Juries Act 1927

The Act primarily affects three groups: prospective jurors, accused persons in indictable matters, and the institutions and officers who administer the jury system.

Prospective jurors are every South Australian enrolled on the House of Assembly electoral roll and entitled to vote (s 11), subject to disqualification (s 12), ineligibility (s 13 and Schedule 3) or residence outside the relevant district (s 14). Persons over 70 have an absolute right to excusal (s 17). Those with recent jury service, health issues, conscientious objections, business conflicts or safety risks may be excused at the discretion of the sheriff or a judge (ss 16, 16A). Employers who continue to pay salary during jury service are entitled to reimbursement (s 70(1)(b)).

Accused persons facing indictable charges in the Supreme or District Court have the right to trial by jury (s 6) but may elect judge-alone trial if they obtain legal advice and all co-accused concur (s 7(1)–(3)). In serious and organised crime matters the Director of Public Prosecutions may apply for a judge-alone order in the interests of justice, including where there is a real risk of jury tampering under ss 245 or 248 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (s 7(3a)–(3c)). An accused also benefits from rules requiring consideration of the major offence before any alternative (s 57(3)), the right to peremptory challenges (s 61) and the preservation of common-law challenge rights (s 67).

Institutional actors include the sheriff (and deputy), who prepares lists, issues summonses, supervises ballots, provides for juror comfort and returns panels (ss 20, 29, 42, 54). The Electoral Commissioner must assist (s 20(2)). Judges exercise powers to excuse jurors (ss 16, 16A, 17, 56), order additional jurors (s 6A), permit separation (s 55), try challenges for cause (s 68), direct further summonses (s 69), and make orders for views (s 88). The Director of Public Prosecutions has standing to seek judge-alone orders in organised-crime cases. Court officers manage the ballot box and swearing of jurors (ss 33, 43, 46).

Finally, the Act indirectly affects the broader community by maintaining the principle of trial by peers while excluding those whose official roles (police, lawyers, judges, parliamentarians) could compromise impartiality (Schedule 3).

Duties of the sheriff are central. The sheriff must prepare annual jury lists before 31 December (s 20), ensure proportional random selection from electoral rolls (s 23), send questionnaires (s 25), summon the required number of jurors each month by random ballot or computer from the current list (s 29), serve summonses at least seven clear days in advance (s 30), return the panel and cards in open court (s 42), and provide for juror comfort and refreshment (s 54). The sheriff may excuse jurors on statutory grounds (s 16) and must facilitate police checks on disqualification (s 12(1a)).

Duties of prospective jurors include completing and returning questionnaires (s 25), attending in obedience to a summons, answering to their name when called three times, and refraining from accepting unauthorised payments (s 78). Once sworn, jurors must deliberate in accordance with the judge’s directions, although the Act itself does not codify the content of those directions.

Rights of accused persons include the default entitlement to a 12-person jury (s 6(2)), the ability to elect judge-alone trial after receiving legal advice (s 7(1)), three peremptory challenges per accused (with joint accused each receiving three under s 65), challenge for cause on disqualification or ineligibility grounds (s 66), and the common-law rights preserved by s 67. An accused also benefits from the rule that a verdict cannot be challenged post-trial on qualification grounds unless the objection was raised before swearing (s 15), the right to a unanimous verdict on murder or treason (s 57(2)), and the structured majority-verdict and alternative-verdict pathways in s 57.

Rights of jurors encompass payment according to the prescribed scale (or employer reimbursement) (s 70), excusal for age over 70 (s 17), discretionary excusal on ill-health, conscientious objection, special urgency, prior recent service or safety/welfare grounds (ss 16, 16A), and the statutory right not to be required to serve outside their district except under s 69. Once empanelled, jurors may separate only on conditions imposed by the court (s 55).

Rights and duties of the court include power to order additional jurors (s 6A), excuse jurors during trial (s 56), permit separation even after retirement (s 55(2)), order views (s 88), try challenges for cause (s 68), and, in organised-crime matters, order judge-alone trials where in the interests of justice (s 7(3b)).

Enforcement is modest and largely self-contained. The principal offence appears in s 78(1): failure to attend after summons, failure to answer to one’s name when called three times, or accepting unauthorised payments as a juror. The maximum penalty is $1,250. The Supreme Court or District Court may deal with such matters summarily and without formality (s 78(2)).

Questionnaire offences under s 25(2)—failure to return without reasonable excuse, or inclusion of false or deliberately misleading information—also attract a $1,250 maximum.

There are no custodial penalties created by the Act itself. Disqualification from future jury service flows automatically from criminal convictions under s 12 rather than as a direct penalty under this statute. The sheriff’s power to seek police reports (s 12(1a)) and the court’s ability to excuse or discharge jurors (ss 16, 56) operate as administrative safeguards rather than punitive measures.

Contempt powers of superior courts remain available for more serious misconduct (for example, deliberate refusal to deliberate or external interference), but these derive from common law and are not created by the Act. Section 67’s preservation of common-law challenge rights indirectly supports enforcement of impartiality through the challenge process itself.

The Juries Act 1927 is tightly integrated with several statutes. The Criminal Procedure Act 1921 is referenced in s 7(3a) for informations presented to the District or Supreme Court that include serious and organised crime offences. The Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 supplies the definitions of “serious and organised crime offence” and the tampering offences (ss 245 and 248) that justify judge-alone orders under s 7(3c).

Electoral machinery under the Electoral Act 1929 (and its successors) supplies the rolls from which jurors are drawn (s 23) and defines “subdivision” (s 3(1)). Jury districts are constituted from those subdivisions (s 8) and survive alterations to electoral boundaries (s 8(4)).

Schedule 3’s ineligibility list cross-references the Family Relationships Act 1975 for the meaning of “domestic partner”. The Coroners Act 2003 is expressly preserved; nothing in the Juries Act affects coronial inquests (s 92).

Rules made jointly by the Chief Justice and Chief Judge under s 89 can supplement the Act on panel sizes, ballot conduct, swearing times and efficient administration. Regulations under s 93 and s 32 cover jury-panel procedures, further service and excusal.

The Act interacts with common law by expressly preserving rights of challenge (s 67) while abolishing specific historical jury forms (ss 85–86). It also sits alongside the general law of contempt and the implied power of courts to control their own processes when managing jury separation or views (s 88).

Recent insertion of s 16A (safety or welfare excusal) reflects contemporary protective legislation concerning juror and witness safety, aligning with witness-protection regimes elsewhere in South Australian statute.

The legislative history reveals steady modernisation. The Juries (Miscellaneous) Amendment Act 2000 (No 44) substituted core provisions, inserted s 6A on additional jurors, rewrote judge-alone election rules (s 7), introduced majority-verdict mechanics (s 57), and updated language around civil and criminal trials. These changes responded to practical difficulties with long trials, hung juries and the need for backup jurors.

The Statutes Amendment (Serious and Organised Crime) Act 2012 inserted subsections 7(3a)–(3d), allowing the DPP to apply for judge-alone trials where jury tampering is a real risk. This was a direct policy response to organised-crime infiltration of jury pools.

The Statutes Amendment (Attorney-General’s Portfolio) Act 2016 (No 28) substituted s 11 to modernise the qualification test and re-inserted an updated s 17 giving persons over 70 an absolute excusal right.

Most recently, the Statutes Amendment (Criminal Proceedings) Act 2025 (No 3) inserted s 16A, empowering a judge to excuse a summoned person on safety or welfare grounds on the sheriff’s application or the judge’s own initiative. This reflects heightened concern about juror doxxing, family violence risks and mental-health impacts post-COVID and amid increased online harassment of participants in the justice system. The provision allows conditional future service (s 16A(3)) to maintain the pool.

These amendments demonstrate a legislative shift from purely administrative jury selection toward a more flexible, participant-safety-oriented and efficiency-driven model while preserving the 12-person jury as the default.

Because the Act is largely procedural, reported challenges tend to focus on the edges. Section 15’s prohibition on post-verdict challenges to a juror’s qualification unless the objection was raised pre-swearing has been strictly applied; once a verdict is returned, disqualification discovered later will not impeach it. Challenges for cause under s 66 are tried by the presiding judge alone (s 68), limiting appellate interference at that stage.

The validity of random-selection methods (ballot or computer under s 23 and s 29) has occasionally been contested on representativeness grounds, but the statute’s express requirement of proportional drawing from each subdivision (s 23(2)) and the use of current electoral rolls has generally insulated the process from constitutional attack.

Judge-alone orders under s 7(3b) are appealable as antecedent decisions (s 7(3d)). Controversy has surrounded the balance between an accused’s election right and the DPP’s organised-crime application power, particularly where the accused prefers a jury but the court finds a real risk of tampering. The “interests of justice” test in s 7(3b) imports a broad discretion that has not, on the face of the Act, generated extensive reported litigation to date.

The abolition of the jury de medietate linguae (s 85) and de ventre inspiciendo (s 86) removed historical anomalies without generating modern controversy. The introduction of majority verdicts after four hours (s 57) has been criticised by some defence practitioners as eroding the unanimity principle, yet the Act’s carve-out for murder and treason (s 57(2)) has largely defused that debate.

Most practitioners underestimate the breadth of disqualification under s 12(1)(c)–(f). A person who was on parole eight years ago, or who received a suspended sentence of imprisonment three years ago, or who is currently subject to a good-behaviour bond, is automatically disqualified even if the underlying offence was minor. The 10-year and 5-year look-back periods run from the “relevant date” (the date qualification falls to be determined), not the date of summons.

The questionnaire offence in s 25(2) is strict in practice; “reasonable excuse” is narrowly construed, and supplying an out-of-date address or omitting a spent conviction can trigger liability. Many prospective jurors assume electoral-roll data is sufficient and ignore the questionnaire at their peril.

Section 7(3a)–(3c) creates an asymmetrical power: the DPP can apply for judge-alone in organised-crime matters even after a jury has been empanelled, and the court may order it “at any time before commencement of the trial”. Defence counsel sometimes overlook that an appeal lies against such an order in the same manner as an antecedent decision.

The interaction between additional jurors (s 6A) and peremptory challenges (s 61(2)) is a trap: the number of challenges does not increase, yet the ballot-off occurs only immediately before retirement. Parties must therefore exercise challenges with the possibility of later random exclusion in mind.

Safety excusals under the new s 16A can be made on the judge’s own initiative without a formal application. In high-profile trials, judges are increasingly proactive; counsel who assume excusal requires a written application from the sheriff may be taken by surprise.

Finally, s 15’s pre-swearing requirement means that if a disqualified juror slips through and is sworn without objection, the verdict stands. Thorough pre-empanelment checks using police reports (s 12(1a)) are therefore not merely advisable but essential for preserving appeal rights.

For legal practitioners advising clients on jury versus judge-alone elections under s 7, obtain and document written advice from an independent legal practitioner before the accused signs the election. In organised-crime matters, prepare submissions on whether a “real possibility” of tampering exists; cite the specific risk factors rather than general assertions.

When challenging for cause (s 66), raise the objection before the juror is sworn (s 15). Have evidence ready for the judge to determine the matter under s 68. Peremptory challenges must be exercised as each juror comes to take their seat (s 64); prepare a seating chart and exercise rights systematically.

For court staff and the sheriff’s office, ensure annual lists are compiled before 31 December with proportional random selection (s 23). Retain records of the randomisation method. Serve summonses strictly in accordance with s 30(3) and retain proof of service. When a questionnaire is returned with apparent discrepancies, cross-check against police reports before finalising the panel.

For judges, document reasons when ordering additional jurors (s 6A(1)), excusing under s 16 or s 16A, or directing continuation with a reduced jury (s 56). When a majority-verdict direction is contemplated, ensure the jury has deliberated at least four hours (calculate total time excluding any ordered interruptions under s 59(3)). For views under s 88, issue formal orders binding the sheriff and record the conduct of the view.

Corporate and government employers should familiarise themselves with the reimbursement right in s 70(1)(b) and maintain records of salary paid during jury service. Advise employees to return questionnaires promptly.

Prospective jurors should treat the questionnaire as compulsory, answer accurately, and apply for excusal under s 16, 16A or 17 as soon as the ground arises, preferably with supporting statutory declaration. Those over 70 need only establish age.

Compliance is best assured by maintaining an auditable trail: random-selection logs, dated summons records, written excusal decisions, and contemporaneous notes of four-hour deliberation periods. Regular training on the 2025 safety-excusal power and the organised-crime judge-alone pathway will prevent procedural missteps that could lead to aborted trials or successful appeals on process grounds.