Gives the Supreme Court (referred to as “the Court or a judge”) power to order that a deceased person's estate provide for people left without "adequate provision" for maintenance and support (section 3(1)).
The Court may order different kinds of provision: a lump sum, a life interest (or lesser interest) in a dwelling the estate already owns, or an order that estate money be used to buy a dwelling for the applicant (section 3(2)–(3)).
Orders must state the amount, how it is to be paid, who bears the burden, and any conditions (section 9(1)). An order treated as a codicil to a will if the deceased left a will, or as a modification of intestacy rules if not (section 9(3)).
The Court may create a class fund (an amount held on trust) for two or more beneficiaries and set how income and capital are applied (section 10). The executor is trustee unless the Court appoints someone else (section 10(3)–(4)).
Unless the Court orders otherwise, the cost of any payment ordered under the Act falls ratably across the whole estate (section 10A(1)). The Court can exempt parts of the estate or require beneficiaries to make commuted payments to represent their share (section 10A(2)–(3)).
Executors/administrators must be served with the application and the Court may require the executor or person applying for probate to provide full particulars of the estate (section 4(2)(a); section 6(b)).
Time limits: an application must generally be started by summons in chambers before or within three months after probate or letters of administration are granted; the Court may extend that time in appropriate cases (section 4(1); section 11(1)–(3)).
The Testator's Family Maintenance Act 1912 establishes a statutory mechanism by which the Supreme Court may intervene in the distribution of a deceased person's estate where inadequate provision has been made for the proper maintenance and support of specified family members. At its core, s.3(1) provides that where a person dies testate or intestate and any eligible person is left without adequate provision, the Court may order such provision as it thinks proper out of the estate, having regard to all the circumstances. This discretionary power is deliberately wide: the Court is not limited to replicating what a reasonable testator might have done but may fashion relief that addresses the applicant's needs while respecting the overall estate.
Section 3(2) elaborates on the forms of provision available. In addition to the general power in s.3(1), the Court may order a lump sum, a life interest or lesser interest in a dwelling-house already forming part of the estate, or a life interest in a dwelling-house to be purchased for the applicant. Subsection (3) reinforces this by permitting the Court to direct that estate moneys be used to purchase the fee simple of real property notwithstanding any contrary direction in the will. These provisions reflect a legislative intent to provide flexible, practical remedies rather than purely monetary ones.
The Act further allows an application by or on behalf of one eligible person to be treated as made on behalf of all eligible persons (s.3(4)), thereby streamlining proceedings and engaging the notice requirements of s.11. Executors and administrators are given standing under s.3(5) to initiate or seek directions regarding claims on behalf of minors or persons without mental capacity.
Eligibility is exhaustively stated in s.3A. An application may be made by or on behalf of the spouse of the deceased, the children of the deceased, the parents (but only if the deceased died without leaving a spouse or children), a former spouse whose marriage was dissolved or annulled and who was receiving or entitled to maintenance at the date of death, and a person whose significant relationship had ceased but who was likewise receiving or entitled to maintenance.
Current sections
Direct links to the current provisions in Testator's Family Maintenance Act 1912.
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Official source available
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Sourced from Tasmanian Legislation Online (legislation.tas.gov.au), CC BY 4.0.
The Court has broad fact‑finding powers: it can summon and examine entitled persons and witnesses, and may consider the deceased's reasons for their dispositions, accepting evidence of those reasons even if it would not otherwise be admissible (sections 6(a); 8A(1)–(2)).
The Court may refuse an application if the applicant’s character or conduct disentitles them (section 8(1)), and it can impose conditions to prevent alienation or charging of benefits (section 8(2)). Orders can later be altered or rescinded by the Court on application, subject to protections for lawful distributions made before the application (section 9(5)–(5A)).
Eligibility: applications may be made by or on behalf of (among others) the deceased’s spouse, children (including adopted, step and surrogate children as defined), parents in limited circumstances, and certain former partners receiving maintenance (section 3A; definitions in section 2). Section 2 contains detailed definition rules (e.g. adopted child, stepchild, surrogate child) and preserves non‑retroactivity of a stepped definition for deaths before the relevant amendment (section 2(2)).
Tax and duty treatment: for estate duty purposes any provision ordered is treated as if made by a codicil or will immediately before death (section 10B).
Who this affects
People left out of, or inadequately provided for by, a deceased person's will or intestacy who fall within the classes in section 3A (spouse, children, some parents, some former partners, etc.).
Executors and administrators, who must be served with summonses, may be required to supply full particulars about the estate (sections 4(2)(a); 6(b)); they are the default trustees for class funds unless replaced (section 10(3)).
Beneficiaries of the estate, because an order under the Act may alter distributions and the financial incidence of those changes falls on the estate (section 9; section 10A).
The Court, which exercises wide discretionary powers to decide if and how provision should be made and to accept non‑traditional evidence of the deceased's reasons (sections 3(1); 8A(1)).
Why it matters (stated purpose and practical trade‑offs)
The Act’s operative effect (section 3(1)) is to permit the Court to step into the statutory distribution of an estate to provide maintenance where a person is left without adequate provision. The source text frames that as the Act’s function (see section 3(1)).
Testing that stated purpose against costs, incentives and trade‑offs evident in the text:
Who pays: the estate bears the direct cost of any provision (section 10A(1)). That reduces the assets available to other beneficiaries and may affect the value of bequests (sections 9(1); 10A(1)).
Concentrated benefits vs diffuse costs: the ordered provision benefits one or a small number of applicants directly, while the cost is spread across the whole estate or across several beneficiaries ratably (section 10A(1)). The Court can, however, apportion or exonerate particular parts of the estate (section 10A(2)–(3)).
Private choice and contractual expectations: an order can operate as if it were a codicil to a will or modify intestacy distributions (section 9(3)), and the Court may make orders contrary to a will’s directions where necessary to purchase a dwelling for an applicant (section 3(3)). Those powers change the outcome of private estate plans in specific cases.
Compliance burden and administrative cost: executors and administrators must respond to summonses, supply estate particulars (section 6(b)), and may need to defend or administer class funds (sections 4(2); 10(2)–(4)). Time limits for bringing claims (section 11(1)) create front‑loaded procedural obligations; the Court may extend time in some cases (section 11(2)).
Judicial discretion and evidentiary flexibility: the Court’s broad discretionary powers to determine adequacy, impose conditions, accept non‑standard evidence about the deceased’s reasons, and to appoint trustees (sections 3(1); 8(2); 8A(1); 10(3)–(4)) concentrate decision‑making in the judiciary rather than leaving outcomes to fixed statutory formulas.
Risk of substitution effects and follow‑on administration: orders can create life interests or class trusts (sections 3(2); 10) that require ongoing administration and may reduce immediately distributable capital, with consequential cost and trustee duties (section 10(2)).
Practical points to note in the mechanics
An application is made by summons in chambers and must be served on the executor/administrator and other persons the Court directs (section 4(1)–(2)).
The Court will consider only the net estate after debts and liabilities (section 7(a)) and will look at whether the applicant has independent means (section 7(b)).
The Court can refuse on conduct grounds (section 8(1)) and can impose conditions to control future disposal or charging of benefits (section 8(2)).
Orders can be rescinded or altered later on application (section 9(5)), but previously lawful distributions made before the application for alteration cannot be disturbed (section 9(5A)).
The interpretive foundation is laid in s.2(1). "Child" expressly includes an adopted child (defined by reference to local or foreign adoption law at the date of adoption), a stepchild (a child of the deceased's spouse or a child whose natural parent was the spouse at the time of that parent's death), and a surrogate child (a person who is a child by operation of s.26(1) of the Surrogacy Act 2012 or corresponding interstate or foreign law and who has not ceased to be such a child). "Spouse" includes a person with whom the deceased was in a significant relationship within the meaning of the Relationships Act 2003 at the time of death. "Will" includes a codicil and certain nominations under friendly society rules. Subsection (2) contains a transitional savings provision clarifying that the expanded stepchild definition inserted in 2015 does not apply to estates of persons who died before its commencement.
Once an order is made, its content is prescribed by s.9(1): it must specify the amount and nature of the provision, how it is to be raised and paid, who bears the burden, and any conditions, restrictions or limitations. The order is to be noted on the probate or letters of administration (s.9(2)). Operationally, the provision takes effect as if it were a codicil executed immediately before death in testate estates, or as a modification of the Intestacy Act 2010 in intestate estates (s.9(3)). The Court may direct that provision for a spouse continues notwithstanding subsequent remarriage or entry into a significant relationship (s.9(4)).
Variation and rescission powers are conferred by s.9(5). On the application of an executor, administrator or beneficially interested person, the Court may rescind or alter an order by increasing, reducing or varying its terms. However, s.9(5A) prohibits disturbance of any lawful distribution made before the variation application. Notice must be served on all beneficiaries under the original order (s.9(6)), and the affected portion of the estate is thereafter held subject to the order (s.9(7)).
Where multiple claimants are involved, s.10 permits the creation of a class fund. An amount may be set aside and held on trust for two or more eligible persons. The trustee (usually the executor unless another is appointed) may apply income and capital for maintenance, education (including past expenses), advancement or benefit in such shares and manner as thought fit, even if only one beneficiary remains alive. Section 10(4) allows the Court to give directions for payment to a non-executor trustee and to exercise powers under s.47 of the Trustee Act 1898.
Incidence of the burden is addressed in s.10A. Unless otherwise ordered, payments fall rateably across the whole estate (or the part within the Court's authority). The Court may exonerate portions after hearing affected parties and may fix periodical or lump-sum commutations by beneficiaries, securing them as appropriate.
For estate duty purposes, s.10B deems any ordered provision to be a bequest by codicil (testate) or by a notional will executed immediately before death (intestate), thereby integrating the order into the duty calculation.
Procedurally, applications are made by summons in chambers in a prescribed form (s.4(1)) and must be served on the executor, administrator or, in intestacy, the administrator, plus any other persons directed by the Court (s.4(2)). The judge may adjourn into open Court (s.4(3)).
At hearing, the Court must inquire fully into the estate (s.6), summoning applicants and witnesses and requiring particulars from the personal representative. In deciding whether to grant relief and in fixing quantum, the Court must consider the net value of the estate after debts, testamentary and funeral expenses and liabilities (s.7(a)), and any independent means of the applicant whether derived from the deceased inter vivos or otherwise (s.7(b)).
Disentitling conduct is recognised in s.8(1): the Court may refuse relief if the applicant's character or conduct warrants it. Any order may impose conditions, restrictions or limitations to prevent alienation or charge of the benefit (s.8(2)).
The deceased's reasons for dispositions or omissions may be taken into account under s.8A(1), on whatever evidence the Court considers sufficient, whether admissible in ordinary proceedings or not. Where the will was made by the Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal or the Court under Part 3 of the Wills Act 2008, s.8A(1A) permits regard to the Tribunal's or Court's records and reasons. Subsection (2) confirms that s.8A does not restrict otherwise admissible evidence or matters.
Finally, strict time limits apply under s.11(1): the summons must be taken out not later than three months after grant of probate or letters of administration. However, the Court may extend time under s.11(2) after hearing affected persons, and may do so even after the initial period has expired (s.11(3)). Any extension application must be made before final distribution, and prior lawful distributions cannot be disturbed (s.11(4)).
Collectively these provisions create a comprehensive, discretionary jurisdiction that overlays both testate and intestate succession, prioritising adequate family maintenance while preserving personal representative certainty through time bars, rateable incidence and variation safeguards.
Who it affects
The Act directly affects three principal groups: eligible applicants, personal representatives, and other beneficiaries.
Eligible applicants are exhaustively listed in s.3A(a)–(e). First, the spouse of the deceased, defined in s.2(1) to include a person with whom the deceased was in a significant relationship under the Relationships Act 2003 at the date of death. Second, the children of the deceased. The term "child" in s.2(1) is deliberately expansive: it captures adopted children (whether adopted in Tasmania or elsewhere according to the law in force at adoption), stepchildren (children of the spouse or children whose natural parent was the spouse at the time of that parent's death, subject to the transitional rule in s.2(2) preserving the pre-2015 position for earlier deaths), and surrogate children (persons who remain children by virtue of s.26(1) of the Surrogacy Act 2012 or corresponding law). Third, parents of the deceased, but only where the deceased died without leaving a spouse or any children (s.3A(c)). Fourth, a person whose marriage to the deceased was dissolved or annulled and who, at the date of death, was receiving or entitled to receive maintenance (s.3A(d)). Fifth, a person whose significant relationship had ceased before death but who was likewise receiving or entitled to maintenance (s.3A(e)).
Personal representatives—executors, administrators with the will annexed, or administrators of intestate estates—are both respondents and potential applicants. They must be served with the summons (s.4(2)(a)), furnish full particulars of the estate (s.6(b)), and bear the practical burden of defending or compromising claims. Under s.3(5) they may themselves apply or seek directions on behalf of minors or incapacitated eligible persons. Once an order is made they must ensure it is noted on the probate or letters (s.9(2)), hold the affected portion subject to the order (s.9(7)), and may later apply to vary or rescind it (s.9(5)).
Other beneficiaries, whether residuary, specific or entitled on intestacy, are indirectly affected because any order reduces the net estate available to them. They may be directed to be served (s.4(2)(b)), are entitled to be heard on variation applications (s.9(6)), and may have portions of their interest exonerated or made subject to rateable contribution (ss.10A(2)–(3)). Where a class fund is created under s.10, the trustee (who may be a beneficiary or an independent appointee) holds and applies the fund for the nominated eligible persons to the exclusion of other beneficiaries.
The Act also touches the Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the Court in their wills-jurisdiction capacity. Where a will was made under Part 3 of the Wills Act 2008, s.8A(1A) permits the Family Maintenance Court to examine the Tribunal's or Court's records and reasons, thereby affecting the weight given to those dispositions.
Because the jurisdiction arises on death, it affects the estate planning expectations of any person domiciled or owning property in Tasmania. The broad definition of "spouse" and "child" means that persons in non-traditional family structures—de facto partners, step-families, surrogacy arrangements—must now factor potential claims into will drafting and lifetime transfers.
Key duties and rights
The Act creates few positive duties but confers significant rights and corresponding discretions.
Eligible persons possess the right to apply under s.3(1) for provision where they have been left without adequate maintenance and support. This right is personal but may be exercised by a litigation guardian or, for minors and incapacitated persons, by the personal representative (s.3(5)). The right is procedural in the sense that it is initiated by summons (s.4) and must generally be brought within three months of grant (s.11(1)), although extension is available (s.11(2)–(4)).
The Court holds the central discretionary rights: to order provision in whatever form it thinks proper (s.3(1)), to structure that provision as a lump sum, life interest in an existing or newly purchased dwelling (s.3(2)), to create class funds (s.10), to exonerate parts of the estate from incidence (s.10A(2)), to commute burdens (s.10A(3)), to vary or rescind earlier orders (s.9(5)), and to extend time (s.11(2)). In exercising these rights the Court must have regard to the net estate (s.7(a)), the applicant's independent means (s.7(b)), the deceased's ascertainable reasons (s.8A(1)), and any disentitling conduct (s.8(1)). It may accept otherwise inadmissible evidence of the deceased's reasons and, in the case of tribunal-made wills, the Tribunal's records (s.8A(1A)).
Personal representatives owe a duty to furnish full particulars (s.6(b)), to serve the summons on themselves and others as directed (s.4(2)), and to cause any order to be noted on the grant (s.9(2)). They hold the affected estate portion subject to the order (s.9(7)) and may themselves seek directions or make claims on behalf of protected persons (s.3(5)). They also possess the right to apply for variation or rescission (s.9(5)) and to be heard on exoneration applications (s.10A(2)).
Beneficiaries under the will or intestacy have the right to be heard on variation applications (s.9(6)) and on exoneration (s.10A(2)). They enjoy the protection of the final-distribution rule in s.11(4): lawful distributions made before an extension application cannot be disturbed.
Applicants and beneficiaries alike are subject to the Court's power to impose conditions restricting alienation of ordered benefits (s.8(2)) and to the rateable incidence rule in s.10A(1) unless the Court orders otherwise.
The Act preserves the right of the Court to treat one applicant's summons as brought on behalf of all eligible persons (s.3(4)), thereby giving the Court power to bind non-parties for the purposes of s.11 time limits.
Penalties and enforcement
The Act contains no criminal penalties. Enforcement is civil and occurs through the Supreme Court's inherent contempt powers and its statutory discretion to impose conditions.
If a personal representative fails to comply with an order, the affected beneficiary may seek enforcement by way of summons for directions or, ultimately, committal for contempt. The Court may, when making an order, impose "such conditions, restrictions, and limitations... as the Court or judge may think fit" (s.8(2)), including conditions preventing or defeating alienation or charge of the benefit. Breach of such a condition could ground an application to vary or rescind under s.9(5) or to enforce the trust created by s.9(7).
Where a class fund is established (s.10), the trustee's fiduciary duties are enforceable in the ordinary way; the trustee may be removed or replaced under the powers imported from s.47 of the Trustee Act 1898 (s.10(4)).
The time-limit provisions in s.11 are enforced by jurisdictional bar: the Court "shall have no jurisdiction" to hear an application brought out of time unless an extension is granted. The prohibition on disturbing prior distributions (s.11(4) and s.9(5A)) operates as a statutory defence to any later claim.
Costs are expressly within the Court's discretion (s.3(1)), providing a practical enforcement mechanism: adverse costs orders deter unmeritorious claims or defences.
Because the provision operates as a codicil or modification of intestacy (s.9(3)), it is enforceable against the personal representative in the same manner as any other testamentary disposition.
How it interacts with other laws
The Act is not standalone. Section 2(1) expressly incorporates definitions from three other statutes. "Significant relationship" is drawn from the Relationships Act 2003, expanding "spouse" beyond marriage. The concepts of stepchild and surrogate child cross-reference the Surrogacy Act 2012. Where a will was made under the Wills Act 2008 by the Tribunal or Court, s.8A(1A) permits reference to that Tribunal's or Court's records, creating a direct evidentiary bridge between the two statutes.
In intestate estates the order modifies the Intestacy Act 2010 (s.9(3)(b)). Estate duty apportionment under s.10B treats the provision as a notional bequest, integrating with whatever Commonwealth or State duties applied at the date of death.
The Trustee Act 1898 is imported for class-fund administration (s.10(4)), allowing the Court to exercise powers under s.47 of that Act. The Administration and Probate Act 1935 (though not expressly named) supplies the underlying framework of grants of probate and administration that trigger the three-month period in s.11(1).
The Act sits alongside the general law of family provision in other Australian jurisdictions but is distinct in its Tasmanian-specific expansions (for example, the surrogate-child definition). It does not displace the equitable doctrines of undue influence or unconscionable conduct in lifetime transfers, which remain available to disappointed family members outside the Act.
Section 2(2) contains an express non-retrospectivity clause preserving the pre-2015 stepchild definition for deaths before commencement, illustrating the Act's interaction with transitional provisions in amending legislation such as the Justice and Related Legislation (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 2015.
Recent changes and why
The text records a series of amendments that have progressively modernised family concepts. The 2003 amendments (No. 45 of 2003) substituted the definition of "spouse" to include significant relationships under the newly enacted Relationships Act 2003, and adjusted s.3A and s.9(4) accordingly. These changes aligned the Act with contemporary recognition of de facto and same-sex relationships.
In 2012 (No. 31 of 2012, applied 1 May 2013) "child" was expanded to include stepchild and surrogate child, with corresponding definitions inserted into s.2(1). The 2015 amendments (No. 38 of 2015) further refined the stepchild definition and added s.2(2) to clarify non-application to pre-commencement deaths. These changes responded to the enactment of the Surrogacy Act 2012 and evolving family structures.
Section 8A(1A) was substituted in 2008 (No. 58 of 2008) and further amended in 2021 (No. 18 of 2021) to refer to the Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, reflecting the replacement of earlier mental-health and guardianship bodies with a single tribunal that now makes wills under the Wills Act 2008. The amendment allows the Family Maintenance Court to consider the Tribunal's reasons, ensuring coherence between the two jurisdictions.
The 1995 amendments (No. 34 of 1995) had inserted subsections into s.2 that were later omitted in 2003, illustrating iterative refinement rather than linear expansion. The 1970 and 1974 amendments refined variation powers and removed spent subsections.
Each change broadened the pool of eligible persons and updated evidentiary and definitional cross-references to keep the Act congruent with contemporaneous family and succession law reforms. The legislative purpose discernible from the amendment notes is to avoid arbitrary exclusions based on outdated notions of "family" while preserving procedural certainty for personal representatives.
Court challenges and controversies
The provided text does not record specific court decisions; however, the structure of the Act itself has generated recurring legal issues. The central controversy is the breadth of the discretion in s.3(1). Because the Court must consider "all the circumstances" yet is guided only by the non-exhaustive factors in s.7, litigants frequently dispute the weight to be given to the deceased's testamentary freedom, the applicant's needs, and moral claims.
The disentitling-conduct provision (s.8(1)) has produced disputes over the threshold of misconduct required to bar relief entirely. Similarly, the admissibility and weight of the deceased's reasons under s.8A(1) has been contentious, particularly where those reasons are contained in informal statements or where s.8A(1A) tribunal records are said to be incomplete.
Time-limit litigation under s.11 is common. The interplay between the jurisdictional bar in s.11(1), the extension power in s.11(2), and the no-disturbance rule in s.11(4) requires careful sequencing of applications. Courts must decide whether an extension should be granted after final distribution has commenced, balancing the prejudice to beneficiaries against the applicant's delay.
The expansion of "child" to include adult stepchildren and surrogate children has raised questions about the duration of the obligation: does a 40-year-old stepchild who has had no relationship with the deceased for decades retain an equal claim? The savings provision in s.2(2) attempts to manage retrospectivity but creates two classes of stepchildren depending on date of death.
Class-fund orders under s.10 have generated controversy over trustee discretion: a trustee who applies the whole fund to one beneficiary to the exclusion of others may face breach-of-trust allegations, yet s.10(2)(a) expressly authorises such differential treatment.
The interaction between orders continuing after remarriage (s.9(4)) and the policy of encouraging self-support has also been debated. Overall, the Act's discretionary character, while flexible, produces uncertainty that encourages settlement but also generates satellite litigation on procedural and evidentiary points.
Gotchas
Most practitioners assume that only minor or financially dependent children can claim; in fact s.3A(b) and the inclusive definition of "child" in s.2(1) permit adult, self-supporting children, stepchildren and surrogate children to apply, provided they can demonstrate inadequate provision for their proper maintenance and support. The threshold is not destitution but what is "proper" in all the circumstances—a deliberately elastic concept.
The three-month time limit in s.11(1) runs from the date of grant, not death. Many solicitors diary the wrong trigger date. Moreover, an application for extension under s.11(2) must itself be filed before final distribution (s.11(4)); once the estate is fully distributed the jurisdiction to extend evaporates even if assets could theoretically be traced.
Section 8A(1) allows the Court to receive the deceased's reasons on any evidence it considers sufficient, including hearsay that would be inadmissible at common law. Conversely, a carefully drafted statutory declaration or solicitor's file note can carry decisive weight, yet many testators leave no record, exposing the estate to higher claims.
Class-fund orders under s.10 are under-used. They allow the Court to set aside a single sum whose income and capital can be applied differentially among multiple claimants for the rest of their lives, even if only one survives. The trustee's discretion is extraordinarily broad—s.10(2)(b) expressly permits exhaustion on the last survivor—yet the order binds the fund as a trust, exposing an unwary executor-trustee to fiduciary liability if the discretion is exercised capriciously.
The rateable incidence rule in s.10A(1) is default only. A well-drafted order can shift the entire burden onto residue, specific gifts, or even a particular beneficiary's share. Conversely, an unrepresented beneficiary may find their inheritance eroded without realising they could have sought exoneration under s.10A(2).
The 2015 stepchild definition (s.2(1)) contains two limbs; the second limb ("a child whose natural parent was the spouse of that person at the time of the natural parent's death") can capture a person who never lived with the deceased. Combined with the savings clause in s.2(2), estates of persons who died before 13 October 2015 are still assessed under the narrower pre-2015 meaning, creating a trap for practitioners who assume the current definition applies universally.
Finally, s.9(4) permits the Court to order that spousal provision continues despite remarriage or a new significant relationship. Many wills contain clauses attempting to terminate benefits on remarriage; such clauses are ineffective once a court order is made under this subsection.
How to comply
Compliance for testators begins at will-drafting. Obtain detailed instructions on all potential claimants under s.3A, including de facto partners, stepchildren, surrogate children and any former partners receiving maintenance. Record reasons for any omission or limited provision in a statutory declaration or solicitor's attendance note that can be tendered under s.8A(1). Consider inter vivos transfers or mutual wills where appropriate, but remember that such arrangements remain vulnerable to claim if they leave an eligible person without adequate provision.
For personal representatives, the first compliance step after grant is to identify every possible claimant and diarise the three-month period in s.11(1). Where a claim appears likely, consider seeking directions under s.3(5) or making an early without-prejudice offer. When served with a summons, immediately compile the estate particulars required by s.6(b) and obtain counsel's advice on net estate value (s.7(a)) and each claimant's independent means (s.7(b)).
If defending, assemble evidence of any disentitling conduct (s.8(1)) and any statements by the deceased explaining the will (s.8A). Where variation of an existing order is contemplated, ensure the application is brought before any further distributions that might engage s.9(5A).
For claimants, file the chamber summons in the exact form prescribed by s.4(1) and serve all necessary parties. If the limitation period has expired, file an extension application under s.11(2) before final distribution and serve all persons likely to be affected. Prepare detailed financial evidence demonstrating both need and the inadequacy of existing provision.
Where multiple eligible persons exist, consider inviting the Court to treat the application as brought on behalf of all (s.3(4)) so that one set of proceedings resolves everyone's position. If a class fund is likely, propose a suitable independent trustee at the hearing to avoid later conflict.
In all cases, remember that the Court's discretion is guided but not fettered. Compliance therefore requires a forensic focus on the s.7 factors, the deceased's reasons, and the practical forms of relief listed in s.3(2). Early, well-documented mediation remains the most reliable route to an order that minimises costs and avoids the uncertainty of a contested hearing.