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[2013] WASCA 288
Court of Appeal (WA)
2013-12-18
Martin CJ
Original judgment source is linked above.
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
CITATION : A -v- CORRUPTION AND CRIME COMMISSIONER [2013] WASCA 288
CORRUPTION AND CRIME COMMISSION OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Jurisdiction : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Citation : RE ROGER MACKNAY QC; EX PARTE A [2013] WASC 243
Corruption and Crime Commission - Public examination - Closed-circuit television (CCTV) footage played during hearing - Certification that disclosure necessary in the public interest - Corruption and Crime Commission Act 2003 (WA), s 152
Administrative law - Certiorari - Application to quash decision to disclose CCTV footage - Public interest - Whether the Commissioner considered irrelevant considerations or failed to consider relevant considerations - Unreasonableness - Improper purpose - Education function - Misconduct function - Subsequent investigation and fair trial of appellant
Evidence Act 1906 (WA), s 21
Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), s 5
Supreme Court (Court of Appeal) Rules 2005 (WA), r 25
Intervener : Mr R M Mitchell SC & Ms A B Preston-Samson
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1947] EWCA Civ 1; [1948] 1 KB 223
Australian Broadcasting Commission v Parish [1980] FCA 33; (1980) 43 FLR 129; (1980) 29 ALR 228
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Ltd (No 3) [2012] FCA 1430
Avon Downs Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1949] HCA 26; (1949) 78 CLR 353
Bruce v Cole (1998) 45 NSWLR 163
Burrell v The Queen [2008] HCA 34; (2008) 238 CLR 218
Channel Seven Perth Pty Ltd v S (A Company) [2007] WASCA 122; (2007) 34 WAR 325
Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1
Commonwealth v Baume [1905] HCA 11; (1905) 2 CLR 405
Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1981] HCA 26; (1981) 147 CLR 297
Corruption and Crime Commission v Allen [2012] WASCA 242
Coulton v Holcombe [1986] HCA 33; (1986) 162 CLR 1
Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163
Elcham v Commissioner of Police [2001] NSWSC 614
Ex parte WA Newspapers Ltd [2008] WASCA 209; (2008) 38 WAR 177
FAI Insurances Ltd v Winneke [1982] HCA 26; (1982) 151 CLR 342
Foley v Padley [1984] HCA 50; (1984) 154 CLR 349
Grassby v The Queen [1989] HCA 45; (1989) 168 CLR 1
Green v Sommerville [1979] HCA 60; (1979) 141 CLR 594
Hogan v Australian Crime Commission [2010] HCA 21; (2010) 240 CLR 651
House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499
Hunter v the Minister for Planning [2012] WASC 247
Khan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1987] FCA 457; (1987) 14 ALD 291
Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission (NSW) [2010] HCA 1; (2010) 239 CLR 531
Lee v New South Wales Crime Commission [2013] HCA 39; (2013) 302 ALR 363
Levi v Australian Securities Investments Commission (No 2) [2013] NSWSC 932
Lo v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2013] NSWCA 180
Maloney v Commissioner for Railways (1978) 52 ALJR 292; (1978) 18 ALR 147
McKinnon v Secretary, Department of Treasury [2006] HCA 45; (2006) 228 CLR 423
McLennan v McCallum [2010] WASCA 45
Metwally (No 2) v University of Wollongong [1985] HCA 28; (1985) 59 ALJR 481
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd [1986] HCA 40; (1986) 162 CLR 24
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 87 ALJR 618
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; (2001) 206 CLR 323
MR & RC Smith Pty Ltd t/as Ultra Tune (Osborne Park) v Wyatt [No 2] [2012] WASCA 110
National Crime Authority v Gould [1989] FCA 477; (1989) 23 FCR 191
O'Brien v Komesaroff [1982] HCA 33; (1982) 150 CLR 310
Osland v Secretary to the Department of Justice (No 2) [2010] HCA 24; (2010) 241 CLR 320
Osland v Secretary to the Department of Justice [2008] HCA 37; (2008) 234 CLR 275
O'Sullivan v Farrer [1989] HCA 61; (1989) 168 CLR 210
Pantorno v The Queen [1989] HCA 18; (1989) 166 CLR 466
Pelechowski v Registrar, Court of Appeal (NSW) [1999] HCA 19; (1999) 198 CLR 435
Plaintiff M70/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] HCA 32; (2011) 244 CLR 144
Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; (1998) 194 CLR 355
R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; ex parte 2HD Pty Ltd [1979] HCA 62; (1979) 144 CLR 45
R v Connell; ex parte Hetton Bellbird Collieries Ltd [1944] HCA 42; (1944) 69 CLR 407
Re Mactiernan; ex parte Coogee Coastal Action Coalition Incorporated [2004] WASC 264
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Applicant S 20 [2003] HCA 30; (2003) 77 ALJR 1165
Re Minister for Resources; ex parte Cazaly Iron Pty Ltd [2007] WASCA 175
Re Roger Macknay QC; ex parte 'A' [2013] WASC 243
Re Shire of Carnarvon; ex parte Humphrey [2005] WASCA 182
Rizhao Steel Holding Group Co Ltd v Koolan Iron Ore Pty Ltd [2012] WASCA 50; (2012) 43 WAR 91
Rowe v Australian United Steam Navigation Company Ltd [1909] HCA 25; (1909) 9 CLR 1
Russell v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 246
Sean Investments Pty Ltd v MacKellar [1981] FCA 191; (1981) 38 ALR 363
State Drug Crime Commission of New South Wales v Chapman (1987) 12 NSWLR 447
Suttor v Gundowda Pty Ltd [1950] HCA 35; (1950) 81 CLR 418
Trompler v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 265
Vagh v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 17
Water Board v Moustakas [1988] HCA 12; (1988) 180 CLR 491
Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission (NSW) v Browning [1947] HCA 21; (1947) 74 CLR 492
Wentworth v New South Wales Bar Association [1992] HCA 24; (1992) 176 CLR 239
Williams v Minister for the Environment & Heritage [2003] FCA 535; (2003) 74 ALD 124
X7 v Australian Crime Commission [2013] HCA 29; (2013) 87 ALJR 858
Zhang v Canterbury City Council [2001] NSWCA 167; (2001) 51 NSWLR 589
1 The appellant, whose name has been suppressed in these proceedings, was formerly a police officer stationed at Broome. He was involved in two incidents in which physical force was used against detainees at the Broome police station. Both incidents were recorded on closed-circuit television (CCTV). The Corruption and Crime Commission (Commission) (the second respondent) commenced an investigation into the incidents in order to assess whether misconduct by public officers occurred or may have occurred during the arrest and detention of the two detainees or in the aftermath of the incidents to which we have referred.
2 The Corruption and Crime Commissioner (Commissioner) (the first respondent) decided to open the Commission's examination of the matters to which we have referred to the public on the ground that it was in the public interest to do so. That decision has never been challenged by the appellant.
3 During the public examination, in the course of her opening address, counsel assisting the Commission presented and played to the Commission the CCTV recordings to which we have referred. However, before that occurred, the Commissioner ordered that the CCTV recordings not be disclosed to the public until further order. The appellant and other witnesses gave evidence with respect to the incidents depicted on the CCTV recordings. After that evidence had been given, the Commissioner revoked the order which he had made preventing disclosure of the CCTV recordings to the public and further certified that disclosure of the CCTV recordings was necessary in the public interest (pursuant to s 152(4)(c) of the Corruption and Crime Commission Act 2003 (WA) (the Act)). The purpose of that certification was to enable the CCTV recordings to be provided to the media for public dissemination.
4 Before the certification could be implemented, and in particular before the CCTV recordings were provided to the media, the appellant commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court seeking orders quashing the decision of the Commissioner to disclose the CCTV recordings 'to the media and/or the public pursuant to s 151 and/or 152' of the Act. The orders were sought on the grounds that the Commissioner had wrongly exercised his discretion, had failed to take into account a number of specified considerations which were said to be relevant, and had taken into account irrelevant considerations. Those proceedings were dismissed - see Re Roger Macknay QC; ex parte 'A' [2013] WASC 243.
5 The appellant appeals from that decision. Appropriately, the Commissioner and the Commission have informed the court that they will abide by the court's decision and have not participated in the appellate process. However, leave was granted to the Attorney General of Western Australia to intervene in the proceedings, and in that capacity the Attorney General has acted as a contradictor to the relief sought by the appellant.
6 The grounds of appeal differ in a number of respects from the grounds which were advanced at first instance. For the reasons which follow, all grounds of appeal should be dismissed.
7 It is convenient to commence by outlining the relevant statutory framework which governs the Commission's operations.
8 The Act's primary purposes are to combat and reduce the incidence of organised crime, and to improve continuously the integrity of, and to reduce the incidence of misconduct in, the public sector (Act, s 7A). These purposes are to be primarily achieved by establishing the Commission, which is able to authorise the use of investigative powers not ordinarily available to the police service to investigate organised crime, and to help public authorities to deal effectively and appropriately with misconduct (Act, s 7B).
9 The Commission's functions are specified in the Act (pt 2, div 2). They include receiving allegations of misconduct and investigating and dealing with such allegations, which may involve the reference of matters to, or taking action with, another authority. This 'misconduct function' is described in s 18 of the Act, which provides:
(1) It is a function of the Commission (the misconduct function) to ensure that an allegation about, or information or matter involving, misconduct is dealt with in an appropriate way.
(2) Without limiting how the Commission may perform the misconduct function, the Commission performs the function by -
(a) receiving and initiating allegations of misconduct;
(b) considering whether action is needed in relation to allegations and matters related to misconduct;
(c) investigating or taking other action in relation to allegations and matters related to misconduct if it is appropriate to do so, or referring the allegations or matters to independent agencies or appropriate authorities so that they can take action themselves or in cooperation with the Commission;
(d) monitoring the way in which independent agencies and appropriate authorities take action in relation to allegations and matters that are referred to them by the Commission;
(e) regardless of whether or not there has been an allegation of misconduct, investigating whether misconduct -
(i) has or may have occurred;
(ii) is or may be occurring;
(iii) is or may be about to occur; or
(iv) is likely to occur;
(f) making recommendations and furnishing reports on the outcome of investigations;
(g) consulting, cooperating and exchanging information with independent agencies, appropriate authorities and -
(i) the Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police;
(ii) the Commissioner of a Police Force of another State or Territory;
(iii) the CEO of the Australian Crime Commission established by the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 of the Commonwealth;
(iv) the Commissioner of Taxation holding office under the Taxation Administration Act 1953 of the Commonwealth;
(v) the Director-General of Security holding office under the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 of the Commonwealth;
(vi) the Director of the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre under the Financial Transaction Reports Act 1988 of the Commonwealth;
(vii) any person, or authority or body of this State, the Commonwealth, another State or a Territory that is declared by the Minister to be a person, authority or body to which this paragraph applies;
(h) assembling evidence obtained in the course of exercising the misconduct function and -
(i) furnishing to an independent agency or another authority, evidence which may be admissible in the prosecution of a person for a criminal offence against a written law or which may otherwise be relevant to the functions of the agency or authority; and
(ii) furnishing to the Attorney General or a suitable authority of another State, a Territory, the Commonwealth or another country, evidence which may be admissible in the prosecution of a person for a criminal offence against a law of the jurisdiction concerned or which may otherwise be relevant to that jurisdiction.
...
10 Section 4 of the Act provides that misconduct occurs if:
(a) a public officer corruptly acts or corruptly fails to act in the performance of the functions of the public officer's office or employment;
(b) a public officer corruptly takes advantage of the public officer's office or employment as a public officer to obtain a benefit for himself or herself or for another person or to cause a detriment to any person;
(c) a public officer whilst acting or purporting to act in his or her official capacity, commits an offence punishable by 2 or more years' imprisonment; or
(d) a public officer engages in conduct that -
(i) adversely affects, or could adversely affect, directly or indirectly, the honest or impartial performance of the functions of a public authority or public officer whether or not the public officer was acting in their public officer capacity at the time of engaging in the conduct;
(ii) constitutes or involves the performance of his or her functions in a manner that is not honest or impartial;
(iii) constitutes or involves a breach of the trust placed in the public officer by reason of his or her office or employment as a public officer; or
(iv) involves the misuse of information or material that the public officer has acquired in connection with his or her functions as a public officer, whether the misuse is for the benefit of the public officer or the benefit or detriment of another person, and constitutes or could constitute -
(v) an offence against the Statutory Corporations (Liability of Directors) Act 1996 or any other written law; or
(vi) a disciplinary offence providing reasonable grounds for the termination of a person's office or employment as a public service officer under the Public Sector Management Act 1994 (whether or not the public officer to whom the allegation relates is a public service officer or is a person whose office or employment could be terminated on the grounds of such conduct).
11 Police officers are classified as 'public officers' under the Act (Act, s 3 and Criminal Code (WA) s 1). Pursuant to s 21A of the Act, the Commissioner of Police is required to notify the Commission of matters concerning, or that may concern reviewable police action in accordance with guidelines issued under s 30 of the Act (which empowers the Commission to issue guidelines with respect to matters referred to in s 21A). 'Reviewable police action' is defined by s 3 of the Act to mean any action taken by a police officer or an employee of the police service that is contrary to law, unreasonable, unjust, oppressive or improperly discriminatory (amongst other things). Section 21A provides that the Commission may deal with a matter notified under that section as if it were a notification of misconduct pursuant to s 28(2) of the Act.
12 The Commission's functions with respect to misconduct are not limited to investigation. The Commission has a further role in helping to prevent misconduct. Section 17 of the Act confers this 'prevention and education' function upon the Commission, and sets out a non-exhaustive list of the ways this function may be performed. It provides:
17. Prevention and education function
(1) The Commission has a function (the prevention and education function) of helping to prevent misconduct.
(2) Without limiting the ways the Commission may perform the prevention and education function, the Commission performs that function by -
(a) analysing the intelligence it gathers in support of its investigations into organised crime and misconduct; and
(ab) analysing the results of its investigations and the information it gathers in performing its functions; and
(ac) analysing systems used within public authorities to prevent misconduct; and
(ad) using information it gathers from any source in support of its prevention and education function; and
(b) providing information to, consulting with, and making recommendations to public authorities; and
(c) providing information relevant to its prevention and education function to the general community; and
(ca) ensuring that in performing all of its functions it has regard to its prevention and education function; and
(cb) generally increasing the capacity of public authorities to prevent misconduct by providing advice and training to those authorities, if asked, to other entities; and
(d) reporting on ways to prevent misconduct.
13 For reasons which will appear, it is significant that the Act expressly provides that the Commission is to have regard to its prevention and education function when performing 'all of its functions' under the Act (s 17(2)(ca) above).
14 Part 6 of the Act specifies the various powers conferred upon the Commission which may be exercised in the performance of its functions. Those powers include the power to obtain information from a public authority or officer (s 94), the power to compel the production of documents or other things (s 95), and the power to summon witnesses to attend an examination and to give evidence or produce any record or other thing in that person's custody or control, or do both (s 96).
15 Part 7 empowers the Commission to conduct examinations (s 137) including examinations for the purposes of an investigation under the Act. Examinations are to be conducted in private unless the Commission otherwise orders (s 139 and s 140). The Commission may open examinations to the public if, having weighed the benefits of public exposure and public awareness against the potential for prejudice or privacy infringements, the Commission considers that it is in the public interest to do so (s 140(2)). If the Commission decides to open an examination to the public, the Commission may close the examination for a particular purpose (s 140(4)).
16 Part 9 of the Act concerns confidentiality, disclosure, secrecy and protection of witnesses, and contains a number of 'stringent' confidentiality provisions - see Corruption and Crime Commission v Allen [2012] WASCA 242 [22]. The critical provisions of the Act for the purposes of this appeal are ss 151 and 152.
17 Section 151 prohibits the disclosure of 'restricted matter' except as authorised or required by the Act.
(1) In this section -
restricted matter means any of the following -
(a) any evidence given before the Commission;
(b) the contents of any statement of information or document, or a description of any thing, produced to the Commission;
(c) the contents of any document, or a description of any thing, seized under this Act;
(d) any information that might enable a person who has been, or is about to be, examined before the Commission to be identified or located;
(e) the fact that any person has been or may be about to be examined before the Commission.
(2) Subject to subsections (3) and (4), a restricted matter must not be disclosed.
(3) Unless the Commission orders otherwise, a restricted matter may be disclosed if that matter has already been disclosed at a part of an examination that was open to the public.
(4) A restricted matter may be disclosed -
(a) in accordance with a direction of the Commission;
(b) to a legal practitioner for the purpose of obtaining legal advice or representation relating to a notice, summons or matter;
(c) to a person for the purpose of obtaining legal aid relating to a notice, summons or matter;
(d) to an officer or agent of a body corporate by the body corporate or another officer or agent of the body corporate for the purpose of ensuring compliance with a notice or summons;
(e) by a legal practitioner for the purpose of complying with a legal duty of disclosure arising from his or her professional relationship with a client;
(f) by a legal practitioner referred to in paragraph (b) for the purpose of giving legal advice, making representations, or obtaining legal aid, relating to the notice, summons or matter;
(g) by a person referred to in paragraph (c) for the purpose of obtaining legal aid relating to the notice, summons or matter; or
(h) if that disclosure is otherwise authorised or required under this Act.
(a) the Commission or a relevant person as defined in section 152(1); or
(b) a relevant person as defined in section 208(1),
in relation to a restricted matter that is official information under section 152 or 208, as the case may be.
(6) This section does not apply to -
(a) an authority or person referred to in section 153 or 209; or
(b) any person or employee under the control of an authority or person referred to in section 153 or 209,
in relation to a restricted matter that is information to which section 153 or 209, as the case may be, applies.
(7) If a restricted matter is disclosed contrary to this section, any person who so discloses the matter, or causes the matter to be so disclosed, commits an offence.
Penalty: Imprisonment for 3 years and a fine of $60 000.
18 Restricted matter includes any evidence given before the Commission (Act, s 151(1)), and 'disclose' is defined as meaning 'to publish in any way' or to 'divulge or communicate to any person in any way' (Act, s 3). A person, other than the Commission or its officers or lawyers, who discloses restricted matter without authorisation under s 151(3) or (4) of the Act commits an offence (Act, ss 151(7), (2), (5) and (6)).
19 Relevantly, disclosure of restricted matter is permitted where the restricted matter has been disclosed as part of an examination that the Commission has determined should be open to the public under s 140, unless the Commission 'orders otherwise' (s 151(3)). As will be seen, the power to 'order otherwise' in s 151(3) was invoked by the Commission to order that the CCTV footage the subject of this appeal not be disclosed publicly until further order. Significantly, in the case of 'restricted matter' that is also 'official information' within the meaning of s 152, s 151 does not apply to or deal with disclosure by the Commission or its officers or lawyers (s 151(5)).
20 Section 152 concerns disclosure of 'official information' by the Commission. The purpose of the provision is to protect from disclosure by its officers or lawyers any information in the possession of the Commission relating to, amongst other things, investigations in which it is involved - Corruption and Crime Commission v Allen [43]. Section 152 provides:
(1) In this section -
Commission lawyer means -
(a) a legal practitioner appointed to assist the Commission; and
(b) a person who assists, or performs services for or on behalf of a legal practitioner appointed to assist the Commission in the performance of the legal practitioner's duties assisting the Commission;
court includes a tribunal, authority or person having power to require the production of documents or the answering of questions;
official information, in relation to a relevant person, means information acquired by the person by reason of, or in the course of, the performance of the person's functions under this Act;
relevant person means a person who is or was -
(a) an officer of the Commission; or
(b) a Commission lawyer.
(2) Subject to subsections (3), (4) and (6) a relevant person must not, either directly or indirectly -
(a) make a record of any official information; or
(b) disclose any official information.
Penalty: Imprisonment for 3 years and a fine of $60 000.
(3) Despite subsection (2), a relevant person may make a record of official information -
(a) under or for the purposes of this Act;
(b) otherwise in connection with the performance of the person's functions under this Act.
(4) Despite subsection (2), official information may be disclosed by a relevant person if it is disclosed -
(a) under or for the purposes of this Act;
(b) for the purposes of a prosecution or disciplinary action instituted as a result of an investigation conducted by the Commission or the Parliamentary Inspector under this Act or any other prosecutions or disciplinary action in relation to misconduct;
(c) when the Commission has certified that disclosure is necessary in the public interest;
(d) to either House of Parliament or to the Standing Committee;
(e) to any prescribed authority or person; or
(f) otherwise in connection with the performance of the person's functions under this Act.
(5) A relevant person is not authorised to disclose operational information under subsection (4)(d) or (e) unless the Commission has certified under subsection (4)(c) that disclosure is necessary in the public interest.
(6) Despite subsection (2), a relevant person may disclose the fact that an allegation has been received or initiated by the Commission or the details of an allegation.
(7) A relevant person cannot be required to produce or disclose any official information in or to any court except for the purposes of a prosecution or disciplinary action instituted as a result of an investigation conducted by the Commission or the Parliamentary Inspector under this Act.
(8) This section also applies to the Commission as if references to official information were references to all information acquired by the Commission by reason of, or in the course of, the performance of the Commission's functions under this Act.
21 The breadth of the definition of 'official information' is such that any information acquired by an officer or lawyer of the Commission, or the Commission itself, in the performance of functions under the Act will fall within the scope of s 152, with the result that s 151 will not apply to the disclosure of that information (s 151(5)). In this case it has never been contended at any point, either before the Commission, the primary judge, or during the appeal, that s 151 provides, of itself, sufficient authority to provide the CCTV recordings to the media.
22 Section 9(2) of the Act effectively provides that anything that may or must be done by the Commission under the Act can be effectually done by the Commissioner. It follows that the orders, directions and certificates of the Commission to which reference is made in s 151 and s 152 of the Act can be issued by the Commissioner.
23 Although less relevant to these proceedings, s 153 forms part of the scheme relating to disclosure contained within pt 9 of the Act. It provides:
(1) In this section -
court includes a tribunal, authority or person having power to require the production of documents or the answering of questions;
produce includes permit access to.
(2) This section applies to information if, in circumstances referred to in section 152(4), it is disclosed to an authority or person for use in connection with the performance of a function of the authority or person under a written law.
(3) The authority or person, or any person or employee under the control of the authority or person -
(i) make a record of information to which this section applies; or
(ii) disclose any information to which this section applies,
except for the purpose for which it was disclosed to the authority or person; and
(b) cannot be required to produce or disclose the information in or to any court except for the purposes of a prosecution or disciplinary action instituted as a result of an investigation conducted by the Commission or the Parliamentary Inspector under this Act.
Penalty, for a contravention of paragraph (a): Imprisonment for 3 years and a fine of $60 000.
(4) Subsection (3) does not prevent the disclosure of the fact that an allegation has been received or initiated by the Commission or the details of an allegation.
The public examination conducted by the Commission
24 The Commission's examination commenced on 10 June 2013. It is clear that the Commissioner had previously determined that the examination would be open to the public, pursuant to s 140(3) of the Act. After taking appearances, the Commissioner adjourned briefly to allow for the installation of equipment which would enable the Commissioner's opening remarks, and the opening address of counsel assisting the Commission, to be televised. When the examination resumed, the Commissioner made brief remarks concerning the role and responsibilities of police officers. He described the investigation to be undertaken by the Commission in these terms:
This investigation concerns two incidents at the Broome police station and particularly will examine issues of supervision and accountability in relation to those incidents, as those things are at the heart of the maintenance of discipline.
The scope and purpose of this series of examinations and investigation is to enable the Commission to make an assessment and form an opinion as to whether misconduct by public officers has or may have occurred during the arrest and detention of D1 and D4.
25 Counsel assisting the Commission then opened the case which would be presented. She referred to two incidents involving the use of force against persons in police custody occurring in Broome police station three weeks apart - in March and April 2013. Both incidents were said to involve the same police officer, described in the examination before the Commission as D5, and who is the appellant in these proceedings. Counsel advised the Commission that the relevant conduct had been captured on CCTV and went on to explain the reasons why the Commission had concluded that the examination should be conducted in public pursuant to s 140 of the Act. In that context, she stated that the main focus of the examination would not be upon the conduct of the officer who used the force, but rather would be on the actions taken or inaction of other officers who witnessed parts of the events. She also adverted to the investigation into the adequacy of supervision within the police service, and advised that the use of padded cells, the stripping of detainees, the use of restraints and police policies in relation to all of those matters would be the subject of investigation. In that context she asserted:
The benefits of public exposure of the investigation into those issues is obvious: in particular, public hearings are likely to be significantly educative of police officers; also, holding public examinations as part of the investigative process will assist in maintaining public confidence that these types of incidents are being investigated thoroughly and transparently. It may also encourage people to make complaints when they have concerns about how a detainee has been treated.
26 Counsel then went on to outline the steps that would be taken in order to prevent prejudice or the infringement of privacy. In that context, she referred specifically to the possible prejudice to the appellant, who may be subject to subsequent criminal charges. She proposed an order suppressing the identity of the appellant (which was made) and further proposed that before any particular witness was examined, specific consideration could be given to the question of whether that witness should be examined in public.
27 In relation to the CCTV recordings, counsel observed that there was potential for the events the subject of the Commission's investigation to stir up strong feelings amongst some members of the public, and in particular amongst the Broome community. She stated that on the whole, those matters did not outweigh the positive benefits of a public hearing, but that one matter that would require further consideration was whether the CCTV recordings should be made public. She proposed that before a decision was made on that subject, the Commission should hear submissions from all those with a relevant interest. In order to enable that to occur, she proposed that 'suppression orders' should be made, including an order that the CCTV recordings which were to be played during the course of her opening address (which, as we have noted, was being televised) were not permitted to be broadcast until further order. Although not specified, it seems clear that the order proposed by counsel was an order to be made pursuant to s 151(3). The Commissioner made the orders sought.
28 Counsel assisting the Commission then opened on the facts. During that opening she presented and played the CCTV recordings to the Commission. Before doing so, she sought and obtained confirmation that the CCTV recordings were 'to be suppressed until further order', which can be taken to be a shorthand reference to the non-disclosure order made by the Commissioner pursuant to s 151(3) of the Act. The recordings were played in a number of instalments, and the Commissioner reiterated that 'at least until further order any reproduction of that footage has been suppressed, [and] is prohibited' (ts 10/6/13, 15). Counsel for the intervener informed the court that the cameras present during the public examination did not record the playing of the CCTV recordings.
29 After counsel's opening was completed, a number of witnesses were called. They were asked about the events depicted in the CCTV recordings. Transcript of that day's proceedings, including the opening observations of the Commissioner, the opening address of counsel assisting the Commissioner, and the evidence of the witnesses was published, and remains published, on the website of the Commission. It seems that no specific order was made, or certificate granted, to enable that publication to occur (although before each witness was sworn, the Commissioner advised the witness that he had determined that the examination was to be conducted in public, and that the evidence to be given by the witness may be published in due course).
30 The public examination resumed on 11 June 2013. The appellant attended in answer to a summons issued by the Commission requiring him to attend and be examined.
31 Prior to his examination, counsel for the appellant applied to the Commissioner under s 140(4) of the Act for an order that his examination be closed to the public. Counsel for the appellant submitted that holding his examination in public may be prejudicial to the appellant. In essence, she contended that if he was charged with criminal offences arising from the incident at some later point, and the examination was public and published in the media, his answers at the hearing could be indirectly used against him in relation to those later charges. She characterised this as an impermissible 'derivative use' of the answers, which she submitted would also undermine the appellant's 'right to silence'. Further, if the examination generated media attention, counsel submitted that this could lead to the jury at his trial having regard to the appellant's answers given at the hearing when considering their verdict (ts 11/6/13, 4 - 7, 10).
32 Counsel assisting the Commission submitted that if the appellant was charged, the matter might be dealt with in the Magistrates Court, or if it was dealt with in the District Court the appellant could apply to be tried by judge alone, potentially minimising any prejudice incurred from the public examination (ts 11/6/13, 7-8). Such prejudice would also be limited, in her submission, by the orders made suppressing the appellant's identifying details.
33 In reply, counsel for the appellant submitted that the issue concerned the erosion of the appellant's privacy, and repeated her submissions regarding the potential prejudice to the appellant from the public examination.
34 The Commissioner ruled that it was appropriate for the examination of the appellant to be in public, on the condition that the appellant's name and identifying details be suppressed. He had regard to, but ultimately rejected the appellant's submissions that a public examination would prejudice the appellant in any future criminal trial or amount to an impermissible 'derivative use'. He adopted the submissions of counsel assisting the Commission (ts 12). He accepted that the potential prejudice to the appellant was outweighed by the benefits of a public examination, and that prejudice to any future trial of the appellant could be addressed by suppression orders relating to his identifying details and by appropriate directions to the jury, which they should be assumed to have the capacity to follow (ts 11/6/13, 12).
35 The Commissioner's decision to decline to make an order closing the examination for the purposes of taking the appellant's evidence has not been challenged by the appellant at any stage. His evidence was given during the course of the public examination and subsequently transcribed and published on the website of the Commission. Counsel assisting the Commission examined the appellant at length in relation to the events depicted on the CCTV recordings, and at a number of points during the course of that examination portions of the CCTV recordings were played to the appellant. At various points during his evidence, the appellant denied the interpretation of the images depicted in the CCTV recordings put to him by counsel assisting the Commission. The examination of the appellant occupied all of that day's hearing.
36 The public examination resumed on 12 June 2013. More witnesses were called. Portions of the CCTV recordings were put to some of those witnesses during the course of their examination. As with the previous day's proceedings, the evidence given by those witnesses was transcribed and published on the website of the Commission, apparently without any specific order to that effect being made, although each witness was warned by the Commissioner that this was likely to occur before being sworn.
37 The public examination continued on 13 June 2013. Counsel representing a number of media organisations announced his appearance and challenged the validity of the 'suppression orders' made by the Commission restricting publication of the CCTV recordings. Submissions were put on a number of grounds, including an asserted lack of statutory power. In response to those submissions, the Commissioner referred counsel for the media organisations to s 151(3) of the Act. Counsel representing the media organisations then put further submissions in support of the proposition that the CCTV recordings should be released.
38 In reply, counsel assisting the Commission cited Ex parte WA Newspapers Ltd [2008] WASCA 209; (2008) 38 WAR 177 in support of the proposition that s 152 of the Act applied to the CCTV recordings, because they came within the definition of 'official information' notwithstanding that those recordings had been played during the course of a public examination. She submitted that it was therefore necessary for a disclosure to fall within one of the provisions of s 152(4) before the CCTV recordings could be disclosed by the Commission to the media. As we have already noted, the proceedings before the Commissioner, the primary judge and this appeal have all been conducted on this basis, which has not been challenged.
39 Counsel assisting the Commission also responded orally to written submissions that had been presented to the Commission by counsel for the appellant in opposition to the disclosure of the CCTV recordings. Those submissions proceeded upon the assumption that disclosure could only occur if a certificate was issued by the Commission to the effect that disclosure was necessary in the public interest, in accordance with s 152(4)(c) of the Act. In those written submissions, the issue of such a certificate was opposed on a number of grounds including:
(1) that disclosure may prejudice the safety or reputation of the appellant, and would defeat the efficacy of any non-disclosure order in respect of the appellant's identity;
(2) that publication would be unfair to persons depicted in the footage, as they have not been charged with any offences;
(3) that disclosure may affect the integrity of any criminal investigation into the appellant; and
(4) that public disclosure could prejudice the fairness of a trial in relation to any criminal or civil proceedings arising from the incidents, and this would be prejudicial to the administration of justice.
40 In response, counsel assisting the Commission submitted that:
(1) the CCTV footage constituted 'official information' and therefore s 152 of the Act, and specifically s 152(4), had to be considered when determining whether the footage could be released;
(2) section 151 was not applicable, because s 151(5) provides that s 151 does not apply to the Commission in relation to a restricted matter that is official information; and
(3) pursuant to s 152(4), the footage can be disclosed if disclosure is necessary in the public interest (s 152(4)(c)).
41 Counsel assisting the Commission spoke to the public interest in the disclosure of the footage. She commenced by addressing the appellant's submissions with respect to the prejudice which might arise from the release of the CCTV recordings. She responded to the submission that the release may prejudice the safety or reputation of the appellant by observing that his identity had been suppressed. In her submission, this, alongside the pixelation of his face in any footage, would be effective to obscure the appellant's identity. In relation to the submission that the release of the footage would be unfair to the persons depicted in the footage, and may impact upon any investigation, counsel noted that the footage was sourced from police cameras and that the footage added little to the publicly reported evidence other than demonstrating visually what happened. As regards the allegation that disclosure may prejudice the fairness of any trial of the appellant, counsel observed that the footage would be admissible evidence at any trial (ts 13/6/13, 27).
42 Counsel assisting then addressed the reasons why in her submission it was in the public interest for the footage to be released. She relied upon the reasons she had enunciated in the course of her opening address explaining why the examination was being conducted in public as being relevant to the determination of whether release of the footage was necessary in the public interest; namely that the release of the footage would assist in maintaining public confidence that such incidents are being thoroughly and transparently investigated, that the release of the footage would be educative of police officers, and that it may encourage further complaints.
43 Counsel assisting noted that one of the core functions of the Commission is to educate. She submitted that this function extends to educating police officers, encouraging them to consider and take seriously their duty of care, and their duties to report and intervene. She pointed out that the appellant had said that he did not use excessive force, and submitted that in order to enhance the education function people should be allowed to assess whether that was the case by reference to the footage itself. For these reasons, she submitted that the release of the footage was necessary in the public interest.
44 Counsel for the appellant made oral submissions to the effect that:
(1) the Commissioner should focus on s 152 of the Act when determining whether to release the footage (ts 13/6/13, 31), and the release of such footage must be necessary in the public interest;
(2) the principles of open justice are of little or no relevance to the proceedings of the Commission, which are governed by specific statutory provisions vesting decisions with respect to public access with the Commission (citing Ex parte West Australian Newspapers);
(3) in considering the Commission's discretion under s 152, in Ex parte West Australian Newspapers the majority in the Court of Appeal held that it was relevant that there was no pending investigation or trial that could be compromised by the publication of the material;
(4) when considering whether to make a non-publication order, an important consideration is the need to preserve the integrity and efficacy of any future investigation, and that it was unclear what effect the release of the footage would have on the investigation of criminal charges;
(5) the Commission's primary function is to deal with misconduct. Whilst the Commission may have a role in assisting in the eradication of misconduct, the performance of this function is enhanced by the Commission ensuring that prosecutions will ultimately be conducted fairly. Publication of the CCTV recordings prior to them being tested in court might compromise the ability to investigate or charge a person with criminal offences;
(6) it was likely that the appellant would face criminal charges, and may be tried by jury, and therefore showing the CCTV recordings to the public may impinge upon the fairness of his trial because members of the public may have pre-judged the appellant based on such recordings;
(7) such prejudice could not be removed by directions to the jury, and even if directions are given, this overlooks the underlying principle which is that information should not be disclosed if the Commission forms the view that it may prejudice the fair trial of an individual;
(8) no weight should be given to the argument of counsel assisting the Commission that the public interest was served by the release of the CCTV recordings in furtherance of the Commission's education function. The Commissioner of Police should instruct his officers what is acceptable behaviour. Even if the disclosure of the footage is educative to police, and police form part of the public at large, it does not follow that disclosure of these images of the appellant before any trial is 'necessary' in the public interest;
(9) the public have had described to them by reporters the contents of the CCTV recordings, and the appellant's evidence of the events depicted on the CCTV recordings. The public's confidence in the transparency of the Commission and of its investigative procedures has already been served by the fact the examinations had been held in public; and
(10) regard must be had to the risk to the appellant's reputation.
45 The Commissioner was of the view that the 'suppression' or 'non-disclosure' order made in relation to the CCTV recordings should be lifted (ts 13/6/13, 44) and certified that disclosure of those recordings to the media, with the faces of persons whose identities had been suppressed pixelated, was necessary in the public interest under s 152(4)(c). He said that 'largely for the reasons put foward by senior counsel for the Commission' (ts 13/6/13, 44), the CCTV recordings should be released to the public including the media. He went on to identify the reasons, additional to those identified by counsel, why in his view release of the recordings was necessary in the public interest, stating:
I think the order in the circumstances in which this matter has proceeded really flows from the order that was made that there be a public examination. What has occurred is that counsel, senior counsel, has opened on a particular basis in relation to that material. Some evidence has been given by some witnesses in relation to that material.
Ms Vernon's client, D5, has given evidence which has strongly challenged a number of factual aspects. This is, to take a term from another context, really a case of best evidence. The position now is that different parties have talked about the same observable piece of information and have given extremely different descriptions of that and in those circumstances, the hearing being a public hearing, in my view it would almost be a perversion to leave the matter as it is.
I'm quite satisfied that it is necessary in the public interest that this material, which is objective material, be allowed to be in the public domain, given the dichotomy in relation to the evidence that has been arrived at. I think that is relevant to the function of [the] commission of which senior counsel has spoken. That is not expressly in relation to D5, but rather in relation to the commission's obligation to exercise oversight of [sic] a particular branch of the public service, that being the police force, and to inform in the way that senior counsel has described.
I arrive at that conclusion pursuant to section 152 subsection (4)(c) and I certify that disclosure is necessary in the public interest for those reasons. In those circumstances it is not necessary for me to consider whether or not section 152(4)(a) would permit disclosure. Clearly, the test under that section would be substantially lower than that in relation to subsection (4)(c) and, clearly, if that was available then, having regard to what I have said, then disclosure would be appropriate under that subsection, but it is not necessary for me to arrive at that point (ts 13/6/13, 44 - 45).
46 Therefore, whilst the Commissioner 'largely' adopted the submissions of counsel assisting, he did not adopt the submission that the CCTV recordings added little to the publicly reported evidence regarding the incident. Rather, he regarded the CCTV recordings as providing a necessary context to the evidence adduced by those summoned to attend the public examinations, and that the examinations could not be properly or accurately understood by the public without reference to the footage.
47 The appellant commenced proceedings seeking writs of certiorari and prohibition to quash the Commissioner's decision to disclose the CCTV recordings and to prevent the Commission from releasing the CCTV recordings to the media. The appellant alleged that the Commissioner's decision to disclose was a 'wrongful exercise of the discretion'. The appellant also asserted that the Commissioner:
(1) failed to take into account relevant considerations, namely:
(a) the need to preserve the integrity and efficacy of the investigation and subsequent proceedings;
(b) the prejudice to the appellant's safety, reputation and right to a fair trial; and
(c) the effect of publication of the CCTV recordings on a website; and
(2) took into account irrelevant considerations; namely the need to disclose the CCTV recordings to police officers as part of the education function of the second respondent.
48 The primary judge was not persuaded that the Commissioner made any error in construing s 152(4)(c), or that he exercised powers under that section for a purpose other than that for which the power was conferred. He interpreted the appellant's argument that the Commissioner exercised his discretion 'wrongly' as a submission that the Commission misconstrued s 152(4)(c) or exercised its power for a purpose other than those for which it was conferred. His Honour accepted that s 152(4)(c) required more than merely establishing that the disclosure was in the public interest; rather, it needed to be 'necessary' in the public interest. However, he held that the Commissioner had in fact found that disclosure was necessary in the public interest, and observed:
Necessary is capable of a wide range of meanings. The meaning will depend on the statutory context. One meaning is needing to be done, or essential. As the High Court has observed, there is, in Australia, 'a long history of judicial and legislative use of the term "necessary" not as meaning essential or indispensable, but as meaning reasonably appropriate and adapted': Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission [2004] HCA 41; (2004) 220 CLR 181 [39]. See, for example, the cases outlined by O'Keefe J in Elcham v Commissioner of Police [2001] NSWSC 614; (2001) 53 NSWLR 7 [48] - [56]. In some contexts, necessary may not mean essential but merely conducive: Lithgow City Council v Jackson [2011] HCA 36; (2011) 244 CLR 352 [53].
In my view, no error of construction of s 152(4)(c) is revealed in the reasons of the Commissioner. The question for the CCC was whether disclosure was necessary in the public interest. That is the question which the Commissioner asked and answered. The Act does not spell out explicitly the considerations relevant to the public interest in s 152(4)(c), and as to the considerations bearing on whether disclosure is necessary in the public interest. That silence is an indication of the breadth of the discretionary decision entrusted to the decision-maker. Whether he took into account all mandatory relevant considerations, or an irrelevant consideration, is dealt with in grounds 2 and 3 [72] - [73].
49 The primary judge found that there was no failure by the Commissioner to take into account the considerations alleged by the appellant to be relevant when making the decision to release the CCTV recordings, and concluded that he did not therefore have to determine whether such considerations were mandatory [84] - [85].
50 In relation to the allegation that the Commissioner took account of irrelevant considerations, the primary judge found that the provisions of s 17(2)(ca) of the Act specifically authorised the Commission to take into account its education function in exercising its power under s 152(4)(c) of the Act.
51 For those reasons, the appellant's case was dismissed.
52 Following an amendment made at the commencement of the appeal hearing, the grounds of appeal are as follows:
1.1 as to the meaning of 'necessary' in section 152(4)(c), when he ought to have found that the ordinary and natural meaning of 'necessary' is 'essential';
1.2 as to the considerations which the first respondent was bound to take into account in applying the test, when he ought to have found that the first respondent was bound to take into account the following relevant considerations:
1.2.1 the need to preserve the integrity of and efficacy of the investigation and subsequent proceedings;
1.2.2 the prejudice to the applicant's safety, reputation and right to a fair trial;
1.2.3 the effect of publication of the CCTV footage being published [sic] on a website,
1.3 that the first respondent was required to balance or weigh up the mandatory relevant considerations and any countervailing factors before determining whether disclosure was necessary in the public interest, when he ought to have so found.
2.1 determine the meaning of 'necessary' in section 152(4)(c);
2.2 identify the mandatory relevant considerations to be taken into account in deciding that disclosure is necessary in the public interest;
2.3 take into account the following mandatory relevant considerations:
2.3.1 the need to preserve the integrity of and efficacy of the investigation and subsequent proceedings;
2.3.2 the prejudice to the applicant's safety, reputation and right to a fair trial;
2.3.3 the effect of publication of the CCTV footage being published on a website;
2.4 conduct the exercise of balancing or weighing up those considerations in 2.3 above;
2.5 give any reasons for concluding why disclosure was 'necessary in the public interest',
and thereby the first respondent misconstrued section 152(4)(c) of the Act.
3.1.1 supporting the first respondent's decision to order a public examination;
3.1.2 exercising oversight of the police service;
3.2 without regard to why disclosure was necessary in the public interest,
and thereby exercised the power for a wrongful purpose or for a purpose other than the purpose for which the power is conferred.
4.1 the need to preserve the integrity of and efficacy of the investigation and subsequent proceedings;
4.2 the prejudice to the applicant's safety, reputation and right to a fair trial;
4.3 the effect of publication of the CCTV footage being published on a website,
were relevant considerations which the first respondent was bound to take into account in applying the test in section 152(4)(c) of the Act [84 - 85], when he ought to have found on a proper construction of the scope, object and purpose of the Act that such considerations were mandatory.
53 Later in the hearing of the appeal, the appellant sought leave of the court to amend his grounds of appeal to include a ground alleging unreasonableness. The proposed ground is in the following terms:
6.1. was so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it; or
6.2. alternatively was unreasonable in that it lacked an evident and intelligible justification by reason of the first respondent:
6.2.1. giving more weight than was reasonably necessary to the significance of the CCC's prevention and education function pursuant to section 17 of the Act;
6.2.2. giving more weight than was reasonably necessary to the fact of the decisions made on 10 June 2013 to conduct the hearings generally in public, and on 11 June 2013 to conduct the appellant's examination specifically in public pursuant to section 140 of the Act;
6.2.3. giving insufficient weight to the potential prejudice to the appellant's fundamental right to a fair trial consequent upon the decision to conduct his examination in public.
54 The court reserved its decision on whether the appellant should be granted leave to rely on this proposed ground and directed the exchange of written submissions on the question of whether leave to amend should be granted and dealing with the substance of the ground, on the basis that those issues would be determined without further oral argument.
55 The appellant's grounds of appeal may therefore be divided into five categories; namely:
56 In essence, all grounds allege that the Commissioner exceeded the jurisdiction conferred upon him by the Act.
57 Where a decision-maker makes a decision outside the limits of the functions and powers conferred upon him or her, or does something which he or she lacks power to do, there will be a jurisdictional error. In Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163 (Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ), the High Court provided the following inclusive definition of jurisdictional error:
If such an administrative tribunal falls into an error of law which causes it to identify a wrong issue, to ask itself a wrong question, to ignore relevant material, to rely on irrelevant material or, at least in some circumstances, to make an erroneous finding or to reach a mistaken conclusion and the tribunal's exercise or purported exercise of power is thereby affected, it exceeds its authority or powers. Such an error of law is jurisdictional error which will invalidate any order or decision of the tribunal which reflects it (179).
58 In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; (2001) 206 CLR 323, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ referred to the non-exhaustive list of jurisdictional errors outlined in Craig, and continued:
Those different kinds of error may well overlap. The circumstances of a particular case may permit more than one characterisation of the error identified, for example, as the decision-maker both asking the wrong question and ignoring relevant material. What is important, however, is that identifying a wrong issue, asking a wrong question, ignoring relevant material or relying on irrelevant material in a way that affects the exercise of power is to make an error of law. Further, doing so results in the decision-maker exceeding the authority or powers given by the relevant statute. In other words, if an error of those types is made, the decision-maker did not have authority to make the decision that was made; he or she did not have jurisdiction to make it [82].
See also - Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission (NSW) [2010] HCA 1; (2010) 239 CLR 531 [67].
Did the Commissioner make a jurisdictional error of law?
59 In grounds 1.1, 2.1, 2.5 and 3.2, the appellant asserts that the primary judge erred in his construction of s 152(4)(c) of the Act. The appellant submits that 152(4)(c) involves a two-stage test which must be satisfied prior to the Commissioner certifying that official information should be disclosed; first, that the disclosure is in the public interest, and second that the disclosure is 'necessary' in the public interest. He asserts that the primary judge erred in his construction of 'necessary' in s 152(4)(c), contending that it is not enough that the disclosure merely serves the public interest, but rather that it must be 'essential' in the public interest. He further alleges that both the Commissioner and the primary judge erred in failing to actually determine the meaning of 'necessary' in s 152(4)(c) at all.
60 Whilst the character of the error said to have been made by the Commissioner is not pellucidly clear, the substance of the allegation appears to be that the Commissioner failed to interpret s 152(4)(c) as requiring the disclosure of official information to be 'necessary' in the sense of 'essential' in the public interest, thereby misdirecting himself and posing for resolution the wrong question, and committing an error of the kind referred to in Craig v State of South Australia, 179. The appellant submits that the primary judge erred in failing to recognise this error.
61 The appellant submits that 'necessary' in s 152(4)(c) means 'essential' using that word in accordance with its definition in the Macquarie Dictionary, namely, 'absolutely necessary' or 'indispensible'. The appellant submits that, on a proper construction of s 152(4)(c), the Commission cannot certify that the release of information is in the public interest unless it is satisfied that the release of the information is 'absolutely necessary' or 'indispensible' to the maintenance or advancement of the public interest.
62 In support of this construction of s 152(4)(c), the appellant relies upon the oft-cited principle that in interpreting a statutory provision, a court should generally strive to give effect to every word of the provision - see Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; (1998) 194 CLR 355, 382 (McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ); Commonwealth v Baume [1905] HCA 11; (1905) 2 CLR 405, 414 - 415 (Griffith CJ), 419 (O'Connor J); Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1, 12 - 13 (Mason CJ).
63 The appellant also relies on a number of authorities to the effect that necessary means more than convenient, reasonable or sensible - Hogan v Australian Crime Commission [2010] HCA 21; (2010) 240 CLR 651 [31], referred to in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Ltd (No 3) [2012] FCA 1430 [19] (ACCC v Air New Zealand).
64 Hogan involved the interpretation of s 50 of the Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth), which conferred a power on the Court to make non-publication orders where it 'appears to the Court to be necessary in order to prevent prejudice to the administration of justice or the security of the Commonwealth'.
65 The High Court unanimously held that '[a]s it appears in s 50', necessary is a strong word, and that the collocation of necessity to prevent prejudice to the administration of justice and necessity to prevent prejudice to the security of the Commonwealth suggests that Parliament was not dealing with trivialities [30] (referring to Australian Broadcasting Commission v Parish [1980] FCA 33; (1980) 43 FLR 129; (1980) 29 ALR 228, 234).
66 However, the meaning of any statutory provision must be determined 'by reference to the language of the instrument viewed as a whole' - Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1981] HCA 26; (1981) 147 CLR 297, 320, cited with approval in Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [69].
67 As is apparent from the reasoning of the High Court in Hogan, and as was noted by the primary judge, the word 'necessary' is capable of a range of meanings. In other contexts the word has been construed as meaning 'reasonably required' or 'legally ancillary' to the achievement of the purpose for which the act is said to be 'necessary' - see for instance Levi v Australian Securities Investments Commission (No 2) [2013] NSWSC 932 [29] - [34]; State Drug Crime Commission of New South Wales v Chapman (1987) 12 NSWLR 447, 452; National Crime Authority v Gould [1989] FCA 477; (1989) 23 FCR 191, 195.
68 Of course, the meaning to be given to the word 'necessary' will depend upon the particular statutory context in which the word is used, and the purpose of the legislature evident in the language of the statute as a whole - see Elcham v Commissioner of Police [2001] NSWSC 614 [58], where O'Keefe J conveniently summarises a number of cases demonstrating the meaning given to the word 'necessary' in different statutory contexts [49] - [55].
69 Helpful guidance as to the proper meaning to be given to the word 'necessary' viewed in the context of s 152(4)(c) of the Act is provided by the decision of Chief Baron Pollock in Attorney-General v Walker [1849] EngR 223; (1849) 3 Exch 242; 154 ER 833, which was referred to by Gaudron, Gummow and Callinan JJ in Pelechowski v Registrar, Court of Appeal (NSW) [1999] HCA 19; (1999) 198 CLR 435 [51].
70 In Attorney-General v Walker, the statute under consideration provided, in effect, that it was lawful for any person to make bricks for the sole purpose of draining wetlands without any duty being charged or chargeable in respect of such bricks. However, this was subject to the provision that it would not be lawful for any person to make use of any such bricks for 'any other purpose' than draining wetlands 'and in constructing the necessary drains, gouts, culverts, arches and walls of the brickwork, [must be] proper and necessarily required for effecting and maintaining the drainage of such lands' (emphasis added).
71 The defendant had undertaken the construction of various drains in order to drain an area of wetland, and had used bricks for that purpose on which he had paid no duty. As part of the overall works, the defendant also erected certain bridges, parapets and the like in order to protect the public from the drains which had been created. Bricks were used for these bridges, parapets and the like upon which the defendant had also not paid any duty. The question was whether the defendant had committed an offence by using bricks upon which it had paid no duty for these latter additional works. As the headnote indicates, Parke B, Alderson B and Rolfe B held that the words 'necessarily required' in the statute meant 'physically necessary' or 'reasonably used with reference to physical necessity', and that the exemption from duty was confined to such bricks as were used in the drains, gouts et cetera themselves. Pollock CB dissented and said, amongst other things, that the word 'necessary' in this context does not mean 'absolutely necessary'. His Lordship said:
The rule I am prepared to lay down is this, that 'drain-bricks' may be used in constructing rains, and all gouts, culverts, arches, and walls, which are physically or legally necessary for the existence and maintenance of the drains, and that in this (as in every other case), the word 'necessary' does not mean absolutely necessary, but reasonably necessary with reference to the circumstances of the case. My learned brothers appear to think, - indeed, they have so given their judgments, - that the act permits the use of duty-free bricks only in the case of physical necessity. In my judgment, the framers of this law did not intend to provide against the laws of nature, in utter oblivion and forgetfulness of the laws of the land ... So, if a large open drain be made in a country where its existence as an open drain would be dangerous to the lives of her Majesty's subjects, who might be passing of right on a public or private way near to it, (or even might be trespassing where no way existed), here, I think, there is a legal necessity to protect the public from danger, and a parapet wall, to protect at once the public and the drain, is as essential a part of such drain as the act contemplates, as is the portion of it in which the water flows; and such a wall is proper and necessary, and may be constructed of duty-free bricks, without incurring a penalty (838 - 839).
I think, if the walls and arches complained of were proper and necessarily required, whether by physical necessity or by law of the land - if they were immediately connected with and arising out of the making of the drain, so that physically or legally, the one could not be made or exist without the other, that the defendant is entitled to our judgment (842). (emphasis added)
73 It is apparent, particularly from the last mentioned passage, that his Lordship considered that what was necessary involved a consideration of whether the drainage works could reasonably be executed or could exist without the additional works. In other words, in determining whether the additional works were necessary, the question of whether there was, in the circumstances, any, or any reasonable, alternative to doing such works, was of significance.
74 His Lordship's observations, with reference to what was reasonably required, both physically and legally, were referred to by Allen J in State Drug Crime Commission of New South Wales v Chapman, 452. Allen J said that the word 'necessary' in the legislative context in that case was to be subjected to the 'touchstone of reasonableness', and that the concept is one as to what reasonably is necessary in a common sense way. It was those observations which were referred to with approval by the majority in Pelechowski v Registrar, Court of Appeal (New South Wales) [51]. In that case, the word 'necessary' did not appear in a statute which was under consideration. Rather, the meaning of the word 'necessary' arose in the context of a consideration of a discussion by Dawson J in Grassby v The Queen [1989] HCA 45; (1989) 168 CLR 1, as to the implied powers of an inferior court where Dawson J had said that:
[E]very court undoubtedly possesses jurisdiction arising by implication upon the principle that a grant of power carries with it everything necessary for its exercise (16). (emphasis added)
75 In that context, the majority in Pelechowski observed:
The term 'necessary' in such a setting as this is to be understood in the sense given it by Pollock CB in Attorney-General v Walker, namely, as identifying a power to make orders which are reasonably required or legally ancillary to the accomplishment of the specific remedies for enforcement provided in Div 4 of Pt 3 of the District Court Act. In this setting, the term 'necessary' does not have the meaning of 'essential'; rather it is to be 'subjected to the touchstone of reasonableness' [51].
76 Their Honours' observation that the word 'necessary' identifies that which is 'reasonably required' may aptly be applied to the construction of the word 'necessary' in the context of s 152(4)(c) of the Act. That which is reasonably required is to be contrasted with that which is absolutely necessary or indispensable. Acceptance of the proposition that the Commission must be satisfied that disclosure is 'required' before exercising the power conferred by s 152(4)(c) 'directs the decision-maker to identify a high-threshold public interest before the power can be exercised' in Osland v Secretary to the Department of Justice (No 2) [2010] HCA 24; (2010) 241 CLR 320 [14] (French CJ, Gummow and Bell JJ). To paraphrase the dicta in Osland, it is not enough that disclosure could be justified in the public interest. Rather, it must be 'required', in the sense that the public interest would not be maintained or advanced unless the information is disclosed.
77 Nevertheless, to borrow again from the language used by their Honours in Osland, the terminology used in s 152(4)(c) of the Act 'does not define a rule so much as an evaluative standard requiring restraint in the exercise of the power' [14]. The application of that evaluative standard will be 'predicated on fact - value complexes, not on mere facts' (Osland [14]) and 'subjected to the touchstone of reasonableness' (see Pelechowski [51], citing State Drug Crime Commission of NSW v Chapman, 452).
78 Consistently with this construction of the word 'necessary', it may readily be accepted that it is 'a strong word' - see Hogan [30]. It can also be accepted that disclosure cannot be permitted pursuant to s 152(4)(c) merely because it is 'reasonable' or 'convenient' or 'sensible' - Hogan [31]. However, this construction of the word 'necessary' falls well short of the appellant's proposition that it means 'essential' in the sense of absolutely necessary or indispensable to the maintenance or advancement of the public interest. It is significant that the appellant has been unable to identify any prior decision in which the word 'necessary' has been construed as bearing the meaning 'essential' in any statutory context analogous to the present, or indeed at all.
79 There are a number of considerations which support this construction of the word 'necessary' in the context of s 152(4)(c). Foremost is the nature of the purpose to be achieved by disclosure - namely, the furtherance of the public interest. The determination of what will advance the public interest is generally a discretionary judgment often confined only by the subject matter, scope and purpose of the Act conferring the power to make the assessment - see O'Sullivan v Farrer [1989] HCA 61; (1989) 168 CLR 210, 216; Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission (NSW) v Browning [1947] HCA 21; (1947) 74 CLR 492, 505 (Dixon J); R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; ex parte 2HD Pty Ltd [1979] HCA 62; (1979) 144 CLR 45, 49; FAI Insurances Ltd v Winneke [1982] HCA 26; (1982) 151 CLR 342, 368 (Mason J); Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 87 ALJR 618 [24] (French CJ); [67] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ) (Li); Re Minister for Resources; ex parte Cazaly Iron Pty Ltd [2007] WASCA 175 [19] (Pullin JA).
80 Questions with respect to the ascertainment of the public interest will rarely have one dimension - McKinnon v Secretary, Department of Treasury [2006] HCA 45; (2006) 228 CLR 423 [55] (Hayne J); Osland v Secretary to the Department of Justice [2008] HCA 37; (2008) 234 CLR 275 [137] (Hayne J); Re Minister for Resources; ex parte Cazaly Iron Pty Ltd [80] (Buss JA). Very often the ascertainment of the public interest will require the consideration of a number of competing factors or considerations, or differing features or facets of the public interest - see Osland v Secretary to the Department of Justice [137].
81 Further, the ascertainment of what is 'necessary in the public interest' for the purposes of the grant of a certificate in accordance with s 152(4)(c) of the Act will be undertaken in a context in which the range of 'official information' received by the Commission may be extremely broad (see Corruption and Crime Commission v Allen), and in a context in which the functions to be performed by the Commission in the furtherance of the public interest are many and varied. In such a context it is difficult to envisage many, if any, circumstances in which disclosure could be said to be 'essential' to the advancement of the public interest in the sense of absolutely essential or indispensable to its maintenance or advancement. The multi-faceted nature of the public interest, and the likelihood of a discretionary judgment balancing competing considerations being required in the exercise of the power conferred by s 152(4)(c) in this statutory context are, in our view, incompatible with the proposition that a certificate can only be issued if the Commission concludes that disclosure is 'essential' to advance the public interest. Rather, these considerations reinforce the view that s 152(4)(c) imposes 'an evaluative standard requiring restraint in the exercise of the power', and require a value judgment to be made 'subjected to the touchstone of reasonableness'.
82 Given the protean concept of the public interest, and the context in which the Commission will be required to apply the evaluative standard imposed by s 152(4)(c), it may well be that reasonable minds differ on the question of whether disclosure is 'necessary' in the particular circumstances at hand. However, that evaluative judgment is entrusted to the Commission, not the court.
83 As we have noted, the nature of the error said to have been committed by the Commissioner in relation to the proper construction of s 152(4)(c) is not pellucidly clear from the grounds of appeal or the argument advanced in support of those grounds. At points the argument seemed to be advanced on the basis that the error lay in the Commissioner failing to determine what 'necessary' meant, at other points the argument appeared to contend that the Commissioner had not in fact found that disclosure 'was necessary', and at other points the argument appeared to contend that the Commissioner erred by failing to construe 'necessary' as meaning 'essential'. To the extent that the argument advances the latter contention, it must be rejected for the reasons we have already given.
84 To the extent that the appellant's argument incorporates the proposition that the Commissioner was obliged but failed to enunciate the construction which he placed upon the word 'necessary' it must be rejected. No authority has been advanced in support of the proposition that it is a condition of the exercise of an administrative power of the kind conferred by s 152(4)(c) of the Act that the decision-maker enunciate the construction which he or she places upon the words used in the conferral of the power. Moreover, the Commissioner enunciated the reasons for his conclusion that disclosure was necessary in the public interest. The substance of the appellant's complaint is that he is dissatisfied with that conclusion.
85 Further, to the extent that the argument advanced asserts that the Commissioner failed to decide that disclosure was necessary in the public interest, it must be rejected. It is clear from the terms in which the Commissioner announced his decision that he directed his mind to the statutory formulation of the power conferred by s 152(4)(c) of the Act, and in particular to the question of whether disclosure was necessary in the public interest. It is implicit from the reasons he gave, and in particular his view that 'it would be almost a perversion to leave the matter as it is', that he concluded that disclosure was required in the public interest, in that the public interest would not be served without disclosure.
86 For these reasons, the various grounds of appeal relating to the interpretation and application of s 152(4)(c) of the Act (grounds 1.1, 2.1, 2.5 and 3.2) must be dismissed.
Did the Commissioner fail to take into account relevant considerations?
87 The appellant also alleges that the Commissioner committed a jurisdictional error by failing to take into the following considerations, which he contends were mandatory and relevant:
(a) the need to preserve the integrity of and efficacy of the investigation and subsequent proceedings;
(b) the prejudice to the appellant's safety, reputation and right to a fair trial; and
(c) the effect of publication of the CCTV recordings on a website.
General Principles - Failure to take account of relevant considerations
88 Where it is alleged that there has been a failure to take into account a relevant consideration, the decision will only be vitiated by jurisdictional error if, on the proper construction of the act in question, the decision-maker was bound to take the consideration into account, as a condition of the valid exercise of the power conferred - Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd [1986] HCA 40; (1986) 162 CLR 24, 39 (Mason J) (Peko-Wallsend); Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority [91] - [93].
89 The factors which a decision-maker is bound to consider are determined by construction of the statute in which the discretionary power is conferred. If the discretion is unconfined by the statute, they must be determined by implication from the subject matter, scope and purpose of the act - Peko-Wallsend, 39 - 40 (Mason J); R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; ex parte 2HD Pty Ltd, 49 - 50.
90 It must be recognised that, between matters a decision maker is bound to take into account, and those irrelevant considerations which the decision-maker is prohibited from considering, there may be a wide range of permissible considerations which the decision-maker may weigh or disregard without committing an error of law. It has been emphasised that a decision maker is not to be criticised for failing to consider everything which the affected party has chosen to include in an exhaustive list of all matters which the decision maker might conceivably regard as relevant - Sean Investments Pty Ltd v MacKellar [1981] FCA 191; (1981) 38 ALR 363, 375; Peko-Wallsend, 39 (Mason J); Lo v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2013] NSWCA 180 [9].
91 The court should be cautious when reviewing decisions on the basis of relevancy and irrelevancy so as to not stray into merits review - Peko-Wallsend Ltd, 40 - 41 (Mason J); Bruce v Cole (1998) 45 NSWLR 163; Zhang v Canterbury City Council [2001] NSWCA 167; (2001) 51 NSWLR 589. The weight which is to be given to a relevant factor is generally a matter for the decision-maker, and the preferred ground for setting aside an administrative decision taken without giving adequate weight to a relevant factor is that the decision is unreasonable - Peko-Wallsend, 41; Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1947] EWCA Civ 1; [1948] 1 KB 223, 230, 233 - 234; see also Li [72] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ).
92 There are divergent authorities on the question of what is required to satisfy the duty to take into account relevant considerations - Re Mactiernan; ex parte Coogee Coastal Action Coalition Incorporated [2004] WASC 264 [62]. One view is that proper, genuine and realistic consideration is required - Khan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1987] FCA 457; (1987) 14 ALD 291, 292 (Gummow J); see also Re Minister for Resources; ex parte Cazaly Iron Pty Ltd [226]. The alternative view is that provided the matter is given some consideration, the duty is discharged - see Peko-Wallsend, 40 - 41. In Re Shire of Carnarvon; ex parte Humphrey [2005] WASCA 182, McLure JA (Le Miere AJA agreeing) noted that 'the preponderance of authority is to the effect that the duty requires proper, genuine and realistic consideration of the relevant matter', referring to Khan and Williams v Minister for the Environment & Heritage [2003] FCA 535; (2003) 74 ALD 124 [60]. For the reasons which follow, it is unnecessary to resolve the differing authorities on this issue in order to resolve this case.
93 The appellant's contention that the Commissioner was obliged to take account of the effect which publication of the CCTV recordings on a website would have can be immediately rejected. Plainly there is no process of construction of the Act which would enable it to be concluded that the consequences of website publication are a consideration which must be taken into account as a condition of the exercise of the power to certify disclosure pursuant to s 152(4)(c). Rather, the appellant's contentions with respect to that consideration must properly be construed as a matter going to the other considerations upon which he relies - namely, the need to preserve the integrity and efficacy of the investigation of the appellant and any subsequent trial, and the prejudice to his safety and reputation.
94 However, there is no reason to suppose that the Commissioner did not take those matters into account at the time he gave his ruling. The ruling was given following the presentation of oral argument supported by written submissions. Counsel for the appellant dwelt at length with the considerations upon which reliance is now placed in both written and oral submissions, and counsel assisting the Commission responded to those contentions in her oral argument. The Commissioner largely adopted those arguments as part of his reasons for concluding that disclosure was necessary in the public interest. Those submissions squarely address the appellant's contentions with respect to the considerations upon which reliance is now placed - namely, the considerations pertaining to the investigation and possible trial of the appellant, and the possible prejudice to his safety and reputation.
95 In substance, the submissions advanced in support of these grounds of appeal were to the effect that the Commissioner must have failed to give adequate weight to these considerations because they compel the conclusion that disclosure of the CCTV recordings was not necessary in the public interest. However, as observed earlier, the weight to be given to a particular factor or consideration was a matter for the statutory decision-maker, not the court, unless the decision is vitiated by unreasonableness. The appellant's contentions with respect to unreasonableness will be considered in the context of proposed ground 6.
96 As it is clear that the considerations upon which the appellant relies were in fact taken into account by the Commissioner, it is, strictly speaking, unnecessary to determine whether the Commissioner was obliged to take account of those considerations as a condition of the valid exercise of the power to issue a certificate pursuant to s 152(4)(c). This was the position adopted by the primary judge. However, for the sake of completeness, given that these matters were addressed in argument, in our view, on the proper construction of the Act, consideration of the matters identified by the appellant in support of these grounds was not a condition of the valid exercise of the power conferred by s 152(4)(c) of the Act.
97 That conclusion follows from many of the same considerations which compel the conclusion that 'necessary' is not to be construed as 'essential' when used in s 152(4)(c) - namely, the characteristics which attend the ascertainment of the public interest for the purposes of that section. Given the breadth of the 'official information' which may be received by the Commission, the range of functions which may be performed by the Commission under the Act, the multi-faceted nature of the public interest pertaining to the performance of those functions, and the discretionary nature of the value judgment which must be made, and which will often require the evaluation of competing considerations in order to ascertain where the public interest lies, in our view, it is impossible to attribute to the legislature an intention that any particular considerations must be taken into account as a condition of the exercise of the power conferred other than those specified by the section itself - namely, whether disclosure is necessary in the public interest.
98 It is of significance to this question that in other provisions of the Act, the legislature has specifically identified considerations which are to be taken into account as a condition of the exercise of the relevant power conferred - see, for example, s 46(1)(c), s 99(5) and s 140(2). Of these, perhaps the most pertinent is s 140(2) in which the legislature has expressly stipulated the matters which the Commission is to weigh before deciding that an examination is to be open to the public. That question is directly analogous to the question which must be addressed by the Commission when exercising the power conferred by s 152(4)(c). If it had been the intention of the legislature to require the Commission to take into account specified matters as a condition of the valid exercise of that power, one would have expected the legislature to have taken the same approach as was taken in s 140, and for those matters to have been expressed.
99 For these reasons, the various grounds alleging that the Commissioner failed to take into account relevant considerations (grounds 1.2, 1.3, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4 and 4) must be dismissed.
Did the Commissioner take into account an irrelevant consideration?
100 In ground 5 the appellant asserts that the Commissioner exceeded the jurisdiction conferred upon him by the Act by taking into account an irrelevant consideration - namely, the education function conferred upon the Commission by s 17 of the Act. In order for this ground to succeed, it must be established that the education function of the Commission was one which the decision-maker was prohibited from considering, either by the express terms of the statute, or by implication arising from the subject matter, scope and purpose of the power being exercised - see Peko-Wallsend, 39 - 40.
101 This ground has always been doomed to fail. As we have already noted, s 17(ca) expressly requires that the Commission have regard to its prevention and education function 'in performing all of its functions'. It is therefore impossible to contend that the education function was a function which the Commission was prohibited from considering in the exercise of the power conferred by s 152(4)(c) of the Act.
102 In support of this ground, the appellant submitted that the education function was irrelevant because education of the public would never be 'necessary' in the public interest. Apart from ignoring the express requirements of s 17 of the Act, this proposition is premised upon the assumption that 'necessary' means 'essential' when used in s 152(4)(c) of the Act, a premise which must be rejected for the reasons we have given.
103 In further support of this ground, the appellant contended that the educative function was irrelevant because the function which the Commission was performing during the public examination was the investigative function, not the education function. Again this submission ignores the statutory requirement that the Commission ensure that regard be paid to its prevention and education function in the performance of all of its functions, and rests on the premise that there will be a clear division between the performance of the investigative function and the performance of the education function. That premise cannot be accepted. When the Commission determines to conduct an examination in public, it will very likely further the Commission's prevention and education function by providing information to the community with respect to the Commission's processes and the subject matter of its investigations, including the alleged misconduct the subject of the investigation.
104 In substance, the contentions advanced on behalf of the appellant in support of this ground come down to the proposition that the Commissioner erred by giving undue weight to the education function. As we have already noted, the weight to be given to particular considerations is a matter for the decision-maker, not the court, unless it can be said that the conclusion at which the decision-maker arrived was vitiated by unreasonableness, a matter to which we will shortly turn.
105 For these reasons, ground 5 of the appeal must be dismissed.
106 In the context of a consideration of the prevention and education function of the Commission, it is appropriate to deal with a submission advanced on behalf of the intervener to the effect that the CCTV recordings could, in the circumstances of the case, be properly disclosed by the Commission pursuant to s 152(4)(f) of the Act, irrespective of whether or not a certificate was issued under s 152(4)(c).
107 The CCTV recordings were disclosed at an examination that was open to the public, and accordingly were, pursuant to s 151(3), able to be disclosed (subject to s 152 - see s 151(5)). All witnesses who gave evidence with respect to the contents of the CCTV recordings, including the appellant, gave evidence by way of public examination. As noted, the decision to open the examination to the public has never been challenged.
108 As noted, s 17 of the Act requires the Commission to have regard to its prevention and education function in performing all of its functions, including the conduct of investigations in the exercise of its misconduct function. That involves providing information relevant to its prevention and education function to the general community. The decision of the Commissioner to publish the transcript of the evidence given by the witnesses at the public examination to the community at large via the Commission's website was permissible pursuant to s 152(4)(f) because it occurred in connection with the performance of the Commission's prevention and education function. The decision to publish the transcript of those examinations, including the evidence given by witnesses with respect to the CCTV recordings, has never been the subject of challenge. In that factual context, the decision of the Commissioner to make available to the media for dissemination to the general community the CCTV recordings which were the subject of conflicting evidence given by the witnesses at the public examination is equally permissible in connection with the performance of the Commission's prevention and education function, pursuant to s 152(4)(f) of the Act. This conclusion would, in itself, deny the appellant the relief which he seeks even if he had made out any of his grounds of appeal.
109 It is first necessary to consider whether the appellant should now be permitted to raise a ground which is said to vitiate the decision of the Commissioner, which was not a ground raised before the primary judge.
Can the appellant raise a new argument on appeal?
110 The appellant did not contend before the primary judge that the Commissioner's decision was vitiated by unreasonableness. Absent an express provision to the contrary, appeals to this court are by way of a rehearing - Supreme Court (Court of Appeal) Rules 2005 (WA), r 25. Yet, as Gibbs CJ, Wilson, Brennan and Dawson JJ noted in Coulton v Holcombe [1986] HCA 33; (1986) 162 CLR 1:
To say that an appeal is by way of rehearing does not mean that the issues and the evidence to be considered are at large. It is fundamental to the due administration of justice that the substantial issues between the parties are ordinarily settled at the trial. If it were not so the main arena for the settlement of disputes would move from the court of first instance to the appellate court, tending to reduce the proceedings in the former court to little more than a preliminary skirmish (7).
111 It is only in the most exceptional circumstances that a party will be permitted to raise a new argument after the case has been decided against him when he or she has failed, either deliberately or inadvertently, to put the argument during the hearing when given the opportunity to do so - see Metwally (No 2) v University of Wollongong [1985] HCA 28; (1985) 59 ALJR 481. The plurality in Coulton endorsed statements by the Court of Appeal of New South Wales in the same matter, recognising the importance of this principle in light of the public interest in
the finality of litigation; the difficulty of inducing an appeal court to consider new facts; the undesirability of encouraging tactical decisions not to present an issue at first instance; keeping it in reserve for appeal; and the need for vigilance to avoid injustice to a party having to meet new facts and new issues of law for the first time at the appeal court (8).
112 These principles are not novel. In Rowe v Australian United Steam Navigation Company Ltd [1909] HCA 25; (1909) 9 CLR 1, Isaacs J observed:
[I]t is a sound general principle, leading not only to the maintenance of fair play, but also to the repression of unnecessary litigation, that parties must be bound by the course they deliberately adopt at the trial (24).
113 However, in some 'very exceptional cases', the failure of a plaintiff to put at trial a case formulated on appeal may not be conclusive against him - see Water Board v Moustakas [1988] HCA 12; (1988) 180 CLR 491, 498 (Mason CJ, Wilson, Brennan and Dawson JJ); Maloney v Commissioner for Railways (1978) 52 ALJR 292; (1978) 18 ALR 147, 152; Rizhao Steel Holding Group Co Ltd v Koolan Iron Ore Pty Ltd [2012] WASCA 50; (2012) 43 WAR 91 [52].
114 It has been established that the opportunity to assert a new case should only be granted where the interests of justice require it and such a course can be taken without prejudice to the defendant (Water Board, 498; Rizhao [52]). As was noted in Rizhao [53], a court is highly unlikely to allow a new argument on appeal where the point, if taken below, might have resulted in additional or different evidence being led - see Suttor v Gundowda Pty Ltd [1950] HCA 35; (1950) 81 CLR 418, 438 - 439; Green v Sommerville [1979] HCA 60; (1979) 141 CLR 594, 608, 362; O'Brien v Komesaroff [1982] HCA 33; (1982) 150 CLR 310, 319.
115 The probability of success of the new ground of appeal will be inherently linked to the assessment of whether it is in the interests of justice to allow the appellant the opportunity to assert a new case. However, in this case, any assessment of success must be weighed against the possible prejudice which may arise from denying the parties opposing the relief sought the opportunity to raise evidence which would have been relevant to assessment of the reasonableness of the impugned decision.
116 In this respect, the intervener submits that if the appellant had raised the issue of reasonableness before the primary judge, evidence may well have been adduced which was relevant to that question, being the CCTV recordings themselves and evidence of the extent of the media coverage of the Commission's proceedings which preceded the decision of the Commission, together with the transcripts of the evidence given by the appellant and other witnesses in relation to the CCTV recordings.
117 On the face of it, those matters would be relevant to an assessment of the reasonableness of the Commissioner's decision. If so, it would not be in the interests of justice to now allow the appellant to raise this ground without that evidence being adduced.
118 However, in our view it is unnecessary to determine the application for leave to amend the grounds of appeal to add ground 6 on this basis. That is because, for the reasons which follow, the proposed ground of appeal has no prospect of success, and leave to amend should be refused on that basis.
119 Proposed ground 6 includes a number of particulars which attribute the allocation of weight by the Commissioner to various factors relevant to the assessment of the public interest. Having regard to the reasons given by the Commissioner, those attributions of weight are entirely speculative, and add nothing to the proposed ground. In essence, the proposed ground comes down to the proposition that the Commissioner's decision was so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it, or, in the more contemporary terms enunciated in Li which will be discussed further below, the Commissioner's decision lacked an evident and intelligible justification.
120 It can be readily accepted that the exercise of the power conferred by s 152(4)(c) of the Act is conditioned upon the formation of a reasonable view by the decision-maker.
121 In R v Connell; ex parte Hetton Bellbird Collieries Ltd [1944] HCA 42; (1944) 69 CLR 407, Latham CJ said:
[W]here the existence of a particular opinion is made a condition of the exercise of power, legislation conferring the power is treated as referring to an opinion which is such that it can be formed by a reasonable man who correctly understands the meaning of the law under which he acts. If it is shown that the opinion actually formed is not an opinion of this character, then the necessary opinion does not exist. A person acting under a statutory power cannot confer power upon himself by misconstruing the statute which is the source of his power (430).
122 More recently, in Li, Gageler J observed:
Implication of reasonableness as a condition of the exercise of a discretionary power conferred by statute is no different from implication of reasonableness as a condition of an opinion or state of satisfaction required by statute as a prerequisite to an exercise of a statutory power or performance of a statutory duty. Each is a manifestation of the general and deeply rooted common law principle of construction that such decision-making authority as is conferred by statute must be exercised according to law and to reason within limits set by the subject-matter, scope and purposes of the statute [90].
123 It is trite to observe that the fact the court may emphatically disagree with a decision reached by a decision-maker does not lead to the conclusion that it is unreasonable, irrational or illogical. Applying a standard of legal reasonableness does not involve substituting a court's view as to how a discretion should be exercised for that of the decision-maker - R v Connell; ex parte Hetton Bellbird Collieries Ltd, 432 (Latham CJ); Foley v Padley (1984) 154 CLR 349; Avon Downs Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1949) 78 CLR 353, 360; Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Applicant S 20 [2003] HCA 30; (2003) 77 ALJR 1165 [5] (Gleeson CJ); Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611 [40] (Gleeson CJ and McHugh J); [1999] HCA 21; Li [30] (French CJ), [66] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ); Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611. In Li, French CJ noted that:
The requirement of reasonableness is not a vehicle for challenging a decision on the basis that the decision-maker has given insufficient or excessive consideration to some matters or has made an evaluative judgment with which a court disagrees even though that judgment is rationally open to the decision-maker [30].
124 'Unreasonableness', as an independent ground of review, traditionally required a person alleging it to establish that a decision was so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have arrived at it - Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation, 230 (Lord Greene MR). However, in the recent decision in Li, a High Court plurality (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ), observed that Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation should not be considered the start or end point for the standard of reasonableness in Australian law [68]. They continued to state:
The legal standard of unreasonableness should not be considered as limited to what is in effect an irrational, if not bizarre, decision - which is to say one that is so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have arrived at it - nor should Lord Greene MR be taken to have limited unreasonableness in this way in his judgment in Wednesbury. This aspect of his Lordship's judgment may more sensibly be taken to recognise that an inference of unreasonableness may in some cases be objectively drawn even where a particular error in reasoning cannot be identified.
This is recognised by the principles governing the review of a judicial discretion, which, it may be observed, were settled in Australia by House v R, before Wednesbury was decided.
...
In Wednesbury, Lord Greene MR discussed the various grounds upon which an exercise of statutory power may be abused. His Lordship foreshadowed defining those grounds under a single head of unreasonableness, stating that it was 'perhaps a little bit confusing to find a series of grounds set out. Bad faith, dishonesty ... unreasonableness, attention given to extraneous circumstances, disregard of public policy' were all relevant to the question of whether a statutory discretion was exercised reasonably [68] - [69].
125 The plurality referred to Mason J's observation in Peko-Wallsend that guidance may be found in the close analogy between judicial review of administrative action and appellate review of a judicial discretion (Peko-Wallsend, 42 (Mason J)). They noted that in the context of appellate review of judicial discretion, it is not enough that an appellate court would have taken a different course to that which was taken by the primary judge; rather, error had to be found in the exercise of discretion. Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ cited the proposition in House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499 to the effect that an appellate court was entitled to draw an inference of unreasonableness where the result, on the facts, was 'unreasonable or plainly unjust', on the basis that even if the nature of the error is not discoverable, the exercise of discretion is reviewed because a substantial wrong has in fact occurred.
The same reasoning might apply to the review of the exercise of a statutory discretion, where unreasonableness is an inference drawn from the facts and from the matters falling for consideration in the exercise of the statutory power. Even where some reasons have been provided, as is the case here, it may nevertheless not be possible for a court to comprehend how the decision was arrived at. Unreasonableness is a conclusion which may be applied to a decision which lacks an evident and intelligible justification [76]. (emphasis added)
127 The observations of Crennan and Bell JJ in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS may also be relevant in this context:
[T]he test for illogicality or irrationality must be to ask whether logical or rational or reasonable minds might adopt different reasoning or might differ in any decision or finding to be made on evidence upon which the decision is based. If probative evidence can give rise to different processes of reasoning and if logical or rational or reasonable minds might differ in respect of the conclusions to be drawn from that evidence, a decision cannot be said by a reviewing court to be illogical or irrational or unreasonable, simply because one conclusion has been preferred to another possible conclusion [131].
128 In Li, Gageler J agreed with the analogy between the approach to judicial and appellate review favoured by the plurality, but went on to note that it should not be taken to affect the high threshold that must be satisfied to establish unreasonableness in Australia:
Yet the stringency of the test remains. Judicial determination of Wednesbury unreasonableness in Australia has in practice been rare. Nothing in these reasons should be taken as encouragement to greater frequency. This is a rare case [113].
129 The characteristics of the assessment of the public interest required by s 152(4)(c) are as relevant to proposed ground 6 as they are to the grounds which assert that the Commissioner took into account irrelevant considerations, or failed to take account of mandatory relevant considerations, or was acting in the furtherance of an unauthorised purpose. Because the public interest is likely to be multi-faceted, and because the assessment of the public interest will very likely involve the evaluation of competing considerations, the evaluation of which is vested in the Commission and not the court, it will be a rare case in which such a process of evaluation and assessment could be said to lack an evident or intelligible justification.
130 Certainly that character cannot be attributed to the determination made by the Commissioner in this case. It is clear from the reasons given by the Commissioner that he relied significantly upon the role which the CCTV recordings had played in the public examination which had been conducted by the Commission. The recordings were presented and played to the Commission during the course of that public examination, and, but for the order made pursuant to s 151(3), could have been recorded by the television cameras present during the course of counsel's opening and republished. The Commissioner's view that public access to the CCTV recordings was necessary to enable the public to evaluate the evidence which had been given by the witnesses called before the Commission was plausible and intelligible, and provided of itself a sufficient basis for the conclusion that disclosure of the CCTV recordings was necessary in the public interest. Put another way, given that the transcript of the evidence given by witnesses and the accused was to be published by the Commission on its website, and that much of the evidence given by those witnesses pertained to what was depicted in the CCTV recordings, there is much to be said for the view formed by the Commissioner to the effect that the evidence given by those witnesses could not be properly or accurately comprehended without reference to the CCTV recordings which had formed a central part of the public examination.
131 In the course of argument in support of the proposed ground, considerable reliance was placed upon the decision in X7 v Australian Crime Commission [2013] HCA 29; (2013) 87 ALJR 858, to support the proposition that the Commissioner's decision was unreasonable because the effect of the decision was inconsistent with the accusatorial nature of the processes of criminal investigation and trial.
132 In relation to this submission, it must first be observed that, for the reasons we have already given, there is no reason to suppose that the Commissioner did not take account of the effect which disclosure of the CCTV recordings would have upon the process of investigation and possible trial of the appellant. Those considerations formed a central part of the argument which was addressed to him and to which counsel assisting the Commission responded. The weight to be given to those matters was a matter for the Commissioner unless and until it could be contended that the only reasonable conclusion open to the Commissioner, that had an evident or intelligible justification, was the conclusion that the CCTV recordings must not be disclosed.
133 There are a number of reasons why that conclusion cannot be reached. These reasons are, in essence, the reasons enunciated by counsel assisting the Commission and adopted by the Commissioner.
134 First, it is significant that no charge had been brought against the appellant at the time the Commissioner made his decision (or indeed has yet been brought against the appellant). By contrast, X7 was concerned with the scope of the coercive power to compel the provision of information in a situation in which the prospective provider of that information had been charged with an offence.
135 Second, it was not, and is not at all clear, whether the appellant would be tried by a magistrate or in a superior court if charged. If tried by a magistrate, obviously the prospect of pre-trial publicity influencing the outcome of the trial is significantly reduced. If tried by a jury, as the Commissioner observed, there is no reason to suppose that the usual directions would not be given to the jury with respect to the need to base their decision entirely upon the evidence adduced in court, and to ignore any material of which they may have been aware prior to taking their oath as jurors, nor any reason to suppose that jurors would be incapable of following that direction.
136 Third, if the appellant is charged with any offence or offences arising from the incidents investigated by the Commission, it seems inevitable that the CCTV recordings would be admissible in evidence in the course of any such trial. It follows that disclosure of the CCTV recordings would not be likely to provide information to prospective jurors which they would not otherwise receive during the course of the trial process.
137 Turning to the matters upon which counsel assisting the Commission relied in order to support her submission that disclosure of the CCTV recordings was necessary in the public interest, including her reference to the prevention and education function, which submissions were in essence adopted by the Commissioner, in our view it could not be said that those propositions lacked an evident and intelligible justification. The fact that the examination had been conducted in public (without challenge by the appellant) was a most material consideration when the public interest in disclosure of evidence adduced during the course of such an examination came to be considered under s 152(4)(c). The Commission had determined that the benefits of public exposure and public awareness justified the conduct of a public examination. The conduct of the public examination provided a cogent basis for the view that disclosure of evidence adduced to the Commission in the course of that public examination was necessary in the public interest, at least in the absence of compelling considerations to the contrary. For the reasons we have given, there were no such compelling considerations.
138 For these reasons, in our view, proposed ground 6 has no reasonable prospect of success. Leave to amend to introduce that ground should be refused on that basis.
Was the Commissioner pursuing an unauthorised purpose?
139 In ground 3.1, the appellant contends that the primary judge made an error of law and fact in finding that the Commissioner did not exercise the power under s 152(4)(c) to certify that disclosure of the footage was in the public interest for unauthorised purposes. The alleged unauthorised purposes are:
(a) to support the Commissioner's decision to order a public examination; and
140 The principles regarding improper purpose were conveniently summarised in Hunter v the Minister for Planning [2012] WASC 247:
[T]he expression 'improper purpose' does not necessarily connote a purpose which is corrupt, immoral or lacking in probity. Rather, it connotes a purpose which is ulterior or extraneous in the sense that it is beyond the scope of the purposes for which the relevant power is conferred (see, for example, Thompson v Randwick Corporation [1950] HCA 33; (1950) 81 CLR 87, 106 (Williams, Webb & Kitto JJ)). Accordingly, where the relevant power derives from legislation, the purposes for which the power has been conferred will be derived by a process of construction of the legislation: see R v Toohey; Ex Parte Northern Land Council [1981] HCA 74; (1981) 151 CLR 170, 186 (Gibbs CJ), 233 (Aickin J).
The ulterior purpose need not be established to be the sole purpose for the exercise of the power. It will be sufficient if it is established that the purpose is a substantial purpose, in the sense that the power would not have been exercised but for the ulterior or extraneous purpose: Thompson v Randwick, 106; see also Re Minister for the Environment; Ex Parte Elwood [2007] WASCA 137 [173].
The party impugning the exercise of power on the basis of improper purpose bears the onus of establishing such a purpose (Municipal Council of Sydney v Campbell [1925] AC 338 at 343; Industrial Equity Ltd v DCT [1990] HCA 46; (1990) 170 CLR 649, 671 (Gaudron J)). In the absence of evidence establishing improper purpose or displacing all possible legitimate purposes, it will be presumed that the power was exercised for a purpose falling within the scope of the purposes for which the power was conferred.
An improper purpose will not lightly be inferred. If the purpose for which the power was exercised must be ascertained by inference from other facts, the presumption of regularity will be applied, so that the inference of improper purpose will only be drawn if the evidence cannot be reconciled with the proper exercise of the power (Industrial Equity Ltd, 672 (Gaudron J)).
There are some authorities which draw a distinction between a substantial purpose, in the sense in which that term is used in the decision in Thompson v Randwick, to which I have referred, and a "dominant" purpose (see, for example, Haneef v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1273 ; (2007) 161 FCR 40 [287]). However, at this stage of these proceedings, it is unnecessary to determine whether there is any material distinction between a test cast in terms of substantial or dominant purpose. It is sufficient for present purposes to observe that the purpose must have motivated the exercise of the power, in the sense that the power would not have been exercised but for the existence of that purpose or motive [24] - [27].
141 The assertion that the Commissioner's decision was motivated by the purpose of supporting his decision to order a public examination must be rejected for a number of reasons. First, there is no evidence to sustain the proposition that this was the Commissioner's purpose, let alone a substantial purpose.
142 Second, for the reasons we have already given in relation to the proposed ground of unreasonableness, the fact that the CCTV recordings had been presented and played to the Commission during a public examination was a material consideration in the exercise of the power conferred upon the Commission by s 152(4)(c) of the Act. Reliance upon that most material consideration cannot be said to provide evidence of an unauthorised purpose.
143 The appellant's contention that the Commissioner's decision was motivated by the improper purpose of exercising oversight of the police service equally lacks foundation. First, there is no evidence to the effect that this was the substantial purpose of the Commissioner's decision to permit disclosure of the CCTV recordings. Second, the Commission's statutory functions include the oversight of the police force through the sections of the Act to which we have referred. Third, the prevention and education function which the Commission is required to take into account in the performance of all of its functions was relevant to the exercise of the power conferred by s 152(4)(c), irrespective of the Commission's oversight role in relation to police conduct.
144 Accordingly, ground 3.1 must also be dismissed.
145 For these reasons, the appellant's application to amend the grounds of appeal in order to introduce ground 6 should be refused, and the appeal dismissed.
146 McLURE P: I would grant leave to amend the grounds of appeal to add a claim of unreasonableness, allow the appeal and quash the respondents' decision to disclose official information under s 152(4)(c) of the Corruption and Crime Commission Act 2003 (WA) (the Act).
147 The Corruption and Crime Commission (the Commission) conducted examinations under s 137 of the Act for the purpose of an investigation of alleged misconduct in the course of two separate incidents in the Broome Police Station in 2013.
148 In each incident, an arrested person (identified as D1 and D4 respectively) was removed from a police van at the lockup by the appellant (D5), a police officer. Both incidents were witnessed by other police officers and captured and recorded on closed circuit television (CCTV).
149 The examinations explored whether the force used by D5 was excessive. However, that was not the main focus of the examinations hearing. Counsel assisting the Commission explained that the main focus would be on the acts and omissions of other police officers who witnessed the incidents or part thereof. They were largely passive and non-interventionist.
150 Counsel assisting the Commission accepted that there was a risk that the appellant would face criminal charges in the future arising out of his conduct during the incidents (Blue/Green at 65).
151 The Commissioner ordered that the examinations be conducted in public, subject to non-disclosure orders relating to the identity of a number of persons, including the appellant. The CCTV recordings of both incidents were played in opening but were the subject of a 'suppression' order until further order. After hearing evidence from a number of witnesses, including the appellant, the Commissioner revoked the suppression order that prevented disclosure of the CCTV recordings and certified that disclosure was necessary in the public interest pursuant to s 152(4)(c) of the Act. The Commissioner understood that the purpose of the certification was to enable the CCTV recordings to be provided to the media for public dissemination.
152 The appellant commenced Supreme Court proceedings for an order quashing the Commissioner's decision under s 152(4)(c) of the Act. That matter came before Beech J who dismissed the application. The appellant appeals to this court from the decision of Beech J.
153 The relevant background is summarised by the primary judge in his reasons for decision. What follows is taken from his reasons. Counsel assisting the Commission opened the inquiry on 10 June 2013. In the course of doing so, she outlined why the hearings were to be held in public in terms that were adopted by the Commissioner. The following is a summary of the main aspects of counsel's opening:
- the main focus of the hearings is not on the conduct of the officer who used force but rather on the actions or inactions of other officers who witnessed part of the events, including questions of physical or verbal intervention; the duty of care owed to a detainee; reports and recordkeeping; the adequacy of supervision; the use of padded cells; stripping of detainees; restraints; the use of force; and police policies in relation to these matters;
- these are matters of public interest, including the adequacy of supervision within the Police Service and any reluctance on the part of other police officers to intervene or report the conduct of a fellow officer;
- the benefits of public exposure of the investigation are clear. Public hearings are likely to be significantly educative of police officers. Holding public examinations will assist in maintaining public confidence that these type of incidents are being investigated thoroughly and transparently. It may also encourage people to make complaints when they have concerns about how a detainee has been treated;
- the Commission has carefully considered prejudice and privacy infringement issues;
- in relation to the detainees and the civilian who reported the matter, their privacy is addressed by suppressing their identity and identifying details. Any CCTV recordings that are released will have faces pixilated;
- any concern as to prejudice to the appellant, who may be exposed to the risk of criminal charges, can be addressed by an order suppressing his identity and individual consideration would be given to whether his examination would be in public before that examination took place;
- negative consequences of publicity must also be considered, including the potential for events to stir up strong feelings in the Broome community, but those did not outweigh the positive benefits of a public hearing;
- one matter requiring further consideration is whether the CCTV recordings should be made public, which would occur following submissions from all relevant interests, including the Police Service and the media;
- having weighed the balance of public exposure and public awareness against the potential for prejudice or privacy infringements, the Commission considers that it is in the public interest for the hearings to be in public, subject to three qualifications:
(i) first, that each examination needs to be considered on its individual merits;
(ii) secondly, release of the CCTV recordings needs to be considered after hearing further from interested parties; and
(iii) thirdly, some suppression orders should be made in relation to identities.
154 The Commissioner confirmed that, for the reasons stated by counsel assisting, the examinations would be conducted in public. The CCTV recordings were played in opening but not filmed by the media.
155 Prior to the appellant's examination, his counsel applied to the Commissioner for an order that his examination be held in private. Among other things, counsel for the appellant referred to potential prejudice to the appellant, in the event that criminal charges were brought against him, arising from the potential use a jury might make of answers given by the appellant to questions asked in the examination and subsequently reported in the media.
156 Counsel assisting the Commission submitted that if the appellant was charged, it might be dealt with in the Magistrates Court, or in the District Court, following election, by judge alone. Assuming the matter came before a jury, any prejudice could be cured by directions, and would be limited by the orders suppressing identifying details.
157 The Commissioner declined the application for a direction that the examination be conducted in private. He considered that the examination should be in public, subject to conditions, including that the appellant's name and identifying details be suppressed. He expressly adopted the submissions of counsel assisting in relation to prejudice arising from publicity in respect of a possible jury trial. He concluded that, taking into account the ability of juries to act on directions from the trial judge, the benefits of a public examination outweighed the risk of prejudice to the appellant.
158 The appellant gave evidence about the manner in which he had held D1. That included evidence about the CCTV recordings and still photographs taken from it. The appellant also gave evidence about what he did in relation to D4, including the number and the force of the punches he delivered to D4.
159 The appellant's evidence about these matters and about what was revealed by the CCTV recordings was inconsistent with evidence of other witnesses on that topic.
160 On 13 June 2013, the Commission heard submissions on whether it should release the CCTV recordings. Counsel for some media organisations made submissions as interested parties.
161 Counsel assisting the Commission made detailed submissions which were subsequently adopted by the Commission. Counsel assisting submitted that the relevant provision of the Act was s 152(4)(c) because s 151(5) provides that s 151 does not apply to the Commission in relation to a restricted matter that is official information under s 152. It was accepted below and in the appeal that the CCTV recordings were official information for the purposes of s 152.
162 Counsel assisting responded to written submissions provided by counsel for the appellant on why the CCTV recordings should not be disclosed. As to the suggestion that release may prejudice the appellant's safety or reputation, counsel pointed out that the identity of the appellant had been suppressed.
163 In response to an assertion that publication was unfair to persons depicted in the CCTV recordings, counsel assisting submitted that the recordings added little or nothing to the publicly reported evidence other than showing what had actually happened. As to the allegation that disclosure may prejudice the fairness of a trial, counsel assisting submitted that the recordings would be admissible evidence and would be played at any trial.
164 Counsel assisting submitted that it was necessary in the public interest that the CCTV recordings be released. She adopted what she had said in opening as to the reasons for the hearings being conducted in public; submitted that one of the core functions of the Commission was to educate, including educating police officers; said it was to be hoped that, from the time the hearing began, messages would get through to the police about their duty of care, their need to report and to intervene in the case of inappropriate conduct; pointed out that the appellant had said in his evidence that he did not use excessive force; and submitted that the best way to enhance the educative function was to allow people to assess the conduct for themselves.
165 The Commissioner determined to release the CCTV recordings. He stated that largely for the reasons explained by Senior Counsel for the Commission, the CCTV recordings should be released to the public, including the media. The Commissioner said that flowed from the order for a public examination. He said:
In my view, largely for the reasons put forward by counsel, senior counsel for the commission, I'm of the view that the suppression order that was made in relation to that material ought be lifted. That is that the material ought be disclosed to relevant interested parties, in particular[,] media outlets.
I think the order in the circumstances in which this matter has proceeded really flows from the order that was made that there be a public examination. What has occurred is that counsel, senior counsel, has opened on a particular basis in relation to that material. Some evidence has been given by some witnesses in relation to that material.
... D5 ... has given evidence which has strongly challenged a number of factual aspects. This is, to take a term from another context, really a case of best evidence. The position now is that different parties have talked about the same observable piece of information and have given extremely different descriptions of that and in those circumstances, the hearing being a public hearing, in my view it would almost be a perversion to leave the matter as it is.
I'm quite satisfied that it is necessary in the public interest that this material, which is objective material, be allowed to be in the public domain, given the dichotomy in relation to the evidence that has been arrived at. I think that is relevant in relation to the function of [the] commission of which senior counsel has spoken. That is not expressly in relation to D5, but rather in relation to the commission's obligation to exercise oversight of a particular branch of the public service, that being the police force, and to inform in the way that senior counsel has described.
I arrive at that conclusion pursuant to section 152 subsection (4)(c) and I certify that disclosure is necessary in the public interest for those reasons.
166 Later on 13 June 2013, the solicitors for the appellant applied for writs of certiorari and prohibition to quash the Commissioner's decision and prevent the Commission from disclosing the CCTV recordings to the media. The claim for prohibition is not pursued on appeal.
167 The appellant also filed an application for an interlocutory injunction to prevent publication pending the determination of the substantive application. On 14 June 2013 the Commission undertook not to disclose the CCTV recordings pending the determination of the substantive application. That undertaking was extended to the determination of this appeal.
168 The common assumption of the parties before the Commission, the primary judge and this court is that s 152(4)(c) of the Act is both the source of the Commission's power to provide the CCTV recordings to the media and the source of the media's authority to publish the recordings to the world at large.
169 For the purpose of these proceedings, the Chief Justice accepts the correctness of the common assumption. However, in my respectful opinion, it is inconsistent with the text, context and purpose of pt 9 of the Act.
170 If a decision depends on an erroneous view of the law, an appeal court must apply the law even if the parties conducted the case on that erroneous view; however, the parties must be given the opportunity to make submissions if the appeal court has a different view of the law: Pantorno v The Queen [1989] HCA 18; (1989) 166 CLR 466, 473; MR & RC Smith Pty Ltd t/as Ultra Tune (Osborne Park) v Wyatt [No 2] [2012] WASCA 110 [39]. During the hearing of the appeal, I put the parties on notice of an alternative construction of the legislative scheme.
171 In order to make the relevant points, it is necessary to refer to the legislative scheme as a whole. The main purposes of the Act are to combat and reduce the incidents of organised crime and to improve continuously the integrity of, and reduce the incidents of misconduct in, the public sector (s 7A).
172 Those purposes are to be achieved primarily by establishing the Commission, a permanent (or standing) commission, that is able to authorise the use of investigative powers not ordinarily available to police to investigate particular cases of organised crime and help public authorities deal effectively and appropriately with misconduct by increasing their capacity to do so while retaining power to itself investigate cases of misconduct, particularly serious misconduct (s 7B).
173 The primary functions of the Commission are the (1) prevention and education function (s 17), (2) misconduct function (s 18), and (3) organised crime functions (pt 4). The Commission also has the power to deal with 'reviewable police action', which is to be dealt with as if it was a matter notified under s 28(2), which in turn imposes a duty upon certain officers to notify the Commission of any matter the officer suspects on reasonable grounds concerns or may concern misconduct.
174 The term 'misconduct' is defined (in s 4) to include corrupt acts or omissions by a public officer; the commission of an offence by a public officer whilst acting or purporting to act in his or her official capacity that is punishable by 2 or more years' imprisonment; and other specified conduct that constitutes or could constitute, inter alia, a disciplinary offence providing reasonable grounds for termination of the public officer's employment.
175 The term 'reviewable police action', defined in s 3, covers less serious conduct ranging from action that is contrary to law to the exercise of a power or discretion for an improper purpose, taking into account irrelevant grounds or considerations and failing to give reasons where they are required.
176 The scope of the misconduct function is described in s 18. The Commission must ensure that an allegation about, or information or matter involving, misconduct is dealt with in an appropriate way. That includes the Commission investigating or taking other action or the Commission referring the allegations or matters to independent agencies or appropriate authorities so that they can take action themselves or in cooperation with the Commission. The Commission can perform the misconduct function by exchanging information with independent agencies or appropriate authorities (s 18(2)(g)).
177 When the Commission is deciding whether further action is warranted, the matters to which it may have regard include whether or not in all the circumstances the carrying out of further action in relation to the allegation 'is justified or is in the public interest' (s 18(3)(d)).
178 In the exercise of the misconduct function, the role of the Commission is to make recommendations as to whether consideration should or should not be given to the prosecution of particular persons or the taking of disciplinary action against particular persons. The Commission may also make recommendations for the taking of other action the Commission considers should be taken (s 43).
179 The Commission must not publish or report a finding or opinion that a particular person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a criminal offence or a disciplinary offence; an opinion that misconduct has occurred is not to be taken as a finding or an opinion that a particular person has committed a criminal offence or a disciplinary offence (s 23).
180 The Commission has very wide powers to compel the provision of information, documents and attendance. The Commission may, by written notice, require a public authority or public officer to produce a statement of information (s 94), and/or produce documents or other things (s 95). The Commission may also issue a summons requiring a person to attend before the Commission at an examination to give evidence and/or produce any document or thing in the person's custody or control (s 96).
181 A notice under s 94 or s 95 or a summons under s 96 may include a notation to the effect that disclosure of information about the notice or summons or about any 'official matter' connected with it, is prohibited except in the circumstances, if any, specified in the notation (s 99(2)). The term 'official matter' is defined to mean, inter alia, the relevant investigation or an examination before the Commission for the purposes of the investigation. Section 99(4) relevantly provides:
The notation is required to be included if the Commission is satisfied that failure to do so could reasonably be expected to prejudice -
(a) the safety or reputation of a person; or
(b) the fair trial of a person who has been or may be charged with an offence; or
(c) the effectiveness of an investigation.
182 The notation may be included if the Commission is satisfied that failure to do so might prejudice, inter alia, the fair trial of a person who has been or may be charged with an offence or if the failure to include a notation 'might otherwise be contrary to the public interest' (s 99(5)).
183 The notation ceases to have effect as provided for in s 99(7), which relevantly provides:
The notation ceases to have effect if, after the conclusion of the investigation concerned -
(a) no evidence of an offence has been obtained; or
(b) although evidence of an offence or offences has been obtained, it has been decided not to initiate any criminal proceedings in which the evidence would be relevant; or
(c) evidence of an offence or offences committed by only one person has been obtained and criminal proceedings have been initiated against that person; or
(d) evidence of an offence or offences committed by 2 or more persons has been obtained and -
(i) criminal proceedings have been initiated against all those persons; or
(ii) criminal proceedings have been initiated against all those persons except any of them against whom it has been decided not to initiate criminal proceedings.
184 Under s 99(9), if the notation is inconsistent with a direction given under s 151(4)(a), the notation has no effect to the extent of the inconsistency.
185 Under s 167 of the Act, it is an offence to disclose a restricted matter contrary to a notation under s 99 save in specified circumstances.
186 Part 7 of the Act deals with examinations. The Commission may conduct an examination for the purposes of an investigation under the Act (s 137). The examination is to be in private unless otherwise ordered. Section 139(1) relevantly provides that:
Except as provided in section 140, an examination is not open to the public.
187 It is an offence to be present at an examination, or part of an examination, that is not open to the public unless the person is entitled to be present by reason of an order under s 139(2) or because they are entitled to be present by reason of s 139(3).
(1) This section does not apply to an organised crime examination.
(2) The Commission may open an examination to the public if, having weighed the benefits of public exposure and public awareness against the potential for prejudice or privacy infringements, it considers that it is in the public interest to do so.
(3) A decision to open an examination to the public may be made at any time before or during the examination.
(4) If the Commission decides to open an examination to the public, the Commission may close the examination for a particular purpose.
189 Section 151, s 152 and s 153 are at the core of the construction exercise. They are in pt 9 of the Act. It is necessary to refer to the detail of each section:
restricted matter means any of the following -
(a) any evidence given before the Commission;
(b) the contents of any statement of information or document, or a description of any thing, produced to the Commission;
(c) the contents of any document, or a description of any thing, seized under this Act;
(d) any information that might enable a person who has been, or is about to be, examined before the Commission to be identified or located;
(e) the fact that any person has been or may be about to be examined before the Commission.
(2) Subject to subsections (3) and (4), a restricted matter must not be disclosed.
(3) Unless the Commission orders otherwise, a restricted matter may be disclosed if that matter has already been disclosed at a part of an examination that was open to the public.
(4) A restricted matter may be disclosed -
(a) in accordance with a direction of the Commission; or
(b) to a legal practitioner for the purpose of obtaining legal advice or representation relating to a notice, summons or matter; or
(c) to a person for the purpose of obtaining legal aid relating to a notice, summons or matter; or
(d) to an officer or agent of a body corporate by the body corporate or another officer or agent of the body corporate for the purpose of ensuring compliance with a notice or summons; or
(e) by a legal practitioner for the purpose of complying with a legal duty of disclosure arising from his or her professional relationship with a client; or
(f) by a legal practitioner referred to in paragraph (b) for the purpose of giving legal advice, making representations, or obtaining legal aid, relating to the notice, summons or matter; or
(g) by a person referred to in paragraph (c) for the purpose of obtaining legal aid relating to the notice, summons or matter; or
(h) if that disclosure is otherwise authorised or required under this Act.
(a) the Commission or a relevant person as defined in section 152(1); or
(b) a relevant person as defined in section 208(1),
in relation to a restricted matter that is official information under section 152 or 208, as the case may be.
(a) an authority or person referred to in section 153 or 209; or
(b) any person or employee under the control of an authority or person referred to in section 153 or 209,
in relation to a restricted matter that is information to which section 153 or 209, as the case may be, applies.
(7) If a restricted matter is disclosed contrary to this section, any person who so discloses the matter, or causes the matter to be so disclosed, commits an offence.
Penalty: Imprisonment for 3 years and a fine of $60 000.
(a) a legal practitioner appointed to assist the Commission; and
(b) a person who assists, or performs services for or on behalf of a legal practitioner appointed to assist the Commission in the performance of the legal practitioner's duties assisting the Commission;
court includes a tribunal, authority or person having power to require the production of documents or the answering of questions;
official information, in relation to a relevant person, means information acquired by the person by reason of, or in the course of, the performance of the person's functions under this Act;
relevant person means a person who is or was -
(a) an officer of the Commission; or
(b) a Commission lawyer.
(2) Subject to subsections (3), (4) and (6) a relevant person must not, either directly or indirectly -
(a) make a record of any official information; or
(b) disclose any official information.
Penalty: Imprisonment for 3 years and a fine of $60 000.
(3) Despite subsection (2), a relevant person may make a record of official information -
(a) under or for the purposes of this Act;
(b) otherwise in connection with the performance of the person's functions under this Act.
(4) Despite subsection (2), official information may be disclosed by a relevant person if it is disclosed -
(a) under or for the purposes of this Act; or
(b) for the purposes of a prosecution or disciplinary action instituted as a result of an investigation conducted by the Commission or the Parliamentary Inspector under this Act or any other prosecutions or disciplinary action in relation to misconduct; or
(c) when the Commission has certified that disclosure is necessary in the public interest; or
(d) to either House of Parliament or to the Standing Committee; or
(e) to any prescribed authority or person; or
(f) otherwise in connection with the performance of the person's functions under this Act.
(5) A relevant person is not authorised to disclose operational information under subsection (4)(d) or (e) unless the Commission has certified under subsection (4)(c) that disclosure is necessary in the public interest.
(6) Despite subsection (2), a relevant person may disclose the fact that an allegation has been received or initiated by the Commission or the details of an allegation.
(7) A relevant person cannot be required to produce or disclose any official information in or to any court except for the purposes of a prosecution or disciplinary action instituted as a result of an investigation conducted by the Commission or the Parliamentary Inspector under this Act.
(8) This section also applies to the Commission as if references to official information were references to all information acquired by the Commission by reason of, or in the course of, the performance of the Commission's functions under this Act.
190 The CCTV recordings are a 'document'. See the definition of 'document' and 'publication' in the Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), s 5.
191 An 'officer of the Commission' means the Commissioner, the staff of the Commission (s 179), a person seconded or otherwise engaged under s 181 and service providers engaged under s 182. Section 153 provides:
court includes a tribunal, authority or person having power to require the production of documents or the answering of questions;
(2) This section applies to information if, in circumstances referred to in section 152(4), it is disclosed to an authority or person for use in connection with the performance of a function of the authority or person under a written law.
(3) The authority or person, or any person or employee under the control of the authority or person -
(i) make a record of information to which this section applies; or
(ii) disclose any information to which this section applies,
except for the purpose for which it was disclosed to the authority or person; and
(b) cannot be required to produce or disclose the information in or to any court except for the purposes of a prosecution or disciplinary action instituted as a result of an investigation conducted by the Commission or the Parliamentary Inspector under this Act.
Penalty, for a contravention of paragraph (a): Imprisonment for 3 years and a fine of $60 000.
(4) Subsection (3) does not prevent the disclosure of the fact that an allegation has been received or initiated by the Commission or the details of an allegation.
192 Section 151(7), s 152(2) and s 153(3) apply despite any law or rule of law, written or otherwise, under which a person may be required to produce or disclose any matter of information (s 154).
193 In relation to the Parliamentary Inspector, s 208 largely mirrors s 152 but without an equivalent to s 152(4)(c) and s 209 is in materially the same terms as s 153. However, s 208(5)(b) is to the same effect as s 152(5).
194 Both officers of the Commission and officers of the Parliamentary Inspector are required to take an oath of secrecy (s 183 and s 214 respectively). The oath is in terms that 'the officer will not disclose any information received by the officer under this Act'.
195 The circumstances in which a person may be in contempt of the Commission are detailed in pt 10 of the Act. A person who, inter alia, fails without reasonable excuse to comply with a notice served under s 94 or s 95, or a summons served under s 96, is in contempt of the Commission. The expression 'reasonable excuse' excludes the failure to produce a document or other thing that might incriminate or tend to incriminate the person or render the person liable to a penalty (s 157, s 158, s 159).
196 It is also a contempt to fail to answer any question relevant to the investigation that the Commission requires the person to answer. A person is not excused from the requirement to answer the question on the ground that the answer might incriminate or tend to incriminate the person or render the person liable to a penalty (s 160).
197 However, a statement made by a witness in answer to a question that the Commission requires the witness to answer is not admissible in evidence against the person making the statement in any criminal proceedings or proceedings for the imposition of a penalty (other than contempt proceedings, proceedings for an offence against the Act or disciplinary action) (s 145). However, the witness may, in any civil or criminal proceedings, be asked about the statement under s 21 of the Evidence Act 1906 (WA), which permits cross-examination on and proof of prior inconsistent statements.
198 Examinations under the Act must be for the purpose of and ancillary to the exercise of the Commission's functions. Relevantly for present purposes, the power to examine is conferred for the purpose of the administrative function of determining whether there is misconduct and, if there is, recommending what (if any) further action is required (by others). The Commissioner identified the purpose of the examinations in this case as being the investigation of 'misconduct', although the specific misconduct is never expressly identified and is not immediately obvious.
199 Further it is clear that many of the matters of concern identified by counsel assisting are incapable of constituting 'misconduct' as defined. The Commission did not expressly rely on the power relating to 'reviewable police action' and the parties did not address whether the misconduct related provisions applied to such a review. However, as there is no challenge to the validity of the examinations, I will assume that reviewable police action is within the misconduct function and that the scope, extent and purpose of the examinations are within power.
200 It is also the case that the appellant does not challenge the decision to conduct his examination in public.
201 The principle of legality is to the effect that a statute affecting important common law rights and procedural and other safeguards of individual rights, freedoms or immunities will be construed 'as effecting no more than is strictly required by clear words or as a matter of necessary implication': Lee v New South Wales Crime Commission [2013] HCA 39; (2013) 302 ALR 363 [29]. The requirements are met where the text, context and purpose of the legislation make it plain that the legislature has directed its attention to the question of the abrogation or curtailment of the right, freedom or immunity in question and has made a legislative determination that the right, freedom or immunity is to be abrogated or curtailed: Lee [172], [314].
202 A person in the position of the appellant has, at common law, a number of rights encompassed within the umbrella concept of the 'right to silence'. For present purposes, those rights include (1) the right of any person to refuse to answer any question except under legal compulsion; (2) the privilege of any person to refuse to answer any question at any time on the ground of self-incrimination; (3) the right of any person who believes that he or she is suspected of a criminal offence to remain silent when questioned by any person in authority about the occurrence of an offence, the identity of the participants or the roles which they played; and (4) the right of a person charged with a criminal offence to a fair trial. See Lee [318].
203 In my view, the principle of legality applies to the construction and application of the powers and discretions in pts 6 to 9 inclusive of the Act. Those compulsory powers are wide enough to apply to the investigation and examination of a person suspected of committing a criminal offence about matters relating to the offence. It is unnecessary to determine whether the Act permits the exercise of the compulsory powers against a person charged with an offence for the purpose of obtaining information relating to the alleged offence.
204 The appellant's common law right to refuse to answer questions has been abrogated. The appellant's common law privilege against self-incrimination has been curtailed.
205 In X7 v Australian Crime Commission [2013] HCA 29; (2013) 87 ALJR 858 and Lee the High Court considered the proper construction of legislation providing for compulsory examinations. Both cases concerned the power to examine a person charged with an offence in circumstances where the subject matter of the compulsory examination overlapped with the subject matter of the offence and whether the legislation on its proper construction curtailed or abrogated the rights and privileges within the rubric of the 'right to silence'.
206 As the relevant legislation contemplated private not public examinations where a person had been charged, the outcome in X7 did not depend on a finding that the examination involved a contempt of court. Much of the discussion in the majority judgments about the curtailment or abrogation of the right to silence is of wider application. However, there is now a question as to whether Lee is consistent with the majority in X7. Hayne J clearly thinks not. However, what is significant for present purposes is the acknowledgement in both cases of the role of private examinations in minimising the impact of the curtailment or abridgement of common law rights, privileges and immunities: X7 [55], [58]; Lee [43], [81], [141].
207 In this case we are not concerned with power. The parties to the appeal accept that the compulsory examination of the appellant relating to the circumstances of the incidents was within power. We are concerned with matters that inform the purpose and scope of the powers and discretions relating to the disclosure of material obtained by the exercise of compulsory powers that abrogate the rights of a person suspected of committing a criminal offence. However, it is relevant that the common law right to silence does not apply to the CCTV recordings, which are real evidence.
The proper construction of s 151 - s 153 of the Act
208 In my view, s 152(4)(c) is not the source of the power to permit media recipients of official information that is also restricted matter for the purposes of s 151, to disclose it to the world at large or at all. The steps in the reasoning are as follows.
209 First, the CCTV recordings are official information for the purposes of s 152 and are also restricted matter for the purposes of s 151. Second, the prohibition against disclosure of restricted matter in s 151(2) applies to the world at large except the persons, in the circumstances, identified in subs (5) and (6) of s 151. That is, s 151 does not apply to:
in relation to a restricted matter that is official information under s 152 or s 208;
(6) an authority or person who has received information pursuant to s 152(4);
(7) an authority or person who has received information pursuant to s 208(4);
(8) any person or employee under the control of an authority or person referred to in (6) and (7);
in relation to a restricted matter that is information to which s 153 or s 209 applies.
210 Section 151 applies to all persons who are not within subs (5) or (6). Accordingly, s 151 applies to recipients of information from relevant persons under s 152(4) and s 208(4) who are not persons covered by s 153 and s 209.
211 Thus the media who receive copies of the CCTV recordings from the Commission under s 152 are prohibited from disclosing those recordings (being restricted matter) unless they come within the exceptions in subs (3) or (4) of s 151.
212 The opening phrase of subs (3) of s 151 ('Unless the Commission orders otherwise') is the source of the Commission's power to make the non-disclosure order relating to the CCTV recordings. The non-disclosure order relating to the CCTV recordings was 'until further order'. That order is within power: Hogan v Australian Crime Commission [2010] HCA 21; (2010) 240 CLR 651 [29]. The Commission also has the power to set aside that non-disclosure order: s 151(3) and s 151(4)(a).
213 If the non-disclosure order ceases to apply or is set aside, the CCTV recordings as they were played at the open hearings (with the identity of relevant participants protected by pixilation) can be disclosed by the media without breaching the prohibition in s 151(2) because the recordings had been disclosed at a part of an examination that was open to the public.
214 However, the media did not film the CCTV recordings played during counsel assisting's opening address and now seek a copy of them from the Commission in order to take advantage of the exception in s 151(3). The term 'disclose' is defined to mean publish in any way or divulge or communicate to any person in any way (s 3). That must include publish by handing over a copy of the CCTV recordings.
215 Moreover, the publication of the transcript of the examinations on the Commission's website (edited to take account of suppression orders) and the provision of other exhibits to the media (both of which occurred without certification) are in the same category as the CCTV recordings. Having determined that it was in the public interest for the appellant's examination to be open to the public, it would seem to follow that further disclosure by the Commission of the now public information would, prima facie, fall within pars (a) or (f) of s 152(4) without the need to have recourse to s 152(4)(c) even if it is an available source of power (see below).
216 If that is correct, the central decision in this case would be the decision to conduct the examination of the appellant in public. It was arguable that the appellant's examination should have been conducted in private having regard to (1) the abrogation and curtailment of the appellant's right to silence; (2) the principle of legality; (3) the inadmissibility of the evidence at any criminal trial; (4) the obligation to include a secrecy notation on a notice or summons when the Commission is satisfied that failure to do so could reasonably be expected to prejudice the fair trial of a person who may be charged with an offence; (5) the default position that examinations under the Act be conducted in private; and (6) the primary purpose of a misconduct investigation. However, that decision is not challenged and I say nothing more on the subject. I turn now to the grounds of appeal.
217 The term 'official information' in s 152 is very widely defined. The width of the definition is consistent with the broad terms of the oath of secrecy that Commission officers are required to take. Section 152(4) of the Act is the source of the authority of relevant persons to disclose official information. Subject to a reservation discussed below, it is also a discretionary power to disclose.
218 There are eight references to 'the public interest' in the Act in addition to s 152(4)(c). Three examples will suffice. First, a mandatory consideration in the Commission deciding whether further action is warranted in relation to an allegation is whether it is justified or 'is in the public interest' (s 18(3)(d)). Second, the Commission may include a s 99 notation if the failure to do so 'might otherwise be contrary to the public interest' (s 99(5)). Third, the Commission may open an examination to the public if, having weighed the benefits of public exposure and public awareness against the potential for prejudice or privacy infringements, 'it considers that it is in the public interest to do so' (s 140(2)). See also s 36, s 46(1)(c) and s 142(2). The expression 'necessary in the public interest' is also used in s 152(5) and s 208(5)(b).
219 The language in s 152(4)(c) (and s 152(5) and s 208(5)(b)) is much stronger than in the other provisions, not only because of the word 'necessary'. The requirement that the Commission certify that disclosure is necessary in the public interest requires the Commission to expressly turn its attention to the question of disclosure and be satisfied on reasonable grounds that it is necessary in the public interest before certifying to that effect. The Commission's satisfaction on reasonable grounds is a condition of the existence of the power. Further, the certification is to be made at the highest level. It is clearly not just an 'on balance' assessment after weighing all relevant public interests as in s 140(2).
220 Subject to s 152(5), a disclosure under s 152(4)(c) is intended to cover matters outside the scope of pars (a) and (f) of s 152(4). That is, it would not be a disclosure under or for the purposes of the Act or otherwise in connection with the performance of the person's functions under the Act. The serious nature of the certification process is underscored by s 152(5), which provides that a relevant person is not authorised to disclose operational information to either House of Parliament, the Standing Committee or any prescribed authority or person unless the Commission has certified under subs (4)(c) that disclosure is necessary in the public interest.
221 The meaning of the word 'necessary' is to be gathered from the statutory context and purpose. Reference to the use of the word in other statutory and common law contexts is of limited assistance. Authority can be found to support a variety of different meanings. Pelechowski v Registrar, Court of Appeal (NSW) [1999] HCA 19; (1999) 198 CLR 435 is an excellent example. The issue in that case was whether a court had implied jurisdiction or power to make an asset preservation order. It was accepted that a grant of power to a court 'carries with it everything necessary for its exercise'. McHugh J said in that setting, 'necessary' does not have the meaning of 'essential' but means 'reasonably required'. That meaning is consistent with the broad approach to construing a grant of statutory jurisdiction or power to a court: Burrell v The Queen [2008] HCA 34; (2008) 238 CLR 218 [102].
222 On the other hand, that is clearly not the meaning of the word 'necessary' in the statement of the principle of legality, which requires that legislative intent be manifested by clear words or necessary implication: Lee [29]; Wentworth v New South Wales Bar Association [1992] HCA 24; (1992) 176 CLR 239, 252.
223 Hogan v ACC concerned the construction of a provision empowering the Federal Court to make a suppression order as appeared to the court 'to be necessary in order to prevent prejudice to the administration of justice or the security of the Commonwealth'. The court described 'necessary' as a strong word and identified what was insufficient to satisfy the requirement but did not go further and positively identify what it required. The court said:
It is insufficient that the making or continuation of an order under s 50 appears to the Federal Court to be convenient, reasonable or sensible, or to serve some notion of the public interest, still less that, as the result of some 'balancing exercise', the order appears to have one or more of those characteristics [31].
224 More assistance is provided in Osland v Secretary, Department of Justice (No 2) [2010] HCA 24; (2010) 241 CLR 320 [14]. In Osland the relevant tribunal had power under freedom of information legislation to decide that access to an exempt document (one protected by legal professional privilege) should be granted where the Tribunal was of the opinion that 'the public interest require[d] that access to the document should be granted under [the] Act'. French CJ, Gummow and Bell JJ said:
[I]t must be accepted that the word 'requires' which appears in s 50(4) directs the decision-maker to identify a high-threshold public interest before the power can be exercised. It is not enough that access to the documents could be justified in the public interest. The terminology of the sub-section does not define a rule so much as an evaluative standard requiring restraint in the exercise of the power. It is, like many common law standards, 'predicated on fact-value complexes, not on mere facts', to be applied by the decision-maker [14].
225 Having regard to the nature and scope of the Commission's compulsory investigative powers, the proper statutory emphasis on maintaining the secrecy of the fruits of such investigations, and the other provisions of the Act relating to the advancement of the public interest, I see no justification for reading down the requirement that the disclosure be 'necessary' to what is 'reasonably necessary'. I am fortified in that conclusion by the fact that the condition enlivening the power in s 152(4)(c) is subjective, unlike the other conditions enlivening the power in s 152(4) to disclose. Thus 'necessary' has its natural and ordinary meaning of required in the public interest. It follows that the threshold for disclosure under s 152(4)(c) is significantly higher than that required to enliven the power to conduct an examination in public.
226 The next question is whether the Commissioner erred in his statement or application of the requirement in s 152(4)(c). As the primary judge correctly notes, there is nothing in the Commissioner's reasons to support the contention that he applied the wrong test. The question the Commissioner asked and answered was whether disclosure of the CCTV recordings was necessary in the public interest. There being no express construction error identifiable from the Commissioner's reasons, the question that the appellant belatedly seeks leave to raise is whether, having regard to the facts and circumstances, it was open to the Commissioner to be satisfied on reasonable grounds that disclosure was necessary in the public interest. I will return to that in due course.
227 I agree with the Chief Justice for the reasons he gives that the appellant has not established that the Commissioner failed to take into account any of the considerations identified in grounds of appeal 1.2, 2.3, 2.4 and 4. The grounds are based on a misapprehension that the identification and assessment of those considerations must be evident from the express terms of the Commissioner's reasons for decision.
228 The appellant contends that the Commission's educative function is an irrelevant consideration in the determination of whether disclosure was necessary in the public interest.
229 As already indicated, the condition enlivening the power in s 152(4)(c) is that the Commission be satisfied on reasonable grounds and certify that disclosure is necessary in the public interest.
230 This claim must fail. The educative function is shorthand for the prevention and education function in s 17. Section 17(2) lists the ways the Commission may perform the prevention and education function, including by:
(c) providing information relevant to its prevention and education function to the general community; and
(ca) ensuring that in performing all of its functions it has regard to its prevention and education function.
231 Although par (ca) is very wide, it is constrained by the express purpose of the function, which is to 'prevent misconduct' (s 17(1)). The appeal was conducted on the assumption that the examinations conducted by the Commission were a valid exercise of the Commission's functions and powers to investigate misconduct.
232 Further, s 140(2) of the Act expressly requires the Commission to weigh the benefits of public exposure and public awareness in determining whether to open an examination to the public. It can be inferred that those benefits are relevant to, inter alia, the furtherance of the prevention and education function. As discussed below, the decision to conduct a public examination in this case bears upon, and is relevant to, an assessment of whether disclosure is necessary in the public interest. It follows that the prevention and education function cannot be an irrelevant consideration in the exercise of the power under s 152(4)(c) of the Act.
233 The appellant contends that the Commissioner exercised the power in s 152(4)(c) for the improper purpose of (1) supporting the Commissioner's decision to order a public examination and (2) exercising oversight of the police service.
234 It is difficult to follow the appellant's submissions on this topic. It is contended that the potential for prejudice and privacy infringements are mandatory relevant considerations in the exercise of the power under s 152(4)(c); that the decision to conduct the appellant's examination in public was the reason the Commissioner exercised the power under s 152(4)(c); the purpose of s 152(4)(c) is to safeguard a suspect's right to silence 'if the primary premise of closed hearings has been displaced', relying on X7.
235 The thrust of the argument, as I understand it, is that the decision under s 140(2) to examine the appellant in public cannot determine or inform the Commission's exercise of its power under s 152(4)(c) because the latter must satisfy a different and stronger test. That is, the determination of whether it is necessary to disclose in the public interest requires a fresh assessment of all relevant matters (including the public interest in avoiding the potential for prejudice and privacy infringements) without regard to the fact that the examinations were conducted in public.
236 An unexpressed assumption on which the appellant's submission depends is that s 152(4)(c) is the source of the media's authority to publish the CCTV footage to the world at large. That is a misunderstanding of the scheme of the Act for the reasons outlined above. The publication of the CCTV recordings to the world at large is authorised as a result of the unchallenged decision to hold the examinations in public. The decision under s 152(4)(c) to provide a copy of the CCTV recordings to the media has the practical effect of facilitating the broader publication permitted under s 151 of the Act.
237 That is, in relation to the exercise of the power under s 152(4)(c), the conduct of the examinations in public is a necessary, but not itself sufficient, condition for the publication of restricted matter to the world at large.
238 In determining what is necessary in the public interest under s 152(4)(c), regard can (and should) be had to the nature and extent of prior lawful disclosures under the Act. It is one of a number of relevant considerations in the evaluative judgment which requires a reconsideration of all relevant public interests. In this case the Commissioner went beyond the mere fact that the examinations were conducted in public in assessing what was necessary in the public interest. This aspect of the claim of improper purpose must fail.
239 In order to conclude that 'oversight of the police service' is an improper purpose it would be necessary to find that the examinations, or aspects thereof, went beyond the purpose and scope of the investigation power. There has been no such challenge to the examinations. The parties have conducted the proceedings in this court and below on the assumption that the examinations were within power.
240 Finally, the CCTV recordings do not fall within the appellant's common law right to silence. They are admissible in evidence in any related criminal proceeding against the appellant. The common law right to silence considerations arose at the examination stage. This ground of appeal must fail.
241 The appellant seeks leave to add a new ground of appeal (ground 6) to raise a matter that was not relied on below. The appellant wants to contend that the Commissioner's decision that disclosure of the CCTV recordings was necessary in the public interest:
(1) was so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it; or
(2) alternatively was unreasonable in that it lacked an evident and intelligible justification by reason of the [Commissioner]:
(a) giving more weight than was reasonably necessary to the significance of the [Commission's] prevention and education function pursuant to section 17 of the Act;
(b) giving more weight than was reasonably necessary to the fact of the decisions made on 10 June 2013 to conduct the hearings generally in public, and on 11 June 2013 to conduct the appellant's examination specifically in public pursuant to section 140 of the Act;
(c) giving insufficient weight to the potential prejudice to the appellant's fundamental right to a fair trial consequent upon the decision to conduct his examination in public.
242 The intervener submits that there is evidence that would be relevant to an assessment of the reasonableness of the decision that was not adduced below, being the content of the CCTV recordings. Evidence before the primary judge but not in the appeal books included an affidavit of Jane Elizabeth Laurence deposing to media reports which preceded the decision under challenge and the transcripts of examination of the appellant and others in relation to the CCTV recordings.
243 The Commissioner found that the witnesses gave evidence by reference to the CCTV recordings, that the appellant's evidence was materially inconsistent with the evidence of others present at various times during the incidents and that the CCTV recordings were necessary to the resolution of the inconsistencies. Those facts are not challenged. Moreover, the clear position taken by the Commission was that the conduct of the appellant captured on the CCTV recordings was objective evidence of his use of excessive force. That is why the main focus of the hearings from the outset was on the other police officers who failed to intervene. I am not persuaded that further evidence is required for the purpose of determining the proposed ground.
244 The leading authorities relating to raising a new point on appeal focus on what was pleaded and litigated in a trial (Water Board v Moustakas [1988] HCA 12; (1988) 180 CLR 491; McLennan v McCallum [2010] WASCA 45). This appeal is from prerogative writ proceedings in which the focus is on jurisdictional errors of law. Further, there is a common theme underlying all the relevant grounds of judicial review, being the pivotal role played by the scope, purpose and construction of the Act. Being public law proceedings which raise issues of substantial public interest, I would grant leave to add ground 6.
245 As noted above, the Commission's satisfaction, on reasonable grounds, that disclosure is necessary in the public interest is a condition that must exist in order to enliven the power to certify and disclose the relevant official information. That is, it is a jurisdictional fact on which the power to disclose depends. See Plaintiff M70/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] HCA 32; (2011) 244 CLR 144 [57]. It is unnecessary to determine whether satisfaction of that condition enlivens a discretion as to whether or not to disclose. See Channel Seven Perth Pty Ltd v S (A Company) [2007] WASCA 122; (2007) 34 WAR 325 [19] - [22]. Nothing turns on the answer to that question because the expression 'in the public interest' imports a discretionary value judgment. As Hayne J said in McKinnon v Secretary, Department of Treasury (2006) 228 CLR 423:
It may readily be accepted that most questions about what is in 'the public interest' will require consideration of a number of competing arguments about, or features or 'facets' of, the public interest. As was pointed out in O'Sullivan v Farrer:
'[T]he expression "in the public interest", when used in a statute, classically imports a discretionary value judgment to be made by reference to undefined factual matters, confined only "in so far as the subject matter and the scope and purpose of the statutory enactments may enable ... given reasons to be [pronounced] definitely extraneous to any objects the legislature could have had in view"'[55].
246 A 'discretionary value judgment' simply means that, with a proper understanding of the nature and limits of the statutory power, reasonable minds may differ as to the outcome. That is, there is no single correct answer as to what is in the public interest or necessary in the public interest.
247 The High Court in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 87 ALJR 618 signalled a departure from the Wednesbury Corporation test as the sole test of unreasonableness as a ground of jurisdictional error. That case concerned the exercise of a statutory discretionary power to adjourn an application for review under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The majority in Li said:
The legal standard of unreasonableness should not be considered as limited to what is in effect an irrational, if not bizarre, decision - which is to say one that is so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have arrived at it - nor should Lord Greene MR be taken to have limited unreasonableness in this way in his judgment in Wednesbury. This aspect of his Lordship's judgment may more sensibly be taken to recognise that an inference of unreasonableness may in some cases be objectively drawn even where a particular error in reasoning cannot be identified. This is recognised by the principles governing the review of a judicial discretion, which, it may be observed, were settled in Australia by House v The King [68].
248 The formation of an opinion or satisfaction on reasonable grounds that conditions the valid exercise of a statutory power differs from the exercise of a statutory discretion. However, even in the case of the exercise of a statutory discretion, a weighting error (attributing too much or too little weight to a relevant consideration) does not give rise to an appealable error except in very limited circumstances: Vagh v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 17 [76]. In considering a challenge to a decision made in the exercise of a statutory discretion, error may be inferred from an unreasonable or plainly unjust exercise of a judicial discretion: House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499. Ordinarily, a so-called weighting error is an ex post facto inference that arises after finding an inferred error: Trompler v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 265 [32].
249 As this case relates to the validity of a decision that a condition enlivening a power was satisfied, not the exercise of a statutory discretion, it is unnecessary to determine whether Li has changed the test of unreasonableness in a way that lowers the threshold for success. The relevant question in this case is whether, on a proper understanding of the Act, it was open to the Commission to be satisfied, on reasonable grounds, that disclosure was necessary in the public interest.
250 The requirement in s 152(4)(c) of the Act that disclosure be 'necessary' in the public interest does not alter the evaluative nature of the judgment as to the public interest: Osland v Secretary, Department of Justice (No 2) [14].
251 For the reasons discussed earlier, the widespread, lawful public disclosure of the examinations conducted by the Commissioner, including of the appellant, is a relevant factual matter in the assessment under s 152(4)(c). However, the high-threshold public interest requirement requires a fresh assessment of all relevant matters.
252 The intervener identified a number of considerations that could properly inform an evaluation of the public interest, some favouring disclosure, some counting against it. As to the former, the intervener submitted that it was open to the Commission to take the view that:
(1) where witnesses were examined about the CCTV recordings, and had given conflicting evidence about what had happened, public disclosure of the CCTV recordings would enable members of the public to better understand the Commission's public proceedings;
(2) its prevention and education function would be best served by the release of the video to the public generally, which would have the effect of more immediately bringing it to the attention of the many members of the police force stationed throughout the State;
(3) giving members of the public a better understanding of the conduct being addressed by the public examinations would encourage reporting of incidents by members of the public who may be concerned about the manner in which a detainee has been treated;
(4) there is a public interest in the exposure of public abuses, the dissemination of information of public importance and in freedom of discussion on those matters.
253 As to matters going to prejudice to the administration of justice, the intervener points out that (1) the appellant had not been charged with any offence(s) and it could not be said that any charges would necessarily be tried or triable by a jury; (2) the publication of the CCTV recordings prior to the appellant being charged would not constitute a contempt of court; (3) even if the offences were triable by jury, the law assumes the capacity of jurors, when properly directed by trial judges, to decide cases in accordance with the law, that is, by reference only to admissible evidence led in court and relevant submissions, uninfluenced by extraneous considerations; (4) the CCTV footage would be admissible in any criminal trial of the appellant unless there were separate charges relating to D1 and D4 which were the subject of separate trials in which event only part of the footage would be admissible in each trial; (5) it is the release of the CCTV recordings rather than the decision to conduct public examinations which is sought to be impugned and the focus must be on any additional prejudice which might result from the disclosure of the recordings.
254 With one reservation, I accept the correctness of the intervener's identification of the public interests favouring disclosure. There is a construction issue lurking in the second proposition. The prevention and education function cannot be relied on to subvert or alter the scope of the Commission's misconduct function. When the Commission itself exercises the misconduct function by investigating cases of alleged misconduct, its end point or objective is to make recommendations to other authorities as to what, if any, further action they should take against the relevant public officer or more generally. It is not the Commission's role to direct public officers as a group on how to conduct themselves in the performance of their duties. The Commission's role is to make recommendations to the public authorities that have the necessary power and authority to direct and discipline those public officers.
255 I also accept the correctness of the first four propositions relating to the prejudice to the administration of justice, although the third proposition has its limitations: Russell v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 246.
256 However, the intervener's submissions significantly underplay the prejudice to the administration of criminal justice. In particular, the concern is not confined to the additional prejudice that might result from a disclosure of the CCTV recordings beyond that which any media reports of the examinations might have created.
257 It can be inferred that there will be very significant media interest in, and public exposure of, the CCTV recordings because there is significantly greater audience interest in (or significantly greater interest can be media-generated by) pictures/vision with words than in words alone.
258 One of the Commission's stated purposes in ordering disclosure of the CCTV recordings is to engage the public in an assessment of where the truth lies between the competing sworn evidence of the appellant and the other witnesses to the incidents. That purpose is likely to be achieved, with the result that attention will be drawn to the appellant's evidence compulsorily obtained but inadmissible against him in any criminal trial. There will be, in effect, a trial by media.
259 Where there is an acknowledged risk, based on objective evidence in the Commission's possession, that the appellant may be charged with a criminal offence or offences, it is contrary to the public interest in the due administration of criminal justice that there be trial by, or facilitated by, the media by reference to inadmissible evidence compulsorily obtained by the Commission. That is particularly so where the primary public focus will be on the evidence that goes directly to the heart of an element of any likely offence(s), namely whether the appellant used more force than was reasonably necessary in the circumstances. See s 231 of the Criminal Code (WA). The prejudice arises from the publication of the CCTV recordings in combination with the evidence given in the public examinations with an invitation to prejudge where the truth lies.
260 The fact that disclosure is positively contrary to the public interest in the due administration of criminal justice prevents satisfaction of the condition in s 152(4)(c) of the Act. Having regard to all relevant and competing public interests, it was not open to the Commission to be satisfied, on reasonable grounds, that disclosure of the CCTV recordings was necessary in the public interest.
261 I would grant leave to amend the grounds of appeal to add ground 6 and uphold that ground, allow the appeal and quash the Commission's decision to disclose the CCTV recordings to the media under s 152(4)(c) of the Act.
(1980) 43 FLR 129
(1980) 29 ALR 228
(1949) 78 CLR 353
(1998) 45 NSWLR 163
(2008) 238 CLR 218
(2007) 34 WAR 325
(1992) 176 CLR 1
(1905) 2 CLR 405
(1981) 147 CLR 297
(1986) 162 CLR 1
(1995) 184 CLR 163
(2008) 38 WAR 177
(1982) 151 CLR 342
(1984) 154 CLR 349
(1989) 168 CLR 1
(1979) 141 CLR 594
(2010) 240 CLR 651
(1936) 55 CLR 499
(2010) 239 CLR 531
(2013) 302 ALR 363
(1978) 52 ALJR 292
(1978) 18 ALR 147
(2006) 228 CLR 423
(1985) 59 ALJR 481
(1986) 162 CLR 24
(2013) 87 ALJR 618
(2010) 240 CLR 611
(1999) 197 CLR 611
(2001) 206 CLR 323
(1989) 23 FCR 191
(1982) 150 CLR 310
(2010) 241 CLR 320
(2008) 234 CLR 275
(1989) 168 CLR 210
(1989) 166 CLR 466
(1999) 198 CLR 435
(2011) 244 CLR 144
(1998) 194 CLR 355
(1979) 144 CLR 45
(1944) 69 CLR 407
(2003) 77 ALJR 1165
(2012) 43 WAR 91
(1909) 9 CLR 1
(1981) 38 ALR 363
(1987) 12 NSWLR 447
(1950) 81 CLR 418
(1988) 180 CLR 491
(1947) 74 CLR 492
(1992) 176 CLR 239
(2013) 87 ALJR 858
(2001) 51 NSWLR 589
(2004) 220 CLR 181
(2001) 53 NSWLR 7
(2011) 244 CLR 352
(1950) 81 CLR 87
(1981) 151 CLR 170
(1990) 170 CLR 649
(2007) 161 FCR 40