International Transfer of Prisoners (China) Regulations 2011

The instrument meshes three legal layers: (1) the domestic statutory scheme under the International Transfer of Prisoners Act 1997, invoked through regs 5 and 6 which reference subsections 8(1) and 8(2) of the Act; (2) a bilateral treaty text contained in Schedule 1, which supplies operational rules and standards; and (3) designated administrative channels via central authorities (Article 3). Key concepts in the treaty that structure practice are defined in Article 1: “Transferring Party”, “Receiving Party”, and “sentenced person”. These definitions determine which jurisdiction is responsible for the original sentence, which assumes continued enforcement, and whom the treaty covers.

Several procedural and substantive gating conditions limit transfers. Article 4 lists five express conditions: dual criminality (Art 4(a)); nationality of the sentenced person as a general requirement, subject to exceptional waiver (Art 4(b)); a minimum remaining sentence threshold of at least one year at the time of request, again subject to exception (Art 4(c)); finality of the judgment with no further proceedings pending (Art 4(d)); and mutual consent among the Transferring Party, Receiving Party and the sentenced person (Art 4(e)). Consent must be voluntary, in writing, and given with full knowledge of legal consequences; the Transferring Party must secure that consent under its law (Article 9(1)). Article 9(2) permits the Receiving Party to verify consent through an official designated by it.

Jurisdictional allocation is a primary structural choice. Article 11(1) expressly preserves the Transferring Party’s jurisdiction for modification or cancellation of convictions and sentences. The Receiving Party enforces the sentence after transfer as if the sentence had been imposed in its jurisdiction (Article 12(1)), but it may adapt the sentence when incompatibility with domestic law arises, subject to constraints on adaptation (Article 12(2)(a)-(f)). The law of the Receiving Party governs enforcement, including parole and reduction of sentence (Article 13(1) and (3)), and the Receiving Party may treat a transferred person as juvenile if local law so provides (Article 13(2)).

Operational mechanics are set out: requests and replies in writing through the central authorities (Articles 3 and 7); required documentation and information lists (Article 8); and delivery logistics determined by consultation between central authorities (Article 10). The treaty also deals with non-substantive facilitation such as language and translation obligations (Article 16), non-requirement for document authentication (Article 19), and dispute settlement through diplomatic channels (Article 18(2)).

Cost allocation is simple and concentrated: the Receiving Party bears transfer expenses and costs of continued enforcement, except for expenses incurred exclusively in the Transferring Party (Article 17). The treaty also contemplates consultation between the central authorities to agree practical measures (Article 18(1)) and provides for entry into force and application to prior sentences (Article 20).

Primary affected parties are identified in the text and can be grouped into categories: the sentenced persons, the Australian Government Attorney-General’s Department and Chinese Ministry of Justice as central authorities, correctional services and parole authorities in the Receiving and Transferring Parties, legal representatives of sentenced persons, and the Commonwealth executive which makes the declaration under the Act.

Sentenced persons: the treaty applies to “a person who has been sentenced by a court or tribunal to imprisonment in the Transferring Party” (Article 1(c)). Only those who meet Article 4 conditions are eligible, notably being nationals of the Receiving Party unless the nationality condition is waived (Article 4(b)). Sentenced persons must give voluntary written consent to transfer (Article 9(1)), though a legal representative may consent in specified circumstances. The treaty requires that sentenced persons be kept informed of progress in writing (Article 6(2)), and be informed of actions taken under Articles 13(2)-(4) (Article 13(6)).

Central authorities: Article 3(2) designates the Australian Government Attorney-General’s Department as Australia’s central authority and the Ministry of Justice for China. These bodies process transfer requests (Article 3(1)), communicate directly (Article 3(3)), and are the conduit for diplomatic and administrative notifications. They decide whether to make or respond to requests and consult on implementation (Articles 7 and 18).

Correctional and parole authorities in the Receiving Party are materially affected because the Receiving Party enforces the sentence under its laws after transfer (Article 13(1)). They must adapt or enforce sentences consistent with the constraints in Article 12; they are responsible for reporting developments such as parole, escape, death, or completion back to the Transferring Party (Article 14).

Government decision-makers: Article 5 expressly leaves the acceptance of transfers to each Party’s discretion; that is, each central authority determines whether to agree to a requested transfer (Article 5). At the domestic level this gives the Attorney-General’s Department a gatekeeping role for outgoing or incoming requests that involve Australia.

Finance and budgets: Article 17 allocates financial responsibility to the Receiving Party for transport and continued enforcement, which affects corrections budgets in the receiving jurisdiction. The Transferring Party remains responsible for expenses incurred exclusively in its territory.

Legal representatives and advisers: the treaty imposes duties on the Transferring Party to ensure informed consent and provide documents (Article 8 and 9). In practice, legal counsel will need to advise on consent, potential adaptation risks under Article 12, parole prospects under Article 13, and the implications of retention of jurisdiction under Article 11.

Diplomatic channels and foreign affairs units will be involved in notification, entry into force and termination (Article 20), and dispute resolution is confined to diplomatic channels (Article 18(2)), which affects how disagreements are escalated.

Finally, the Regulations themselves affect statutory coverage under the International Transfer of Prisoners Act 1997 by declaring China a transfer country (reg 5) and making the Act apply subject to the treaty (reg 6), thereby expanding the set of jurisdictions to which Australia’s domestic transfer machinery applies.

The instrument and the treaty allocate specific duties and confer rights on Parties, central authorities, sentenced persons, and correctional authorities. The Regulations provide the legal basis domestically by making China a declared transfer country (reg 5) and by applying the Act subject to the treaty (reg 6). The treaty then sets out the operative duties and rights.

Duties of central authorities: Article 3(1) requires central authorities to process requests in accordance with the treaty. Article 3(3) mandates direct communication between central authorities. Article 7(3) requires that requests and replies be transmitted through those channels. Article 18(1) creates an ongoing duty to consult to promote effective use of the treaty and agree practical measures.

Documentary duties: Article 8(2) obliges the Transferring Party, upon making a request, to provide specified documents and information including a certified copy of the judgment, statement of facts and applicable law, length of sentence and time served, any extradition requests, medical reports and a copy of the written application for transfer. Article 8(3) reciprocates certain statements from the Receiving Party regarding nationality, dual criminality, and how the sentence would be enforced.

Consent and verification obligations: Article 9(1) requires the Transferring Party to ensure written, voluntary consent by the sentenced person with full knowledge of legal consequences; Article 9(2) grants the Receiving Party a right to verify that consent through a designated official.

Decision-making discretion and duty to inform: Article 5 confers on each Party the discretionary power to agree to transfers, but Article 6(1) imposes a duty to endeavour to inform sentenced persons of the substance of the treaty and Article 6(2) requires keeping the sentenced person informed in writing of progress.

Enforcement duties: After transfer, the Receiving Party is obliged to continue enforcement of the sentence pursuant to its nature and duration as determined by the Transferring Party (Article 12(1)), but must adapt the sentence where incompatibility exists following Article 12(2) rules and then transmit adaptation documentation to the Transferring Party (Article 12(3)). Article 13(3) makes parole and reduction of sentence matters for the Receiving Party under its law. Article 14 requires the Receiving Party to provide information to the Transferring Party on parole, completion, escape, death, or on request.

Financial obligations: Article 17 places primary financial responsibility on the Receiving Party for the transfer of the sentenced person (except expenses incurred exclusively in the Transferring Party) and for the continued enforcement of the sentence after transfer.

Rights of Parties and sentenced persons: Parties have the right to refuse transfers (Article 5), and to require or provide verification (Article 9(2)). Sentenced persons have the right to be informed and to give or withhold consent (Articles 6 and 9). The treaty recognises the Transferring Party’s right to retain jurisdiction over modification or cancellation of convictions (Article 11(1)) and to communicate any pardons to the Receiving Party (Article 13(4)).

Procedural rights: Article 19 provides a facilitative right: documents provided through central authorities need not be authenticated or certified, which lowers documentary formalities for Parties.

Termination and entry into force: Article 20(3) gives each Party the right to terminate the treaty by written notice, with termination taking effect 180 days after notice.

These duties and rights are interlocking: central authorities must supply information and process requests; sentenced persons must consent; Parties retain decision-making discretion and bear financial and enforcement responsibilities as allocated.

The Regulations do not themselves create criminal penalties or enforcement sanctions; their effect is to apply the International Transfer of Prisoners Act 1997 to China subject to the treaty (reg 6). Enforcement mechanisms and obligations appear primarily through the treaty’s administrative and operational provisions rather than through penal sanctions in the instrument.

Under the treaty, enforcement obligations are operational rather than punitive between States. After transfer, the Receiving Party enforces the sentence under its laws and procedures (Article 13(1)), and is responsible for implementing measures such as parole or commutation under domestic law (Article 13(3)). Where the Receiving Party adapts a sentence due to incompatibility with domestic law, Article 12(3) requires transmission of the legal document effecting adaptation to the Transferring Party. The Transferring Party retains jurisdiction to modify or cancel convictions and sentences imposed by its courts (Article 11(1)); such decisions must be acted upon by the Receiving Party insofar as enforcement is modified or terminated (Article 11(2)). Those are enforcement interfaces between States, not criminal penalties imposed by the instrument.

Procedural enforcement between Parties is accomplished through central authorities and diplomatic channels. Article 7(2) requires prompt notification of acceptance or refusal of transfer requests; Article 18(2) restricts dispute resolution to diplomatic channels. Article 19 simplifies document handling by removing authentication requirements, which reduces formal obstacles to enforcement of transfers. Article 14 places a duty on the Receiving Party to inform the Transferring Party of specific events,parole, completion, escape, death,or upon request, which supports oversight of sentence enforcement.

At the domestic level, the Regulations’ operation depends on the International Transfer of Prisoners Act 1997. The Regulations do not specify sanctions for non-compliance with treaty duties by domestic officials; any administrative or criminal consequences would arise under the Act or general public law, not from these Regulations themselves. The treaty does not create judicial remedies between the Parties, and disputes are to be resolved diplomatically (Article 18(2)). This means that there is no interstate forum created by the treaty for enforcement by judicial compulsion; enforcement relies on executive implementation and intergovernmental cooperation.

Finally, the treaty affords some individual procedural protections that indirectly enforce rights: the requirement for voluntary written consent by the sentenced person (Article 9(1)), the opportunity for verification of consent (Article 9(2)), and the obligation to keep the sentenced person informed in writing of progress (Article 6(2)). Failure to observe those procedural obligations could affect the validity of a transfer under the treaty framework, but the treaty itself relies on the Parties’ implementation and diplomatic mechanisms rather than a supranational enforcement court.

The Regulations operate as an instrument that applies the domestic International Transfer of Prisoners Act 1997 in respect of China, subject to the treaty. Reg 5 explicitly declares China a transfer country for subsection 8(1) of the Act, and reg 6 applies the Act to China subject to the treaty under subsection 8(2). The Regulations therefore do not displace the Act; they extend the Act’s reach where the treaty governs particular matters.

Relationship to domestic law: Article 12(2) and Article 13(1)-(3) of the treaty create an intersection between the legal determinations of the Transferring Party and the domestic law of the Receiving Party. After transfer, enforcement is governed by the Receiving Party’s laws and procedures (Article 13(1)). This means that, in practice, Australian correctional law and parole regimes will apply to an Australian national transferred to Australia as the Receiving Party, while if Australia is the Transferring Party, Australian law will continue to permit the Transferring Party to retain jurisdiction for modification or cancellation (Article 11(1)). The treaty anticipates and allows adaptation when the Transferring Party’s sentence is incompatible with a Receiving Party’s law, and sets constraints on adaptation (Article 12(2)(a)-(f)). Thus domestic sentencing and parole regimes remain operative subject to the treaty constraints.

Jurisdictional boundaries: The treaty expressly preserves the Transferring Party’s jurisdiction to modify or cancel convictions and sentences (Article 11(1)), and requires the Receiving Party to act on such modifications (Article 11(2)). That allocation interacts with domestic post-conviction procedures, because any modification by the Transferring Party must be recognised and acted upon by the Receiving Party in enforcement terms.

International obligations and diplomatic law: The treaty assigns dispute resolution to diplomatic channels (Article 18(2)) and requires notification procedures for entry into force and termination (Article 20). Thus conflicts between treaty obligations and other international agreements would be managed through diplomatic rather than judicial routes under this instrument.

Documentary formalities: Article 19 removes the need for authentication or certification for documents exchanged through central authorities. That simplifies compliance with documentary requirements that might otherwise be imposed by domestic law for authenticated foreign documents, and it interacts with domestic evidentiary rules by effectively letting central-authority channels stand in place of formal judicial or notarial authentication.

Interaction with extradition or other cross-border regimes: Article 8(2)(c) requires disclosure of any extradition requests or any State expressing interest in extraditing the sentenced person. That provision recognises potential overlap between transfer and extradition processes and requires central authorities to account for competing claims. The treaty does not modify extradition law but requires cooperative disclosure to prevent conflicting processes.

Domestic administrative discretion and compatibility: Article 5 gives each Party discretion to accept transfers. Domestic statutes and administrative rules governing the Attorney-General’s Department and corrections authorities will inform how that discretion is exercised. The Regulations themselves do not constrain domestic decision-makers beyond applying the Act subject to treaty terms.

Temporal application: Article 20(2) provides that the treaty is applicable to the transfer of sentenced persons against whom the sentence was imposed before its entry into force. That temporal provision interacts with domestic retroactivity rules by allowing transfers of older sentences, subject to the treaty and domestic legal limits on retrospective application of measures that would adversely affect legal rights.

In summary, interaction with other laws occurs mainly through the treaty’s allocation of enforcement to the Receiving Party’s domestic law, the Transferring Party’s retained jurisdiction, document-handling simplifications, disclosure obligations relating to extradition, and the domestic exercise of discretion under the International Transfer of Prisoners Act 1997 as applied to China by these Regulations.

The Regulations effect a limited amendment in the statutory instrument sense by repealing an earlier instrument. Regulation 3 expressly repeals the International Transfer of Prisoners (China) Regulations 2008. There is no further amendment history or subsequent modification recorded in the instrument itself. The commencement clause (reg 2) ties operation to a treaty event: these Regulations commence on the day the treaty comes into force for Australia. The treaty sets its own entry-into-force mechanism in Article 20(1), which requires diplomatic notes indicating that each Party has taken necessary steps for entry into force, with the treaty entering into force on the thirtieth day from the date of the later diplomatic note.

The Schedule reproduces the treaty text dated 6 September 2007, but the Regulations are dated 30 June 2011 and signed by the Governor-General and the Minister for Justice. The note appended in the legislative instrument refers readers to the Federal Register of Legislative Instruments for registration. The instrument does not record any subsequent amendments to the treaty text itself; under the treaty Article 3(2) obliges the Parties to notify each other through diplomatic channels if either Party changes its designated central authority.

Practically, the amendment history for implementation will be driven by three knobs: (1) domestic exercise of discretion under the International Transfer of Prisoners Act 1997, including any future regulations; (2) any diplomatic notifications that alter the treaty’s operative status, central authorities or termination under Article 20(3); and (3) possible future bilateral instruments that amend, suspend or replace the treaty. None of those subsequent actions are recorded in this instrument. The sole express textual change effected by these Regulations is the repeal of the 2008 Regulations and the new declaration and application provisions linking the Act to China subject to the treaty.

Because the treaty contains its own termination mechanism (Article 20(3), termination effective 180 days after written notice), the treaty as implemented by these Regulations can be ended by either Party independently of domestic amendments. The Regulations do not specify procedural steps for domestic implementing legislation beyond their own commencement and repeal clauses. Any future amendment to the domestic statutory coverage would require a separate legislative instrument or parliamentary amendment to the Act or regulations.

The legislative instrument and the treaty text in the Schedule do not contain or refer to any litigation history. There are no cases, judicial decisions, or administrative law decisions reported or cited in the instrument itself. The treaty provides administrative and diplomatic procedures for disputes between the Parties (Article 18(2) requires resolution through diplomatic channels), which indicates that the Parties have agreed not to create a judicial dispute settlement mechanism under the treaty. This choice means the treaty does not itself create an interstate judicial forum for enforcement.

For individual litigants, the instrument does not specify judicial remedies in domestic courts relating to the treaty obligations; rather, it incorporates the treaty into domestic operation by declaring China a transfer country under the International Transfer of Prisoners Act 1997 (regs 5-6). Any litigation arising from a transfer decision would therefore proceed, if at all, under the domestic Act, domestic administrative law principles, or relevant domestic human rights and sentencing review mechanisms. The instrument does not record or purport to preclude judicial review of domestic decisions taken under the Act, but it also does not provide procedural steps for litigants.

In practice, the absence of litigation history in the instrument means practitioners must look to subsequent domestic cases, administrative records, and parliamentary materials to discover how courts have treated transfers to or from China under this regime. None of those materials are included in the text provided. The treaty’s specification that disputes between Parties are for diplomatic channels reduces the interstate litigation vector, leaving the principal litigation pathway as domestic judicial review of administrative decisions under the Act and implementing regulations; however, such litigation is not recorded in this instrument.

Therefore, the current instrument provides no litigation precedents, and it signals that international disputes under the treaty will be processed diplomatically rather than judicially. Practitioners should expect that any legal questions arising from transfers to or from China will be litigated in domestic courts rather than by reference to interstate adjudication under the treaty, if litigation occurs at all.

Several technical and practical pitfalls arise directly from the treaty provisions and the way the Regulations link the Act to China. These are factual, source-grounded points that can produce unintended outcomes if overlooked.

Consent requirements and verification: Article 9 requires the Transferring Party to ensure voluntary written consent with full knowledge of legal consequences. The Receiving Party may request verification through a designated official (Art 9(2)). Practitioners must not assume that consent given informally or orally suffices; the treaty requires a written declaration and allows verification. Failure to secure properly documented consent could invalidate a transfer under the treaty or expose the Transferring Party to diplomatic friction.

Nationality and waiver mechanics: Article 4(b) makes nationality of the Receiving Party a gate condition, but allows exceptional waivers by agreement of both Parties. That means that non-nationals may be transferred only if the Parties explicitly agree. Practitioners should not assume nationality alone is determinative; they must check whether a waiver was sought and agreed through the central authority channels.

One-year remaining sentence rule and exceptions: Article 4(c) imposes a threshold of at least one year remaining at the time of request, but permits exceptions. This creates a timing sensitivity. A transfer request lodged too late may be ineligible without exceptional agreement, and conversely a Transferring Party might be exposed to pressure to make timely requests. The treaty does not create an automatic remedy for missed thresholds; agreement between Parties is required in exceptions.

Dual criminality and scope of offence: Article 4(a) requires that the conduct for which the sentence was imposed also constitute an offence under Receiving Party law. This can lead to edge cases where factual findings differ in their legal characterisation. The Receiving Party must state that Article 4(a) is met in its response (Article 8(3)(b)). Where legal categories differ, adaptation procedures under Article 12(2) may be invoked, but adaptation is constrained. Practitioners need to analyse comparative offence elements carefully.

Adaptation constraints and sentencing consequences: Article 12(2) allows adaptation but prohibits conversion of custodial penalty to a pecuniary penalty (Art 12(2)(b)), and requires adapted sentences to be no more severe (Art 12(2)(d)). Nonetheless adaptation can change the practical experience of detention, parole eligibility and sentence duration because the Receiving Party applies its law (Art 13(1) and (3)). Sentenced persons and advisers must assess how adaptation and the Receiving Party’s parole and reduction regime will affect time served.

Retention of jurisdiction vs enforcement reality: Article 11 retains Transferring Party jurisdiction to modify or cancel convictions or sentences, but the Receiving Party enforces under its law and must act upon notification of modifications. Practitioners should note that a Transferring Party’s post-transfer modification can alter enforcement only insofar as the Receiving Party implements those changes, which may involve administrative processes and timing lags.

Expenses and recovery terms: Article 17 makes the Receiving Party primarily responsible for transfer and continued enforcement costs, but Article 4(e) requires that the transfer, including terms relating to the recovery of any costs which may be incurred, must be consented to in writing by the sentenced person or their legal representative. This intersects with the person’s consent: cost recovery terms must be disclosed and consented to. Failure to disclose or obtain consent on cost allocation could render consent defective.

No authentication requirement vs domestic evidentiary practice: Article 19 waives authentication or certification for documents provided through central authorities. That facilitates the process, but practitioners should verify that domestic court or administrative processes accept documents transmitted through central authorities without additional formalities; the treaty’s waiver may not alone resolve evidentiary doubts in every domestic forum.

Dispute resolution limited to diplomatic channels: Article 18(2) confines interstate disputes to diplomatic channels. Parties cannot invoke an arbitral or judicial interstate mechanism under the treaty. This affects remedies available to a Party aggrieved by the other Party’s administrative implementation and creates reliance on executive diplomacy rather than judicial enforcement.

Entry into force timing and retroactivity: The Regulations commence upon the treaty’s entry into force for Australia (reg 2) and Article 20(1) sets a 30-day period from the later diplomatic note. Article 20(2) permits application to sentences imposed before entry into force. Practitioners must be careful about timing, particularly with older sentences, because domestic procedural rights may intersect with retroactive application in practice.

Administrative discretion: Article 5 gives each Party discretion to accept transfers. Discretionary refusals are not constrained by the treaty beyond consultation duties. That means central authorities can refuse transfers for policy or administrative reasons and those refusals are not subject to interstate adjudication under the treaty.

These points are not exhaustive but identify concrete operational and legal "gotchas" that flow directly from the treaty text reproduced in Schedule 1 and the Regulations’ linkage to the Act.

Compliance requires coordinated action by central authorities, corrections agencies, legal representatives and the sentenced person. The following steps are directly grounded in the treaty provisions and the Regulations.

1. Confirm applicability and commencement: Verify that the Regulations have commenced for Australia by confirming the treaty’s entry into force as described in Article 20(1) and reg 2. Because reg 2 ties commencement to the treaty’s entry into force, transfers may not be processed until that event has occurred.

2. Channel communications through central authorities: Use the Australian Government Attorney‑General’s Department as the central authority designated in Article 3(2) for requests, replies, and document exchange. The central authorities must communicate directly with one another (Article 3(3)), and Article 7(3) requires written transmission through those channels.

3. Check eligibility against Article 4 conditions: Before preparing a request, ensure the sentenced person meets the conditions in Article 4: dual criminality (Art 4(a)); nationality of the Receiving Party unless waived (Art 4(b)); at least one year remaining to serve at the time of request unless exceptional agreement (Art 4(c)); finality of judgment and absence of pending proceedings (Art 4(d)); and agreement of Transferring Party, Receiving Party and the sentenced person (Art 4(e)). For each element, document evidence that supports compliance.

4. Obtain and document informed, voluntary written consent: Under Article 9(1), the Transferring Party must ensure the sentenced person voluntarily consents with full knowledge of legal consequences and that the consent is in writing. If consent is given by a legal representative due to age or incapacity, the legal representative must provide written consent. Prepare the written declaration and retain records for verification, because the Receiving Party may request verification under Article 9(2).

5. Assemble required documentation per Article 8(1)-(2): A request must include the sentenced person’s identification details (Art 8(1)(a)-(c)). If a request is made, the Transferring Party must, unless refused, provide certified copies of the judgment, statement of facts, statement of relevant law, sentence termination date, time already served including pre‑trial confinement, extradition background information, medical and corrections reports, and a copy of the written application for transfer by the sentenced person (Art 8(2)(a)-(e)). Ensure that copies are certified as required and transmitted through the central authority.

6. Expect reciprocal statements from the Receiving Party: The Receiving Party must supply a statement of nationality, a statement that Article 4(a) has been met, and information describing enforcement (Art 8(3)(a)-(c)). Ensure these statements are obtained before transfer is finalised.

7. Negotiate and record cost allocation terms: Article 17 places primary responsibility on the Receiving Party for transfer and continued enforcement costs, but Article 4(e) requires that the transfer and any cost recovery terms be consented to in writing by the sentenced person. Record any cost recovery arrangement in the consent documentation to avoid later disputes.

8. Plan logistics through central authorities: Agree on delivery timing, place and procedures through consultation between central authorities per Article 10. If transit through third States is necessary, notify and coordinate under Article 15, recognising domestic law constraints of transit States.

9. Prepare for adaptation and post-transfer enforcement: Advise the sentenced person about the Receiving Party’s law applying to enforcement, parole, reduction of sentence and other measures (Article 13(1) and (3)). If adaptation may be required because of incompatibility, anticipate the constraints in Article 12(2) and plan to receive the legal document of adaptation (Article 12(3)) and to communicate it back to the Transferring Party where relevant.

10. Maintain information flows after transfer: The Receiving Party must inform the Transferring Party of parole, completion, escape, death, or on request (Article 14). Establish contact points and recordkeeping to ensure timely reporting.

11. Use translations where needed: The treaty requires communication in each Party’s official language and translation into the other Party’s official language (Article 16). Ensure translation quality for legal documents, consent forms and notifications.

12. Keep records for administrative and diplomatic contingencies: Because disputes between Parties are to be resolved diplomatically (Article 18(2)), maintain complete records of requests, consents, verification, documentation and correspondence to enable central authorities to consult and resolve issues.

13. Confirm termination and retroactivity implications: For sentences imposed before entry into force, Article 20(2) allows application of the treaty. Confirm whether the sentence is pre‑existing and whether any special domestic rules apply. Be aware that the treaty may be terminated by either Party on 180 days’ notice (Article 20(3)); ensure any ongoing transfers are handled before termination takes effect.

14. Follow domestic statutory requirements: The Regulations apply the International Transfer of Prisoners Act 1997 to China subject to the treaty (reg 6). Ensure all domestic statutory procedures imposed by the Act are observed in parallel with treaty requirements.

By following these steps, administrative actors, legal advisers and corrections authorities align practice with the express textual requirements of the Regulations and the treaty. Documentation, central-authority coordination, careful timing and strict adherence to Article 4 and Article 9 requirements are key to compliant transfers.