The Act operates around a small set of core legal concepts. Each is defined or instantiated in the text and determines who may publish, what counts as publication, and when publication attracts legal protection.

Definitions and institutional roles. Section 3 provides the Act’s operative definitions. “Committee” covers a committee of either House or of both Houses. “House” means House of Parliament. “Joint sitting” is defined by reference to two statutory mechanisms: a joint sitting convened under specified sections of the Constitution Act 1902 or the Houses sitting and voting together under s 15 of the Commonwealth Constitution (s 3(1)). The Act also signals that notes included in the Act do not form part of the operative text (s 3(2)). Those definitional choices restrict the Act’s personal and institutional reach to parliamentary structures recognised in the definitions.

Authorisation of publication. Section 4 splits the decision-making power: either House or a joint sitting may authorise publication of a document laid before it, and a Committee may authorise publication of a document received by it or evidence given before it. The phrase “laid before it” or “received by it” is left to ordinary statutory interpretation; the Act does not codify procedural form for laying or receiving.

Who may publish. Section 5 creates the practical link between authorisation and publication. When an order to publish is made by either House, a joint sitting or a Committee, a “relevant person” may publish the document or evidence unless the order expresses a contrary intention (s 5(1)). “Relevant person” is defined narrowly to the clerks and deputy clerks of each House: the Clerk of the Parliaments and Clerk of the Legislative Council, Deputy Clerk of the Legislative Council, Clerk of the Legislative Assembly and Deputy Clerk of the Legislative Assembly (s 5(3)). Section 5(2) adds that a relevant person is authorised to publish reports of the debates and proceedings in each House and of a joint sitting. The Act also clarifies that “publish includes print” (s 5(3)), thus tying older printing-based statutory language to broader publication.

Legal protection. Section 6 provides a defence in any civil or criminal action for publication of a document or evidence if it is proved that the publication was authorised under s 4 or by s 5. The defence is not absolute; it is triggered only if the defendant proves authorisation, and it is expressly made subject to s 7. Section 7, in plain operative terms, states that “This Act does not operate so as to provide or affect a defence to an action or proceeding for defamation.” The accompanying note to s 7 refers to the Defamation Act 2005 as providing an absolute privilege for publication in the course of parliamentary proceedings, but the Act itself treats that as a non-operative note (and s 3(2) reminds readers that notes do not form part of the Act).

Website publication. Section 9 modernises the equivalent of “printing by authority” for digital publication by specifying that an Act authorising the Clerk of a House to print a document authorises the Clerk to publish the document on the NSW Parliament website (s 9(1)). It then declares that a document published on that website by the Clerk is taken to be printed by, or by the authority of, the Clerk (s 9(2)). Section 9(3) unambiguously extends the section to acts done before its commencement, and the section defines “NSW Parliament website” as the URL www.parliament.nsw.gov.au or another site used by the Parliament of New South Wales (s 9(4)). This renders website publication by the Clerk formally equivalent to traditional printing for statutory purposes.

Interaction with parliamentary privilege. Section 8 says nothing in the Act derogates from a power or privilege of either House, the Members of either House, or a Committee. That preserves the constitutional and procedural autonomy of parliamentary privilege alongside the Act’s mechanisms.

Collectively, the Act defines a narrow institutional route for authorised publication, a limited list of officers who may lawfully publish under that authorisation, a statutory defence that depends on proof of authorisation, and an extension of “printing” to website publication by the Clerk. The Act preserves other legal regimes and privileges by express non-derogation clauses and a provision excluding defamation defences from its scope.

The Act identifies specific actors whose rights, decisions or liabilities the text directly addresses, and it leaves other actors outside its express protections.

Primary decision-makers. The primary decision-makers under the Act are either House, a joint sitting and Committees. Section 4 expressly confers on either House or a joint sitting the power to authorise publication of a document laid before it, and on a Committee the power to authorise publication of documents received by it or evidence given before it. Practically, this means parliamentary majorities and committee controls determine whether particular material is authorised for publication under the statutory route. The Act provides no statutory process for how those authorisations are made beyond saying they may authorise publication; the procedural form of the authorisation will therefore be a matter for the Houses’ and Committees’ own standing orders and practices.

Relevant persons authorised to publish. Section 5(3) narrowly names the officers who may publish when an authorisation has been made: the Clerk of the Parliaments and Clerk of the Legislative Council; the Deputy Clerk of the Legislative Council; the Clerk of the Legislative Assembly; and the Deputy Clerk of the Legislative Assembly. These named clerks are the only persons who, by the Act’s express terms, enjoy the statutory permission to publish material authorised under s 4 or s 5. That exclusivity has operational consequences for delegation, outsourcing or third-party republication: the Act does not itself extend the statutory authorisation or defence to any person who is not a “relevant person” unless the authorising order indicates otherwise.

Potential defendants and litigants. The Act engages individuals and entities who might be defendants in civil or criminal proceedings for publication, and those who might bring such actions. Section 6 establishes a defence to any action or proceeding, civil or criminal, for authorised publication, but only if the defendant proves that the publication was authorised under s 4 or by s 5. Section 7 operates as a direct limit on the Act’s reach: the Act does not operate so as to provide or affect a defence to an action for defamation. Therefore, authors, clerks and anyone involved in publishing authorised material still face exposure to defamation liability outside the Act’s statutory defence. The Act’s note in s 7 references statutory privilege in the Defamation Act 2005 as providing absolute privilege for publication in parliamentary proceedings, but that note is not operative text (s 3(2) indicates notes do not form part of the Act).

Parliamentary institutions and the public. The Act affects the institutional capacity of the Houses and Committees to disseminate material and shapes public access to parliamentary papers. Section 5(2) expressly authorises relevant persons to publish reports of debates and proceedings. Section 9 extends “printing by authority” to the NSW Parliament website and treats website publication by the Clerk as equivalent to printing by authority (s 9(1)-(2)). Those provisions affect how the public can obtain official parliamentary documents and what legal character is attached to web-published documents.

Who does not gain protection under the Act. Because the statutory defence applies only if it is proved the publication was authorised under s 4 or by s 5 (s 6), persons who publish without that authorisation are not covered by the Act’s defence. The Act does not itself authorise private journalists, publishers or third parties to rely on the defence unless they can show the publication was made by a relevant person acting under an authorisation. The Act also does not create statutory obligations or liabilities beyond the publishing authorisation and defence; it leaves broader legal exposure (for example defamation) intact (s 7).

Other stakeholders. The Act also touches on record-keeping, administrative functions and the clerks’ office: clerks are given the practical task of publishing and confirming published documents are “printed by, or by the authority of, the Clerk” when on the official website (s 9(2)). That confers on clerical offices the role of both publisher and custodian of legal status for published material.

In summary, the Act primarily affects parliamentary decision-makers (Houses, joint sittings and Committees), the clerks named as relevant persons, potential litigants in civil/criminal actions for publication and the public receiving parliamentary material, while leaving exposure to defamation and parliamentary privilege regimes intact.

The Act confers rights of authorisation and publication, and it imposes practical duties or constraints that follow from those rights. The key operative duties and rights fall into authorisation, publication, evidentiary proof and non-derogation.

Right to authorise publication. Either House or a joint sitting may authorise publication of a document laid before it; Committees may authorise publication of a document received by them or evidence given before them (s 4). That is a right exercisable by the collective parliamentary institutions. The Act does not prescribe the procedural form of the authorisation, but the right is expressed in the operative text.

Right to publish following authorisation. Section 5 provides that when either House, a joint sitting, or a Committee orders a document or evidence to be published, a relevant person may publish the document or evidence unless the contrary intention appears in the order (s 5(1)). The right is therefore conditional: authorisation is necessary and an order may expressly limit publication by indicating a contrary intention. The relevant persons entitled to exercise the right to publish are limited to specified clerks and their deputies (s 5(3)). Section 5(2) further entitles the relevant person to publish reports of debates and proceedings in each House and of a joint sitting, a specific right that complements broader authorisation powers.

Duty to respect contrary intention in order. The Act imposes a constraint on the right to publish: publication is permitted “unless the contrary intention appears in the order” (s 5(1)). That places an operational duty on relevant persons to consult the authorising order and not to publish where the order discloses a contrary intention. It also places a duty on Houses and Committees that authorise publication to be explicit if they intend to restrict or withhold publication.

Duty of proof to obtain the defence. Section 6 frames the statutory protection as a defence in civil or criminal proceedings, but it is conditional on proof. The Act provides that it is a defence “if it is proved that the publication ... was authorised under section 4 or by section 5” (s 6). Practically, defendants must be prepared to prove that the authorisation was in fact made and that the publication was within its scope. The Act does not prescribe the evidentiary standard or mechanisms for establishing proof, so normal rules of civil and criminal procedure will apply.

Non-extension to defamation. Section 7 affirmatively removes or limits what the Act might otherwise be thought to do in relation to defamation: “This Act does not operate so as to provide or affect a defence to an action or proceeding for defamation.” That is an explicit limitation on the reach of the defence in s 6 and imposes an obligation on those relying on the Act to manage defamation risk through other means. The s 7 note refers to the Defamation Act 2005 provisions that speak to absolute privilege for publication of parliamentary proceedings; however, the Act’s note is not part of the operative text (see s 3(2)).

Right to treat website publication as printed. Section 9 effectively creates a right and declaratory rule for treating publication on the NSW Parliament website by the Clerk as equivalent to printing by authority: an Act that authorises the Clerk to print a document also authorises the Clerk to publish it on the website, and documents so published are taken to be printed by or by the authority of the Clerk (s 9(1)-(2)). Section 9(3) extends this to past actions. The definition of “NSW Parliament website” is given in s 9(4).

Preservation of privilege. Section 8 is a declaratory preservation: nothing in the Act derogates from a power or privilege of either House, their Members, or Committees. That means the operation of standing orders, parliamentary privilege law and the Houses’ internal rules remains intact and may create duties or rights beyond the Act’s text.

Scope limitations and exclusivity. The Act’s rights are tightly circumscribed by its language. The right to publish is vested in specified clerks (s 5(3)), and the statutory defence requires proof of authorisation (s 6). The authorising body may also specify a contrary intention (s 5(1)). These constraints collectively create duties on authorisers to be explicit and on publishing officers to ensure compliance with the terms of the authorisation.

In short, the Act grants institutional rights to authorise and to publish but attaches duties of record, proof and respect for express restrictions, while excluding defamation defences and preserving parliamentary privilege.

The Act does not itself create new criminal offences or express pecuniary penalties. Instead, it establishes an evidentiary and defensive posture for persons who publish parliamentary documents or evidence pursuant to statutory authorisation. Enforcement therefore operates primarily through existing civil and criminal processes in which the statutory defence may be invoked.

Defensive mechanism rather than penal regime. Section 6 provides that proof of statutory authorisation is a defence to “any action or proceeding, civil or criminal,” that arises from publication of a document or evidence authorised under s 4 or by s 5. The Act’s remedial instrument is therefore a defence in pre-existing forums rather than a new enforcement power or penalty. There is no provision in the Act for fines, injunctions or regulatory sanctions specifically tied to contravention of the Act’s publication provisions. Enforcement of publication limits or consequences for unauthorised publication must therefore be pursued under other statutory or common law causes of action.

Burden and nature of proof. The Act places a practical evidentiary burden on persons seeking to rely on the defence: the defence applies only “if it is proved that the publication ... was authorised” (s 6). That means in litigation the defendant must tender evidence of the authorising order, the act of publication by a relevant person, and compliance with any expressed terms of the order. The Act does not specify the standard or type of proof required; ordinary civil and criminal evidentiary rules will govern how the defence is established and weighed by courts.

Interaction with defamation law. Section 7 expressly states the Act does not create or affect a defence in defamation proceedings. Consequently, a publisher who relies on authorisation under this Act may still face a defamation suit unaffected by the s 6 statutory defence. The s 7 note references the Defamation Act 2005 as providing absolute privilege for the publication of parliamentary proceedings; however, notes do not form part of the operative Act per s 3(2). The upshot for enforcement is that courts deciding defamation claims will apply defamation law and any statutory privileges therein, not s 6 per se, and the Act will not itself immunise defendants from defamation liability.

Operational enforcement through orders. A practical enforcement consequence arises from the Act permitting an authorising order to express a contrary intention (s 5(1)). If an authorising order limits publication, then publication in breach of that limitation is unauthorised and falls outside the scope of the s 6 defence. Enforcement of breaches of orders will therefore depend on recourse to the appropriate legal or parliamentary remedies, including internal parliamentary sanctions, contempt processes or external civil or criminal actions, but those are not created by this Act.

No express administrative enforcement mechanism. The Act does not create an administrative enforcement regime to police compliance with authorisations. The chief enforcement instruments remain courts and the Houses’ internal procedures. Section 8’s non-derogation of parliamentary privileges preserves parliamentary internal enforcement mechanisms, but the Act itself does not supply penalties.

Retrospectivity for website publication. Section 9(3) extends the website publication provision to “anything done before the commencement of this section.” This is declaratory and has evidentiary significance: past acts of Clerk-operated website publication are to be treated as if they were covered by the authority to print, which may affect litigated claims about past publications. That retroactive declaratory effect, however, does not create penalties or authorise retrospective imposition of new liabilities against third parties; it instead confirms the legal character of past Clerk website publications for statutory purposes.

In sum, enforcement under the Act is defensive and procedural , the Act supplies a statutory defence coupled with limits, and it preserves other legal remedies and privileges. Actual penalties for unauthorised publication or for misconduct related to publication arise under other bodies of law or parliamentary rules rather than this Act.

The Act is deliberately concise and relies on interaction with other statute and parliamentary practice to operate effectively. Its text expressly references other laws and leaves some matters to those regimes. The principal points of interaction are with defamation law, constitutional provisions cited in the joint sitting definition, parliamentary privilege regimes and any law treating printing by authority.

Defamation law. Section 7 is the primary interface with defamation law. It states the Act “does not operate so as to provide or affect a defence to an action or proceeding for defamation.” The note appended to s 7 refers to s 27(2)(a) of the Defamation Act 2005 as providing absolute privilege for publication of defamatory matter in the course of proceedings of a parliamentary body, and lists several examples of what that privilege covers. The Act’s operative text, however, makes clear the Parliamentary Papers Act itself neither creates nor modifies defamation defences. Given s 3(2) states that notes included in the Act do not form part of the Act, the s 7 note must be treated as explanatory rather than legally operative. Therefore, defamation liability and statutory defences remain matters for the Defamation Act and common law, and the protection in s 6 is not to be read as displacing or altering those regimes.

Constitutional and state statutory provisions. The Act’s definition of “joint sitting” in s 3(1)(b) refers to the Houses sitting and voting together under s 15 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act. It also refers in s 3(1)(a) to joint sittings convened under specified sections of the Constitution Act 1902. These references anchor the Act’s concept of a joint sitting in pre-existing constitutional and state statutory mechanisms. The Act does not modify those constitutional provisions; it simply recognises them for the purposes of defining parliamentary structures that may authorise publication.

Parliamentary privilege and internal law. Section 8 expressly provides that nothing in the Act derogates from a power or privilege of either House, Members, or a Committee. That preserves the operation of parliamentary privilege law and the Houses’ standing orders and contempt procedures. Where those regimes impose restrictions or grant privileges concerning publication, they continue to do so alongside the Act.

“Printing by authority” and modern publication. Section 9 updates the legal equivalence of printing by authority to modern web publication by declaring that an Act authorising the Clerk to print a document also authorises the Clerk to publish it on the NSW Parliament website, and that such publication is taken to be printed by or by the authority of the Clerk (s 9(1)-(2)). That interacts with other statutes or rules which treat printed material as “by the authority” of a parliamentary officer by extending the same legal character to Clerk-controlled website publication. The section also defines the relevant website and extends the rule retrospectively (s 9(3)-(4)).

Evidence and procedural law. The Act’s requirement that the defendant prove authorisation for the s 6 defence means the Act will be applied and tested within ordinary civil and criminal procedural rules. Courts will determine admissibility and sufficiency of evidence of authorisation, the content of any order showing a contrary intention, and whether the defendant’s publication falls within the scope of the authorisation. The Act does not prescribe the form the authorisation must take or the standard of proof; those issues will be governed by the courts’ procedural rules and evidentiary law.

Parliamentary documents and administrative law. While the Act confers authority to publish, it does not displace administrative law regarding access to documents, records retention or privacy. Publication of documents authorised under the Act may nonetheless engage other statutory duties or limits outside the Act, such as privacy obligations, confidentiality regimes or access-to-information laws. The Act does not provide immunity from those obligations.

In summary, the Act is intended to operate alongside pre-existing constitutional provisions (for joint sittings), parliamentary privilege, defamation law and procedural rules. It declares legal consequences for authorised publication and for Clerk-managed website publication, but it leaves regulation of substantive liability (for example, defamation or privacy) to those other regimes.

The Act’s text contains internal amendment notations that identify discrete modifications to definitions and to the list of persons authorised to publish, and it records the insertion of provisions dealing with website publication.

Original enactment and commencement. The Act is cited as the Parliamentary Papers (Supplementary Provisions) Act 1975 (s 1) and is deemed to have commenced on 1 July 1974 (s 2). Those provisions indicate the Act was intended to apply from a date prior to its formal enactment, by deeming commencement.

Amendments to definitions and notes. Section 3 carries amendment annotations: “s 3: Am 1978 No 82, sec 2; 2005 No 77, Sch 6.14 [1].” That indicates s 3 was amended in 1978 and again in 2005 by a schedule to another Act, reflecting adjustments to definitions or related textual elements. The Act also contains the stand-alone note in s 7 that was inserted by a 2005 amendment: “s 7, note: Ins 2005 No 77, Sch 6.14 [2].” That insertion links the Parliamentary Papers Act text to provisions of the Defamation Act 2005 by way of explanatory note, though s 3(2) confirms notes are not operative law.

Clerks and relevant persons update. Section 5 carries a recent amendment notation: “s 5: Am 2024 No 82, Sch 3.7[1]-[4].” That indicates that in 2024 the list or wording concerning relevant persons authorised to publish (clerks and deputies) was amended. The amendment may have clarified the list of relevant persons or modernised wording; the operative text currently names the Clerk of the Parliaments and Clerk of the Legislative Council, Deputy Clerk of the Legislative Council, Clerk of the Legislative Assembly, and Deputy Clerk of the Legislative Assembly (s 5(3)).

Website publication insertion. Section 9 is marked as inserted in 2024: “s 9: Ins 2024 No 82, Sch 3.7[5].” Section 9’s text explicitly authorises the Clerk to publish documents on the NSW Parliament website where an Act authorises the Clerk to print, treats such website publication as printed by authority, extends the rule to past acts and defines the NSW Parliament website. The 2024 insertion therefore represents a modernising amendment that updates the “printing” concept to include controlled web publication.

Notes and non-operative text. Section 3(2) remains in the text with its amendment notation and provides that notes included in this Act do not form part of the Act. That placement confirms that editorial notes (such as the s 7 note referring to defamation law) are explanatory and not legal commands, and marks a legislative choice to separate explanatory material from operative clauses.

Taken together, the amendment history recorded within the Act indicates incremental updates: definitional adjustments in 1978 and 2005, insertion of an explanatory note in 2005 relating to defamation, and a 2024 update that refines who may publish and adds explicit website publication provisions. The Act as presented reflects those amendments; the amendment notations provide the formal trace of how the Parliament has adapted the Act to modern publishing practices and to coherence with other statutes.

The Act’s text does not include references to judicial decisions or case law. There are no cases named within the statute as being statutory authorities or as interpretive signals. Consequently the Act itself does not record litigation history or judicial interpretation. The absence of annotated case law in the text means that users of this Act must look to court records and reported decisions outside the Act to determine how courts have interpreted its provisions.

Areas likely to attract litigation and judicial interpretation. Although the Act does not supply cases, its operative provisions point to the contours of disputes that courts will likely resolve when litigated under the Act. Those areas include:

• Proof of authorisation. Section 6 makes proof of authorisation the gateway to the statutory defence. Litigation is likely to involve disputes over whether an authorisation was validly made under s 4 or s 5, whether the order’s terms permitted the particular mode of publication, and whether a relevant person actually acted pursuant to that authorisation. Courts will be required to apply evidentiary standards to such proof.

• Scope of authorisation and “contrary intention”. Section 5(1) permits an authorising order to express a contrary intention that would prevent publication. Litigation may therefore arise over the interpretation of an order, whether it disclosed a contrary intention, and whether the defendant’s publication breached that limitation.

• Application to non-listed publishers. Since the Act identifies specific “relevant persons” (s 5(3)), litigation might involve whether third parties who publish material derive any protection from the Act, whether delegation or authorisations in writing extend the authorisation beyond listed clerks, and whether republication by third parties falls within the statutory defence.

• Interaction with defamation law. Section 7 disclaims any operation in relation to defamation defences, but the s 7 note refers to the Defamation Act 2005. Judicial issues may include how courts reconcile privileges and defences in defamation law with the statutory defence in s 6, particularly where publication occurs in the context of parliamentary proceedings and where the Defamation Act’s own privilege provisions may apply.

• Website publication and retrospective effect. Section 9 declares website publications by the Clerk to be equivalent to printing by authority and extends the provision to past acts (s 9(3)). Litigation may engage the retrospective character of that provision, affecting the legal status of past Clerk website publications and whether a defendant can rely on the Act for publications made before s 9’s insertion.

Lack of recorded judicial guidance in the Act. Because the Act’s text contains no judicial annotations, any practitioner seeking to rely on the Act’s defence must research external case law to determine how courts have treated the Act’s proof requirement, the required form and content of authorising orders, and the interplay with defamation and privilege doctrines. The Act itself provides the statutory framework; courts supply the interpretive application, but the statute does not set out that jurisprudence.

In the absence of cases cited in the Act, the key litigation points are matters of ordinary statutory construction, evidentiary burden and the interplay of the Act with defamation and privilege law. Those are the topics litigants and courts will address when the Act’s provisions are tested in legal proceedings.

The Act is compact, but several operational and interpretive pitfalls arise directly from its wording and from its relationship with other laws. Practitioners and parliamentary officers relying on the Act should be alert to these features.

Notes are not part of the Act. Section 3(2) expressly states that notes included in the Act do not form part of the Act. That limits the legal weight of the s 7 explanatory note which refers to the Defamation Act 2005. The note may be informative, but it is not operative text and cannot be relied on as a statutory defence or legal rule. Users must therefore treat notes as interpretive aids rather than binding provisions (s 3(2)).

Statutory defence requires proof. Section 6 provides a defence only “if it is proved that the publication ... was authorised under section 4 or by section 5.” That puts the onus on defendants to adduce evidence of a valid authorisation and of publication by a relevant person. Absent documented authorisation or clear evidence that the publication was within the order’s terms, the statutory defence is unavailable.

Defamation protection not supplied by this Act. Section 7’s operative text says the Act does not provide or affect a defence to defamation actions. Practitioners must not assume that authorisation under this Act automatically immunises a publisher from defamation liability. While the s 7 note points to the Defamation Act 2005 provision on absolute privilege for parliamentary proceedings, that note is not operative and defamation outcomes depend on defamation law and any privileges existing there (s 7 and s 3(2)).

Authorising order may limit publication. Section 5(1) states publication is permitted “unless the contrary intention appears in the order.” That means an authorising order may itself negate or limit the authorisation. A “gotcha” arises if clerks publish without carefully checking the terms of the order and miss an express restriction; such publication will be unauthorised and outside the s 6 defence.

Relevance of the narrow list of “relevant persons.” Section 5(3) tightly defines who is a “relevant person.” If publication is made by a parliamentary staffer not within that list, or by a third-party contractor or news outlet, that publisher may not benefit from the Act’s defence unless the authorisation itself expressly or implicitly extends to those actors. Delegation or contract-based publication should be structured so the Act’s authorisation is clearly captured and recorded.

Website publication is authorised only when done by the Clerk. Section 9 treats website publication by the Clerk as printed by authority. It does not authorise third parties to publish on the Parliament’s website; nor does it automatically treat third-party websites as “by authority.” The legal equivalence to printing applies only to Clerk-conducted publication on the defined NSW Parliament website (s 9(1)-(2), (4)). Relying on republication by others or mirror sites presents legal risk.

Retroactivity is declaratory for website publication. Section 9(3) extends the website provision to “anything done before the commencement of this section.” That retrospective aspect may be useful for treating past Clerk website publication as printed by authority, but it does not create new retroactive protections for third parties who published material elsewhere, nor does it alter defamation law outcomes.

Ambiguity about the form of authorisation. The Act does not prescribe a particular form for orders of authorisation. That leaves open questions about whether an oral resolution, a minute, a Hansard entry, or a written order suffices. Such ambiguity increases litigation risk over admissibility and sufficiency of proof. Best practice therefore requires formal, contemporaneous written records.

No express mechanism for delegation. The Act names specific clerks. It does not provide a statutory mechanism for delegating the publication function to other officers or to private providers. If the Clerk wishes to delegate publication tasks operationally, the legal basis for that delegation and whether it preserves the statutory defence is not addressed in the Act and must be considered in light of the Houses’ own powers and administrative law.

Taken together, these “gotchas” show that the Act supplies a targeted legal protection but relies on precise authorisations, clarity in orders, careful record-keeping and attention to overlapping legal regimes such as defamation and parliamentary privilege.

Compliance under the Act requires attention to authorisation, documentation, actor eligibility, order content, and the interaction with defamation and privilege regimes. The Act sets out what must be proven to obtain the defence and what restrictions parliament may impose; the following steps are grounded in the Act’s text.

1. Ensure a clear, recorded authorising order before publication. Section 4 gives the legal power to either House, a joint sitting or a Committee to authorise publication. Because s 6 makes the statutory defence contingent on proof of authorisation, those bodies should adopt a practice of making express, contemporaneous, written authorisations (for example, recorded in minutes, orders, or Hansard entries) that identify the material to be published, the scope of the publication and any restrictions. Explicit wording will reduce disputes about whether “contrary intention” appears (s 5(1)).

2. Use only the named relevant persons to publish unless the order expressly provides otherwise. Section 5(3) limits “relevant person” to named clerks and deputies. To preserve the Act’s defence, publishing should be done by one of those officers or by a mechanism that establishes the work was done under their authority. If operational realities require outsourcing publication tasks (for example to a web hosting provider), ensure the authorising order records delegation and that the Clerk retains and documents legal authority over the publication.

3. Check orders for “contrary intention” and comply strictly with any limitations. Section 5(1) permits orders to specify contrary intention. Before any publication, clerks must check the authorising order for limitations (redaction requirements, embargoes, confidentiality clauses) and apply them. Non-compliance may result in the publication being unauthorised and the s 6 defence being unavailable.

4. Keep documentary evidence demonstrating authorisation and the act of publication. Because the defendant must prove authorisation (s 6), preserve the order, internal instructions, publication logs, timestamps, and any server or website records showing the Clerk’s role in publishing. For website publication under s 9, archives or snapshots demonstrating the Clerk’s publication will be useful to establish the document was “taken to be printed by, or by the authority of, the Clerk” (s 9(2)).

5. Treat Clerk website publication as equivalent to printing by authority, but manage third-party republication separately. Section 9 authorises the Clerk to publish on the NSW Parliament website and declares such publication to be printed by authority (s 9(1)-(2)). This means the Clerk’s website publications occupy the legal status accorded to printed parliamentary papers. However, third-party republication or dissemination beyond the official site does not automatically gain that status; manage licences, take-downs and republication policies with this limitation in mind.

6. Manage defamation risk independently of the Act. Section 7 states the Act does not provide or affect a defence to defamation proceedings. Do not assume that authorisation under this Act immunises publishers from defamation actions. Before publication, conduct defamation/privacy/legal vetting where necessary and apply editorial checks consistent with defamation law and any applicable absolute or qualified privileges found in other statutes.

7. Coordinate with Houses’ standing orders and privileges offices. Section 8 preserves parliamentary powers and privileges. Ensure the publication process accords with the Houses’ standing orders, privilege advice and any internal rules on sensitive material, confidentiality, or parliamentary procedure. Where privilege implications exist, consult parliamentary counsel or the privileges committee.

8. Where retrospective issues arise, document the legal status of past publications. Section 9(3) extends website publication treatment to prior actions. If litigation involves past publications, compile contemporaneous records, evidence of Clerk publication and parliamentary orders to demonstrate the legal character of the published material.

9. Standardise form and content of authorising orders. Because the Act gives no prescribed form, adopt a template order that identifies the document/evidence, names the relevant person authorised to publish, specifies the permitted modes of publication (including website and printed copies), records any embargo or limitation, and documents the date and House/Committee resolution number. That reduces ambiguity and aids proof in litigation (s 4, s 5 and s 6).

10. Train clerks and publishing staff on the Act’s limits. Educate those who operate the Parliament’s publication systems about the narrow list of “relevant persons,” the need to check orders for contrary intention, and the requirement to retain proof of authorisation. Procedural checklists will minimise the risk of unauthorised publication.

These compliance steps follow directly from the Act’s operative provisions: obtain explicit authorisation (s 4), ensure publication is by a relevant person and not inconsistent with the order (s 5(1), s 5(3)), document proof to satisfy the s 6 defence, and treat website publication by the Clerk as printed by authority under s 9 while remaining mindful that defamation liability remains governed outside this Act (s 7).