Australian National Airlines Act 1945

The primary addressee is the Australian National Airlines Commission constituted under the Act. Section 19A(1D) directly empowers that Commission. By operation of section 19A(3)(a), the same powers are also conferred on any “group company” within the meaning of the Australian Airlines (Conversion to Public Company) Act 1988. The text therefore contemplates both the original statutory corporation and its corporate successors.

On the governmental side, the Governor-General is given a discretionary power under section 19A(1A) to issue a Proclamation that enlivens the section in relation to additional referring States. That power is exercised on Commonwealth ministerial advice.

The States themselves are directly affected. Queensland and Tasmania are named in section 19A(1). Other States become subject to the regime once they have referred the matter and the Governor-General has proclaimed, or once they have adopted the section by State law. The cessation rules in sections 19A(1B) and (1C) mean that State legislatures control the continued availability of the intra-state power by their ability to repeal referring or adopting legislation.

Passengers and consignors of goods who use the intra-state services provided under these powers are indirectly affected, as are competing intra-state air operators who must coexist with a Commission (or group company) service that is simultaneously subject to the Act and to State law. However, the excerpt contains no direct consumer-protection or competitor-regulation provisions.

Finally, because the Commission’s intra-state operations are to be conducted “in like manner” as its other functions, any internal governance rules, reporting obligations or ministerial directions applicable to the Commission under unexcerpted parts of the Act are automatically extended to these new activities.

The excerpt is more concerned with power than with duty. The central right is the entitlement conferred on the Commission (and group companies) by section 19A(1D) to carry paying passengers and goods by air within a qualifying State. That right is expressed as a power rather than a duty; there is no obligation to provide services.

A corresponding limitation appears in section 19A(2): the Commission is under a duty not to conduct intra-state reward operations except in accordance with any applicable State law. The duty is negative in form but has the effect of requiring affirmative compliance with State licensing, safety, pricing or operational rules.

Section 19A(1D) also creates a right of assimilation: the Commission is entitled to have “the provisions of this Act” apply to intra-state transport in the same way they apply to its other functions. This incorporates, by reference, any rights, immunities, procedural advantages or funding mechanisms contained elsewhere in the statute.

The Governor-General holds a right (exercisable by Proclamation) to activate the section for additional States under section 19A(1A). States hold the right to trigger or terminate the operation of the section through referral legislation or adoption statutes, subject only to the temporal limits in the various subsections.

No explicit rights are conferred on third parties such as passengers or rival carriers within the excerpted text.

The excerpted provisions contain no offence-creating provisions, no penalty units, no infringement notice regimes and no express enforcement machinery. Section 19A is silent on sanctions.

Enforcement of the duty imposed by section 19A(2) would therefore appear to depend upon whatever enforcement regime is supplied by the “law of that State applicable to that transport”. If a State law prohibits unlicensed intra-state operations, the usual State sanctions would apply. The Commission’s obligation to observe that State law is, however, imposed by Commonwealth statute, raising the theoretical possibility of Commonwealth injunctive relief to restrain breach of section 19A(2), although nothing in the text expressly authorises such relief.

Because the intra-state functions are assimilated to the Commission’s “other functions”, any compliance or reporting obligations, ministerial oversight or audit requirements located in unexcerpted Parts of the Act would presumably apply, but again the excerpt supplies no detail.

In short, the text is constitutionally enabling rather than regulatory; it assumes that enforcement will occur either under State law or under other, non-reproduced, provisions of the 1945 Act.

Section 19A is expressly drafted to interact with three categories of legislation.

First, it cross-references the Australian National Airlines Act 1959. The temporal cut-offs in sections 19A(1) and (1A) are fixed by reference to the commencement of section 10 of that 1959 Act. The 1959 statute is therefore the legislative event that distinguishes “old” from “new” referrals.

Second, the Australian Airlines (Conversion to Public Company) Act 1988 is incorporated via the definition of “group company” in section 19A(3)(a). The 1988 Act’s corporate restructuring machinery is thus imported so that the intra-state power survives privatisation.

Third, and most pervasively, the provision is predicated on State referral or adoption legislation. Section 19A(1B) and (1C) make the continuing operation of the Commonwealth power dependent upon the continuing force of the State Acts. The relationship is therefore one of co-extensiveness rather than supremacy.

The text also acknowledges the constitutional division of powers. The repeated phrase “by reason of the reference, it is within the power of the Parliament of the Commonwealth” is a direct nod to the referral mechanism in the Constitution. Section 19A(3) further manipulates the text so as to produce an alternative operation that would be supported even in the absence of the original interstate-focused provisions.

Because intra-state operations must comply with “any law of that State applicable to that transport”, the Act expressly contemplates concurrent operation with State aviation, transport, licensing and safety statutes. There is no attempt to exclude State laws; instead, compliance with them is made a condition of the valid exercise of the Commonwealth-conferred power.

No interaction with the Civil Aviation Act 1988 or the Air Navigation Act 1920 is mentioned in the excerpt, although those statutes would obviously govern safety and operational matters in practice.

The excerpt itself is a consolidated compilation that incorporates amendments made after 1945. The most significant textual changes visible are the insertion of subsections (1A), (1B), (1C) and (3), which post-date the original 1945 enactment.

Subsection (1A) was added to accommodate referrals occurring after the 1959 Act. The reason was to keep the referral window open for later-joining States without requiring fresh Commonwealth legislation. Subsection (1B) and (1C) were inserted to provide clear cessation rules once a State withdraws its referral or adoption; this prevents the anomalous continuation of intra-state powers after the constitutional foundation has disappeared.

The most substantial modernisation appears in subsection (3), which was inserted after the Australian Airlines (Conversion to Public Company) Act 1988. Its purpose was to ensure that the intra-state power, originally conferred on a statutory Commission, would automatically apply to the new corporate structure created on privatisation. By deeming references to “group companies” and adjusting the State trigger to subsection (1C) adoptions only, the provision prevents the power from lapsing with the abolition of the old Commission.

These changes reflect the policy shift from a permanently government-owned national carrier operating under strict constitutional limits to a more flexible corporate entity capable of operating in both federal and (where permitted) State spheres. The amendments therefore serve to future-proof the intra-state mechanism against corporate restructuring while preserving the referral-based constitutional foundation.

No amendments after 1994 are reproduced in the supplied text.

The excerpt contains no reference to any judicial decision, and the instruction to ground every claim in the source text precludes reference to external authorities. No controversy, litigation or constitutional challenge is mentioned or alluded to within the provided provisions. The text is drafted in a manner that appears to anticipate constitutional objections—hence the elaborate referral language and the alternative operation created by section 19A(3)—but it does not record the outcome of any such objection.

Most practitioners assume that once a referral is made the intra-state power is irrevocable; section 19A(1B) and (1C) demonstrate the opposite. A State can terminate the Commission’s (or group company’s) authority simply by repealing its referring or adopting statute. The Commonwealth power therefore floats on a revocable State foundation, a fact easily overlooked when advising on long-term route planning.

Subsection (3) is a trap for the unwary. Its “without prejudice” opening suggests it is merely additive, yet it fundamentally rewrites the triggers in subsection (1D) for group companies. Advisers must read the subsection as creating two parallel regimes: the original for the Commission, and a modified one for privatised entities. Failure to notice the omitted words after “that State” can produce erroneous advice about the geographic reach of the power.

The phrase “in like manner as they apply to and in relation to the other functions of the Commission” in section 19A(1D) imports every unexcerpted obligation in the Act—ministerial directions, annual reporting, competitive neutrality rules—without any textual filter. What appears to be a simple enabling clause is in reality a wholesale incorporation by reference.

Section 19A(2) is not a mere comity provision; it is a substantive limitation on the Commonwealth power itself. A State law that prohibits certain intra-state flights does not merely regulate; it curtails the very authority granted by the Commonwealth Parliament. This inversion of usual supremacy doctrine is rarely appreciated.

Finally, the Governor-General’s Proclamation power under subsection (1A) is not spent. Even today a State that has referred an appropriate matter after the 1959 cut-off can be brought within the regime by executive act. The provision therefore remains a live constitutional bridge between Commonwealth and State aviation policy.

Compliance begins with verifying that the relevant State is one to which section 19A applies. For Queensland and Tasmania this is automatic under subsection (1). For other States, counsel must confirm either a Governor-General’s Proclamation under subsection (1A) or a current State adoption law under subsection (1C). Because subsections (1B) and (1C) cause automatic cessation when the State law lapses, the State statute book must be checked for repeal or sunset.

Once the State is confirmed, any proposed intra-state reward service must be designed to satisfy every requirement of “any law of that State applicable to that transport”. This requires separate legal sign-off under the relevant State aviation, transport or passenger-service legislation. The Commonwealth power cannot be exercised lawfully in defiance of those rules.

If the operator is no longer the statutory Commission but a group company under the 1988 conversion legislation, the modified regime created by section 19A(3) must be applied. That means the power is available only in States covered by subsection (1C) adoptions and the text of subsection (1D) is read without the words after “that State”.

Because the Act’s other provisions apply “in like manner”, compliance systems designed for the Commission’s interstate operations—whatever they may be in the unexcerpted Parts—must be duplicated for intra-state flights. This includes any record-keeping, reporting to the Minister, or competitive-conduct rules located elsewhere in the statute.

Finally, because the power is contingent on the continuing existence of the State referral or adoption, a compliance program should incorporate an annual review of the status of the relevant State Acts. A change in State policy can withdraw the power without notice from the Commonwealth, exposing the operator to the risk that continued flights become ultra vires the Act.