaries. His Honour had not agreed, seeing the protection of the public as prevailing over Mr Adler's private interests; his Honour said in his reasons of 30 May -
"Here, concededly, Mr Adler will be impeded in his field of activity, which includes financial consultancy and investment, including joint ventures, but that is the very area where he has committed the relevant contraventions. That puts in stark relief the need to make the public protective purpose paramount over Mr Adler's private interests, though it be the case that disqualifying him may require him to be a passive investor with no seat on the board or role in management. Whether that of itself prevents him investing is a matter for him and not a matter for the court to enter into. To the extent that Adler Corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiaries are already engaged in ongoing financial or business activity, should a disqualification order be made against Mr Adler he will simply have to find others to carry on that activity or manage it, independently of him, on the basis that he must , in the public interest, be excluded wholly from that activity. That is, at least until such time as a court is persuaded to grant leave pursuant to s206G, if it be so persuaded in light of the then known facts."
19 What his Honour said is also caught up in the challenges in the appeal, one of the grounds of appeal being that his Honour erred in failing to qualify any disqualification order in the manner suggested. As a general principle, however, the protective purpose of a disqualification order, and its precedence over the private interests of the person disqualified, should be accepted for this application.
20 The affidavit of Ms Platford provides scant explanation of the affairs of Adler Corporation, or of an unacceptable burden on Mr Adler if the disqualification order is not stayed.
21 From other material before me it seems that Adler Corporation carries on business in part as trustee of a family trust of which the beneficiaries are Mr Adler, his wife Mrs Lynda Adler and their children, and in part not as trustee. A letter from Mr Adler's solicitors says that "the vast majority of Adler Corporation's business involves trading in equity or property investments". What the business activities are, and with whom Adler Corporation has dealings, are otherwise not exposed. It seems clear that third parties stand to be affected by Mr Adler's management of Adler Corporation if that management continues until the determination of the appeal.
22 What Mr Adler intends to do remains uncertain, six months after Santow J's first reasons and three months after the disqualification order. I do not consider that it is satisfactorily explained why (the prospect of) adopting a partnership structure is necessary for him to exclude himself from the management of Adler Corporation pending the hearing of the appeal, or why some other course less momentous for a restructuring will not serve so to exclude him while permitting in the interim appropriate financial support and the management by others of the affairs of Adler Corporation.
23 On behalf of Mr Adler it was submitted that he and Adler Corporation had conducted themselves cooperatively and expeditiously in the appeal to the present time, that the stay in force to the present time had not had untoward consequences, and that there was nothing to suggest that a stay in the terms sought would be likely to bring detriment to outweigh the hardship to Mr Adler. Until impugned, and it was not submitted that for this application I should not take them at face value, Santow J's findings against Mr Adler should be given effect as to the future of Adler Corporation, and I do not think that on the evidence in this application a sufficient countervailing case of hardship to Mr Adler has been made out.
24 It is open to Mr Adler to apply pursuant to s 206G of the Act for leave to manage Adler Corporation. It may be that the evidence on any such application will be more complete, and the interests of the public and Mr Adler can then be more suitably considered than in this application (see Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Bannister (1996) 1 WLR 118, in which it was said that the equivalent to s 206G should normally be taken up instead of applying for a stay).