41Meaning of legitimate purpose

#### 41 Meaning of legitimate purpose (1) For the purposes of this Part, each of the following is a legitimate purpose for an entity to handle a security‑sensitive biological agent: (a) to carry out scientific or medical work with the security‑sensitive biological agent: (i) to develop or produce a vaccine or treatment for it; or (ii) to better understand a disease it causes; (b) in relation to a security‑sensitive biological agent that is a toxin—to carry out scientific or medical work in relation to the applications of the toxin (for example, in treating cancer or, in the case of Botox (botulinum toxin), for medical or cosmetic use); (c) to carry out diagnostic analysis of: (i) samples infected with a security‑sensitive biological agent; or (ii) samples contaminated with a toxin; but only if the analysis is carried out at a veterinary, diagnostic or pathology laboratory; (d) to carry out research that the Director‑General of the CDC considers is responsible and legitimate; (e) to carry out forensic procedures in relation to the security‑sensitive biological agent for law enforcement purposes; (f) if the entity is an agency or instrumentality of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory that is responsible for testing or carrying out other activities in relation to the security‑sensitive biological agent—to carry out that testing or those other activities in relation to the security‑sensitive biological agent; (g) any other purpose determined by the Minister, by legislative instrument, to be a legitimate purpose. (2) The Director‑General of the CDC must consult with persons with scientific or technical knowledge in relation to security‑sensitive biological agents before making a decision under paragraph (1)(d). The Director‑General must have regard to any advice given by the persons consulted. (3) Subsection (2) does not prevent the Director‑General of the CDC from consulting any other person who the Director‑General considers may assist the Director‑General in making a decision under paragraph (1)(d). (4) The Minister must not make a determination under paragraph (1)(g) unless the Minister has consulted with: (a) persons with scientific or technical knowledge in relation to security‑sensitive biological agents; and (b) the States, the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory. (5) Subsection (4) does not prevent the Minister from consulting any other person who the Minister considers may assist the Minister in relation to a determination under paragraph (1)(g). (6) The Minister must have regard to any advice received under subsection (4).