Particular 1: ground in notice of intention to cancel
36 The first particular is expressed in the following terms:
"The only ground specified in the Notice of Intention to Cancel ('Notice') dated 17 May 1999 was that the Applicant 'departed Australia the second day after getting subclass 457 visa and has not been to Australia till now'. The requirement that the Applicant be resident in Australia is to be found in regulation 457.223 subparagraph 7(f). That subparagraph was not in force at the date when the Applicant applied for the visa (14 May 1997) and therefore could not be a 'circumstances which permitted the grant of the visa' which 'no longer exist' within the meaning of s116(1) of the Migration Act".
37 What the notice of intention did is to be understood in terms of s 119 of the Act pursuant to which it issues. That section reads:
"119 (1) Subject to Subdivision F (non-citizens outside Australia), if the Minister is considering cancelling a visa, whether its holder is in or outside Australia, under section 116, the Minister must notify the holder that there appear to be grounds for cancelling it and:
(a) give particulars of those grounds and of the information (not being non-disclosable information) because of which the grounds appear to exist; and
(b) invite the holder to show within a specified time that:
(i) those grounds do not exist; or
(ii) there is a reason why it should not be cancelled.
(2) The holder is to be notified in the prescribed way or, if there is no prescribed way, a way that the Minister considers to be appropriate.
(3) The way of notifying the holder, whether prescribed or considered appropriate, may, without limiting the generality of subsection (2), be orally.
(4) The other provisions of this Subdivision do not apply to a cancellation:
(a) under a provision other than section 116; or
(b) to which Subdivision F applies."
None of the qualifying provisions has any relevant effect nor is there any "prescribed way" to be taken in account. It will be observed that s 119(1) distinguishes between "grounds", "particulars of those grounds" and "information…because of which the grounds appear to exist".
38 On my reading of the relevant passage of the notice of intention to cancel, the "ground" specified is that in s 116(1)(a). The reference relating to the applicant's departure is a particularisation of the ground. I do not therefore accept the premise of the submissions for the applicant in relation to this particularisation that the reference to departure is the only ground specified in the notice.
39 In doing so I am mindful of and accept the submissions for the applicant that the procedure for cancelling visas under Part II Div 3, sub-division E and F of the Act (ss 119‑133) replaces, in full measure, the rights conferred by the common law as belonging to natural justice. The argument for the applicant is that the notice provides no particulars of the grounds why circumstances permitting the grant of the visa no longer exist, as required by s 119(1)(a) and 120(2)(a) of the Migration Act save for the applicant's absence from Australia which was not a relevant particular, but rather a ground which was not an available ground for cancelling the visa: Eshetu v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1997) 71 FCR 300; Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Zhang (1999) 84 FCR 258 at 268-269 per French and North JJ; Merkel J agreeing at 273.
40 For the applicant it is also contended that given the central importance of the notice of intention and associated particulars required to be provided by the statutory regime for affording natural justice, it is the notice and the notice only which can form the basis for the Minister's decision to cancel a visa under s 127. Reliance is placed on the dicta of Olney J in Chiorny v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1997) 44 ALD 605 at 611 where he said:
"To advise a visa holder that the visa was to be cancelled because 'the circumstances which permitted the grant of the visa no longer exist' is not, in my opinion, sufficient to comply with the requirement that the visa holder be given the particulars required to be given under ss 119(1)(a) and 120"
That is not this position nor were the circumstances at issue in Chiorny even close to the circumstances of this present application.
41 In my view, the reference to the applicant's departure from Australia in the notice of intention to cancel is not an attempt to track the provisions of the inapplicable par (f) of reg 457.223(7). Rather, it is a particularisation of circumstances giving rise to the ground where the circumstances permitting the grant of the visa contained innumerable statements on behalf of the applicant of the need for his presence in Australia. The notice was not therefore fatally flawed because it relied upon an inapplicable subparagraph. Furthermore it put "the substance of the ground for proposed cancellation … to the visa holder in terms that are intelligible and which allow for an informed response in accordance with the procedural requirements of the Act": Zhang at 270.