The Weapons Act 1999 casts a wide net. Any person physically present in Western Australia who carries, possesses, imports, manufactures, sells or supplies a weapon falls within its scope. This includes residents, visitors, commercial traders, collectors, martial-arts practitioners, security personnel and ordinary members of the public who might carry a knife for utility purposes.

Children under 18 are specially protected by the child-sale and supply offences in ss.6B and 8A; any person who sells or supplies an edged or controlled weapon to them commits an offence regardless of whether the child had lawful excuse (subject only to the reasonable-belief defence in supply cases). Employers whose staff carry tools that might qualify as edged or controlled weapons (for example, chefs, farmers, carpenters) are indirectly affected because they must ensure employees have lawful excuse and do not carry the items in a threatening manner.

Police officers, special constables, Police Service employees, contracted service providers to the Police Force, and public transport security officers enjoy broad functional exceptions under s.10(1). Museum personnel and persons engaged with recognised museums receive separate exceptions under s.10(2) for collection and display purposes. Business proprietors who keep articles for lawful defence of business premises (provided the area is not open to the public) are protected by s.8(5). Collectors and sporting participants fall within the lawful-excuse umbrella in s.5A(1)(a) provided the activity is lawful.

The Commissioner of Police is expressly granted functions in relation to retention, forfeiture, disposal and delegation (ss.15–19). Magistrates Court and higher courts are engaged in forfeiture applications, appeals and determinations of lawful entitlement. Juvenile justice teams are referenced in the definition of “relevant day” for non-conviction forfeiture applications (s.17(2)(b)).

Because the Act applies to “articles” including liquids and gases (s.3), manufacturers, importers and transporters of industrial chemicals or irritant sprays must also consider compliance. The Crown itself is bound (s.5), although functional exceptions for law-enforcement personnel largely mitigate operational impact.

The statute imposes negative duties (prohibitions) rather than positive obligations to register or licence. The primary duty is to refrain from the conduct listed in ss.6, 6A, 6B, 7, 8 and 8A unless an exception or lawful excuse applies. Where a person claims lawful excuse, s.5A confines it to enumerated non-defensive purposes unless a regulation expressly permits defensive use of prescribed controlled weapons in prescribed circumstances.

Rights are largely cast as defences or exceptions. Section 10(1) and (2) confer immunity on law-enforcement and museum personnel performing their functions. The dwelling and business-premises defences in s.8(3)–(5) grant limited rights to keep articles for home or business defence. The right to apply for return of seized property is conferred on persons lawfully entitled to possess the weapon under ss.16 and 17, including rights to be heard, to use Criminal Procedure Act 2004 s.71 procedures, and to appeal under the Criminal Appeals Act 2004.

Accused persons have the statutory right to prove exceptions or lawful excuse on the balance of probabilities (s.11), although the reverse onus itself is a significant limitation on the practical right to silence. Persons claiming ownership or authorisation may assert lawful entitlement under s.12(2), which requires both ownership/authorisation and that possession is not otherwise prohibited by law.

Police powers to stop, detain, search and seize without warrant (s.13) or under warrant (s.14) create corresponding rights for individuals to be searched only on reasonable suspicion and to have property returned if no offence is established and no forfeiture order is made (s.15(2)).

Penalties are graduated by weapon type and culpability. The most serious offence—dealing with prohibited weapons—carries 5 years imprisonment and a $60,000 fine (s.6(1)), reducible on summary conviction to 3 years and $36,000. Edged-weapon offences under s.6A and child-supply offences under s.6B each attract 3 years and $36,000. Controlled-weapon and s.8 offences are capped at 2 years imprisonment and $24,000 fines.

A statutory note appended to ss.6, 6A and 6B records that Young Offenders Act 1994 s.22(1) does not permit a police caution instead of charge for these matters, ensuring formal prosecution of juveniles.

Enforcement is police-led. Section 13 authorises warrantless stop, detention and search of persons or conveyances on reasonable suspicion of an offence, of carrying a weapon relating to an offence, or of finding evidence. Section 14 warrants extend these powers to private places and permit use of reasonable force. Seized items may be retained for investigation, juvenile justice team matters, or where no person satisfies the Commissioner of lawful entitlement (s.15(1)).

Forfeiture occurs automatically in certain non-claim scenarios (s.17(4)) or by court order on conviction (s.16(1)(a)). A convicted person’s weapon may instead be returned to a lawfully entitled third party (s.16(1)(b)). Non-conviction claims must be made to the Magistrates Court within 21 days of the “relevant day” (defined in s.17(2)), with the applicant bearing the balance-of-probabilities burden. The Commissioner may sell, destroy or otherwise dispose of forfeited weapons (s.18), subject to appeal periods.

Section 19 permits the Commissioner to delegate all Part 3 functions except the delegation power itself. Section 11’s reverse onus is a powerful enforcement tool, relieving the prosecution of proving absence of excuse.

The Act is expressly “in addition to and not instead of” any other written law relating to weapons (s.4). It therefore sits alongside the Firearms Act 2024, whose definition of “firearm” is imported into s.3. The 2024 amendments to the Weapons Act (No. 23 of 2024 s.495 and No. 33 of 2024) were enacted concurrently with firearms reform, ensuring consistent terminology.

The Criminal Code ss.25 and 31 are preserved by s.9; the statutory exclusion of self-defence from “lawful excuse” (s.5A(1)(b)) therefore does not derogate from the general criminal-law defences of emergency or self-defence. The presumption in s.8(2) interacts with the Code’s general intent provisions but creates an evidentiary shortcut.

The Young Offenders Act 1994 is engaged both by the caution prohibition notes and by the juvenile justice team provisions in s.17(2)(b) and the definition of “offence” in s.12(1). Forfeiture and return applications invoke the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (s.16(2)(b)) and Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (s.16(2)(c)).

Museum-related exceptions cross-reference the Museum Act 1969 (s.10(2)). Public transport security officers’ immunity refers to the Public Transport Authority Act 2003 s.3. The Police Act 1892 is relevant to the appointment of special constables (s.10(1)(b)).

Regulations made under s.20 can prescribe specific articles as prohibited, controlled or edged weapons, create exceptions, or authorise defensive use of certain controlled weapons. Because the definitional sections repeatedly defer to “prescribed by the regulations”, the substantive content of the regime is largely contained in subordinate legislation that must be read together with the Act.

The most significant recent changes were effected by the Police Legislation Amendment Act 2024 (No. 33 of 2024), which commenced on 20 December 2024. That Act inserted the entire definition of “edged weapon” as new s.3A, created new offences in ss.6A and 6B, substantially rewrote the lawful-excuse provision as s.5A, amended the controlled-weapon offence (s.7), inserted the child-supply offence s.8A in revised form, updated s.8, inserted s.9 preserving Criminal Code defences, expanded the exceptions in s.10, amended the burden-of-proof section (s.11), and made consequential changes to interpretation and enforcement sections.

The Firearms Act 2024 (No. 23 of 2024) amended the definition of “firearm” in s.3 to align with the new consolidated firearms statute.

These changes were driven by concern that knives and edged implements were being used in an increasing number of street offences. By creating a distinct statutory category with its own offences and by narrowing lawful excuse to exclude routine self-defence claims (unless prescribed by regulation), the legislature sought to deter casual carriage of knives while preserving legitimate occupational and sporting uses. The introduction of specific child-supply offences reflects a policy of reducing youth access to blades. The retention of the reverse onus (s.11) and the prohibition on cautions for young offenders signal a “tough on knives” enforcement stance.

The printed Act itself contains no reported cases; however, several structural features are likely to generate litigation. The rebuttable presumption of intent in s.8(2) shifts the evidential burden once “circumstances that give reasonable grounds for suspecting” the prohibited intent are shown. Courts must determine the threshold of “reasonable grounds” and the standard to which the accused must “prove the contrary”. Because s.9 expressly preserves The Criminal Code ss.25 and 31, defendants will argue that the statutory presumption cannot override Code defences in appropriate factual scenarios.

The definition of “edged weapon” in s.3A(1)(d) contains evaluative language—“reasonably capable of being held in 1 or both hands”, “made or modified to be used” for injury, fear or martial purposes. These phrases invite factual dispute and will require judicial gloss, especially where an ordinary kitchen knife is carried by a tradesperson.

The exclusion of self-defence from lawful excuse (s.5A(1)(b)) while preserving Criminal Code self-defence under s.9 creates an apparent tension that will require appellate clarification. Prosecutors may charge under both the Weapons Act and the Code; defendants will contend that an acquittal on Code self-defence should preclude Weapons Act liability.

Forfeiture proceedings under ss.16 and 17 engage property rights. The 21-day strict time limit in s.17(1) and the balance-of-probabilities test for “lawfully entitled to possess” have already produced procedural disputes in analogous firearms legislation. The Commissioner’s disposal power under s.18, particularly the prohibition on early destruction pending appeal, is likely to be tested where valuable or culturally significant items are seized.

The statutory note barring cautions under the Young Offenders Act 1994 s.22(1) has been controversial among youth advocates, who argue it removes discretion that could divert minor knife possession cases from the formal justice system.

Most practitioners miss that “lawful excuse” is now exhaustively defined in s.5A and deliberately excludes self-defence unless a regulation carves out an exception for prescribed controlled weapons carried in prescribed circumstances. Carrying a folding knife “just in case” is therefore unlawful even if the carrier harbours no aggressive intent.

The reverse onus in s.11 applies to every exception under ss.6–8 and 10 as well as to lawful excuse. An accused who remains silent at trial risks automatic conviction once the prosecution proves the physical act.

Section 3A’s edged-weapon definition captures far more than obvious knives. An ordinary hatchet carried in a car without work-related justification, or a sharpened screwdriver modified for self-defence, can fall within paragraph (d). The “made or modified” limb is not limited to commercial manufacture; homemade sharpening can suffice.

The presumption in s.8(2) is not a legal presumption of guilt but an evidentiary one; however, once triggered, the accused must positively disprove intent. Circumstances such as presence in a known trouble spot while wearing gloves and carrying a baseball bat have been held in analogous cases to raise the presumption.

Museums and collectors must rely on the specific s.10(2) exception; the general lawful-excuse provision in s.5A(1)(a)(iii) is not available for prohibited weapons. A collector of prohibited items therefore remains strictly liable.

Forfeiture can occur without conviction. If no timely application is made under s.17 within 21 days of the relevant day, the weapon is automatically forfeited even though the owner was never charged.

Businesses keeping “panic buttons” or improvised weapons behind the counter must ensure they are stored in a part of the premises “not in the view of the public” and “to which the public does not usually have access” (s.8(5)). A back office that customers occasionally enter may not qualify.

Finally, because regulations prescribe the content of each weapon list, the Act is a moving target. A knife lawful today can become an “edged weapon” or “controlled weapon” tomorrow by simple gazettal, with no grandfathering provision.

Compliance begins with classification. Organisations should maintain an up-to-date copy of the regulations listing prohibited, controlled and edged weapons and cross-reference every item in inventory or issued to staff. A written weapons policy should expressly adopt the s.5A lawful-excuse criteria and prohibit carriage for defence unless a specific regulation authorises it.

Staff training must cover the distinction between lawful occupational carriage and threatening manner (ss.6A(2), 7(2)). Delivery drivers, security guards and tradespeople should be issued with written authorisations confirming the lawful employment purpose. Where possible, lockable storage or vehicle consoles should be used so that the item is not “carried” on the person.

Retailers must implement age-verification processes before selling any knife or edged implement. The reasonable-belief defence in ss.6B(3) and 8A(4) requires documented ID checks and, where practicable, a signed declaration that the purchaser has lawful excuse.

Security risk assessments for business premises should identify likely threats and, if defensive articles are deemed necessary, ensure they are stored strictly in compliance with s.8(5). Incident logs recording when and why an article was deployed will assist in proving reasonable apprehension of attack.

Museums and collectors must document the s.10(2) functional nexus and keep weapons secured when not on display. Transport of weapons should be by prior arrangement with police where s.6(2) delivery-to-custody safe-harbour is to be used.

In the event of seizure, immediate legal advice should be obtained to meet the 21-day s.17 deadline. Applications for return should be supported by sworn evidence of ownership, authorisation and lawful entitlement under s.12(2).

Organisations should subscribe to the Western Australian Government Gazette and legislation website alerts for amendments to the regulations. Annual compliance audits should test a sample of carried items against the current lists and verify that every carrier can articulate a s.5A lawful excuse.

Finally, because the reverse onus applies, internal investigation reports and disciplinary records should never contain unguarded admissions that could be used to negative lawful excuse in subsequent proceedings.