Legal principles
40 Mr Horsley, who appeared for Mr Ede, submitted that the Court has general power to stay execution of a judgment. He relied on ss 67 and 135 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 and on the Court's inherent jurisdiction over its own procedure to stay execution of a judgment "if it be just". He referred to In Re A debtor, No. 21 of 1950 (No. 2); Ex parte The Petitioning Creditors v The Debtor [1951] CH 612 at 621 where it was held that the Court has inherent jurisdiction to grant a stay of execution effectively amounting to set-off "if it be just".
41 That principle was cited with approval by Barrett J in Padkohe Pty Limited v Fletcher [2006] NSWSC 1239 at [4] and, specifically in the context of set-off for costs in different actions and in different courts, by White J in Australian Beverage Distributors Pty Limited v Evans & Tate (2006) 58 ACSR 22; [2006] NSWSC 560 at [79].
42 As noted by Mr Horsley, the Court's power to stay execution of a judgment on the grounds of set-off does not depend on satisfaction of the requirements for establishing an equitable set-off: Australian Beverage Distibutors at [79], where White J said:
"On the materials before me, ABD owes more to ETPW than ETPW owes to it. Even though that is not sufficient to give rise to a set-off in equity, and even though a stay of execution is tantamount to allowing a set-off, the jurisdiction to stay execution of the order for costs does not depend on satisfaction of the requirements for establishing an equitable set-off. There is no reason to think that it should, as an equitable set-off extinguishes or reduces the debt, whereas a stay merely precludes enforcement of the debt for so long as the stay operates."
43 White J granted a stay which, in due course, was overturned by the Court of Appeal: Australian Beverage Distributors Pty Limited v Evans & Tate (2007) 61 ACSR 441; [2007] NSWCA 57. However, as submitted by Mr Horsley, his Honour's summary of the law was not the subject of any criticism by the Court of Appeal.
44 Nonetheless, it should be noted that the Court of Appeal (per Beazley JA, with whom Hodgson and Santow JJA agreed) said at para [145]:
"The mere fact that there were other claims between the parties, some of which were disputed and some of which were not, was not sufficient in my opinion in all the circumstances of this case … to stay the enforcement of an order that created another indebtedness. As I have indicated, this is even the more so when, even if a stay was granted, the debt subject of the stay remains due and payable".
45 In Padkohe, Barrett J formulated the principle in the terms discussed by Dr Durham in The Law of Set-Off, 3rd ed 2003 at para 2.80 (also approved by White J at first instance in Australian Beverage Distributors), namely, that the issue is "what the justice of this case requires by way of exercise of the general jurisdiction of the Court over the suitors in it".
What does the justice of this case require?
46 I am not satisfied that I should exercise my discretion to stay execution of the judgment in these proceedings. First, I do not accept the premise of Mr Ede's application that the dealings between the parties may be summarised in the statement that Mr Adamson owes Mr Ede more than Mr Ede owes Mr Adamson.
47 The evidence makes it plain that justice as between Mr Adamson and Mr Ede cannot be summarised in such simple terms. Further, the position is constantly changing with each manoeuvre and counter-manoeuvre, as disclosed by the applications to re-open the evidence made by each party in these proceedings.
48 Secondly, it is relevant to consider the nature of the debts relied on by Mr Ede to sustain the application for a stay. As frankly acknowledged by Mr Horsely, they are, in the main, costs orders that have not yet been assessed but have been estimated by Mr Ede's solicitor, Mr Bilinsky. I do not doubt Mr Blinsky's sincerity, but I have some doubt as to the reliability of his estimates. One is an estimate of costs of the proceedings in the Local Court in which Mr Ede obtained judgment against Mr Adamson in the sum of $18,160. Mr Bilinsky estimates Mr Ede's costs of those proceedings at $95,000. No evidence was placed before me from which I can assess the reasonableness of Mr Ede's incurring such costs. I do not know whether the amount claimed was substantially more than the amount awarded, or indeed anything about the issues in dispute in the proceedings. Taken at face value, the estimated costs appear to be completely disproportionate to the amount awarded but I have no basis for assessing whether that is due to any unreasonable conduct on the part of Mr Ede, or Mr Adamson, or both, or whether there is some other entirely reasonable explanation.
49 Equally, there is no material before me on the strength of which I can assess the reasonableness of the other costs estimates nor, indeed, the reasonableness of their being pitted against a verdict and judgment of this Court.
50 As to the liquidated claims, the fact that Mr Ede was able to take an assignment of a debt in the order of $110,000 for consideration of $1, and did so after the judgment in these proceedings was entered, suggests a strategic imperative that has not been explained to this Court. I suspect that it may be as simple as the proposition that Mr Adamson and Mr Ede dislike each other intensely and will stop at nothing to make each other's lives miserable. I do not think the Court should permit its powers to be deployed as artillery in such a battle.
51 I do not mean to suggest that Mr Ede is the author of the present situation, or that he is not entitled to stand on his legal rights. It is impossible for me to discern whether either gentleman is the greater aggressor in these disputes. However, it is Mr Ede who now seeks the stay of execution. If Mr Adamson and Mr Ede have a multiplicity of causes of action against each other, they are entitled to pursue them in multiple sets of proceedings but I do not think that it is in the interests of justice to permit one set of proceedings to become bogged down by the others. The judgment in these proceedings was entered after two contested hearings (one before a jury) and is not the subject of any appeal. I do not think that I should stay its enforcement.
Whether the previous orders should be set aside
52 Mr Horsley acknowledged that the application to have the charging order and the examination order set aside raises the same issue as the application for a stay. It follows that no basis has been established to set aside either of those orders.