Creates a statutory office called the Solicitor‑General of the Commonwealth and declares that person the "second Law Officer" (s5).
Sets how the Solicitor‑General is appointed: by the Governor‑General for a term up to 7 years (re‑appointment allowed), subject to eligibility (at least 5 years’ standing as a barrister or solicitor of the High Court or a State Supreme Court) and such terms as the Governor‑General determines (s6).
Provides for pay and allowances determined by the Remuneration Tribunal and prescribed allowances, and makes pay and leave subject to related Commonwealth laws (ss7, 7A).
Limits outside paid work: the Solicitor‑General cannot practise as a barrister or solicitor or take paid employment except while performing official duties or with the Attorney‑General’s consent; if consent to outside practice is given the Attorney‑General must lay written reasons before each House of Parliament within 15 sitting days (s9).
Lists grounds for removal (incapacity except for short illness, misbehaviour, bankruptcy/insolvency) and gives the Governor‑General power to remove (s10). The Solicitor‑General may resign by written notice to the Governor‑General (s8).
Allows the Governor‑General to appoint an acting Solicitor‑General during vacancy, absence or inability to perform, subject to eligibility (s11).
Specifies the Solicitor‑General’s functions: to act as counsel for the Crown, the Commonwealth, Commonwealth ministers and officers, Territory bodies or persons for whom the Attorney‑General requests representation; to give legal opinions to the Attorney‑General on referred questions of law; and to perform other counsel functions requested by the Attorney‑General (s12).
The Law Officers Act 1964 is the foundational statute that statutorily establishes the office of Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth and comprehensively regulates the terms and conditions under which that office is held. At its core, s 5 declares that there “shall be a Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth, who shall be the second Law Officer of the Commonwealth.” This statutory creation elevates the role beyond mere administrative arrangement into a distinct statutory office with defined functions, tenure, remuneration, ethical constraints, removal grounds and pension entitlements.
Section 6 governs appointment. The Governor-General appoints the Solicitor-General for a period not exceeding seven years, with eligibility for re-appointment. Eligibility is confined to persons who are or have been a barrister or solicitor of the High Court or of a Supreme Court of a State for not less than five years’ standing (s 6(2)). The appointee holds office on terms and conditions determined by the Governor-General, subject to the Act (s 6(3)).
Remuneration is dealt with in s 7. The Solicitor-General receives remuneration determined by the Remuneration Tribunal and prescribed allowances, with the section expressly subject to the Remuneration Tribunal Act 1973 and s 7 of the Judicial and Statutory Officers (Remuneration and Allowances) Act 1984. Section 7A further subordinates ss 6 and 7 to the Long Service Leave (Commonwealth Employees) Act 1976, ensuring long-service leave entitlements are not displaced by the general appointment and remuneration provisions.
Resignation is straightforward: the Solicitor-General may resign by signed notice to the Governor-General (s 8). Vacation of office is compulsory in defined circumstances. Under s 10 the Governor-General must remove the Solicitor-General if he or she becomes incapable of performing the duties (except temporary illness), is guilty of misbehaviour, or becomes bankrupt or takes statutory debt-relief steps.
Current sections
Direct links to the current provisions in Law Officers Act 1964.
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Sourced from the Federal Register of Legislation (legislation.gov.au), CC BY 4.0.
Confirms the Solicitor‑General’s entitlement to practise as a barrister and to the rights and privileges of a barrister in federal, State and Territory courts and tribunals when acting in official capacity (s13).
Sets how superannuation and pension arrangements interact with existing judicial and public service schemes: a sitting Commonwealth officer who becomes Solicitor‑General is treated specially in relation to the Judges’ Pensions Act and various superannuation Acts; the Act permits a Solicitor‑General to elect to come within the Judges’ Pensions Act subject to time limits and procedural requirements (s14). Detailed pension rules (including a 1997 cut‑off and a formula for calculating an "appropriate current salary") apply to persons who served as Solicitor‑General (s16). Pensions under the Act are payable from the Consolidated Revenue Fund (s16(13)).
Authorises the Attorney‑General to delegate any of the Attorney‑General’s powers and functions (generally or as restricted by the instrument of delegation) to the Solicitor‑General or to the Secretary of the Attorney‑General’s Department, except the power of delegation itself; delegations are revocable at will and do not prevent the Attorney‑General from exercising the power personally. The section lists statutory exceptions to delegation (notably certain ASIO and interception powers) (s17).
States that, at commencement, existing references in Commonwealth or Territory laws to the Solicitor‑General are to be read as references to the Secretary of the Attorney‑General’s Department (s18).
Enables the Governor‑General to make regulations to carry the Act into effect (s19).
Who pays, who decides, and what changes in behaviour
Who pays: remuneration is set by the Remuneration Tribunal and allowances are prescribed (s7); pensions under the Act are paid from the Consolidated Revenue Fund (s16(13)). Superannuation consequences depend on prior membership of Commonwealth superannuation schemes (s14).
Who decides: the Governor‑General appoints and removes and sets the appointment term (s6, s10); the Attorney‑General controls delegation of legal work to the Solicitor‑General, may consent to the Solicitor‑General’s outside practice (s9, s12, s17), and certifies disability for pension purposes (s16(6)).
Behavioural changes enforced by the Act: the officeholder is restricted from private practice without AG consent (s9); the Solicitor‑General is made the authorised counsel for specified Commonwealth and Territory interests and must provide opinions and such other counsel functions as the Attorney‑General requests (s12); the Attorney‑General can shift legal work by delegation (s17); pre‑existing statutory references to the Solicitor‑General are, at the Act’s commencement, read as references to the Secretary of the Attorney‑General’s Department (s18).
Implementation, incentives and trade‑offs to note (source‑grounded)
Concentrated benefits and fiscal cost: the office provides a single, high‑status legal post with statutory pay and pension entitlements; pension liabilities created by s16 are explicit and charged to the Consolidated Revenue Fund (s16(13)). That concentrates direct benefit on the officeholder while distributing cost across public finances.
Administrative and compliance burdens: pension and superannuation interactions require specific elections and time limits (for example, the 3‑month election window in s14(2A)); the pension rules in s16 are detailed, include a dated salary formula and certification pathways for disability and age, and allow Administrative Review Tribunal review of certain refusals (s16(9), (11), (11A)).
Executive discretion and transparency: the Attorney‑General has broad discretion to delegate powers and to permit the Solicitor‑General to undertake private practice; the Act attaches a transparency requirement to consent for outside practice (a written statement of reasons to each House within 15 sitting days) (s9(2)). Delegations are revocable at will (s17(5)), and s17 lists statutory limits to delegations (s17(6)).
Possible substitution effects and role mapping: by prescribing that pre‑existing statutory references to the Solicitor‑General be read as references to the Secretary of the Attorney‑General’s Department at commencement, the Act alters (for legal interpretation) who those pre‑Act provisions point to in practice; that may shift which office or official performs certain functions unless later statutes or administrative arrangements replace that mapping (s18).
Limits on private market participation: the officeholder is barred from paid private legal practice except with AG consent (s9). That reduces direct participation of the Solicitor‑General in the private legal market unless the Attorney‑General allows it.
Risk and trade‑off summary: the Act centralises legal functions and discretion in constitutional offices (Governor‑General, Attorney‑General, Solicitor‑General) and creates administrative obligations and fiscal entitlements. The key trade‑offs are between executive control and legal capacity (delegation), between individual entitlements and public cost (remuneration and pensions), and between preventing conflicts of interest and enabling the officeholder’s broader professional engagement (restriction on outside practice with an AG consent mechanism) (ss6, 7, 9, 16, 17).
Acting appointments are authorised by s 11. The Governor-General may appoint an eligible person to act during a vacancy or during any period the Solicitor-General is absent from duty or from Australia or is otherwise unable to perform the functions. The note to s 11(1) expressly imports the standard acting-appointment rules in s 33A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901.
The substantive functions of the office are set out in s 12. The Solicitor-General is to act as counsel for the Crown in right of the Commonwealth, the Commonwealth itself, persons suing or being sued on behalf of the Commonwealth, Ministers, Commonwealth officers, holders of offices under Commonwealth or Territory laws, bodies established by such laws, and any other person or body at the request of the Attorney-General. The Solicitor-General must also furnish opinions on questions of law referred by the Attorney-General and carry out other functions ordinarily performed by counsel as requested by the Attorney-General.
Section 13 confers explicit rights of audience and privileges. In his or her official capacity the Solicitor-General is entitled to practise as a barrister in any federal court, State or Territory court, or tribunal of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory, and enjoys all the rights and privileges of a barrister in those forums, whether or not otherwise entitled.
Ethical constraints appear in s 9. Except in the performance of official duties or with the Attorney-General’s consent, the Solicitor-General must not engage in barrister or solicitor practice or paid employment. Where consent is given, the Attorney-General must lay a written statement of reasons before each House of Parliament within 15 sitting days.
Pension arrangements are the most intricate part of the Act and occupy the bulk of s 16. The section does not apply to persons appointed after 31 December 1997 (s 16(1AA)). For earlier appointees, the Judges’ Pensions Act 1968 (other than subsection 4(2)) applies to a person who is or has been Solicitor-General as if he or she were a Judge and as if service as Solicitor-General were judicial service (s 16(1)). Detailed rules govern the interaction with subsequent judicial appointment (s 16(2)), cessation of judicial pensions upon appointment as Solicitor-General (s 16(3)), and a fallback discounted-pension regime for persons with at least seven years’ service who cease office otherwise than for misbehaviour and are not otherwise entitled to a pension (ss 16(4)–(9)). The “relevant discounted rate of pension” is defined by a formula that takes the lesser of 0.5 per cent of the appropriate current salary per completed month of service or 60 per cent of that salary, then reduced by 2.5 per cent for each whole year between cessation and the relevant triggering event (disability, death or age 60) (s 16(5)). The “appropriate current salary” is itself calculated by a statutory formula in s 16(11A) that scales the Solicitor-General’s 1997 salary by the ratio of current Federal Court (non-Chief Justice) judicial salary to the 1997 judicial salary.
Section 14 deals with the situation where a Commonwealth officer who is already a member of one of the Commonwealth superannuation schemes is appointed Solicitor-General. The Judges’ Pensions Act 1968 does not apply unless the appointee elects within three months to cease superannuation membership, in which case the Judges’ Pensions Act is taken to have applied from the moment of appointment and the person is taken to have left the earlier scheme immediately before appointment.
Delegation powers are conferred on the Attorney-General by s 17. The Attorney-General may delegate any of his or her powers or functions under Commonwealth or Territory laws (except the power of delegation itself) to the Solicitor-General or to the Secretary of the Attorney-General’s Department. Delegations are revocable, do not prevent the Attorney-General from exercising the power personally, and may coexist. Certain national-security and telecommunications-interception powers are excluded from delegation.
Transitional and interpretive provisions complete the scheme. Section 4 defines “Solicitor-General” and extends the term in certain sections to include acting Solicitors-General. Section 18 provides that pre-commencement references in other laws to the Solicitor-General are to be read as references to the Secretary of the Attorney-General’s Department. Regulation-making power is conferred by s 19.
Collectively the Act therefore does three things: it creates a statutory office with defined tenure and ethical walls; it assigns high-level representational, advisory and counsel functions to that office; and it overlays a sophisticated remuneration, superannuation-election and pension architecture that links the Solicitor-General’s entitlements to those of federal judges while preserving compatibility with broader Commonwealth employment law.
Who it affects
The Law Officers Act 1964 directly affects a narrow but constitutionally and practically significant class of persons. First, it governs every person who holds or has held the office of Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth since the Act’s commencement. This includes both substantive appointees and persons appointed to act under s 11.
Second, the Act affects the Governor-General, who is the formal appointing authority (s 6), the authority who must remove the Solicitor-General in the circumstances listed in s 10, and the authority who makes acting appointments (s 11). In practice these powers are exercised on ministerial advice, but the statute places the legal acts in the Governor-General’s hands.
Third, the Attorney-General is both a beneficiary and a duty-holder under the Act. The Attorney-General receives the Solicitor-General’s opinions (s 12(b)), may request the Solicitor-General to act for additional persons or bodies (s 12(a)(viii)), may consent to the Solicitor-General undertaking outside practice (s 9(1)) and must table statements of reasons for such consent (s 9(2)). The Attorney-General is also the repository of certification functions concerning permanent disability or infirmity (s 16(6), (9)), may delegate powers to the Solicitor-General or the Departmental Secretary (s 17), and is the respondent to Administrative Review Tribunal applications arising from refusal of a disability certificate (s 16(11)).
Fourth, a range of Commonwealth entities and individuals are entitled to the Solicitor-General’s services as counsel. These include the Crown in right of the Commonwealth, the Commonwealth itself, Ministers, Commonwealth officers, persons suing or being sued on behalf of the Commonwealth, office-holders under Commonwealth or Territory legislation, and statutory bodies (s 12(a)).
Fifth, the Act affects the superannuation and pension administrators who must apply the Judges’ Pensions Act 1968, the Superannuation Act 1976, the Superannuation Act 1990 and the Superannuation Act 2005 in the manner modified by ss 14 and 16. The Consolidated Revenue Fund is directly appropriated for the payment of pensions arising under s 16(13).
Sixth, the Parliament is affected by the mandatory tabling obligation in s 9(2) and by the fact that the Act itself can only be amended by further legislation.
Finally, the Administrative Review Tribunal is given jurisdiction to review refusals by the Attorney-General to issue a disability certificate under s 16(6) (s 16(11)). Thus the Act reaches beyond the executive to the merits-review machinery of the Commonwealth.
Key duties and rights
The Solicitor-General’s duties are exhaustively stated in s 12. The primary duty is to act as counsel for the enumerated Commonwealth parties and for any additional party or body at the request of the Attorney-General. This is not a mere permission; it is expressed as one of the “functions of the Solicitor-General.” The second function is to furnish opinions on questions of law referred by the Attorney-General. The third is open-ended: to carry out such other functions ordinarily performed by counsel as the Attorney-General requests. These functions are performed in the Solicitor-General’s official capacity and attract the rights and privileges of a barrister in every Australian court and tribunal (s 13), even if the Solicitor-General would not otherwise be entitled to appear in a particular jurisdiction.
The Solicitor-General also has a negative duty under s 9(1): except when performing official duties or with the Attorney-General’s consent, the Solicitor-General “shall not engage in the practice of a barrister or solicitor or engage in paid employment.” The consent power is conditioned by a transparency obligation: the Attorney-General must lay before each House a statement of reasons within 15 sitting days.
Rights conferred on the Solicitor-General include the right to receive Remuneration Tribunal-determined remuneration and prescribed allowances (s 7), the right to resign by signed notice (s 8), the right (subject to eligibility) to be considered for re-appointment (s 6(1)), and the right to long-service leave under the Long Service Leave (Commonwealth Employees) Act 1976 (s 7A). Where the statutory pension regime applies, the Solicitor-General has rights to a pension calculated in accordance with the modified Judges’ Pensions Act 1968, including the discounted-rate pathways in s 16(6)–(8) and the right to apply for a disability certificate (s 16(9)).
An acting Solicitor-General has the same functions and entitlements while acting (s 4(2) and s 11). A person who was a Commonwealth superannuation member immediately before appointment holds the right to elect, within three months, to move into the judicial-pension regime (s 14(2)).
The Attorney-General’s rights include the right to refer legal questions, to request additional counsel work, to grant or withhold consent to outside practice, to delegate powers (subject to the exclusions in s 17(6)), and to issue (or refuse to issue) disability certificates.
Penalties and enforcement
The Act does not create criminal offences or civil penalty provisions. Enforcement is essentially internal to the executive and parliamentary processes. The principal sanction is compulsory removal from office under s 10. If any of the three grounds—incapacity (other than temporary illness), misbehaviour, or bankruptcy/insolvency steps—is satisfied, the Governor-General “shall” remove the Solicitor-General. The mandatory language removes discretion once a ground is established.
Misbehaviour is not defined in the Act. The statute simply uses the word, leaving its content to be informed by the common-law understanding applicable to other constitutional officers, although the Act itself supplies no further elaboration.
The pension regime contains indirect sanctions. A person who ceases office under s 10(b) (misbehaviour) is excluded from the fallback discounted-pension regime in s 16(4)(b). Similarly, certain elections and cessations of prior pensions operate automatically on the occurrence of defined events (ss 14(2B), 16(2)(a), 16(3), 16(4A)).
Transparency enforcement is achieved through the parliamentary tabling requirement in s 9(2). Failure to table would constitute a breach of the statute, although the Act does not specify a consequence. The delegation provisions in s 17 are enforceable through ordinary administrative-law remedies; a purported delegation of an excluded national-security power would be ultra vires.
Review by the Administrative Review Tribunal of a refusal to issue a disability certificate (s 16(11)) provides a limited external check on the Attorney-General’s exercise of that particular power. Otherwise, enforcement of the Act’s requirements relies on political accountability, parliamentary scrutiny, and the capacity of the Governor-General (on advice) to act where statutory preconditions are met.
How it interacts with other laws
The Law Officers Act 1964 is deliberately woven into a web of other Commonwealth statutes. The most prominent interaction is with the Judges’ Pensions Act 1968. Section 16(1) applies most of that Act to Solicitors-General (with the explicit exclusion of subsection 4(2)) as if the Solicitor-General were a Judge. Sections 16(2)–(10) then modify the application of that Act in specific scenarios, including aggregation of service, cessation of pensions, and the substitution of discounted rates. The definition of “relevant provisions of the Judges’ Pensions Act 1968” in s 16(12) and the incorporation of the statutory salary-ratio formula in s 16(11A) further integrate the two statutes.
Superannuation legislation is engaged by s 14 and by the pension cessation rules. A pre-appointment member of the CSS, PSS or PSSAP schemes may elect to exit those schemes and enter the judicial-pension regime. The timing and effect of that election are deemed to occur immediately before appointment (s 14(2B)(b)).
The Remuneration Tribunal Act 1973 and s 7 of the Judicial and Statutory Officers (Remuneration and Allowances) Act 1984 are expressly preserved by s 7(3). Long service leave is preserved by s 7A’s subordination of ss 6 and 7 to the Long Service Leave (Commonwealth Employees) Act 1976.
The Acts Interpretation Act 1901 is imported for acting-appointment rules via the note to s 11(1). The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (other than subsections 34JE(3) and (4)) and the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 are carved out of the Attorney-General’s delegation power (s 17(6)).
Section 18 contains an express transitional rule for references in other Commonwealth or Territory laws that were in force at the commencement of the 1964 Act: such references to the Solicitor-General are taken to mean the Secretary of the Attorney-General’s Department. This prevents unintended disruption to pre-existing statutory references.
The regulation-making power in s 19 is limited to matters required or permitted by the Act or necessary or convenient to carry it into effect, and regulations must not be inconsistent with the Act.
Recent changes and why
Although the supplied text is a compilation, it reveals several layers of amendment. The insertion of s 7A subjects appointment and remuneration to the Long Service Leave (Commonwealth Employees) Act 1976, reflecting the policy of aligning statutory office holders with general Commonwealth employment standards.
The addition of s 14 and the extensive amendments to s 16 address the interaction between the Solicitor-General’s office and the successive Commonwealth superannuation schemes (1976, 1990 and 2005 Acts). These changes allow an incoming Solicitor-General who is already a scheme member to choose whether to remain in that scheme or move to the judicial-pension regime. The three-month election window and the “taken to have ceased” deeming rules were introduced to provide certainty and to prevent double-dipping.
The post-31 December 1997 cut-off in s 16(1AA) and the salary-ratio formula in s 16(11A) are clearly later additions. The formula ties the Solicitor-General’s notional salary to movements in Federal Court judicial salaries since 1997, ensuring pensions keep pace with judicial remuneration without the need for separate annual determinations. The detailed discounted-rate mechanism in s 16(5)–(8) and the Administrative Review Tribunal review right in s 16(11) further modernise the pension pathway for long-serving Solicitors-General who do not qualify for a full judicial-style pension.
Section 17(6) exclusions for ASIO and telecommunications-interception powers reflect post-1979 policy decisions to keep sensitive national-security delegations within the Attorney-General’s personal control rather than allowing routine sub-delegation to the Solicitor-General.
These changes collectively respond to three pressures: (1) the need to maintain parity between the Solicitor-General and the federal judiciary in pension and remuneration matters; (2) the evolution of Commonwealth superannuation from a single scheme to a choice-of-funds model; and (3) the growth of national-security legislation that Parliament has chosen to insulate from delegation.
Court challenges and controversies
The text of the Law Officers Act 1964 itself contains no reference to any specific court challenges or decided cases. The statute does, however, anticipate certain points of legal tension. The undefined term “misbehaviour” in s 10(b) is left to be interpreted according to constitutional doctrine applicable to removal of other officers, although the Act supplies no gloss. The compulsory language of s 10 (“shall remove”) raises questions about whether the Governor-General retains any residual discretion once a ground is factually established.
The pension provisions in s 16 have the potential to generate controversy around the calculation of the “appropriate current salary” under the statutory formula in s 16(11A). Because the formula relies on the salary payable to a non-Chief-Justice Federal Court judge at the calculation time, any dispute about what that salary actually is at a given moment could affect pension quantum.
The exclusion of certain national-security powers from delegation in s 17(6) reflects a legislative judgment that those powers are too sensitive for even the Solicitor-General to exercise. Any future attempt to test the boundaries of that exclusion could give rise to justiciable controversy.
The obligation in s 9(2) to table reasons for consent to outside practice invites parliamentary scrutiny and, potentially, political controversy if the reasons are thought inadequate. Because the Act provides no enforcement mechanism beyond tabling, the efficacy of this safeguard depends on parliamentary willingness to debate the statement.
The review right conferred on the Administrative Review Tribunal by s 16(11) is a relatively recent procedural innovation that brings the Attorney-General’s refusal to certify permanent disability or infirmity within merits-review oversight. Any exercise of that jurisdiction would necessarily require the Tribunal to examine medical and occupational evidence concerning the Solicitor-General’s capacity, which could itself become a matter of public controversy.
Overall the Act is drafted to minimise rather than invite litigation, relying instead on executive self-discipline, parliamentary oversight and the professional culture of the office.
Gotchas
Most practitioners assume the Solicitor-General is simply “the government’s senior barrister.” The statute reveals a more nuanced picture. The functions in s 12 are expressed as duties of the office rather than powers that may be declined; once the Attorney-General requests an opinion or representation, the Solicitor-General is statutorily required to provide it. The apparent breadth of s 12(a)(viii) (“any other person or body for whom the Attorney-General requests him or her to act”) is not unlimited; it must still be read with the constitutional role of the Solicitor-General and the implied limitation that the person or body must be one for whom the Commonwealth can properly provide legal services.
The interaction between s 14 and s 16 is a trap for new appointees. A Solicitor-General who was a PSSAP member and who fails to make the election within three months remains in the superannuation scheme and is permanently excluded from the Judges’ Pensions Act regime (s 14(1)). Conversely, an election irrevocably moves the person into the judicial-pension world from the moment of appointment.
The discounted-pension formula in s 16(5) is often misunderstood. The 0.5 per cent per month rate is not cumulative in the ordinary sense; the statute caps it at 60 per cent and then applies a further 2.5 per cent reduction for each year between cessation and the triggering event. The choice of the “lesser” of the two limbs can produce counter-intuitive outcomes for shorter-serving Solicitors-General.
Section 9(1) uses the phrase “engage in the practice of a barrister or solicitor or engage in paid employment.” The disjunctive drafting means that even unpaid work that could be characterised as “practice” might require consent. The parliamentary-tabling obligation is triggered by the giving of consent, not by the performance of the work, so timing is critical.
The note to s 11(1) importing s 33A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 is easily overlooked. That section imposes a suite of default rules about acting appointments (including maximum term, remuneration and validation) that apply unless the Law Officers Act displaces them. Because the Law Officers Act is largely silent on those mechanics, s 33A fills the gaps.
Finally, s 18 is not spent. It continues to operate on any pre-1964 law of a Territory (or any Commonwealth law that has not been amended) that still uses the old terminology. In obscure statutes or regulations that have escaped modernisation, a reference to “the Solicitor-General” may actually mean the Secretary of the Attorney-General’s Department.
How to comply
Compliance for a prospective Solicitor-General begins at the appointment stage. The candidate must confirm that he or she meets the five-year standing requirement in s 6(2). Upon appointment, an immediate audit of existing superannuation membership is required so that a considered election under s 14(2) can be made within the strict three-month window. The election notice must be in writing to the Minister.
While in office the Solicitor-General must maintain a strict separation between official functions and any outside activities. Any request for consent under s 9(1) should be documented in advance and should address why the proposed work will not impair the ability to perform statutory functions. If consent is granted, the Solicitor-General should diarise the 15-sitting-day tabling obligation that falls on the Attorney-General and offer drafting assistance if requested.
Day-to-day compliance centres on the functions in s 12. When asked to furnish an opinion, the Solicitor-General should ensure the request is recorded as coming from the Attorney-General personally or under delegated authority. When briefed to appear, the Solicitor-General should confirm that the client is within the classes listed in s 12(a) or has been properly added by Attorney-General request.
Remuneration and leave records should be kept in accordance with Remuneration Tribunal determinations, the Long Service Leave (Commonwealth Employees) Act 1976 and any terms and conditions determined under s 6(3). Any period of acting service should be tracked separately because it counts toward the seven-year threshold in s 16(4)(a).
For pension planning, the Solicitor-General (or former Solicitor-General) must monitor the triggers in s 16(6)–(8). An application for a disability certificate under s 16(9) should be supported by comprehensive medical evidence and should be lodged before age 60. If the certificate is refused, the applicant has 28 days (or such further time as the Tribunal allows) to seek Administrative Review Tribunal review.
The Attorney-General’s office must maintain delegation instruments that comply with s 17, expressly excluding the prohibited national-security and interception powers. Instruments should be reviewed whenever the Solicitor-General or Departmental Secretary changes.
Finally, any proposed amendment to the Act or to regulations made under s 19 must be checked for consistency with the core provisions, particularly the pension formula and the mandatory removal grounds. Because the Act appropriates the Consolidated Revenue Fund for pensions (s 16(13)), any policy change that could increase or decrease pension liability requires careful drafting to ensure the appropriation remains effective.
By treating the Act as an integrated code rather than a collection of isolated sections, practitioners can ensure that appointment, functions, ethical walls, remuneration, superannuation elections and ultimate pension outcomes all align.