Several provisions in the Act contain traps for the unwary. First, the time limit for registration is strict: six years from the date of the judgment, or from the date of the last appeal judgment, under s 5(1)(b). For certain pre‑Act UK judgments, the limit is twelve months. Missing this deadline is fatal , there is no general power to extend except as allowed by the Court for the pre‑Act category. However, s 8(2) allows a further application after an appeal is disposed of or after a judgment becomes enforceable by execution if registration was set aside on those grounds. But if the six‑year window expires during the pendency of an appeal, the creditor may need to register promptly after the appeal is finalised; the Act does not expressly toll the time for appeal proceedings.
Second, the currency conversion rule in s 5(3) uses the rate of exchange prevailing at the date of the judgment of the original court, not at the date of registration. This can produce a windfall or a loss if exchange rates have moved significantly, and it is a fixed rule , the Court has no discretion. The creditor bears the exchange risk from the judgment date to the registration date.
Third, the prohibition in s 9 on other proceedings is absolute for judgments to which Part II applies. A judgment creditor cannot bring a common law action on the judgment even if registration is not possible (e.g., because the time limit has expired) , but note that s 9 only applies to “judgments to which this Part applies”. If the judgment could have been registered but was not, s 9 still bars other proceedings? The wording: “No proceedings for the recovery of a sum payable under a judgment to which this Part applies, other than proceedings by way of registration of the judgment, shall be entertained.” This appears to catch any such judgment, regardless of whether it is actually registered. So if a creditor misses the registration deadline, they cannot sue on the judgment at common law either , a serious trap.
Fourth, the definition of “action in personam” in s 3(2) excludes matrimonial causes, administration of estates, bankruptcy, winding up, lunacy, and guardianship of minors. These excluded proceedings are not subject to the deemed jurisdiction rules in s 7(3)(a). Practitioners must check whether the foreign judgment falls within these exclusions, and if so, jurisdiction will be determined under s 7(3)(b) or (c) instead.
Fifth, the requirement that the judgment be “final and conclusive” is satisfied even if an appeal is pending (s 4(4)). This allows registration before appeals are exhausted, but if the debtor appeals, the Supreme Court may set aside or adjourn under s 8(1). The trap is that registration before appeal may be premature if the judgment is later reversed: the debtor must apply to set aside or seek a stay. The Act does not provide for automatic vacation of registration on reversal of the foreign judgment; the debtor must rely on the fraud ground or the public policy ground to overturn registration post‑reversal.
Sixth, the recoverable tax provisions are limited to Papua New Guinea income tax, excluding penalties and interest, and the Governor can designate other PNG taxes as non‑recoverable (s 3(3)). A judgment that includes non‑recoverable tax cannot be registered at all unless separable. The partial registration provision (s 5(4A)) only allows registration for the recoverable part, but the non‑recoverable part cannot be enforced. This is a narrow exception to the general rule against enforcing foreign tax judgments.
Seventh, s 7(3) deems the original court to have had jurisdiction in certain scenarios, but s 7(4) contains exceptions. Notably, if the bringing of proceedings in the original court was contrary to an agreement to settle the dispute by some other means (e.g., an arbitration or exclusive jurisdiction clause), then jurisdiction is not deemed except in the cases where the debtor submitted voluntarily or was plaintiff/counterclaimed, or where jurisdiction is recognised by Victorian law (s 7(4)(b)). This means a party that agreed to arbitrate cannot later rely on a foreign judgment obtained in breach of that agreement , the registration can be set aside for lack of jurisdiction.
Eighth, the service of notice ground in s 7(1)(c) requires that the debtor did not receive notice in sufficient time to defend and did not appear. This applies even if process was duly served under the law of the original court. A debtor who was served but had no practical opportunity to defend (e.g., very short notice) may have the registration set aside, but must show both lack of sufficient time and non‑appearance.
Ninth, the Act does not allow for registration of judgments that are solely for non‑monetary relief (injunctions, specific performance). Only money judgments (or criminal compensation orders) qualify. A foreign judgment for an injunction cannot be registered, but may be recognised under s 10 if it would have been registrable had it been for money? s 10 applies to judgments to which Part II applies or would have applied if a sum of money had been payable. So a judgment that is otherwise final and from a superior court but orders only an injunction cannot be registered but can be recognised as conclusive under s 10.
Tenth, the Governor in Council can make an Order under s 11 barring enforcement of judgments from a country that does not reciprocate favourably. Practitioners must check current Orders because if a country is added to the s 11 list after a judgment is obtained, registration may become impossible. The savings provision s 13 does not protect judgments given before the s 11 order unless the order itself provides otherwise? s 13 deals with relevant orders under s 4(2) and s 3(3), not s 11 orders directly. Actually s 13(2) says the Act continues to apply to judgments given before a relevant order as if the order had not been made. A s 11 order is not a “relevant order” under s 13(1). So a s 11 order likely applies to all judgments of that country, including those given before the order, subject to any directions in the order itself (s 11(2): “Except in so far as the Governor in Council may by Order under this section otherwise direct”). This could cut off enforcement retroactively.