The Act contains a number of detail-oriented requirements and interlocking provisions that can produce practical pitfalls if overlooked. These are implementation hazards and procedural traps grounded in the statutory text.
Enduring power formalities are strictly conditional: Section 6(2) makes an enduring power ineffective unless two formalities are met: at least one attesting witness to the deed must be a person authorised by law to take affidavits, and the deed must have endorsed on it or annexed to it a statement of acceptance in the form in Schedule 2 or an equivalent executed by the donee (s 6(2)(a)-(b); Schedule 2). Failure to comply with either element renders the instrument ineffective as an enduring power. Practitioners should not assume that any witness will suffice; the witness must be legally authorised to take affidavits.
Donee acceptance must be executed: The donee’s acceptance in the prescribed form (Schedule 2) is not optional for an enduring power (s 6(2)(b)). If the donee fails to sign the acceptance as required, the enduring character of the instrument will not be effective under the Act. This is a point that may be missed in informal executions.
Distinction between general and enduring powers: A general power by its terms need not survive incapacity unless the instrument expresses enduring intent. The general power form in Schedule 1 is a distinct statutory model (s 5(1)). Attempting to rely on a general power as an enduring power without the requisite wording and formalities will fail.
Trustee and personal representative functions excluded: Section 5(4) explicitly states that a general power of attorney does not confer authority to perform functions the donor has as a trustee or personal representative. Parties assuming an attorney can exercise trust or estate administration powers via a general power may confront invalid acts.
Renunciation during incapacity is restricted: A donee cannot renounce an enduring power during the donor’s period of legal incapacity except with the Supreme Court’s permission (s 9). Donees who attempt to renounce without permission may remain bound or face practical problems in extricating themselves.
Record-keeping offence is narrowly targeted yet criminal: Section 8 creates a summary offence for failure to keep and preserve accurate records and accounts, with a penalty up to $1,000. The provision targets bookkeeping compliance rather than only harmful acts, and it is criminalised. Donees and their advisers must maintain accurate records and retain them, because failure is criminal exposure.
Accountability to statutory appointees: Where a committee, administrator under the Mental Health Act 1977, or manager under the Aged and Infirm Persons' Property Act 1940 is appointed, the donee becomes accountable to that person as if that person were the donor (s 10(a)), and that person can vary or revoke the power as the donor could (s 10(b)). Donors and donees should be cautious: an enduring power does not necessarily maintain independent force in the face of statutory guardianship or property manager appointments.
Time limitations for beneficiary applications: Section 11A(4) requires applications by beneficiaries to be made within six months from the date of the grant in this State of probate or letters of administration unless the Supreme Court extends time. Practitioners representing beneficiaries should be alert to this relatively short deadline and file promptly or seek extensions before final distribution (s 11A(6)). Section 11A(7) protects distributions made before an application for extension of time from being disturbed, which can affect strategies for recovery.
Interstate enduring powers are limited: Section 14 allows interstate enduring powers to have effect in South Australia only insofar as their powers could validly have been given by an enduring power under this Act (s 14(1)-(2)). An interstate instrument that confers powers not available under South Australian law will not confer those powers here. Relying parties cannot assume identical content across jurisdictions.
Certifications and evidentiary presumptions: Section 14(4) admits a certificate by a qualified interstate legal practitioner as prima facie proof of formal compliance. However, the certificate can be rebutted by proof to the contrary. Practitioners should not treat certification as absolute; it shifts evidentiary burdens but does not eliminate challenges.
Third-party protections depend on lack of knowledge: Section 12 protects those who act in good faith without knowledge of death or incapacity. If a third party has notice, the protection will not apply. This allocates risk to parties who fail to make enquiries or who act with awareness of an authority’s termination.
Deed execution by agent in own name: Section 13 preserves the effect of a deed executed by an agent in his own name where it is apparent from the deed that the agent acted for the principal (s 13(1)). However, disputes may arise over whether the deed makes the agency “apparent.” The protection is not absolute and fact-sensitive.
Forms are templates, but equivalence must be clear: Schedules 1 and 2 provide forms, and the Act allows equivalent forms “to the same effect” (s 5(1); s 6(2)(b)). Substantive non-conformity may expose the instrument to challenge. Practitioners should ensure equivalent language is sufficiently clear to satisfy the statutory intent and withstand scrutiny.
Preserved operation of other statutes: Because the Act does not affect the operation of specific provisions in the Real Property Act 1886 or the Registration of Deeds Act 1935 (s 12(5)), property practitioners must reconcile the Act’s protections with registry requirements. Failure to observe registry formalities may undermine transactions even where the Act provides good-faith protection.
Together, these points emphasise the importance of attending to statutory formalities, timely litigation windows, the interplay with guardianship regimes, and the evidentiary limits of interstate certification. Overlooking these details can produce invalid instruments, procedural defeats, or loss of statutory protections.