The Act is described as having a 'Current version for 7 March 1927 to date (accessed 3 April 2026 at 15:54)' with only a single point-in-time version existing (07/03/1927), yet the status information states 'Legislation on this site is usually updated within 3 working days after a change to the legislation.' No changes have occurred in approximately 99 years, rendering the update promise entirely moot.
The document as provided contains no substantive legislative provisions whatsoever. It consists entirely of website navigation elements, metadata, status information, and boilerplate text. An Act of Parliament with no operative sections, definitions, purposes, or enforcement mechanisms cannot achieve any legal effect and is logically incomplete as a legislative instrument.
The document certifies itself as correct under section 45C of the Interpretation Act 1987, a statute enacted 60 years after this Act was passed in 1927. The certification mechanism post-dates the Act being certified by six decades.
The currency statement describes the version as current 'for 7 March 1927 to date', implying continuous and unbroken currency across 99 years. However, the point-in-time version panel lists only a single version dated 07/03/1927 as the sole 'In force version'. These two representations create a minor logical tension: the currency framing implies ongoing active currency requiring maintenance, while the version history implies the Act has been static and untouched since its commencement date.
Section 7 provides that consent from a parent or guardian may be given at the time a State athlete registers to compete in an 'open age sporting competition', but section 7 applies specifically to athletes under 18 years. An under-18 athlete registering for an open age competition may not have a parent or guardian present at that point, and more critically, the consent provision as drafted appears to treat registration for an open age competition as a trigger for blanket consent for a minor — potentially circumventing meaningful parental consent protections.
Section 7(2) begins by stating 'The consent may be given either generally or in relation to a particular request' and then immediately appends timing conditions ('Consent given— at the time the State athlete becomes a member... or at the time the State athlete registers...') without completing the sentence or specifying what legal effect consent given at those times produces. The provision appears grammatically and legally incomplete, leaving it unclear whether consent given at those times is deemed valid, irrevocable, or has any special status.
The Act is titled the 'Sport Integrity Australia Act 2020' but the commencement table lists Royal Assent as '7 March 2006' and sections 3-79 as commencing '13 March 2006'. A 2020 Act cannot have received Royal Assent in 2006.
The definition of 'athlete' requires a person to be 'subject to the NAD scheme', but the NAD scheme itself determines which classes of athletes are subject to it (per section 13(1)(a)). A person can only be an 'athlete' if already subject to the NAD scheme, yet the NAD scheme applies to 'athletes'. This is a circular definition.
The Northern Territory is simultaneously included in the definition of 'State' and excluded from the definition of 'Territory', creating a classification anomaly where the Northern Territory is legally treated as a State throughout the Act except where Territory is the operative concept.
A Special Prosecutor who acts entirely outside the matters specified by the Attorney-General cannot be challenged in any court on that ground. This effectively renders the Attorney-General's specification power under s6(1) legally meaningless as a constraint, since breaching it has no legal consequence.
The definition of 'content' for the purposes of 'digital media service' is entirely circular and substantively meaningless. It defines 'content' as 'content' in various forms, providing no definitional boundary whatsoever.
The Act imposes extensive mandatory duties on the SBS (s.6(2)) and on the Board (s.10(1)) using obligatory language ('must'), then immediately declares in s.6(4) and s.10(2) that none of those duties are enforceable by court proceedings. This renders the mandatory language functionally meaningless as a legal obligation.
Section 20 is titled 'Declaration of contravention is conclusive evidence' and states that a declaration of contravention is conclusive evidence of the matters referred to in 'section 20(3)'. However, section 20 has no subsection (3). The declaration of contravention and its required contents are defined in section 19(3), not section 20(3).
Section 10 refers to 'section 6(3), (4) and (5)' in its exception clause, but section 6 contains only two subsections: (a) and (b) as a single operative rule. There are no subsections (3), (4) or (5) in section 6.
A distributor-retailer is declared 'not a body corporate' yet is granted 'all the powers of an individual' including the power to sue and be sued, employ staff, acquire property, and enter contracts. These are precisely the powers that define a body corporate. The entity is a non-body-corporate that acts exactly like a body corporate.
Section 12(3) makes a distributor-retailer's powers 'subject to any limitations' under particular Acts, but section 12(4) immediately provides that exercising a power 'in contravention of a limitation or restriction under an Act does not invalidate or otherwise affect the exercise of the power.' This renders the limitations meaningless — they bind but have no legal consequence.
The Authority is declared to not be a body corporate, yet it is simultaneously granted 'all the powers of an individual', including the power to enter contracts, hold property, employ staff, and sue and be sued. These are quintessentially the legal capacities of either a natural person or a body corporate. A non-corporate entity that is also not a natural person has no recognised legal personality at common law to exercise such powers.
The Authority may 'sue and be sued in the name it is given under section 6(1)', yet it is not a body corporate and does not have perpetual succession. Standing to sue and be sued as a named entity is a function of legal personality, which the Act simultaneously denies.
Plans must be 'in the approved form' AND printed on A3 paper at 130gsm. If the approved form specifies different paper dimensions or density, strict compliance with both requirements simultaneously may be impossible. The approved form requirement is undefined within this regulation, creating a potential conflict with the physical paper requirements.
The alteration procedure requires striking through original text 'so the original printing or writing is still legible.' This is a practical impossibility in many circumstances — a sufficiently heavy strike-through obscures the original, while a light one may not constitute a valid strike-through. The standard is inherently self-defeating.
The definition of 'reconfiguring' specifies 'amalgamating 7 South Bank lots' as a specific trigger. This is an oddly precise and arbitrary number - why exactly 7? Amalgamating 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 lots would apparently not constitute 'reconfiguring' under this limb, while section 4(a)(ii) treats amalgamation of 2 or more lots as exempt from assessable development. The specific number '7' appears to be a drafting error (likely should be 'any' or '2 or more').
The 'approved development plan' is defined as the plan 'approved by the Governor in Council under section 34 as amended from time to time.' This is a circular definition that defines the approved development plan partly by reference to its own future amended state, creating logical indeterminacy about which version of the plan is operative at any given time.
Temporal impossibility: notice must be served 14 days before nominations close, but nominations close 21 days before the anniversary of the first AGM — no mechanism exists if the AGM is held less than 35 days after the previous one or if the anniversary date falls before the 35-day window
Section 6(1) states the State 'may' enter into an agreement with the Commonwealth, using permissive language. However, section 3(2) states the objects of the Act are to be achieved 'mainly by providing for the State to enter into an agreement with the Commonwealth.' If the agreement is merely permissive and never executed, the Act's stated objects cannot be achieved, yet the Act provides no mechanism to compel the agreement or any alternative pathway to achieving its objects.
Section 4 states that the schedule dictionary defines particular words used in the Act. Section 5 states that expressions used in both this Act and the Commonwealth Act have the same meaning as in the Commonwealth Act. No schedule or dictionary appears in the extracted text, and there is no mechanism to resolve conflicts where the schedule dictionary and the Commonwealth Act define the same term differently.
2 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
The definition of 'drug' includes 'any substance (whether naturally occurring or otherwise)'. This is so extraordinarily broad that it includes water, oxygen, food, and every compound in the human body, making the term practically meaningless and capable of absurd application.
Section 11 mandates a public consultation process before the CEO amends the NAD scheme, but section 11(3) expressly provides that failure to comply with this consultation requirement 'does not affect the validity of the instrument'. The mandatory consultation process is therefore entirely unenforceable and illusory.
11 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
A Special Prosecutor is entitled to practise as a barrister in all relevant courts 'whether or not he or she would, but for this section, be entitled to practise in that court.' This means a person who is qualified only as a solicitor (never as a barrister) is granted barrister rights by statute, potentially overriding court admission rules and professional conduct frameworks.
The mandatory termination trigger for absence without leave is expressed in the alternative: 14 consecutive days OR 28 days in any 12 months. A Special Prosecutor absent for exactly 14 consecutive days triggers mandatory termination, but one who is absent for 13 days, returns for one day, then is absent for 13 more days (26 days total, non-consecutive) does not. The threshold for consecutive absence is lower than the aggregate threshold, creating an arbitrary disparity.
6 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
Section 11 creates a layered system of Ministerial direction that is internally incoherent: the Minister may give directions (s.11(1)), but only on prescribed matters or in prescribed circumstances (s.11(2)), but must not direct on program content or scheduling (s.11(3)), and must not direct on digital media content (s.11(3A)). Combined with s.13(1) which says the SBS is not subject to Government direction except as provided, the scope of permissible direction is so narrow as to be potentially illusory, yet the framework purports to provide a meaningful power.
Section 12(5) requires a Ministerial direction under section 12 to be 'given in writing, or sent by telex or fax'. The inclusion of 'telex' as an authorised method of official Ministerial direction in legislation still on the books is practically absurd — telex infrastructure has not existed commercially in Australia since the 1990s, creating a situation where one of the three authorised transmission methods is physically impossible to use.
12 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
The definition of 'compensation order' in section 3 cross-references 'section 22(1)', but section 22 has no subsection (1) — it is a single unsubdivided provision dealing with time limits. The compensation order is actually defined and created by section 21(1).
The definition of 'declaration of contravention' in section 3 cross-references 'section 20(1)', but section 20 has no subsection (1) — it is a single unsubdivided provision. The declaration of contravention is actually established by section 19(1).
7 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
The 99-year expiry mechanism for a distributor-retailer that 'is not a body corporate' and 'is not constituted by its board or participants' creates an absurdity: at expiry, assets and liabilities transfer to 'participants' in proportion to 'participation rights under the participation agreement', but participants are local governments whose own existence, composition, and statutory roles may have changed entirely over 99 years. The mechanism assumes static institutional structures over a near-century timeframe.
The participation agreement is deemed to have 'effect as a contract' binding 'each member of the board', yet board members are not parties to the agreement and under section 9, the distributor-retailer is not a body corporate. Non-parties are deemed to have 'agreed to observe and perform' a contract they never executed and may not have seen.
15 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
The Authority 'must have a board' (s.14(1)) but 'is not constituted by the members of the board' (s.14(2)). Combined with the Authority not being a body corporate (s.6(2)), it is unclear what legal entity the board governs or what the board's resolutions bind, since the Authority has no identifiable legal constitution.
Section 9(1) provides that the Authority's functions exist only 'to the extent they are consistent with its operational and strategic plans', while section 49 requires the Authority to 'comply with its strategic and operational plans'. The plans are themselves subject to Ministerial direction and are not finalised until agreed or imposed. This creates a circular dependency: the Authority's functions depend on the plans, but the plans are determined partly by reference to the Authority's functions.
12 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
Same logical impossibility as sec.3(2)(a): instruments must be altered by striking through so the original remains legible, and instruments must also be 'free from discolouration and blemishes' (sec.17(1)(b)(iii)). A struck-through alteration would arguably constitute a blemish on the instrument.
Section 23 requires that 'the total of the proposed value proportions of the stratum lots intended to be created is equal to the value of the stratum lot intended to be subdivided.' This conflates 'value proportions' (a proportional/relative measure) with 'value' (an absolute measure). Value proportions by definition sum to a fixed total within a stratum plan — they cannot be compared directly to an absolute value without a conversion mechanism that is not provided.
6 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
'Public authority' is defined to include 'a public agency', while 'public agencies' is defined to include 'any public authority'. This creates a circular definition where each term is defined by reference to the other.
The board composition provision states the board consists of 'at least 2 but no more than 10 members' comprising: 1 chairperson + up to 2 council nominees + up to 7 Minister nominees = maximum 10. However the minimum of 2 members is structurally inconsistent with the requirement for a chairperson as one mandated position - if only 2 members exist, the board consists only of a chairperson and one other member, yet quorum and governance requirements implicit in schedule 1 likely require more.
13 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
Voter completing ballot at the AGM is still required to place it in a ballot paper envelope and send it to the secretary — internally contradictory for in-person completion
Secret ballot rule 1 cross-references 'section 21A, rule 2' for ballot paper envelope compliance, but rule 2 of section 21A specifies requirements for giving ballot papers to persons on the roll — not specifications for the envelope itself
8 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.