Several provisions in the Act contain traps for the unwary. The most significant is the personal liability of directors under section 16(3). This provision makes members of the board of directors jointly and severally responsible to the Court for the proper discharge of the trustee company’s duties, “as if such members of the board had jointly and severally applied for appointment or been appointed as executor, administrator, trustee, receiver, receiver and manager, guardian, committee, manager, surety or guarantor instead of the trustee company.” This means that directors can be held personally accountable for breaches of fiduciary duty by the company, without the protection of the corporate veil. The liability is not limited to negligence: it extends to proper discharge of all duties. Directors of trustee companies should be acutely aware that their personal assets are at risk, particularly in relation to estate administration.
A related trap is the criminal liability of officers under section 44. Where a trustee company commits an offence under the Act, any officer (including a director, principal executive officer or secretary) who was “in any way, by act or omission, directly or indirectly knowingly concerned in or party to the commission of the offence” is also guilty and liable to the same penalty. This is broad accessory liability - it catches officers who turn a blind eye or who fail to prevent an offence they knew about. The penalty for false or misleading statements can be up to $10,000 and two years imprisonment (section 43(1)), meaning an officer could face jail time if the company lodges a misleading document and the officer is implicated.
The small estates election under section 10 has a trap: if the property is later found to exceed the prescribed amount or to include out-of-State property, the election ceases and the company must file an affidavit and then proceed under the Administration Act 1903 to seek an order to administer. Failure to do so could leave the company acting without lawful authority. The prescribed amount is set by regulation (section 10(1)) - a company that assumes the estate is small without verifying the value could find itself in an unauthorised administration. Similarly, if the company believes the deceased died intestate but later discovers a will, the election ceases and accounts must be filed with the Master of the Court (section 10(4)). This is a procedural trap that could invalidate all actions taken under the election.
Section 27(6) requires an annual statement to the Treasurer “not later than 2 months after the end of each financial year of the company.” The statement must set out particulars of unclaimed moneys held, dates and amounts of payments to the Treasurer, and reasons for any delay. Non-compliance without reasonable excuse is an offence. The daily penalty of $50 per day (section 27(7)) can accumulate quickly.
The prohibition on appointment in section 12(3) and (4) is a trap for instrument drafters: if the will or trust instrument “forbids the appointment of a trustee company” or “expressly provides that there shall be another trustee in addition to a trustee company or that a trustee company shall not be appointed or act as sole trustee”, the company cannot be appointed. A testator who wishes to exclude trustee companies must use clear words. Conversely, a person seeking to appoint a trustee company must check the instrument for such prohibitions.
Section 15(3) prevents appointment if the testator or settlor expressed “the desire in the will or trust instrument that a trustee company should not be appointed to perform and discharge acts and duties instead of the executor, administrator or trustee.” Note that the Act uses “desire” not “direction” - a less stringent standard than a binding prohibition. This could catch informal expressions of intent.
Section 6(2) and 7(2) allow the Court to grant letters of administration to a trustee company “unless the testator by his will expressed his desire that the office of executor should not be delegated or should not be delegated to a trustee company.” Again, “desire” rather than “direction” sets a low threshold - if the will expresses a mere wish against delegation, the company cannot obtain administration.
Part III voluntary transfers under section 33 are enabled by regulations, but those regulations have effect despite anything in a contract, deed, undertaking, agreement or other instrument (section 33(3)). A trustee company contemplating a voluntary transfer should not assume that contractual restrictions on assignment will apply; the regulations can override them. However, section 34(2)(c) specifically preserves surety obligations, so a transfer does not release a surety.
Finally, note that the Act does not limit the rights of interested persons to apply for a grant even after a grant has been made to a trustee company (section 11). A person who did not authorise the company can still seek a grant, potentially creating competing administrations. A trustee company that proceeds to administer an estate may face a challenge from an interested person.