Victims of Crime Act 1994

The Act defines four key terms. Victim means a person who has suffered injury, loss or damage as a direct result of an offence (including an alleged offence), or, if the offence results in death, any member of the immediate family of the deceased. The definition does not require the injury to have been reasonably foreseeable by the offender, so it is broad. It does not include secondary victims who suffer indirect loss (for example, a business that loses custom because a customer was assaulted outside its premises) unless that loss is a direct result. The definition also covers victims of alleged offences, so it applies from the moment an offence is suspected, not only after a conviction. Public officers and bodies is an expansive list that includes Ministers, judges, magistrates, other judicial officers, court officers, the DPP and prosecution personnel, the Commissioner of Police and police officers, the Prisoners Review Board, the Mental Impairment Review Tribunal (added in 2023), the Supervised Release Review Board, juvenile justice teams, and any employees or bodies in the public sector whose functions involve dealing with offenders or victims. This covers nearly every state actor a victim might encounter. Guidelines means the 12 items in Schedule 1, which are statements of how victims should be treated: with courtesy, compassion and dignity; given access to counselling and information about services; informed about protection from violence; have inconvenience minimised; have privacy protected; kept informed about investigation progress, charges, bail, variations, trial process, sentence, appeals, release decisions, release information, and escape; and have their property returned as soon as possible. Prescribed information is defined in section 4(1) and includes the victim's name, address, telephone number, age and ethnicity; a description of the offence and abridged circumstances; the name of the offender or alleged offender if known; the name, rank and registered number of the investigating officer; the police station or office where investigation information is held; the status of investigation and prosecution; and any information prescribed by regulations. The definition is detailed and personal, raising privacy implications. The term agency is also defined in section 4(1) and means the Public Sector agency principally assisting the Minister in administering a relevant enactment (which includes the Victims of Crime Act, the Prisons Act 1981 or the Sentence Administration Act 2003). The Act does not define "direct result" or "immediate family", leaving those to ordinary meaning or judicial interpretation in the rare event of litigation, though section 3(3) largely forecloses that possibility.

The Act directly affects public officers and bodies as defined, because they are the addressees of the guidelines and the information-sharing provisions. Police officers, prosecutors, judges, correctional staff, board members, and public sector employees who deal with offenders or victims are expected to have regard to the guidelines. The practical impact on them is limited: they are authorised, not required, to apply the guidelines, and only where it is within their functions and practicable. A police officer investigating a crime might feel organisational pressure to follow the guidelines, but no legal consequence attaches if they do not. The Act also affects victims of crime, but only as passive beneficiaries of a voluntary code. A victim has no right to demand any particular treatment, no right to information (except that the guidelines say they should be kept informed if they request it), and no remedy if guidelines are ignored. The information-sharing provisions affect victims whose personal data may be passed from police or the DPP to a government agency without their consent. The victim is not notified of or consulted about this transfer, though the information must be used only for offering victim services. That creates a risk that a victim who prefers not to be contacted by a government agency may nevertheless have their details shared. The Act affects government agencies that receive prescribed information under section 4. They must not use that information for any purpose other than offering services to the victim. They have no discretion to use it for research, compliance, law enforcement, or any other purpose. This is a statutory restriction on use, but there is no penalty for breach within the Act itself. The Act does not affect private individuals or businesses directly, because the definition of public officers and bodies does not include private sector entities, and the guidelines are directed only at state actors. However, if a government agency contracts with a private counselling service to deliver victim support, that private entity might receive information indirectly under the contract. The Act does not regulate that onward transmission. The Act also does not affect offenders directly, though guidelines 10 to 12 refer to decisions about releasing the offender from custody and informing the victim of release or escape. Those guidelines could influence parole board or correctional practices, potentially affecting an offender's release planning or the timing of information provided to victims. But again, the guideline has no legal force; a decision is not invalid for ignoring it.

The Act imposes no legal duties and confers no legal rights. Section 3(1) says public officers and bodies "are authorised to have regard to and apply the guidelines" and "should do so" to the extent practicable and within their functions. The word "authorised" indicates permission, not obligation. "Should" is hortatory, not mandatory. This is the weakest form of legislative direction. Section 3(2) allows another person to act on behalf of a victim who cannot because of age, disability or other reason, if the public officer or body is satisfied it is appropriate. This is a facilitative provision, not a right of the representative. The most critical provision is section 3(3), which expressly denies any legally enforceable right or entitlement. It states that a failure to apply the Act, have regard to a guideline, or treat a victim in accordance with a guideline does not: affect the validity of anything done or not done or of any proceedings; provide grounds for any act, omission or decision to be challenged, appealed, reviewed, quashed or called in question; or provide grounds for any relief, remedy or order to be asked for or granted, whether by prerogative writ or otherwise. This ouster clause is comprehensive. It eliminates the possibility of judicial review for failure to follow the guidelines, unless the failure also constitutes a breach of some other legal duty. For example, if a police officer refused to inform a victim about bail and that refusal also amounted to some independent tort or breach of another statute, the Act itself would still provide no cause of action. The information-sharing provision in section 4 is also permissive, not mandatory. The Commissioner of Police "may provide" prescribed information; the DPP "may provide" such information as the DPP thinks fit. No victim has a right to have their information shared or not shared. The only duty-like element is the requirement in section 4(6) that information provided must not be used by an agency for purposes other than offering victim services. But even this is a restriction on use, not a duty to the victim. There is no enforcement mechanism for breach. The review obligation in section 6 imposes a duty on the Minister to carry out reviews and table reports. That is a political duty, not one enforceable by a court (likely based on convention and parliamentary process, not justiciability). In summary, the Act creates no duties and only a fragile, unenforceable set of expectations.

The Act has no penalty provisions. There are no fines, imprisonment terms, infringement notices, or civil penalties for any failure to comply with the guidelines or the information-sharing provisions. This is consistent with the Act's design as a non-binding charter. Enforcement is therefore non-existent in a legal sense. If a public officer or body ignores the guidelines, a victim has no court-based remedy. The only possible consequences are internal: a supervisor may direct an officer to follow the guidelines; a minister may raise concerns; or a parliamentary committee may scrutinise a failure. But those are discretionary and political, not legal. The absence of penalties reflects a deliberate legislative choice to avoid imposing mandatory obligations on the criminal justice system. The second-reading speech presumably would have cited a desire for flexibility and respect for professional discretion, but the Act itself does not record that reasoning. The practical effect is that the Act is aspirational: it states what should happen, but provides no mechanism to ensure it does. This is a significant gap for victims who assume the guidelines are rules. The information-sharing provisions are similarly unenforceable. If a police officer shares prescribed information in bad faith or negligently, the Act provides no penalty; but the good faith protection in section 4(5) would not protect intentional misuse, because the provision applies only if the information is provided "in confidence and in good faith". If the officer acts maliciously, they may lose the protection and be subject to other laws (for example, breach of confidence or privacy torts). However, the Act itself does not create a cause of action for that. The agency that misuses information under section 4(6) has no statutory penalty. The only potential consequence is that the agency may be acting outside its statutory authority, which could be relevant in other contexts (for example, if the information is later used in a way that harms the victim, and another cause of action arises). The regulation-making power in section 5 could theoretically be used to prescribe penalties, but none have been made (the source provides no regulations). The review mechanism in section 6 is the only built-in accountability: the Minister must review operation and effectiveness and table a report. But there is no penalty if the Minister fails to do so, and no mechanism for a victim to compel a review. The Act is thus an example of legislation that signals values without coercive force.

The Act interacts with other laws primarily through section 4(5), which provides that the provision of prescribed information in confidence and in good faith does not constitute a breach of any written or other law. This overrides other statutes that would otherwise prohibit disclosure of personal information without consent, such as the Privacy Act (in its state equivalent) or the Criminal Code provisions on official secrecy. It also overrides common law duties of confidentiality and equitable obligations. This is a significant carve-out: it allows police and the DPP to share a victim's personal details (including ethnicity, address, phone number, and offence description) with a government agency without the victim's consent and without liability for breach of confidence or privacy. However, the provision only protects information shared "in good faith". If an officer shares information maliciously or recklessly, the protection may not apply, and other laws would continue to apply. The Act does not override the Freedom of Information Act or evidence laws, but because the information is shared with an agency, it could become subject to FOI requests. The restriction on use in section 4(6) may prevent the agency from using it for non-service purposes, but it does not prevent a third party from seeking access under FOI. The Act interacts with the Criminal Procedure Act, Sentencing Act, Sentence Administration Act, and Prisons Act by directing that the guidelines be considered within those statutory frameworks. For example, the Prisoners Review Board, when deciding release, should have regard to guideline 10 (victim's views and concerns). But the Act does not amend those Acts to make the guidelines mandatory; they remain a permissible consideration. The Act also interacts with the Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1991 by designating the DPP as a source of information. It does not conflict with it. The Act does not interact with private law (contract, tort, property) except that the good faith protection may affect tort claims for breach of confidence. The Act does not create any statutory duties of care that could ground a negligence action. The ouster clause in section 3(3) likely prevents any attempt to use the Act as a basis for a duty of care in tort. The Act includes no provision overriding the common law rights of offenders; guideline 11 (informing victim of proposed residential address) could raise privacy concerns for the offender, but the guideline is only aspirational and must be balanced against other legal protections for the offender (for example, the Prisons Act). The Act's interaction with the Criminal Law (Mental Impairment) Act 2023 is reflected in the addition of the Mental Impairment Review Tribunal to the definition of public officers and bodies. That means tribunal members should have regard to the guidelines when dealing with victims. No other conflicts are apparent.

The Act originated as the Victims of Crime Act 1994 (No. 81 of 1994), assented 23 December 1994, commenced 20 January 1995. The original Act included sections 1 to 4 and Schedule 1, but not sections 5 and 6 as they appear now. The first amendment was via the Sentencing (Consequential Provisions) Act 1995 (No. 78 of 1995), Part 79, which made consequential changes when the Sentencing Act was reformed. It commenced 4 November 1996. The next significant amendment was the Victims of Crime Amendment Act 2004 (No. 30 of 2004), which inserted the current section 4 (information sharing by police and DPP). This was a major structural addition, giving the Act its only operational mechanism beyond guidelines. It commenced on 14 October 2004. The Parole and Sentencing Legislation Amendment Act 2006 (No. 41 of 2006) amended section 2 by adding the Supervised Release Review Board to the definition of public officers and bodies. It commenced 28 January 2007. The Prisons and Sentencing Legislation Amendment Act 2006 (No. 65 of 2006) amended section 4 and inserted section 5 (regulation-making power). It commenced 4 April 2007. The insertion of section 5 is notable because it gives the Governor power to prescribe matters by regulation, potentially expanding the Act's reach without further primary legislation. The Acts Amendment (Justice) Act 2008 (No. 5 of 2008) amended section 6 (review provision) to set the first review date as 1 January 2010 and every five years after. It commenced 30 September 2008. The Standardisation of Formatting Act 2010 (No. 19 of 2010) made a minor formatting amendment to the Schedule 1 heading, effective 11 September 2010. The most recent amendment was by the Criminal Law (Mental Impairment) Act 2023 (No. 10 of 2023), section 411, which added the Mental Impairment Review Tribunal to the definition of public officers and bodies. It commenced 1 September 2024. The compilation table shows reprints in 2005 and 2011. The Act has not been substantially rewritten; it remains a short, skeletal piece. The trend of amendments is to expand the definition of public officers and bodies to include new bodies as they are created, rather than to strengthen rights or enforcement. No amendment has ever attempted to make the guidelines enforceable or to add penalties. The review requirement was added in 2008, but the source does not indicate whether the reviews have actually been conducted or what they found.

The source provided contains no reference to any litigation under the Victims of Crime Act 1994. This is consistent with the Act's design: section 3(3) expressly ousts judicial review for non-compliance, so there are no reported cases where a victim successfully sued or obtained relief under the Act. The Act has likely been cited in other proceedings as background context, but not as a source of rights. For example, a victim might refer to the guidelines in a victim impact statement or in submissions to a parole board, but that usage has no legal force. The Act may have been mentioned in cases about the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act as evidence of legislative policy, but it does not create a right to compensation. The information-sharing provisions have not been litigated, likely because the victim is not notified of the sharing and therefore has no standing to challenge it. The good faith provision in section 4(5) might be raised as a defence in a breach of confidence action, but no such case is reported in the source. The ouster clause is broad enough to prevent any challenge to administrative decisions based solely on a failure to follow the guidelines. Even if a victim sought judicial review on other grounds (for example, procedural fairness), the Act would not assist them. The only potential avenue for litigation would be if a victim argued that a public officer's conduct was so egregious that it constituted an independent tort, but the Act itself would be irrelevant to that claim. The Act's immunity from legal challenge makes it highly unlikely that any significant litigation history exists. The lack of reported cases reinforces the conclusion that the Act is a symbolic statement rather than a legally operative instrument. The review process under section 6 may have generated reports that discuss the Act's impact, but those reports are not litigation. The Act has not been the subject of constitutional challenge, as it does not affect Commonwealth powers or individual rights in a manner that would raise constitutional issues. Overall, the litigation history is effectively nil, which is exactly what the Act's drafts would have intended.

The primary trap for anyone relying on this Act is the false sense of security it creates. The guidelines read like promises: a victim "should be" treated with courtesy, kept informed, and have their views considered. But section 3(3) makes crystal clear that none of these are enforceable. A victim who assumes they have a right to be informed about bail, for example, has no legal remedy if they are not told. The information-sharing provisions (section 4) are another trap: a victim's personal data can be passed from police or the DPP to a government agency without the victim's knowledge or consent. The Act provides no mechanism for the victim to opt out. Although the information must be used only for offering services, there is no penalty for misuse within the Act. If an agency uses the data for another purpose, the victim may have a complaint under privacy laws, but that is not part of this Act. The definition of "victim" is broad but has limits: a person who suffers injury, loss or damage must show it was a "direct result" of an offence. Indirect victims (for example, family members of a seriously injured but not deceased victim) are not included unless they come within "immediate family of the deceased" if death occurs. A business that suffers economic loss because a crime was committed on its premises may not qualify if the loss is deemed indirect. The Act does not define "immediate family", leaving scope for narrow interpretation. The term "offence" includes "alleged offence", meaning the guidelines apply even if no one has been charged or the alleged offender is acquitted. But public officers may be reluctant to share information about an investigation that is still open, and the guidelines themselves say the obligation to inform is "except where to do so may jeopardize the investigation". That gives officials wide discretion to withhold information. The requirement that public officers apply the guidelines "to the extent that it is ... practicable" is a significant escape clause. If a police officer is busy, they can argue it was not practicable to inform a victim. The Act provides no standard for what is practicable. The review mechanism in section 6 has a periodic requirement, but if the Minister fails to conduct a review or table a report, there is no consequence. Victims and advocacy groups have no statutory standing to enforce the review. The regulation-making power in section 5 is broad: regulations could prescribe matters that expand the Act's scope, but no regulations are shown in the source. Practitioners should check whether regulations have been made since the compilation. Finally, the Act is a Western Australian law; it has no application in other states or territories. Those dealing with Commonwealth offences or cross-border crime must look to other charters.

Because the Act imposes no mandatory requirements, compliance is largely about good practice rather than legal necessity. For public officers and bodies, the simplest approach is to treat the guidelines as internal policy. Officers should be trained on the 12 guidelines and encouraged to follow them where it is within their functions and practicable. Record-keeping that shows the officer considered the guidelines may be useful in the event of internal review or complaint, but no court will compel it. For police and the DPP, the information-sharing provisions should be handled carefully. They may share prescribed information with an agency only for the purpose of offering victim services. They should document the sharing, ensure it is done in confidence and in good faith, and limit the information to what is prescribed or otherwise appropriate. There is no obligation to share, so discretion should be exercised based on the victim's apparent needs and consent if possible (though not required). For agencies that receive information, they must comply with section 4(6) by using it only for offering services and not for any other purpose. They should implement data security measures and restrict access to staff involved in victim support. They should not share the information further or use it for research, enforcement, or administrative purposes. The Act is silent on how long the information can be kept; agencies should apply standard data retention policies. For victims, the Act provides no compliance obligations, but they should be aware that the guidelines are not legally enforceable. If a victim wants to ensure they receive information, they should make a specific request to the relevant officer (as many guidelines require a request: for example, guidelines 6 to 8 and 11 say a victim who has so requested should be informed). A simple verbal or written request may trigger the officer's discretion. Victims should also be aware that their personal information may be shared without their knowledge. If they wish to object, they should contact the police or DPP directly and ask not to have their details passed on. The Act does not give them a right to object, but officers may choose to respect the request. For legal practitioners advising victims, the main compliance task is to manage expectations. Explain that the Act is a charter of principles, not a source of entitlements. If a client is unhappy with treatment, the appropriate avenue is a complaint to the relevant agency or the Ombudsman, not litigation under this Act. Practitioners should also check whether other state or federal laws provide enforceable rights (for example, victim impact statement legislation, the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act, or the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) - but not in WA). No regulations have been provided under section 5, but if regulations exist, officers must comply with them. The review obligation under section 6 is on the Minister; other actors are not required to assist, but may be asked to provide information for the review. Cooperation with the review is not mandated but is prudent for effective governance.