River Murray Waters Act 1915

Official rationale (claim in the text)

• The preamble and Agreement state the objective as economically using River Murray waters for irrigation and navigation and reconciling Commonwealth and riparian State interests (Preamble; Agreement recitals). The Act therefore implements that stated policy by creating the Commission, financing arrangements and operational rules (s.5; Agreement cl.4,20–33,42–51).

Testing that rationale against costs, incentives and trade‑offs (source‑grounded)

• Who pays: The Contracting Governments share upfront construction and ongoing costs in fixed proportions (Commonwealth £1,000,000; New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia each £1,221,000 as estimated) (Agreement cl.32–33). Annual contributions are to be provided to the Commission in those proportions (Agreement cl.34–35). The Act requires parliamentary appropriation for moneys needed (s.18). The Commonwealth’s statutory cap on liability is explicit (s.5).

• Financial risks and contingencies: The Commission can approve and advance funds and may authorise expenditure in excess of the estimates; excess costs are borne by the Governments in the agreed proportions (Agreement cl.36). If a Government refuses or neglects to perform or pay, the other Governments (with Commission sanction) may complete works and recover the defaulting State’s share as a debt in court with interest (Agreement cl.43). Administrative expenses of the Commission are shared equally, while Commissioner salaries are paid by the appointing government (Agreement cl.38; cl.8).

• Incentives and behaviour: The Commission controls approval of designs, order of construction, maintenance standards and water delivery declarations (Agreement cl.23,28,19). That central direction creates incentives for State governments to obtain Commission approval and to progress works in Commission‑approved ways to secure funding advances (Agreement cl.34–35, cl.28). Where a State’s interests diverge from two others, the Agreement restricts what the Commission may treat as ‘formal’ business (Agreement cl.6), and unresolved differences among Commissioners may be referred to arbitration (Agreement cl.58).

• Compliance burden: States must submit schemes, designs and annual estimates for approval (Agreement cl.23,34); provide statements of existing diversions shortly after Commission appointment (Agreement cl.53); and supply information requested by the Commission (Agreement cl.59). Persons operating locks must pay tolls set by Commission regulation and tolls are strictly limited by purpose and amount (ss.15–17,16; Agreement cl.42).

• Bureaucratic discretion and enforcement: The Commission has broad discretionary powers to set operational rules, regulate tolls, give directions on construction and to vary water allocations during drought (s.7; ss.8,12; Agreement cl.28,51). Regulations made by the Commission are legally binding (s.8) and are subject to publication and parliamentary disallowance procedures when they concern tolls or penalties (s.7(2)–(3)). The High Court can enforce Commission duties (s.11), and arbitrator decisions are binding where the Agreement prescribes arbitration (Agreement cl.58).

• Opportunity costs and trade‑offs: Money directed to construction and maintenance must be appropriated by Parliament (s.18) and balances held by the Commission carry over year to year (Agreement cl.39). The Act exempts the works from rates and taxes (s.20), which removes local revenue streams that might otherwise fund maintenance. The drought clause allows the Commission to proportion reductions among States but does not remove the need to maintain the specified infrastructure or repay advances (Agreement cl.51). The Lake Victoria and Upper Murray storages are a gating condition for certain water‑sharing clauses — allocation rules don’t fully operate until those storages are effective or seven years elapse (Agreement cl.44).

• Concentrated benefits/diffuse costs: The Agreement identifies particular infrastructure (weirs, locks, Lake Victoria, Upper Murray storage) that will directly benefit navigation and regulated water supply (Agreement cl.20, Schedule A). Costs are shared by four Governments in fixed proportions (Agreement cl.32). The Act limits the Commonwealth’s maximum cash liability (s.5), concentrating residual financial exposure on the States according to the agreed shares if costs exceed estimates (Agreement cl.36).

Key implementation and legal features to watch (source citations)

• Commission regulatory power (s.7) and legal force of regulations (s.8).
• Commission orders’ enforceability in the High Court (s.12) and mandamus jurisdiction (s.11).
• Financial apportionment, annual estimates and payment mechanics (Agreement cl.32–35). Commonwealth cap on liability (s.5).
• Water‑sharing schedule and drought variation (Agreement cl.44–51) and the conditioning of those clauses on completion or effectiveness of key storages (Agreement cl.44).
• Arbitration for non‑law questions (Agreement cl.58) and the Commission’s power to enter land (s.10).

Bottom line (mechanical effect): The Act creates a statutory mechanism — a multi‑member Commission with rule‑making, approval, funding allocation and enforcement powers — to build, maintain and operate navigation and storage works on the River Murray and Lake Victoria, to allocate construction costs among the Commonwealth and three States in specified proportions, to set limited navigation tolls, and to implement a detailed water‑sharing regime that becomes operative on completion of key storages (s.5; Agreement cl.4,20,28,32,42,44–51).