This Act has been repealed and is no longer in force. It is retained for historical reference.
Jurisdiction
Commonwealth
Act Number
113 of 1984
Collection
act
Plain English Summary
7/10 complexity
What this law does
The Act creates a time-limited subsidy (called a "bounty") that the Commonwealth pays to manufacturers for producing specified kinds of computer and related equipment in Australia (see s.9, s.3). The bounty applies only for goods produced during the "bounty period" (6 July 1984 to 30 June 1997) (s.3).
Who is covered and who pays
Manufacturers of "bountiable equipment" are the entitled recipients, subject to conditions and registration requirements (s.9(2)–(3), s.3, s.20).
The Commonwealth pays the bounty out of public money: for goods completed before 6 July 1990 payments are from the Consolidated Revenue Fund; for goods completed on or after 6 July 1990 payments must be covered by specific parliamentary appropriation (s.34).
How much is paid and how it changes over time
The bounty is a percentage of the manufacturer’s "value added" to the equipment, with the percentage falling in stages during the bounty period: e.g. 25% for completion before 20 August 1986, then stepping down to 5% for goods completed on or after 1 January 1997 and before 1 July 1997 (s.10).
"Value added" is defined as the manufacturer’s factory cost for processes carried out at registered premises, with detailed inclusions and many explicit exclusions (notable exclusions include costs of certain bought-in parts if they would be dutiable if imported, software costs except operating software, profit, certain taxes, freight, many forms of interest and depreciation rules) (s.6).
Sourced from the Federal Register of Legislation (legislation.gov.au), CC BY 4.0.
Key administrative mechanics and conditions
The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Customs administers the Act and has principal operational powers (s.2A).
A manufacturer must have the processes carried out and the final manufacture completed at registered premises to be eligible (s.9(3), s.20). The CEO registers premises and can refuse, transfer or cancel registrations (s.20).
Manufacturers must lodge claims and returns on approved forms within prescribed time limits (claims within 12 months after completion; periodic returns within 6 months after each accounting period falling in the bounty period) (s.13(2), s.16(1)).
The CEO may make inquiries, inspect premises, require production of documents, require attendance for questioning, and administer oaths (ss.24–26). Non-cooperation can stop bounty payments until compliance (s.25(6)).
The CEO may require security (bond, guarantee or cash) from applicants as a condition of entitlement (s.22).
The CEO can determine the appropriate value added where the CEO is unable to verify a manufacturer's figures or suspects overstatement, and that determination is binding for the Act’s purposes (s.6(6)).
Eligibility limits and exclusions
Specific exclusions include equipment manufactured by the Commonwealth, States or their authorities, and certain Defence contracts where a premium compensates for local manufacture (s.9(5)–(6)).
Exports to New Zealand after 1 July 1990 are excluded if the Comptroller is satisfied the goods were or will be exported there (s.9(6A)).
The Minister may add or remove classes of computer equipment by Gazette notice (s.5), and changes to the Customs Tariff Act can affect which goods qualify (s.4). The Act contains rules treating timing of Tariff changes for the purposes of ongoing manufacture (s.4).
Compliance, verification and remedies
The Act requires record keeping (keep records for 3 years after claim) and permits the CEO to demand certified accountant certificates in some cases (s.21, s.16(3)–(5)).
Penalties and recovery mechanisms exist: fines for failing to keep records, penalties for failing to disclose over‑claims or for failure to attend/answer questions, demands for repayment where overpayments are found, and criminal sanctions under the Criminal Code apply to offences under the Act (s.21, s.15, s.27, s.19, s.8A).
The Administrative Appeals Tribunal can review specified CEO and Minister decisions under the Act (s.32).
Stated purpose and how the law would operate practically
Mechanically, the Act subsidises domestic production of particular computing equipment by paying registered manufacturers a percentage of qualifying factory costs (s.9, s.10, s.6).
The Act routes payments through administrative gates: registration of premises (s.20), claims on approved forms (s.13), documentary verification and possible accountant certification (s.16), and government payment (s.34).
Costs, incentives and trade‑offs (source‑grounded)
Who pays: The cost is borne by the Commonwealth (public funds) when bounty is paid (s.34). Payment requires appropriation for later periods (s.34(2)).
Who benefits: Benefits are concentrated on manufacturers who meet the eligibility conditions and obtain registration (s.9(2)–(3), s.20). The Minister has an explicit power to declare classes of equipment that qualify, which can expand or restrict who benefits (s.5).
Incentives for private behaviour: The bounty raises the after‑cost return to producing qualifying equipment in Australia (s.10, s.6). That creates an incentive to perform manufacturing processes at registered premises and to structure costs so more factory cost is attributable to registered‑premises activity (s.9(3), s.6).
Compliance burden and administration costs: Manufacturers must register premises, retain and supply detailed cost records, submit returns and claims on approved forms, potentially obtain certified accountant certificates, and submit to inspections and questioning (ss.20, 21, 16(3)–(5), 24–26). Those are explicit administrative and compliance requirements in the Act.
Bureaucratic discretion and verification risk: The CEO has considerable administrative discretion—registering premises (s.20), requiring securities (s.22), inspecting and requiring documents (ss.24–25), publicly declaring classes of equipment via the Minister (s.5), and determining value added where the CEO cannot verify or suspects overstatement (s.6(6)). These powers concentrate decision‑making in the agency and create points where eligibility or payment levels may be altered administratively.
Enforcement and error correction: The Act provides mechanisms to recover overpayments (ss.17–19), criminal and civil penalties for falsehoods or failures to comply (ss.15, 27, 29, 8A), and review rights to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (s.32). Those rules impose legal risk and potential costs on claimants and create administrative workload for the agency.
Implementation risks and interaction with other laws
The Act’s scope of qualifying goods depends on the Customs Tariff Act classifications and on Ministerial declarations; changes to tariffs or declarations alter which goods are bountiable and include rules for how such changes affect manufacturing already in progress (s.2(2), s.4, s.5).
The Criminal Code applies to offences under the Act (s.8A), which affects evidential and prosecutorial regimes for false claims or non‑cooperation.
Overall, the Act implements a time‑bounded, administratively controlled production subsidy targeted at specified classes of computer equipment made in registered Australian premises, with detailed rules for measuring value added, verification, enforcement and discretionary administration (see especially ss.3, 6, 9, 10, 16, 20, 22, 24–26, 34).