Security for costs
12 The respondents initially sought security for costs totalling $415,000, comprising:
1. $230,000 for costs already incurred; and
2. $260,000 for costs up to and including the trial,
less $75,000 already provided.
13 Before me, the applicant agreed to give security for the respondents' costs up to and including the trial. The dispute therefore narrowed to whether the applicant should give security, and if so in what quantum, for costs already incurred.
14 In support of the application for security, Mr Round, of the solicitors for the respondents, deposed to a company search of the applicant undertaken on 21 February 2011, which disclosed that:
1. Since 28 December 2006, the applicant's sole director and secretary was Alexander Ponfoort, who owned 90% of the shares, while a limited liability company incorporated in the Netherlands owned the remaining 10%.
2. The applicant was, since 19 June 2007, subject to a fixed and floating charge in favour of Westpac.
3. The applicant had an issued and paid up share capital of only $10 and was not the registered owner of any property in Victoria or New South Wales.
15 Further, Mr Round deposed that in about February 2011, Mr Goatcher, of the applicant's solicitors, informed him that Mr Ponfoort resided in Singapore.
16 Mr Round deposed to his correspondence with the applicant's solicitors in February 2011, in which he expressed concern that the applicant lacked the means to meet a costs order against it should the respondents successfully defend the claim and that enforcement would, in any event, be impossible, as the applicant effectively operated from Singapore and had no tangible assets in Australia. Mr Round therefore sought access to the applicant's financial statements, and security for costs of $75,000 based on a conservative estimate of the respondents' taxed costs up to the commencement of trial (excluding past costs). In his letter, Mr Round also stated that the respondents reserved the right to review the estimate of their costs should it prove inadequate. He estimated that the respondents' costs would exceed $300,000 should the matter proceed to trial.
17 By a letter dated 1 March 2011, the solicitors for the applicant advised that the applicant would not provide its financial records, but offered security of $75,000 in the form of a payment into their trust account, to be released only on specified conditions. The letter expressly stated that the applicant did not concede that the respondents were entitled to security.
18 Mr Round deposed to a number of developments after the provision of the security in March 2011, by reason of which the sum of $75,000 proved to be a significant underestimate of the respondents' costs, as follows:
1. extensive correspondence between the parties' solicitors about the ethics investigation by one of Boeing's employees;
2. Boeing's agreement to accept liability for contracts entered into by ASTA;
3. provision of extensive, larger than anticipated discovery in tranches; and
4. resolution of confidentiality issues.
19 As Mr Round deposed, the applicant also twice further amended its statement of claim, by order made on 22 June 2011 after a contested hearing and by an order on 21 July 2011 made by consent, which expanded the applicant's case.
20 The further amended statements of claim added allegations of breach of contract and copyright by misuse of Technical Data, CAD drawings and software in connection with a 2005 universal holding fixture ("UHF") supplied to the respondents by Marand Pty Ltd ("Marand").
21 The second further amended statement of claim added further allegations that the respondents infringed copyright in CAD drawings in connection with the supply of the 2005 UHF by Marand.
22 Discovery in relation to the issues arising from the amended pleadings took place in August 2011 and on 1 September 2011, and the applicant filed evidence by six deponents.
23 In March 2012, the respondents filed and served affidavits by nine deponents and in April 2012 issued subpoenas to two witnesses and filed and served a further affidavit.
24 Mr Round deposed that the respondents experienced difficulties in preparing answering evidence, as the allegations related to manufacture of UHFs during three different periods going back to 2001 involving different personnel or other witnesses, many of whom were no longer employed or were difficult to locate, reluctant to give evidence or unable to access their files.
25 Further, the subject matter was highly complex and technical and the respondents spent much time amending their own pleadings and addressing the new issues raised by the applicant's amendments.
26 Mr Round deposed that he realised the extent of the underestimate of costs only in about April 2012. On 11 May 2012, he sought further security for costs to the commencement to trial of $225,000, made up as follows:
27 On 21 May 2012, the applicant declined to provide the further security, but offered (if Boeing paid a disputed claim of $306,480 it allegedly owed the applicant in respect of an invoice dated 11 November 2010) to hold $225,000 of that sum as security.
28 By a letter dated 3 August 2012, the respondents' solicitors reiterated the request for further security, failing which they would make an application.
29 Mr Round deposed that Dr Field's affidavit and the application to amend the second further amended statement of claim, foreshadowed on 10 August 2012, discussed below, would further impact on the costs.
30 Mr Round, a solicitor extensively experienced in intellectual property litigation, deposed to his analysis of the respondents' costs. On the basis that they would, conservatively, be taxed at 67%, he estimated the respondents' taxed costs to the date of his affidavit at $230,000.
31 Mr Round exhibited the confidential expert report of a costs consultant, Jenny Young, which estimated the respondents' taxed costs to date of judgment at $442,091.49 and taxed costs incurred between 23 February 2011 and 7 August 2012 at $157,246.50.
32 When the sum of $75,000 already provided as security was subtracted, on the basis of the expert's estimate, the respondents' taxed costs incurred between March 2011 and August 2012 were approximately $157,000.
33 Mr Round deposed to updated searches of the applicant and deposed:
61 Having regard to:
(a) the searches annexed as CJR-12, CJR-13 and CJR-14 to this affidavit;
(b) the refusal of ACP to provide particulars evidencing its financial viability;
(c) the demand by ACP to pay the Alleged Debt as a precondition to providing security for costs; and
(d) the estimated costs likely to be awarded to Boeing in the event that ACP was unsuccessful at trial,
I consider that there is reason to believe that ACP would be unable to pay Boeing's costs if so ordered.
34 Mr Goatcher, of the solicitors for the applicant, denied that he informed Mr Round that Mr Ponfoort, although he worked in Singapore from time to time, resided there. Mr Goatcher did not, however, dispute Mr Round's account of the correspondence between the parties, the estimated quantum of costs or the assertion that the respondents would be unable readily to enforce a costs order.
35 Mr Goatcher nevertheless deposed that until May 2012, the applicant had assumed, on the basis of the correspondence, that only $75,000 would be required as security for costs up to trial, and further, that the respondents had accepted its refusal on 21 May 2012 to provide further security.
36 The applicant submitted that it was entitled to assume, and had prosecuted the proceeding on the basis, that security for the relevant period was limited to $75,000. The applicant submitted that security for costs already incurred should be ordered only in rare or exceptional circumstances.
37 The applicant further submitted that the matters on which the respondents relied to explain the delay were in fact entirely predictable, and the delay in seeking the significantly increased estimate in May 2012 was significant and not adequately explained.
38 Section 56 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) provides:
(1) The Court or a Judge may order an applicant in a proceeding in the Court, or an appellant in an appeal under Division 2 of Part III, to give security for the payment of costs that may be awarded against him or her.
(2) The security shall be of such amount, and given at such time and in such manner and form, as the Court or Judge directs.
(3) The Court or a Judge may reduce or increase the amount of security ordered to be given and may vary the time at which, or manner or form in which, the security is to be given.
(4) If security, or further security, is not given in accordance with an order under this section, the Court or a Judge may order that the proceeding or appeal be dismissed.
(5) This section does not affect the operation of any provision made by or under any other Act or by the Rules of Court for or in relation to the furnishing of security.
39 The Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) provide:
19.01 Application for an order for security for costs
(1) A respondent may apply to the Court for an order:
(a) that an applicant give security for costs and for the manner, time and terms for the giving of the security; and
(b) that the applicant's proceeding be stayed until security is given; and
(c) that if the applicant fails to comply with the order to provide security within the time specified in the order, the proceeding be stayed or dismissed.
(2) An application under subrule (1) must be accompanied by an affidavit stating the facts on which the order for security for costs is sought.
19.02 Matters to be addressed by the respondent
The respondent's affidavit should state the following:
(a) whether there is reason to believe that the applicant will be unable to pay the respondent's costs if so ordered;
(b) whether the applicant is ordinarily resident outside Australia;
(c) whether the applicant is suing for someone else's benefit;
(d) whether the applicant is impecunious;
(e) any other relevant matter.
40 Section 1335 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) provides:
(1) Where a corporation is plaintiff in any action or other legal proceeding, the court having jurisdiction in the matter may, if it appears by credible testimony that there is reason to believe that the corporation will be unable to pay the costs of the defendant if successful in his, her or its defence, require sufficient security to be given for those costs and stay all proceedings until the security is given.
(1A) Subsection (1) does not apply to a corporation that is an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporation.
(2) The costs of any proceeding before a court under this Act are to be borne by such party to the proceeding as the court, in its discretion, directs.
41 In Baygol Pty Ltd v Huntsman Chemical Co Australia Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 1248, Tamberlin J stated at [9]-[11]:
It is common ground that the Court's discretion is broad and unfettered and that the Court must have regard to all the circumstances of each particular case. The discretion must be exercised judicially. An order for security for costs is interlocutory in nature and the rules of Court do not delimit the Court's discretion. The purpose of an order for costs in a case such as the present is to ensure the effective enforcement of any order the Court may make in favour of a successful respondent in circumstances where the applicant company is without any substantial assets to meet such order.
Some of the principles often applied by the Court when considering security for cost issues have been collected and stated by Beazley J in KP Cable Investments Pty Ltd v Meltglow Pty Ltd (1995) 56 FCR 189 at 196-198. These principles have been approved and applied in subsequent decisions of this Court: see Olbers Co Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia [2002] FCA 1269; Gartner v Ernst & Young (No 3) [2003] FCA 1437.
These principles in relation to security for costs applications can be summarised into the following considerations:
• whether the application was brought promptly;
• the strength and bona fides of the applicant's case;
• whether the applicant's impecuniosity was caused by the respondent's conduct which is the subject of the claim;
• whether the respondent's application for security is oppressive, in the sense that it is being used merely to deny an impecunious applicant a right to litigate;
• whether there are any persons standing behind the company who are likely to benefit from the litigation and are willing to provide the necessary security,
• whether persons standing behind the company have offered any personal undertaking to be liable for costs, and if so the form of any such undertaking;
• whether the party against whom the security for costs order is sought is a plaintiff.
42 In Sylverton Pty Ltd v Minter Ellison [2011] FCA 1072, Kenny J recently considered significant factors relevant to the exercise of the discretion at [18] and [19], as follows:
There are numerous factors that may be relevant to the Court's exercise of discretion, including the nature of the risk that Sylverton will not be able to satisfy a costs order if made against it and in the respondent's favour. Other factors may also be relevant such as the nature of the applicant's claim, including the chances of success, whether an order for the giving of security would operate to prevent the applicant from pursuing the claim, and whether the applicant's impecuniosity arises from the conduct the subject of the proceeding. This list of factors is not exhaustive, and there may be other discretionary factors, some of which are mentioned in KP Cable Investments Pty Ltd v Meltglow Pty Ltd (1995) 56 FCR 189 at 197-198 and Gartner v Ernst & Young (No 3) [2003] FCA 1437 at [10].
…
Security must be sufficient in the circumstances disclosed - an approach that requires consideration of the whole of the case. The principles are well-known. As Heerey J said in Farmitalia Carlo Erba SrL v Delta West Pty Ltd (1994) 28 IPR 336 at 342, the fixing of quantum is a discretionary exercise in which, besides any expert opinion evidence as to estimated costs, factors falling for consideration may include the chance of the case not proceeding to trial; the chances of success, if discernible; and the undesirability of stifling the proceeding, if such a risk exists. Here, as noted, there is no evidence about the financial position of those who would benefit from success in this proceeding and the chances of success are not presently discernible.
43 In Strategic Financial and Project Services Pty Ltd v Bank of China [2012] FCA 445 ("Strategic Financial"), on which the respondents relied, Robertson J applied "a broad-brush approach" (at [61]) in ordering security for costs. In Strategic Financial, a substantial part of a claim for increased security related to past costs, the application was made only four months prior to trial and there had been some delay in taking advantage of the reserved right to seek further security. Nevertheless, his Honour ordered further security in a quantum which incorporated a substantial proportion of the costs already incurred (at [59]-[62]).
44 In this case, all principal factors worked in favour of an order for additional security, save for the delay. There was quite a lengthy hiatus between the first and second requests for security. The request in May 2011 was for a substantially increased amount, the greatest part of which, however, was incurred not long before the second request. The increase was due in large part to the applicant's successive amendments which expanded the scope of its case. The delay was largely, if not wholly, explained by the matters to which Mr Round deposed. While the applicant asserted its assumption that only $75,000 would be required, the respondents had, from the outset, reserved their right to seek an increase. Further, the applicant proffered no evidence of any conduct in reliance on that assumption or any specific prejudice. There was no suggestion that the applicant was unable to furnish the security or that it would stifle the claim.
45 While circumspection is required when ordering security for costs already incurred, and delay may be a basis for refusing to do so, it is but one of a number of relevant factors. I considered that in this case, the respondents were, in all the circumstances, entitled to further security in a quantum of $80,000, which represented about half the estimated taxed costs for the relevant period.