Juries Act 1957

The Act primarily affects three groups: potential jurors, court officers and employers.

Potential jurors are any person enrolled on a Legislative Assembly electoral roll who lives in a jury district (s. 4(1)). Exclusions remove approximately 10–15 % of the adult population: judicial officers, legal practitioners, police, parliamentarians, certain corruption officers and those with significant criminal histories (Schedule 1 and s. 5(3)). Persons over 75 are ineligible (s. 5(3)(a)); those with mental impairment, recent imprisonment or multiple convictions within the five-year “relevant period” are disqualified (s. 5(3)(b)–(d)). Any summoned person may apply for excusal on hardship, language, health or indifference grounds (Part VC). Talesmen—bystanders pressed into service under s. 52—must also meet eligibility criteria.

Court officers bear heavy administrative burdens. The sheriff and jury officers compile jurors’ books (s. 16A), issue precepts (s. 20, s. 32G), conduct ballots (s. 26, s. 32H), serve summonses (s. 33) and maintain secrecy (s. 34). The Electoral Commissioner supplies annual lists (s. 14). Jury pool supervisors manage attendance and roll calls using identification numbers (s. 32FA). Proper officers conduct empanelment in open court (s. 35–36). Judges determine numbers of jurors (s. 18(2)), rule on excusals referred by summoning officers (s. 34F(3)), issue security orders (s. 43A) and control jury separation (s. 41).

Employers are affected by the anti-victimisation provisions in s. 56. It is an offence, punishable by $10 000 (individual) or $50 000 (body corporate), to terminate, reduce pay or otherwise prejudice an employee because the employee has been summoned or has performed jury service. The reverse onus in s. 56(6) requires the employer to prove the adverse action was not motivated by jury service. Employers who continue to pay salary during jury service may claim reimbursement from the State (s. 58B(3)).

Parties to litigation are indirectly affected: they receive panel lists (subject to s. 43A restrictions), exercise peremptory challenges and for-cause challenges, and may apply for views (s. 51) or tales (s. 52). The broader community benefits from the preservation of trial by jury while bearing the civic obligation of service.

Jurors’ duties include attendance on summons (s. 55(1)), disclosure of Schedule 2 matters (ss. 32FA, 34B), truthful answers on voir dire, maintenance of secrecy (Part IXA), and diligent participation until discharged. A juror must not discuss the case except with fellow jurors in the jury room, nor receive external information. Failure to attend without reasonable excuse attracts a $5 000 fine (s. 55(4)).

Rights of jurors comprise payment of prescribed allowances (s. 58B(2)), protection from employer prejudice (s. 56), anonymity (s. 36A), and the right to be excused for good reason (s. 34H) or permanent incapacity (s. 34E). Section 42 limits attendance to five days per sittings unless finishing a part-heard case.

Summoning officers’ duties are prescriptive: preparation of panels or pools at random (s. 26(2), s. 32C), service of summonses with prescribed notices (s. 33A), allocation of unique identification numbers (s. 26(6), s. 32D(1a)), maintenance of ballot-box security, and restoration of unused tickets (s. 28). They must observe strict secrecy (s. 34) and may withdraw summonses by ballot if over-summoned (s. 32E).

Judges’ rights and duties include determining juror numbers (s. 18(2)), ruling on challenges and excusals, ordering majority-verdict directions (s. 49), discharging jurors for cause (s. 46 in civil; incorporated Criminal Procedure Act 2004 provisions in criminal), and issuing protective orders under s. 43A to safeguard juror security.

Parties’ rights encompass inspection of panels (s. 30, subject to s. 43A), peremptory challenges (incorporated via s. 40 and Criminal Procedure Act 2004 s. 104), challenges for cause, and in civil trials the strike-out procedure allowing six objections per party (s. 29(2E)). An accused may pray a tales (s. 52).

Employers’ duties are negative: they must not act prejudicially. They enjoy a correlative right to reimbursement if they continue paying salary (s. 58B(3)).

Penalties are graduated. Officials who neglect duties face a $100 fine imposed summarily by the Supreme Court (s. 53). More serious official misconduct—tampering with lists, taking bribes to excuse jurors, or breaching secrecy—may attract whatever fine the Court “deems fit” (s. 54). Juror non-attendance without reasonable excuse, personation, or failure to obey a s. 32H(4) direction carries a $5 000 fine (s. 55). Employer victimisation offences are more heavily sanctioned: $10 000 for individuals, $50 000 for corporations (s. 56(5)), with compensation and reinstatement orders available (s. 56(7)–(9)).

Jury confidentiality breaches under ss. 56B–56D each carry a $5 000 penalty. Photographing jurors is a contempt punishable at large by the Supreme Court (s. 57). Fines are enforced under the Fines, Penalties and Infringement Notices Enforcement Act 1994 (s. 59) and credited to the Consolidated Account.

Enforcement is primarily by the sheriff reporting to the Court. Contempt proceedings lie for breach of s. 57 or interference with jurors (s. 43A). The reverse onus in s. 56(6) eases prosecution of employer offences. No specific statutory limitation period applies; common-law principles govern.

The Act is not standalone. Section 3A subjects the District Court to its provisions. Section 40 incorporates large parts of the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 on challenges, swearing, separation, views and verdicts. Eligibility criteria reference the Spent Convictions Act 1988, Sentencing Act 1995, Mental Health Act 2014, Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 and the Criminal Law (Mental Impairment) Act 2023 (CLMI Act) via s. 5.

Jury lists derive from the Electoral Act 1907 (s. 14). Commonwealth jury exemption under the Jury Exemption Act 1965 (Cth) is respected (s. 5(3)(c), s. 34G(2)(c)). Electronic court processes are facilitated by the Courts and Tribunals (Electronic Processes Facilitation) Act 2013 (s. 3B).

Confidentiality provisions interact with contempt of court, the Corruption, Crime and Misconduct Act 2003 (disclosure permitted to the Commission), and the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971. Payments under s. 58B are charged to the Consolidated Account. Employer victimisation orders are enforceable as civil judgments under the Civil Judgments Enforcement Act 2004 (s. 56(9)).

The Act preserves coronial inquests (s. 60) and grand juries are abolished (s. 57A). Where the Act is silent, English High Court practice applies (s. 58).

The most significant recent amendments were introduced by the Juries Legislation Amendment Act 2011, which inserted Part VC (serving summonses and excusing), replaced name-based selection with identification numbers, and expanded jury pools. These changes responded to juror harassment concerns and the need for greater administrative efficiency. The 2011 Act also aligned excusal criteria with modern understandings of hardship and capacity.

The Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2022 amended Schedule 1 to update the definition of “legal practitioner”, reflecting national uniformity.

The Criminal Law (Mental Impairment) Act 2023 substituted references in s. 5 to the new CLMI Act terminology for unfit accused and supervised persons, ensuring consistency with contemporary mental-health diversion pathways.

The Courts and Tribunals (Electronic Processes Facilitation) Act 2013 added s. 3B, enabling digital jury-list compilation and ballots. These amendments reflect technological modernisation, increased emphasis on juror privacy post high-profile trials, and harmonisation with mental-health and uniform legal-profession legislation. No wholesale repeal or replacement has occurred; the statute remains a 1957 framework heavily layered with 21st-century safeguards.

Because s. 8 validates verdicts despite irregular jurors, direct challenges to convictions on jury-composition grounds are rare and usually unsuccessful. In R v. Smith (unreported, WA CCA, 1998) an argument that a juror’s undisclosed prior conviction invalidated the verdict failed by operation of the predecessor to s. 8. Challenges to the array under s. 45 (civil) or incorporated Criminal Procedure Act 2004 provisions (criminal) require evidence of systematic exclusion, a high threshold rarely met.

Controversies have centred on confidentiality. After several high-profile cases in the early 2000s where jurors spoke to media, the 2000 amendments creating Part IXA were enacted. Subsequent cases have tested the breadth of “protected information”. Courts have confirmed that post-trial interviews identifying a juror without consent breach s. 56D even if the juror is willing, unless falling within s. 56E.

Employer victimisation under s. 56 has produced civil claims but few reported prosecutions, suggesting the reverse onus and compensation powers operate as an effective deterrent. The use of identification numbers (s. 36A) has been challenged on natural-justice grounds but upheld on the basis that parties retain full challenge rights and access to lists under s. 30 (subject to s. 43A security orders).

Demographic representativeness remains a live policy issue. Aboriginal under-representation on juries has been noted in reports but has not produced successful constitutional challenges in Western Australia, partly because s. 4 ties liability to electoral enrolment rather than random household selection.

Most practitioners underestimate the strictness of the five-year “relevant period” in s. 5(2). The clock runs from the first attendance date under the current summons, not the date of offence or conviction. A seemingly minor community-order breach five years and one day ago may still disqualify if it falls inside the rolling period.

Section 34H(4) creates a trap for serial deferral applicants: once a deferral has been granted, outright excusal on a second application is available only on “exceptional reasons” or unforeseeability. Summoning officers are increasingly referring such applications to judges, producing last-minute courtroom disputes.

Identification-number protocols are often misunderstood. Section 36A prohibits addressing a juror by name in open court, yet many counsel still inadvertently do so. More subtly, s. 43A allows judges to restrict even the parties’ pre-trial inspection of panels; counsel who assume automatic access risk being refused.

The employer reimbursement scheme in s. 58B(3) is elective. Many small businesses continue paying salary but forget to claim, or assume the employee must claim. The regulations require verification by statutory declaration; late claims are frequently rejected.

Schedule 2 disclosure obligations are broader than most jurors realise. Item 10 requires disclosure of “any reason why the person may not be indifferent between the parties”. This catches indirect connections (e.g., a Facebook friendship with a victim’s cousin) that jurors may not volunteer unless the Schedule 2 notice is read carefully.

Finally, talesmen under s. 52 remain liable to peremptory challenge yet are selected from bystanders with no prior vetting against the jurors’ book. Defence counsel often overlook that these impromptu jurors may carry undisclosed disqualifications that only emerge post-trial, at which point s. 8 protects the verdict.

For summoning officers and court staff: Maintain an auditable chain of custody for jurors’ books and ballot boxes. Use the computerised option under s. 29A wherever possible to reduce human-error risk. Ensure every summons is accompanied by the s. 33A notice. Refer borderline excusal applications to a judge promptly. Document all ballots and restorations of tickets. Observe strict secrecy—breaches carry criminal liability.

For legal practitioners: Request s. 43A orders early if juror safety is a concern. Scrutinise the panel list for Schedule 2 disclosures at the first opportunity. Prepare voir dire questions that elicit indifference without leading. In civil trials, coordinate objections under s. 29(2E) with co-parties to avoid wasting strikes. Advise clients that majority verdicts are possible after three hours in civil matters.

For potential jurors: Read the attached notice. Complete any online eligibility questionnaire promptly. If seeking excusal, apply under the correct section (e.g., s. 34H for hardship, s. 34I for bias) and supply statutory declarations or medical evidence. Disclose all Schedule 2 matters when the roll is called. Once sworn, maintain absolute silence about deliberations.

For employers: Continue salary if policy allows and claim reimbursement via the prescribed form with statutory declaration. Document any adverse action against an employee who has performed jury service so the reverse onus can be discharged if challenged. Train human-resources staff on s. 56 obligations.

For judges: Give clear majority-direction warnings under s. 49. Exercise s. 43A powers proactively in sensitive trials. Refer complex excusal applications to ensure consistency. Record reasons for permanent certificates under s. 34E to withstand potential review.

Compliance is best achieved through early preparation, meticulous record-keeping and a working familiarity with the 2011 amendments that now dominate day-to-day practice. Regular refresher training for court staff on identification-number protocols and confidentiality is essential to avoid costly contempt or criminal proceedings.