Several specific provisions in the Act create legal effects or traps that practitioners need to read carefully; this section highlights statutory outcomes that may be unexpected if one assumes ordinary evidentiary or procedural paths.
Irrebuttable presumptions: particular statutory presumptions are declared irrebuttable. Sections 17(3) and 18(3) state that a presumption created by those subsections is irrebuttable; subdivision 2A also contains a general irrebuttable provision (s 19F). Where an irrebuttable presumption applies, ordinary fact‑finding or DNA evidence cannot overturn the statutory fiction. Practitioners must therefore identify whether the fact pattern fits an irrebuttable presumption (for example a married woman’s fertilisation procedure giving rise to ss 17-19) because rights and liabilities will be conclusively allocated by statute (see ss 17-19, 19F).
Vesting and property preservation: the Act preserves vesting in possession or in interest of property that occurred before particular amendments or commencement dates (s 14(2), s 14(4), s 36(3), s 37(3), s 33, s 34). That means even if parentage is later recognised by declaration, that recognition may not affect property rights already vested. Section 8(2) similarly protects estates and rights that were absolutely vested before an act, event or conduct enabling recognition occurred. Practitioners litigating succession claims must check timing carefully: a late declaration may not disturb prior vesting.
No penalty for refusing testing, but inferences can be drawn: s 11(7) explicitly states a person is not liable to any penalty for contravening a parentage testing order by refusing to consent. Yet s 11(5) allows courts to draw whatever inferences they consider appropriate. That creates an asymmetry: no criminal or statutory fine for non‑compliance, but non‑compliance can be used to the party’s disadvantage in civil proceedings. Advice to clients should therefore focus on the risk of adverse judicial inferences rather than criminal consequences.
Consent presumptions and rebuttable presumptions about husband’s consent: several provisions presume a husband’s consent to fertilisation procedures in proceedings where operation of ss 17-19 is relevant (ss 17(4), 18(4), 19(4)). These are rebuttable presumptions. By contrast, for de facto partner consent in subdivision 2A the Act presumes consent unless the contrary is proved but marks that presumption as rebuttable (s 19G). Parties should therefore document consent carefully; otherwise statutory presumptions may operate against their interests but can be rebutted with evidence.
Effect of marriage after donation: where a man produces semen used in artificial insemination, s 21(1) initially denies him rights or liabilities in respect of the resulting child; s 21(1)-(2) however allows that if he later becomes the husband of the child’s mother he acquires parental rights and liabilities as a father, but absent agreement those are restricted to rights and liabilities arising after he becomes husband. That timing‑dependent mechanism can create complexity in disputes over child support or inheritance if marriage occurs after birth.
Interaction with guardianship and powers of attorney: parentage testing orders involving adults with “impaired capacity” require consent from a person who may exercise powers under a power of attorney in personal matters or a guardian under the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (s 11(4)(c)). That injects an additional layer into procedures and can slow or block testing where capacity disputes or contested appointments exist.
Court findings from other jurisdictions: s 26 treats express findings by prescribed courts (including courts of other jurisdictions if prescribed) as establishing presumptions of parentage, with findings made while the person is alive being irrebuttable (s 26(1)-(2)). Practitioners must check whether overseas findings qualify as “prescribed” and whether the operative standards of the foreign court match expectations; the Act gives those findings powerful effect where they meet the section’s thresholds.
Registrar-general access restrictions and challenge route: access to filed documents is limited to persons with a “proper interest” and permits refusal; the remedy is an application to the court under s 9(4)-(8). That framework may delay discovery of registration evidence and requires parties to be ready to undertake judicial proceedings to compel registry access.
Inadmissibility rules in criminal proceedings: s 13 bars the use of acknowledgements of paternity or certified copy register entries as evidence in criminal proceedings to prove penile intercourse. This is a trap for prosecutors and defence counsel alike if registry evidence is expected to be used for sexual offence proofs; it also means registrars and clinics should not assume register acknowledgements are admissible for criminal proofs.
Resolution of conflicting presumptions: when multiple presumptions conflict, the court chooses the presumption that appears most likely correct except that a presumption under s 26(1) (a live court finding) prevails (s 30). Understanding which presumptions have priority (irrebuttable, court finding) is essential when multiple statutory presumptions could apply.
Limited legislative penalties and reliance on civil remedies and presumptions: because the Act relies on presumptions, civil inferences and court declarations rather than criminal sanctions, parties who wish to enforce or contest parentage should gear their strategy towards civil litigation and evidentiary tactics rather than expecting statutory fines or enforcement by regulators.
Document execution before commencement: ss 33 and 34 preserve the pre‑commencement governing law for documents executed or intestacies that occurred before commencement; practitioners should check whether a document pre‑dates the Act and plan claims accordingly.
Overall, the “gotchas” flow from timing‑sensitive presumptions, the mix of irrebuttable and rebuttable rules, preservation of vested property, consent rules for testing tied to capacity regimes, and the Act’s choice to prioritise civil remedies and evidentiary devices over penal enforcement.