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Commonwealth act
This Act has been repealed and is no longer in force. It is retained for historical reference.
The Act creates a system of war pensions to be paid by the Commonwealth to members of the Defence Forces (and certain Imperial reservists resident in Australia) or their dependants when death or incapacity results from employment connected with warlike operations (s 3, s 15).
It sets who counts as dependants and children for the purpose of pension entitlement and defines key terms used throughout the Act (s 2).
A three‑member Pensions Board, including a medical practitioner, is appointed to decide whether a death or incapacity was caused by war service, to assess dependency and to recommend pension rates (s 4(1)–(4)). The Board can summon witnesses, take evidence on oath and require documents (s 5).
The Board’s findings and rate assessments are subject to the Treasurer’s approval (the Minister) (s 6). A pension must also be approved by the Governor‑General before payment (s 11).
The Act fixes maximum pension amounts and basic rates: a widow’s pension and a member’s pension on total incapacity are set by reference to a printed Schedule; each child’s pension is set at £13 per year; other dependants are assessed up to overall caps tied to the Schedule (s 8 and Schedule). Where pay falls between steps in the Schedule, the pension is calculated by proportional interpolation (Schedule).
The Board, with the Minister’s sanction, may convert small assessed pensions (no more than 30% of a total incapacity rate) into a lump‑sum instead of ongoing payments (s 9).
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Direct links to the current provisions in War Pensions Act 1914.
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View on official registerSourced from the Federal Register of Legislation (legislation.gov.au), CC BY 4.0.
A widow’s pension ends if she remarries (s 10). Pensions are paid from parliamentary appropriations (s 12) and, once granted, are inalienable — they cannot be sold, assigned or seized (s 13).
The Act prevents double‑payment by substituting its pension for other Commonwealth payments where both would apply; it also requires taking into account Imperial or State pensions or compensations in assessing amounts (s 3(b)–(c), s 15).
The Act makes it an offence to obtain a pension by false or misleading statements or to present false documents, with criminal penalties (s 14). It also prescribes penalties (fines) for refusing to obey a Board summons or to answer on oath (s 5(2)–(3)).
The Governor‑General may make regulations to implement the Act, including procedures for handling pensions or instalments for persons under incapacity (s 16).
Who pays, who decides, and what changes in behaviour the law creates
Who pays: the Commonwealth — pensions are payable out of moneys appropriated by Parliament (s 12). Taxpayers ultimately bear the cost of the program.
Who decides: the Pensions Board investigates and assesses causal connection, dependency and rates (s 4). The Treasurer (the Minister) must approve the Board’s assessments (s 6). The Governor‑General must approve each pension before payment (s 11). Regulations may further allocate procedural detail (s 16).
Behavioural effects and compliance triggers:
Implementation, discretion and administrative burdens (mechanical consequences)
Centralised administrative control: although the Board carries out fact‑finding and assessment, the Minister must approve assessments (s 6) and the Governor‑General must approve pensions (s 11). Those approvals create points of executive discretion in every case.
Evidentiary and procedural burden on claimants: the Board’s power to summon witnesses and require documents (s 5), plus the statutory time limits for claims (s 3 proviso (a)), mean claimants must assemble evidence promptly and may be required to give sworn testimony.
Administrative workload and cost: the Board must medically and financially assess causation, incapacity degree and dependency (s 4(4)(a)–(c)). The Schedule’s step rates and the interpolation rule require calculation for pay grades between steps (Schedule), and the Board or administrators must coordinate with other Commonwealth, Imperial or State benefit programs to avoid duplicative payment (s 3(b)–(c), s 15).
Regulatory discretion: the Governor‑General may make implementing regulations (s 16), including rules for handling payments to persons under incapacity, which hands detail to executive regulation rather than the Act itself.
How the measure affects private actors and markets (mechanisms, not judgments)
Direct market impact is limited: the Act creates a public transfer (pensions) to individuals; it does not regulate prices, competition, ownership, or private contract terms.
Effect on private employers or insurance markets: the Act substitutes a Commonwealth pension where other Commonwealth payments would otherwise arise (s 3(b)). It also requires the Board to take Imperial or State payments into account (s 3(c), s 15). Those rules change the net entitlement of recipients who might otherwise claim multiple public payments, which can affect private decisions about buying supplementary insurance but the Act does not itself compel private parties.
Distribution of costs and benefits: benefits flow to a concentrated group (eligible members and dependants). Costs are borne broadly by the Commonwealth via parliamentary appropriation (s 12). The Act’s mechanisms (fixed rates, inalienability s 13, cessation on remarriage s 10) shape who receives and retains benefits.
Trade‑offs, risks and practical constraints (mechanisms to watch)
Substitution rules (s 3(b)–(c), s 15) reduce duplicative Commonwealth payments but require cross‑program information sharing and administrative matching.
Ministerial and Governor‑General approvals (s 6, s 11) provide formal checks but concentrate discretion and can slow payment decisions.
Time limits for claims (s 3 proviso (a)) reduce open‑ended liability for the Commonwealth but create the risk that valid claimants miss deadlines.
The Board’s investigatory powers (s 5) and criminal penalties for false claims (s 14) aim to limit fraud, but they impose evidentiary and compliance costs on claimants and administrative oversight costs on government.
Source references: selected provisions cited above — Definitions and scope (s 2, s 3), Board constitution and duties (s 4), Board powers and penalties (s 5), Ministerial/Governor‑General approvals (s 6, s 11), Rates and Schedule (s 8, Schedule), Lump‑sum option (s 9), Widow remarriage rule (s 10), Appropriation (s 12), Inalienability (s 13), Offences (s 14), Extension to Imperial reservists (s 15), Regulations (s 16).