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Commonwealth act
This Act has been repealed and is no longer in force. It is retained for historical reference.
The Act sets up and continues the Australian Wheat Board (the Board) as the central authority for buying, handling and selling wheat for export, interstate trade and marketing in Territories. (See: sections 6, 13.)
For wheat in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) the law makes delivery to the Board compulsory on demand; ownership passes to the Board on delivery. A person in possession of wheat in the ACT may also deliver voluntarily. (See: section 14.)
The Board determines payments to those who deliver wheat to it. The method for calculating payments is specified: net proceeds from disposal of a season’s wheat are pooled and apportioned back to deliverers, with quality and transport adjustments. The Board may make advance payments with Ministerial approval and need not finalise payments until it has disposed of that season’s wheat. (See: sections 17 and 18.)
A guaranteed price concept is set by reference to a cost-of-production figure. The Minister fixes the cost of production for each season after consultation with State Ministers; the first season’s cost is fixed in the Act. That figure is used in parts of the pricing and accounting rules. (See: section 5.)
The Board has powers to buy, accept, store, process and sell wheat and related products, to appoint licensed receivers within Australia to accept deliveries on its behalf, and, with Ministerial approval, to appoint overseas agents. The Minister can give directions to the Board. (See: sections 11–13 and 12.)
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Direct links to the current provisions in Wheat Industry Stabilization Act 1958.
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View on official registerSourced from the Federal Register of Legislation (legislation.gov.au), CC BY 4.0.
Exports and most dealings with wheat outside the Board’s system are restricted unless the Board consents. The Act creates criminal penalties and pecuniary penalties for unauthorised sales, exports and refusals to comply with delivery demands. (See: sections 14–16 and penalties in those sections and section 34.)
Financial arrangements for stabilization: an explicitly identified Wheat Prices Stabilization Fund receives amounts equivalent to the wheat export charge and pays sums to the Board to top up net proceeds in certain circumstances. If the Fund is insufficient, the Consolidated Revenue Fund can be called on to make up shortfalls. The Treasurer and Minister have specified roles in payments and refunds. (See: sections 27–28 and 26.)
The Act contains administrative provisions on Board membership, appointment and removal (including Ministerial appointment power and State nominations/elections), meetings, delegation to an Executive Committee, appointment and pay of officers and licensed receivers, audit by the Auditor‑General, and interaction with State laws. (See: sections 7–10, 25, 30–33, 31, 32.)
Temporal limit: the Act applies only up to wheat harvested on or before 30 September 1963 (so its operation is tied to specific seasons). (See: section 36.)
Why the Act exists (as stated) and how that aligns with the mechanics
Who pays, who decides, and what behaviour changes
Who pays: growers who deliver wheat receive payments from the Board (secs 17–18). The Fund that subsidises top-ups is financed from amounts equivalent to the wheat export charge (sec 27(2)); if the Fund is insufficient the Consolidated Revenue Fund may meet deficiencies (sec 27(4)). Persons exporting or selling outside the Board may face penalties (secs 16, 34). Licensed receivers receive remuneration determined by the Minister on the Board’s recommendation (sec 31).
Who decides: the Minister has several discrete powers — to determine cost of production each season after State consultation (sec 5(2)), to appoint certain Board members (sec 7(2)), to give directions to the Board (sec 13(2)), to approve overseas agents (sec 12), to arrange or guarantee bank advances (sec 26) and to declare final delivery days (sec 19(1)). The Board decides operational matters such as licensing receivers (sec 11), determining payments to growers (sec 17), managing and disposing of wheat (sec 13(1)) and keeping accounts (secs 24–25).
Behaviour changes required: persons in the ACT must deliver wheat on demand to the Board (sec 14(1)(b)). Generally, private sale, possession, export or dealing with wheat outside the Board’s system is prohibited except where specifically allowed (secs 14–16). Deliverers must provide information about interests in the wheat when consigning to a licensed receiver (sec 15(2)), and must comply with Board notices requiring returns (sec 21).
Costs, incentives, trade-offs and compliance burden (mechanisms and likely effects)
Concentration of receipts and benefits: payments to growers are pooled and determined by the Board’s accounting of net disposal proceeds (sec 17). This concentrates the distribution mechanism through a single buyer (the Board).
Funding and diffuse costs: support for guaranteed returns or top-ups is supplied from the export charge (sec 27(2)) and, if the Fund runs short, from Consolidated Revenue (sec 27(4)). That mechanism shifts the cost-recovery burden to exporters (via the charge) and ultimately may involve the public purse if the Fund is insufficient.
Compliance burden on private parties: compulsory delivery in the ACT (sec 14), the need to supply declarations for older-season wheat (sec 19), statutory requirements to provide particulars when consigning to licensed receivers (sec 15(2)), and Board powers to require returns and enter premises (secs 21, 20) create administrative obligations and exposure to inspection or seizure.
Restrictions on private contract freedom and market entry: the Act prohibits private sale and export outside the Board’s consent (sec 16). Ownership of wheat delivered to the Board vests in the Board (sec 14(2)), which alters private sellers’ control over their commodity and restricts independent export activity.
Discretion and decision points: the Minister and the Board both hold significant discretions: appointment/removal of members (secs 7(2), 8), directions to the Board (sec 13(2)), Ministerial determination of cost-of-production (sec 5(2)–(4)), and the Board’s judgment in attributing sales to seasons and payments to deliverers (sec 17(3)). Those discretions determine outcomes for prices, advance payments, and operational priorities.
Cashflow and implementation risks: the Board may defer final payments until it has disposed of a whole season’s wheat (sec 17(4)), but may make advance payments with Ministerial approval, creating liquidity dependence on Board decisions, Ministerial approvals and on the Fund or bank advances (secs 17(4), 26, 27).
Auditing and oversight: accounts are subject to audit by the Auditor‑General (sec 32), and the Board must keep separate accounting for Tasmania freight receipts and related payments (secs 23–24), which imposes further administrative controls.
Concrete trade-offs and opportunity costs built into the Act
The Act centralises sales and export control (sec 13) and thus trades sellers’ immediate freedom to contract and export for a pooled, season-based payment approach (sec 17). The opportunity cost is that growers cannot independently access export markets or retain ownership in the ACT after delivery (secs 14, 16).
Financially, the scheme uses an export charge to create a stabilization Fund (sec 27), but that Fund is backed by the Consolidated Revenue Fund if necessary (sec 27(4)). The trade-off here exchanges an industry-level buffer funded by exporters for a contingent fiscal obligation on the Commonwealth.
Procedural and temporal limits
The Act expressly replaces the prior Wheat Industry Stabilization Act 1954 but carries forward many provisions for transitional situations (section 3). (See: section 3.)
The Act’s application is limited to wheat harvested on or before 30 September 1963 (sec 36), so the statutory regime is time-bound to specified seasons.
Implementation points that matter in practice
Ministerial control over cost-of-production and over directions to the Board (secs 5 and 13(2)) means policy choices about the guaranteed price and operational direction are centrally determined.
The Board’s requirement to apportion pooled proceeds (sec 17(2)(c)) and its power to treat sales and seasons in the way it judges equitable (sec 17(3)) are the operational levers that determine individual grower payments.
Enforcement relies on criminal and pecuniary penalties, seizure powers and information requirements (secs 14–16, 20–21, 34). These are the primary compliance instruments.
Key sections to consult quickly: 5 (cost of production), 6–7 (Board continuation and membership), 13 (Board powers and Ministerial directions), 14–18 (delivery, unauthorized dealings, price/payment rules), 27–28 (Fund and refunds), 20–21 (inspection and returns), 26 (bank advances), 36 (expiry of operation).