Extradition (United Mexican States) Regulations

The instrument relies on a compact set of extradition concepts, set out in the Schedule, that govern when and how requests circulate between the "Requesting Party" and the "Requested Party". The core definitional and operational concepts are:

• Extraditable offence and dual criminality threshold. Article 2(1) defines extraditable offences as those offences punishable under the laws of both Parties by a penalty of at least one year’s deprivation of liberty. Article 3 extends extraditability to offences made extraditable by multilateral conventions to which both States are parties.

• Temporal and territorial scope. Article 2(5) permits extradition irrespective of when the acts occurred provided the acts were offences under both Parties’ laws at the time of commission and when the request is made. Article 2(4) deals with offences committed outside the Requesting State, requiring that the Requested State’s law provide for extraterritorial punishment in similar circumstances, otherwise leaving extradition to the Requested Party’s discretion.

• Convicted persons and remaining sentence. Article 2(2) imposes a minimum remaining custodial period requirement: where a person has been convicted and extradition is sought for enforcement of sentence, there must be at least six months of the sentence remaining.

• Exceptions and bars. Articles 5-14 list exceptions: political offence and related immunity (Art 5); exclusion where prosecution is for prohibited discrimination or persecution (Art 5(2)); purely military offences not punishable under ordinary law (Art 6); final judgment, pardon or time served (Art 7); statute of limitations or other bar to prosecution (Art 8); extraordinary or special tribunals (Art 9); nationality and refusal of nationals (Art 10); competency of domestic courts to try the offence (Art 11); convicted in absence , requirement for trial rights assurances (Art 12); death penalty , requirement for assurance where applicable (Art 13); human rights and humanitarian exceptions including ICCPR Article 7 analogue and other exceptional personal circumstances (Art 14).

• Authentication and documentary sufficiency. Article 15 prescribes authentication rules that differ depending on whether the requesting State is Mexico or Australia. Article 16 lists the documents that must accompany a request, including a statement of acts, arrest or conviction orders, legal basis and penalties, identity details and, where convicted, remaining sentence particulars. Translations into the language of the Requested State are required (Art 16(1)).

• Provisional arrest and timing. Article 19 sets a provisional arrest procedure for urgent cases, permits applications by any written means, and imposes a 60‑day limit after which a provisionally arrested person may be discharged if the full request and supporting documents are not received (Art 19(4)). Article 21(3-4) contains a corresponding surrender timeframe, with removal required within 60 days of notice that the person is available for surrender, or release follows.

• Speciality. Article 18 protects the person surrendered from being detained, tried or punished for offences other than the one(s) for which extradition was granted, and from onward extradition to third States for pre‑extradition offences, subject to specified exceptions: voluntary return, failure to leave within 60 days, or consent by the Requested Party. Article 18(2) limits the rule to pre‑extradition offences.

• Property, transit, expenses and multilateral obligations. The treaty addresses ancillary matters: securing and surrendering property connected to offences subject to domestic law limits (Art 23); requests for transit through the other Party, with refusal permitted on public policy or nationality grounds and expenses reimbursed by the Requesting Party (Art 24); expenses allocation, where transport costs are borne by the Requesting Party and other in‑territory expenses by the Requested Party (Art 27); and preservation of multilateral obligations (Art 25).

• Relationship to domestic law. Article 26 provides that the laws of the respective Parties apply to the extent the treaty does not govern extradition proceedings.

These concepts allocate legal burdens and process steps between the two States and set thresholds and safeguards that must be considered when a request is prepared or assessed.

The Regulations and the Schedule allocate roles and affect multiple actors. Primary effect is on the Commonwealth’s extradition machinery and on any person in Australia who may be the subject of an extradition request from Mexico or a request made by Australia to Mexico. The actors and the effects are:

• Australian executive and judicial authorities. The Regulations (reg 5) apply the Extradition Act 1988 in relation to Mexico subject to the treaty. That places responsibility on Australian agencies and courts that administer the Extradition Act to follow the treaty’s procedural and substantive limits when dealing with Mexican requests or Australian requests involving Mexico. The treaty governs authentication, documentary requirements, provisional arrest, surrender timeframes and grounds for refusal, which Australian authorities must apply when deciding to arrest, detain, surrender or refuse.

• Mexican authorities. When Australia acts as Requested Party for a Mexican request, Mexican authorities will be the Requesting Party and must conform to the treaty’s documentary and authentication standards (Articles 15-16), and pay transport costs where relevant (Article 27). Conversely, when Mexico is Requested Party for an Australian request, it must apply the same treaty provisions.

• Persons sought. The treaty establishes procedural rights available to the person whose extradition is sought. These include the right to be informed of the charges and supporting documents (Art 16), protections where prosecution may be politically motivated or discriminatory (Art 5), protection against transfer to special tribunals (Art 9), rights if convicted in absence (Art 12), and the rule of speciality limiting subsequent prosecution for offences other than those for which surrender was granted (Art 18). The 60‑day rules for provisional arrest and surrender (Arts 19 and 21) affect the duration of possible detention before release if transfer is not effected.

• Diplomatic and consular channels. The treaty repeatedly requires transmissions by diplomatic channel for regular requests (Art 15(1)), for transit requests (Art 24(2)) and for notifications about entry into force and termination (Art 28). Diplomatic representatives are also involved in document legalisation for Australian requests to Mexico, specifically by the Mexican diplomatic or consular representative accredited to Australia (Art 15(b)(ii)).

• Law enforcement agencies. Agencies engaged in arrest, detention, evidence collection and property seizure are affected. Article 23 obliges the Requested Party to secure and deliver property that may serve as evidence or that resulted from the offence, subject to domestic law and third‑party rights. Article 19 compels rapid action on provisional arrest requests.

• Financial actors for costs. Article 27 allocates most in‑territory expenses to the Requested Party and transport costs to the Requesting Party. Budget officers and operational units in both States must account for these allocations when planning transfers.

• Persons and third parties with property interests. The treaty contemplates the surrender and eventual return of property, and it instructs that where a Requested Party or third parties have rights over property surrendered, the property should be returned as soon as possible and free of charge (Article 23(4)).

The instrument therefore affects both State decision‑makers and private persons subject to extradition, with specific procedural obligations imposed on both Requesting and Requested Parties and collateral effects on diplomatic and budgetary decision‑makers.

The treaty creates a set of reciprocal duties for the Parties and rights for persons whose extradition is sought. Below are the principal duties and rights, cited to the treaty and Regulations:

Duties of the Parties

• Duty to extradite in accordance with the treaty. Article 1 obliges the Parties to extradite, in accordance with the treaty, persons against whom criminal proceedings have been initiated or who are wanted for imposition or enforcement of a custodial sentence for an extraditable offence.

• Duty to authenticate and supply documents. Article 15 sets authentication procedures; Article 16 requires a set of specified documents (statement of acts, warrant or conviction, legal basis, identity details, sentence details) accompanied by a translation into the language of the Requested State.

• Duty to inform and give reasons. Article 21(1-2) requires the Requested Party to communicate its decision through diplomatic channels and to give reasons where extradition is refused either totally or partially.

• Duty to secure and deliver property. Article 23 directs the Requested Party to secure and deliver property that may be evidence or that has resulted from the offence, subject to domestic law and third‑party rights.

• Duty to consider provisional arrest requests and inform of outcome. Article 19 requires the Requested Party to take steps to secure provisional arrest and to inform the Requesting Party of the outcome.

• Cost allocation duties. Article 27 allocates in‑territory expenses to the Requested Party and transport costs to the Requesting Party.

Discretionary duties and permitted refusals

• Discretion to refuse in certain circumstances. The treaty lists mandatory bars and enumerated discretionary or conditional refusals: political offences and related exceptions (Art 5); military‑only offences (Art 6); final judgments, pardons, amnesty or served sentences (Art 7); time bars or other causes precluding prosecution (Art 8); special tribunal concerns (Art 9); refusal of nationals (Art 10, though Art 10(2) imposes an ancillary duty to consider domestic prosecution); competence of local courts to try the offence (Art 11); need for assurances if convicted in absence (Art 12); need for death‑penalty assurances (Art 13); human rights/humanitarian exceptions and ICCPR Article 7 analogue (Art 14). The treaty also permits refusal of transit on public policy grounds or if the person is a national of the transit State (Art 24(3)).

Rights of persons sought

• Right to procedural information and translation. Article 16(1) requires that documentary materials be accompanied by a translation into the language of the Requested State. Article 16(a-e) specifies the details to be supplied.

• Right to be protected from politically motivated prosecution. Article 5(1-2) bars extradition where the offence is regarded as political by the Requested Party or the request appears aimed at prosecution or punishment on account of race, religion, nationality or political opinions.

• Right to protection regarding death penalty. Article 13 protects persons where the Requesting State’s law allows the death penalty, by requiring sufficient assurances that the death penalty will not be carried out.

• Right to be tried by ordinary tribunals. Article 9 prevents extradition where the person is liable to be tried by an extraordinary or special tribunal in the Requesting State.

• Speciality protection. Article 18 protects the extradited person from being detained, tried or punished for offences other than those for which extradition was granted, and from onward extradition, except in tightly defined circumstances (voluntary return, failure to leave within 60 days, or consent).

• Right to release if removal is not effected. Article 21(3-4) provides that the Requesting Party must remove the person within 60 days of notice that the person is available for surrender, failing which the person is released.

Procedural duties relating to timing and completeness

• Duty to correct omissions or defects. Article 17 permits the Requested Party to inform the Requesting Party of defects and requests correction before submission to judicial authorities.

• Duty to abide by provisional arrest time limit. Article 19(4) causes discharge if the full request and required documents are not received within 60 days of provisional arrest.

Relationship to domestic law

• Article 26 explicitly provides that the laws of the respective Parties shall be applied to the extent the treaty does not govern the extradition proceedings. On the Australian side, reg 5 makes the Extradition Act apply subject to the treaty, thereby imposing a duty on Australian decision‑makers to implement the treaty’s specific requirements while continuing to apply domestic law in areas the treaty leaves open.

These duties and rights create a layered compliance and decision framework: documentary and authentication duties are paired with time limits and assurances; substantive exclusions are set against an overarching duty to extradite for offences meeting the dual criminality and penalty threshold.

The Schedule does not create new criminal offences or administrative penalties that are directly enforceable against individuals. Instead, enforcement within the treaty’s terms operates through state decision‑making, process constraints and domestic implementation under the Extradition Act 1988 (reg 5). The principal enforcement mechanisms and consequential effects in the instrument are:

State decisions and consequences

• Refusal or grant of extradition. The Requested Party enforces the treaty by granting or refusing extradition in accordance with the treaty grounds (Articles 1, 5-14, 26). Article 21 requires the Requested Party to communicate its decision and to give reasons for refusal, providing a record that can be relied on for contest or review under domestic law.

• Release as automatic consequence of non‑removal. There are two explicit temporal enforcement consequences: a person provisionally arrested must be discharged if the full request and documents are not received within 60 days (Article 19(4)); and if, after extradition is granted, the Requesting Party does not remove the person within 60 days from notification that the person is available for surrender, the person shall be released (Article 21(3-4)). These are process‑driven enforcement outcomes that convert diplomatic or administrative inaction into a release obligation.

Assurances and procedural conditions

• Assurances as condition of extradition. Where the death penalty may apply under the Requesting Party law, extradition is conditioned on assurances acceptable to the Requested Party that the death penalty will not be carried out (Article 13). Where the person was convicted in absence, extradition is conditional on assurances that defence rights and procedures will be afforded (Article 12). These are enforceable in practice insofar as the Requested Party can require such assurances before surrender.

Property and costs

• Surrender of property and return obligations. Article 23 gives the Requested Party the duty to secure and deliver property for evidentiary or confiscatory purposes, subject to domestic law. It permits temporary retention where property is required for proceedings in the Requested Party, and mandates return to the Requested Party when third‑party rights exist. These provisions impose operational obligations on law enforcement and administrative authorities and create expectations for property transfer and return.

Jurisdictional and human‑rights limits

• Humanitarian and human‑rights bars. Article 14 allows refusal where extradition would be incompatible with humanitarian considerations or where the offence carries a punishment of a nature referred to in Article 7 of the ICCPR, as incorporated in the treaty text. While the treaty does not itself create domestic remedies, Requested Parties will enforce these protections through their own legal processes and decisions under domestic law.

Practical enforcement follows domestic procedures

• Use of domestic processes under the Extradition Act. The Regulations make the Extradition Act apply to Mexico subject to the Treaty (reg 5). Enforcement action therefore proceeds through the Act’s mechanisms , arrest, committal hearings, ministerial decisions, and judicial review routes available under domestic law , but constrained and informed by the treaty’s requirements and limits.

Sanctions for breach of treaty obligations

• The treaty contains no express interstate sanctions such as monetary penalties for failure to comply. The available remedies for a Party aggrieved by the other Party’s conduct are diplomatic and treaty‑level remedies, including termination under Article 28(2). Operational enforcement consequences are administrative and procedural rather than penal for non‑compliance, with specific process consequences such as release after defined delays.

In sum, the instrument enforces extradition obligations largely by structuring domestic processes, setting documentary and timing obligations, and enabling states to withhold extradition where treaty conditions are not met or where human‑rights or nationality grounds apply. The domestic Extradition Act translates those treaty constraints into actionable arrest, detention and surrender procedures.

The Regulations and treaty establish a specific layering of international and domestic law and identify interactions with other instruments. The key points of interaction, as provided in the Schedule and Regulations, are:

Priority and operation with the Extradition Act 1988

• The Regulations expressly apply the Extradition Act in relation to Mexico subject to the treaty (reg 5). That means Australian authorities must apply the Extradition Act’s procedures while observing the treaty’s specific substantive and procedural constraints. The treaty governs where it speaks to a matter; where it is silent, domestic law fills the gap (Article 26).

Relationship with multilateral conventions

• Article 3 states that offences made extraditable by multilateral conventions to which both Parties are parties are also extraditable under the treaty. This extends the treaty’s scope by incorporating multilateral treaty obligations into the bilateral framework for extradition between Australia and Mexico.

Pre‑existing bilateral instruments

• Article 28(3) explicitly terminates, upon entry into force of this treaty, the provisions of the Treaty for the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals between Great Britain and Mexico done at Mexico City on 7 September 1886 as between Australia and Mexico. Article 28(5) provides transitional coverage, so requests made before entry into force remain governed by the earlier instrument whereas requests made after entry into force are governed by the new treaty regardless of the date of the offence.

Domestic law constraints and "to the extent permitted by law" clauses

• Several treaty provisions are expressly subject to the domestic law of the Requested Party. For example, Article 16(2) permits extradition notwithstanding non‑compliance with documentary requirements where the person sought consents. Article 10(2) requires the Requested Party, when refusing extradition of a national, to submit the case for domestic prosecution "to the extent permitted by its law", and mandates that documents be sent "free of charge in the manner provided for in Article 16". Article 23(1) conditions delivery of property on the laws of the Requested Party. These "to the extent permitted by law" formulations explicitly embed domestic legal constraints into the treaty operation and require Australian decision‑makers to invoke domestic law when assessing practical compliance or cooperation.

International human‑rights law reference

• Article 14(a) invokes a ground where extradition is barred if the offence carries a punishment of the kind referred to in Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The treaty thereby references an external human‑rights standard, creating an interaction between bilateral extradition obligations and the Parties’ international human‑rights commitments.

Diplomatic and consular legalisation

• Article 15 sets different authentication requirements for documents depending on the requesting State. Australian requests to Mexico must be certified by a competent judicial authority of Australia and legalised by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and by the Mexican diplomatic or consular representative accredited to Australia (Article 15(b)). That imposes an interaction between criminal‑justice processes and foreign‑affairs legalisation procedures.

Transit and competing treaty obligations

• Article 24 governs transit requests between the Parties for movement of prisoners through the other Party’s territory. Article 20 requires the Requested Party, when concurrent requests are received from one Party and other States, to determine priority having regard to the circumstances including other treaties under which the Requested Party has obligations. That introduces an interaction between bilateral treaty obligations and other concurrent extradition requests under different treaties.

Costs and domestic budgeting

• Article 27 allocates transport costs to the Requesting Party and other in‑territory expenses to the Requested Party, creating budgetary interactions for domestic agencies that execute arrests, detentions and property seizures.

In short, the treaty operates as an overlay on domestic extradition law, invoking domestic limits and administrative procedures in multiple provisions and explicitly drawing in multilateral conventions and prior bilateral instruments, while preserving the application of domestic law where the treaty is silent.

The instrument as presented contains the original Regulations and the treaty Schedule. The Regulations were made by the Governor‑General on 21 March 1991 and commenced on 27 March 1991 (regs 1-2). The Schedule sets out the Treaty on Extradition between Australia and the United Mexican States done at Canberra on 22 June 1990. The printed material indicates the treaty was notified in the Commonwealth of Australia Gazette on 26 March 1991 (Note).

The treaty itself contains a mechanism for termination by written notice through diplomatic channels, taking effect on the 180th day after notice is given (Article 28(2)). The treaty also states that it will enter into force once the Parties notify each other in writing that their domestic requirements for entry into force have been complied with (Article 28(1)). The treaty therefore contemplates future amendment only by subsequent agreement between the Parties, or unilateral termination in accordance with Article 28(2). The Schedule does not include provisions for amendment by one Party alone.

No post‑enactment amendments to the Regulations or to the text of the Schedule are recorded within the instrument supplied. The instrument does not record any amendments, variations or later Orders in Council, and it does not list any subsequent Notifications or Exchanges of Notes that would vary authentication arrangements, timeframes or other treaty terms. The printed Note indicates the Gazette notification date only.

If either Party were to seek to alter treaty operation, standard international practice would require an exchange of diplomatic communications or a formal amendment protocol, and on the Australian side any domestic effect would require that the Extradition Act continue to be applied subject to the new treaty terms under a fresh instrument or an amendment to these Regulations. The treaty’s own termination clause provides a defined exit route that would alter the legal framework on expiry of the 180‑day notice period.

The instrument and the Schedule do not identify or record any judicial decisions or litigation arising under the Regulations or the Treaty. The Schedule contains no case citations and the Regulations do not summarise any court rulings. Consequently, the text as supplied contains no litigation history to cite.

Two treaty features to note for potential litigation risk, from the text itself: first, several provisions leave substantial assessment to the Requested Party, such as whether an offence is political (Article 5(1)), whether humanitarian considerations render extradition incompatible (Article 14(b)), and whether the law permits domestic prosecution after refusal to extradite a national (Article 10(2)). These discretionary assessments are the kinds of issues that commonly attract judicial review under domestic law, but the instrument provides no domestic case law or judicial treatment. Second, documentary and authentication requirements (Articles 15-17) and the 60‑day time limits for provisional arrest and surrender (Articles 19 and 21) create procedural points where domestic courts may be asked to rule on the lawfulness of detention or surrender, particularly where a failure to comply with documentary or timing rules is alleged. The treaty thus contains procedural and substantive hooks that could give rise to litigation in domestic courts applying the Extradition Act, but the instrument does not itself record outcomes or precedent.

If parties seek to litigate points such as the scope of the political offence exception, the sufficiency of assurances against the death penalty, or the application of the speciality rule, they will rely on domestic statutory law and judicial interpretation of the Extradition Act as modified by this treaty. The Schedule does not supply those domestic interpretive materials.

The Schedule contains a number of provisions where practical effects, procedural traps and conditional language can produce unexpected results for practitioners, officials and persons sought. The following are concrete issues to watch, tied to the treaty text:

1. Dual criminality threshold is measured by maximum penalty, not name of offence. Article 2(1) requires that the acts be punishable in both States by imprisonment for a maximum of at least one year. The test is penalty‑based rather than name‑based. Practitioners must explicitly compare maximum penalties, not merely descriptive labels.

2. Convicted persons need six months remaining. Article 2(2) bars extradition for enforcement of a sentence unless at least six months of the custodial penalty remain. That is a bright‑line threshold for post‑conviction extradition requests that can defeat attempts to secure transfer for short residual sentences.

3. Differences in elements are handled by totality of acts. Article 2(3) instructs that if the constituent elements differ between jurisdictions, the totality of acts alleged shall be taken into account. That invites a fact‑intensive inquiry and may complicate dual criminality assessments.

4. Extraterritorial conduct requires domestic enabling law or discretionary grant. Article 2(4) requires the Requested Party to have domestic law allowing punishment for conduct committed outside the Requesting State for extradition to be mandatory; otherwise extradition is discretionary. This places an evidential and legal burden on Requesting Parties to show their alleged conduct is punishable under the Requested Party’s extraterritorial statutes, or to accept a discretionary surrender.

5. Authentication routes differ and can delay requests. Article 15(a-b) prescribes divergent authentication rules: Mexican requests are authenticated by signature and seal of a Mexican judicial authority, whereas Australian requests must be certified by a competent Australian judicial authority and legalised by DFAT and by the Mexican diplomatic or consular representative accredited to Australia. These steps, particularly legalisation by diplomatic representatives, can add delay and complexity.

6. Translation requirement is strict. Article 16(1) requires translations into the language of the Requested State. For requests from Mexico to Australia, Spanish‑to‑English translation is required. A missing or inadequate translation is an omission that Article 17 allows the Requested Party to require be corrected before judicial consideration.

7. Provisional arrest and surrender 60‑day cutoffs. Articles 19(4) and 21(3-4) create 60‑day periods after provisional arrest and after notice that a person is available for surrender. Failure to supply documents or to remove the person in those windows requires discharge or release. Operational delays by diplomatic channels, legalisation or transport logistics can therefore cause automatic release.

8. Rule of speciality exceptions are narrow but consequential. Article 18 preserves speciality but lists exceptions (voluntary return, not leaving within 60 days, or consent). Figuring out whether return is voluntary or whether the person has "been free to do so" can generate contested facts and possible litigation.

9. Death penalty assurances are state‑sensitive. Article 13 requires assurances acceptable to the Requested Party where the Requesting Party’s law permits the death penalty. The treaty leaves the Requested Party to judge sufficiency of assurances, which can be a significant bargaining point and may defeat extradition if assurances are absent or judged inadequate.

10. Nationals and domestic prosecution expectation. Article 10 allows refusal to extradite nationals but couples that refusal with a duty, at the Requesting Party’s request and "to the extent permitted by its law", to submit the case for domestic prosecution and to send documents free of charge as per Article 16. Practitioners should not assume refusal of nationals ends cooperation; domestic prosecution and transfer of materials are expected where domestic law permits.

11. Transit can be refused on public policy or nationality grounds. Article 24(3) permits refusal of transit requests on public policy grounds or where the person is a national of the transit State, which may disrupt cross‑border transfer plans.

12. Property surrender subject to domestic rights and proceedings. Article 23 allows temporary retention of property required for domestic proceedings and conditions surrender on third‑party rights. This creates uncertainty about availability of evidence or assets requested by the Requesting Party.

13. "To the extent permitted by law" carveouts create legal variance. Multiple provisions (Arts 10(2), 16(2), 23(1)) fold domestic legal limits into treaty obligations, producing variable practical outcomes depending on the domestic law of the Requested Party.

14. Interaction with multilateral obligations and prior treaties. Article 3 brings multilateral conventions into play, and Article 28 swaps out a prior bilateral surrender treaty as between Australia and Mexico on entry into force. Practitioners must track which instrument governs a request, particularly during transitional periods.

15. The Regulations do not spell out domestic process detail. The Regulations themselves are short and rely on the Extradition Act for domestic mechanics. Users should not assume the treaty text replaces or duplicates the Act’s domestic procedural detail; they must consult the Extradition Act for arrest, committal and review mechanisms.

In practice, these are operational hazards rather than legal invalidities. They create timing, documentation, admissibility and sovereign‑discretion issues that will determine success or failure of extradition efforts.

Compliance divides into two vectors: (A) how a Requesting Party (or its agent) prepares and transmits a request to secure cooperation; and (B) how an Australian authority receiving a Mexican request (or making an Australian request to Mexico) should act under the Regulations and the treaty. The text prescribes detailed steps and optional alternatives. The following is a compliance checklist mapped to the treaty text.

A. Preparing a request (Requesting Party requirements under Articles 15-16 and 19)

• Use diplomatic channels for standard requests. Article 15(1) requires that the request for extradition be made in writing through the diplomatic channel. For provisional arrest, Article 19 permits any written means.

• Authenticate documents as required. If the request comes from Mexico to Australia, ensure documents purport to be signed or certified by the Mexican judicial authority and sealed with the official seal (Article 15(a)). If the request originates in Australia to Mexico, certify the document by a competent Australian judicial authority and legalise it through DFAT and the Mexican diplomatic or consular representative accredited to Australia (Article 15(b)).

• Include the documentary package in Article 16. The request must be accompanied by: a statement of acts or omissions with time and place and legal description (Art 16(1)(a)); original or authenticated copy of the warrant, commitment or conviction, or other judicial order authorising arrest (Art 16(1)(b)); statement of laws and penalties, including limitation periods (Art 16(1)(c)); identity and nationality details and location information where possible (Art 16(1)(d)); and for convicted persons, a statement of the sentence, its enforceability and remaining period (Art 16(1)(e)). Translate all documents into the language of the Requested State (Art 16(1)).

• For provisional arrest, supply the condensed package specified in Article 19(1): description of the person sought; statement that extradition will be requested via diplomatic channel; statement of existence of authorising document per Article 16(b); statement of the alleged offence and potential punishment; and a summary of alleged acts. Apply for provisional arrest through diplomatic channel where possible, but Article 19(2) allows any written means in urgent cases.

• Where the offence may attract the death penalty, prepare to provide assurances. Article 13 requires the Requesting Party to provide assurances satisfactory to the Requested Party that the death penalty will not be carried out if the Requested Party requires them.

B. Receiving and processing a request (Requested Party / Australian authority actions)

• Verify authentication and translations on receipt. Apply Article 15 authentication tests to determine whether documents are properly certified and legalised, and confirm translations into the Requested State’s language per Article 16(1). If documents are insufficient or defective, invoke Article 17 to inform the Requesting Party of omissions or defects and request correction prior to submission to judicial authorities.

• Act promptly on provisional arrest requests. Article 19(3) requires the Requested Party to take necessary steps to secure the arrest and to inform the Requesting Party of the outcome. Observe the 60‑day time limit in Article 19(4): discharge the provisionally arrested person if the full request and required documents are not received within 60 days.

• Apply the Extradition Act subject to the treaty. Under reg 5, apply the Extradition Act 1988 in relation to Mexico, constrained by the treaty’s substantive thresholds and procedural obligations. Use the treaty definitions for dual criminality, penalty thresholds and exceptions when applying the Act.

• Assess dual criminality and extraterritoriality carefully. For each charged act, determine whether it constitutes an offence under Australian law punishable by at least one year’s imprisonment (Art 2(1)), and if the alleged conduct occurred outside the Requesting State assess whether Australian law provides for extraterritorial punishment in similar circumstances or whether extradition is discretionary (Art 2(4)).

• Check for bars and grounds for refusal. Apply Articles 5-14 to check for political‑offence claims, nationality grounds (Art 10), expiration of limitation periods (Art 8), prior judgments or pardons (Art 7), military‑only offences (Art 6), special tribunal concerns (Art 9), humanitarian exceptions or ICCPR Article 7 analogue grounds (Art 14), and competency of domestic courts to try the offence (Art 11).

• Manage speciality and conditional surrender. If extradition is granted, ensure surrender arrangements include documentation to preserve the rule of speciality (Art 18), and obtain consent from the Requested Party before permitting onward detention, trial, punishment or extradition to a third State for pre‑extradition offences unless one of the Article 18 exceptions applies.

• Observe surrender timing and release obligations. Once extradition is granted, the Requesting Party must remove the person within 60 days of notification that the person is available for surrender (Art 21(3)). If removal does not occur, release is required (Art 21(4)). Build operational plans to effect transfer within that window, or document reasons for delay and coordinate with the Requesting Party.

• Secure and handle property in accordance with Article 23. If requested to secure or deliver property, assess domestic law constraints and third‑party rights. Where requested property is subject to domestic proceedings, consider temporary retention or conditional surrender as allowed by Article 23(3), and plan for eventual return where rights exist (Art 23(4)).

C. Protecting the rights of the person sought

• Raise political and humanitarian claims early. If the person claims political offence, persecution or other bars under Articles 5 or 14, ensure those claims are independently evaluated and documented prior to surrender.

• Seek assurances where required. If the person faces the death penalty or was convicted in absence, obtain the assurances required by Articles 13 and 12 before authorising surrender.

• Preserve speciality protections. Ensure records of the offence for which extradition was granted accompany the surrender and that any request to prosecute for other offences is accompanied by the documents in Article 16 and by the Requested Party’s consent if required by Article 18.

D. Practical and administrative steps

• Use the diplomatic channel for regular communications and any notifications about entry into force or termination as required by Article 28. Track the treaty’s entry into force status (Article 28(1)) to know which instrument governs requests.

• Maintain clear records of authentication and legalisation steps for each document transmitted in either direction to avoid procedural rejection.

• Establish inter‑agency protocols covering the 60‑day time limits for provisional arrest and surrender, transport logistics, and cost accounting in line with Article 27.

• Coordinate translation services to ensure complete and accurate translations into the language of the Requested State, and factor translation time into operational timelines.

• Where a Requested State refuses to extradite a national and offers to prosecute domestically as per Article 10(2), prepare to receive evidence and records "free of charge in the manner provided for in Article 16" and to coordinate domestic prosecutorial decisions consistent with local law.

This compliance checklist is derived directly from the treaty and Regulations. It assumes the Extradition Act’s broader domestic procedures and remedies will be followed; the treaty sets the international parameters that must be satisfied alongside those domestic processes.