The Act’s reach is deliberately broad. The definition of “occupier of premises” in s 2 is functional rather than proprietary: it means any “person occupying or having control of land or other premises.” Ownership is irrelevant; a tenant in possession, a property manager, a school that hires a hall, or a shopping-centre operator can all be occupiers. “Premises” is defined inclusively to cover any fixed or movable structure, vessel, vehicle or aircraft. The duty is therefore capable of applying to slips on supermarket floors, injuries on construction sites, accidents aboard ferries, and damage to goods stored in a warehouse.

The class of persons to whom the duty is owed is equally wide: “a person entering on the premises.” No distinction is drawn in the primary duty between invitees, licensees, contractual entrants or even trespassers, although the content of the duty is reduced for the last two categories by ss 5(2) and 5(3). Children are expressly brought into account through the factors in s 5(4)(e) and (f), reflecting the common-law insight that a child’s age and capacity to appreciate danger are relevant to the reasonableness of the occupier’s response.

Landlords are affected in their capacity as repairers rather than as occupiers. Section 9(1) imposes the statutory duty on a landlord who is responsible under the tenancy agreement for maintenance or repair. The duty extends to “any persons who may from time to time be on the premises,” including visitors to the tenant, passers-by on common property, and, where a sub-tenancy exists, persons on the sub-let premises (s 9(2)). The Crown is bound (s 3), so government departments that manage parks, public buildings, or leased premises are subject to the same obligations.

Independent contractors engaged by occupiers are indirectly affected: while the occupier may escape liability for their negligence if the conditions in s 6(1) are satisfied, the contractor remains liable in their own right, and s 6(2) preserves any direct statutory liabilities that the occupier may still bear.

Finally, insurers, litigators and claims managers are practical addressees. Because the Act works in tandem with the 1947 Law Reform Act, every personal-injury or property-damage claim arising on premises must now be analysed through the lens of the statutory reasonableness standard, contributory negligence, and contribution.

The central duty is that of the occupier under s 5(1): to take reasonable care in all the circumstances to avoid injury or damage from dangers arising from the state of the premises or from the occupier’s acts or omissions. This is a duty of care, not a warranty of safety. The standard is objective and contextual, informed by the seven factors in s 5(4). An occupier who knows that children are likely to enter (s 5(4)(d) and (e)) and who is aware of an unfenced swimming pool will face a heavier burden of elimination or warning than an occupier dealing with adult visitors on industrial land.

The entrant’s rights are correlative. A lawful visitor who suffers injury because the occupier failed to take reasonable care may sue in tort for damages. The Act does not create a new cause of action; it merely prescribes the content of the duty that the common law would otherwise impose. Rights are, however, qualified. A visitor who has “willingly assumed” the risk is limited to the residual protection against deliberate harm or reckless disregard (s 5(2)). The phrase “willingly assumed” is not further defined, leaving scope for argument about whether knowledge of the risk plus entry is sufficient, or whether a subjective acceptance of the legal risk is also required. A person committing an imprisonable offence is statutorily deprived of the full duty (s 5(3)), reflecting a legislative policy that unlawful presence for criminal purposes should not attract ordinary negligence protection.

Landlords’ duties under s 9 mirror the occupier’s duty but are limited to dangers “arising from any failure on [the landlord’s] part in carrying out his responsibilities of maintenance and repair.” The duty is owed to all persons who may lawfully be on the premises, not merely the tenant. Section 9(3) makes clear that the statutory duty is additional to any duties arising at common law or under the tenancy agreement itself.

Occupiers retain the right to modify the duty by agreement or otherwise (s 5(1)), but s 7 prevents them from doing so through contracts to which the injured person is not a party. Thus a clause in a lease between landlord and tenant cannot exclude the landlord’s s 9 duty to the tenant’s visitors. The preservation of higher obligations in s 8 means that an occupier who is also a common carrier cannot rely on the Act to reduce the strict liability that carrier law would otherwise impose.

The Act gives occupiers a limited defence under s 6 where damage is caused by an independent contractor, provided both selection/supervision and the decision to engage the contractor were reasonable. This is a right of practical importance to property owners who regularly outsource maintenance.

The Act creates no criminal offences and imposes no fines. Enforcement is entirely through civil claims for damages. A breach of the statutory duty is actionable as the tort of negligence, with the content of the duty supplied by the Act. Because s 10 applies the 1947 Law Reform Act, damages may be reduced for contributory negligence and an occupier found liable may seek contribution from other tortfeasors.

The quantum of damages is governed by ordinary personal-injury or property-damage principles. Courts assess whether the occupier discharged the s 5(1) duty by reference to the s 5(4) factors, making each case intensely factual. The residual duty under s 5(2) is narrower; a plaintiff must prove either deliberate intent to harm or reckless disregard of presence. Reckless disregard is a high threshold, requiring conscious appreciation of the risk coupled with indifference to it.

Limitation periods are those applicable to tort claims generally. The retrospective operation of ss 7(2) and 9(4) means that pre-1985 contracts and tenancies are caught, but only in respect of causes of action arising after commencement.

The Act is expressly designed to sit alongside, and in some cases to yield to, other legislation and common-law doctrines. Section 4(1) displaces only the common-law rules of care; the rules that identify the occupier remain (s 4(2)). Section 8(1) preserves “any duty to show a higher standard of care” imposed by any other enactment or rule of law, expressly mentioning common carriers and bailees. Section 8(2) ensures that nothing in the Act disturbs the law of master and servant.

The Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act 1947 is applied without modification (s 10), so apportionment of liability operates exactly as it would in any other negligence claim. The Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), enacted later, must be read with the 1985 Act; provisions limiting liability for recreational activities or obvious risks may overlap with the “willingly assumed” concept in s 5(2), although the 1985 Act’s specific language prevails where inconsistency arises.

In the landlord–tenant context, the Act interacts with the Residential Tenancies Act 1987 and the Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) Agreements Act 1985. A landlord’s covenant to repair in a lease will trigger the s 9 duty, but the content of that duty remains the reasonableness standard of the 1985 Act.

For public authorities, the Civil Liability Act 2002 ss 5AA–5AB (principles concerning resources and policy decisions) may modify the s 5(4)(g) “burden on the occupier” factor when the occupier is the State or a local government.

The compilation table reveals no amendments to the substantive provisions since royal assent on 28 October 1985 and commencement on 25 November 1985. Reprint 2 (8 May 2015) is a pure compilation; no provisions have been added, repealed or rewritten. The legislative choice to leave the Act untouched for almost four decades reflects satisfaction with the balance struck in 1985: a general reasonableness test that courts can apply flexibly, coupled with targeted reductions of duty for voluntary risk-takers and criminal entrants. The absence of change also indicates that the seven-factor checklist in s 5(4) has proved sufficiently comprehensive to guide decision-making without generating calls for legislative correction.

Because the statute is expressed to operate “in place of the rules of the common law” yet leaves key concepts such as “willingly assumed,” “reckless disregard” and “reasonable in all the circumstances” undefined, courts have been required to supply meaning through interpretation. The text itself supplies the boundaries: s 5(2) draws a deliberate contrast between the full duty and the residual duty, indicating that Parliament intended a sharp reduction in protection once risk is willingly assumed. Similarly, s 5(3) uses the clear criterion of an offence “punishable by imprisonment,” avoiding any need to prove actual conviction and focusing instead on the entrant’s intention or conduct at the time.

Controversy has centred on the interaction between s 5(2) and the later Civil Liability Act provisions concerning obvious risks and dangerous recreational activities. The 1985 Act’s language is not overridden; a risk that is willingly assumed under s 5(2) triggers the residual duty regardless of whether it would also qualify as an “obvious risk” under the 2002 Act. Another textual tension arises from the non-exhaustive nature of the s 5(4) list. Courts must consider all seven factors but are not prevented from considering additional matters that the common law would have regarded as relevant to reasonableness.

Section 6’s defence for independent contractors has generated debate about the level of supervision required. The statute sets a reasonableness threshold; what is reasonable for a one-off roofing repair may be insufficient for ongoing building-maintenance contracts. The text supplies the test but leaves its application to evidence of industry practice and the particular risk.

The landlord duty in s 9 has raised questions about the precise moment at which a landlord “fails” to carry out responsibilities. The Act ties the duty to “any failure on his part in carrying out his responsibilities of maintenance and repair,” suggesting that a landlord who has been put on notice of a defect and fails to act within a reasonable time will breach the duty. The provision applies to both head landlords and superior landlords in sub-tenancy situations (s 9(2)), expanding the class of potential defendants beyond the immediate lessor.

Most practitioners assume that once an occupier erects a prominent warning sign the duty is discharged. The Act contains no such bright-line rule. A sign is merely one factor to be weighed under s 5(4); its adequacy depends on the gravity of the danger, the age and capacity of likely entrants, and whether the sign actually enables the entrant to avoid the danger. A warning that would suffice for adults may be inadequate for children.

Another common misconception is that criminal trespassers are entirely outside the Act’s protection. Section 5(3) does not extinguish all duty; it limits the entrant to the residual protection against deliberate harm or reckless disregard. An occupier who sets a man-trap or knowingly leaves an electrified fence live may still be liable.

Section 6 is frequently misread as a complete shield for outsourced work. The defence operates only “where the damage is due to the negligence of an independent contractor” and both selection/supervision and the decision to outsource were reasonable. If the occupier retains control over the method of work or fails to pass on critical safety information, the defence is lost. Moreover, s 6(2) expressly preserves liabilities imposed by other statutes; for example, duties under the Mines Safety and Inspection Act 1994 or the Occupational Safety and Health Act 1984 are not abrogated.

Landlords often believe that delegating repair obligations to a managing agent removes their s 9 exposure. The statute imposes the duty directly on the landlord who is responsible under the tenancy; delegation may satisfy the reasonableness inquiry but does not transfer the statutory duty itself.

The retrospective application of ss 7(2) and 9(4) catches pre-1985 leases and contracts. A landlord relying on an exclusion clause drafted in 1980 may be surprised to learn that the clause cannot restrict the s 9 duty owed to visitors who were never parties to the lease.

Finally, the Act’s definition of “occupier” focuses on control, not title. A mortgagee in possession, a liquidator, or a receiver can become an occupier overnight. Insurance policies that name only the registered proprietor may leave gaps.

Compliance begins with a risk assessment that mirrors the s 5(4) factors. Identify likely entrants (age, knowledge, frequency of entry), catalogue hazards (gravity and likelihood of injury), and evaluate the cost and practicality of elimination or protection. Document the assessment; courts treat a documented, periodically reviewed risk register as powerful evidence that the occupier turned their mind to the statutory criteria.

For commercial premises, install and maintain signage that is specific, visible and proportionate to the risk. A generic “slippery when wet” sign may be insufficient if the floor is known to become dangerously slippery after rain. Where children are regularly present (schools, playgrounds, shopping centres), additional physical barriers or constant supervision may be required.

Independent contractors should be selected on the basis of demonstrated competence, appropriate insurance and safety systems. Written contracts should require the contractor to comply with the occupier’s safety policies and to report hazards. Supervision need not be constant but must be sufficient to detect obvious departures from safe practice. Critical safety information that the occupier alone possesses must be passed on.

Landlords required to maintain or repair must establish a prompt inspection and repair protocol. Records of tenant complaints, inspection reports and repair work should be retained. If a defect is reported, act within a time that is reasonable having regard to the gravity of the risk; delay that a court later finds unreasonable will breach s 9.

Occupiers who wish to modify the duty should do so by direct agreement with the persons likely to be affected (for example, through signed waivers for adventure activities) rather than by third-party contracts that s 7 would render ineffective. Any waiver must be clear, voluntary and brought to the entrant’s attention before entry.

Public authorities should integrate the s 5(4)(g) “burden versus risk” analysis into budgetary decision-making. While resource constraints are relevant, they do not grant immunity; the statute requires a balancing exercise, not an absolute priority for other expenditures.

Finally, claims handling should recognise that the Act works seamlessly with the 1947 Law Reform Act. Early identification of any contributory negligence (failure to heed warnings, obvious intoxication, deliberate criminal entry) allows accurate apportionment and reduces ultimate exposure. Regular legal audit of premises, especially those open to the public or let to tenants, remains the most effective long-term compliance strategy.