Zepinic v Chateau Constructions

Public Policy

1. Applications such as this have a public policy dimension. And the vice of vexatious litigation is well recognised. It not only subjects the defendant to 'inconvenience, harassment and expense out of all proportion to any gain likely to accrue to the claimant' but it also 'involves an abuse of the process of the court, meaning by that a use of the court process for a purpose or in a way which is significantly different from the ordinary and proper use of the court process': Attorney-General v Barker [2000] 1 FLR 759 at [19] per Lord Bingham CJ; approved by Lord Phillips MR in Bhamjee v Forsdick (No 2) [2003] EWCA 1113 at [7].
2. In recent years, the courts have become more conscious of the extent to which vexatious litigation represents a drain on the limited and finite resources of the court. Two pronouncements in the English Court of Appeal well explain and illustrate the underlying rationale for making vexatious proceedings orders.
3. In Attorney-General v Jones [1990] 1 WLR 859 at 865, Staughton LJ said that there were at least two reasons for making such orders: First, the opponents who are harassed by the worry and expense of vexatious litigation are entitled to protection; secondly the resources of the judicial system are barely sufficient to afford justice without unreasonable delay to those who do have genuine grievances and should not be squandered on those who do not.
4. And in Attorney-General v Ebert [2000] EWHC Admin 286 at [50] Laws LJ articulated his anxiety by saying that the proceedings have: …been very damaging to the public interest; quite aside from the oppression they have inflicted on his adversaries. … The real vice here, apart from the vexing of Mr Ebert's opponents, is that scarce and valuable judicial resources have been extravagantly wasted on barren and misconceived litigation, to the detriment of other litigants with real cases to try.

Service & Notice

1. At this hearing, neither Mr Zepinic nor his wife or daughter appeared although in the past Mr Zepinic has almost always appeared personally and on their behalf. Perhaps he thought it was the end of the road. A few days before the hearing, he sent an email to me requesting that the hearing not take place in public. His email suggested that he was concerned to avoid the publicity that followed my dismissal of his claims on 5 September 2016. I am satisfied that Mr Zepinic was aware of the hearing date and chose not to attend. He received copies of Chateau's written submissions and the principal affidavit on which it relied.

CTTT Proceedings and Appeals

1. The chronicle starts in February 2006 when Mr and Mrs Zepinic entered into a contract with Chateau for residential building work to be undertaken at the Turramurra property. They did not pay Chateau's eighth progress claim dated 28 November 2006 ($125,000.00) or Chateau's ninth progress claim dated 20 December 2006 ($98,000.00). On 18 January 2007 Chateau filed a claim against Mr and Mrs Zepinic in the CTTT. On 25 June 2007 Mr and Mrs Zepinic filed a cross-claim alleging that that some of the works performed by Chateau were defective and that some works had not been completed.
2. The proceedings were heard in the CTTT on 26 and 27 May 2008 and again on 22, 23 and 24 September 2008. On 22 September 2008, when their cross claim had been dismissed, Mr and Mrs Zepinic made an application for an adjournment on the basis that they no longer had legal representation. The tribunal declined to adjourn the hearing. It found that Mr and Mrs Zepinic terminated the retainer of their solicitors, Gray & Perkins, on 18 September 2008 knowing that they would not be able to obtain an adjournment of the proceedings. It found that the evidence given by Mr Zepinic was 'less than straight forward', 'somewhat obtuse' and 'not straightforward'.
3. On 24 September 2008 on the final day of the hearing in the CTTT, Mr and Mrs Zepinic sought to tender the following seven letters: 1. letter from Mr Zepinic to Chateau dated 16 March 2006; 2. letter from Mr and Mrs Zepinic to Chateau dated 25 March 2006; 3. letter from Mr Zepinic to Chateau dated 29 March 2006; 4. letter from Mr Zepinic to Chateau dated 26 April 2006; 5. letter from Mr and Mrs Zepinic to Chateau dated 30 November 2006; 6. letter from Mr and Mrs Zepinic to Chateau dated 20 December 2006; 7. letter from Mr and Mrs Zepinic to Chateau dated 29 January 2007,
4. The authenticity of letters (e) and (f) was tested in a voir dire. The tribunal declined to receive them. The other letters were accepted into evidence but the tribunal invited Chateau to make submissions regarding the weight to be given to those letters. Chateau submitted that the letters had been fraudulently fabricated.
5. All of the letters have numerous inconsistencies and curious features that suggest they are not genuine. All of them appear to address weaknesses Mr and Mrs Zepinic perceived in their evidence. Prior to the hearing, neither the solicitor acting for Chateau nor Chateau had seen or received any of the letters.
6. I have concluded that Mr and Mrs Zepinic prepared the letters after the conclusion of the hearing on 22 September 2008 in response to the tribunal's enquiry as to whether there had been any correspondence from Mr and Mrs Zepinic disputing the progress claims. The tribunal held that it was 'implausible' that the letters dated 30 November 2006 and 20 December 2006 had not been produced prior to 23 September 2008 or that Mr and Mrs Zepinic did not refer to them in their 'very thorough' notice to the CTTT dated 19 September 2008 setting out the orders for which they contended. None of the letters was annexed to any of the statements or affidavits served by Mr and Mrs Zepinic. None had been pleaded or particularised.
7. The CTTT made final orders on 18 December 2008. On 13 May 2009, Mr and Mrs Zepinic filed a summons in the District Court appealing from the CTTT's orders. On 21 July they filed an amended summons. On 20 November 2009, the amended summons was dismissed with costs.

Appeals to Court of Appeal

1. Undeterred, on 19 February 2010, Mr and Mrs Zepinic filed a summons seeking leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal from the orders made in the District Court. On 10 May, the Court of Appeal dismissed the summons seeking leave to appeal and ordered Mr and Mrs Zepinic to pay Chateau's costs.
2. In dismissing the summons, the Court of Appeal found that the summons for leave to appeal was not served within the time limited by the Rules; the summary of argument did 'not even come close to complying with the Rules'; the summary of argument failed to grapple with the real issues that were determined in the District Court; and that it would be futile to allow the matter to proceed.
3. Three years later, on 9 July 2013, after he had taken up residence in the United Kingdom, Mr Zepinic returned to the fray. He filed a notice of motion in the Court of Appeal relating to the orders made in the District Court in 2009. Neither the notice of motion, nor the affidavit in support disclosed any reasonable ground for the orders sought. The notice of motion was followed on 6 August 2013 by an amended notice of motion seeking, among other things, to set aside the 'ex parte Judgment by McColl JA made on 1 July 2013' (sic).
4. Annexure 2 to Mr Zepinic's supporting affidavit was a letter which purported to be dated 8 September 2009. Chateau's solicitor first saw the letter when he was provided with a copy of the affidavit. This letter also has many suspicious features. I am satisfied that it was prepared dishonestly. Among many other things, it was not referred to in Mr Zepinic's affidavit of 25 April 2013 in other proceedings that he commenced earlier that year in the Supreme Court. The 25 April affidavit purported to provide a detailed chronology of the issues that he considered relevant to his contract dispute.
5. Mr Zepinic's submissions in support of his amended notice of motion contained the following allegations: Chateau 'fraudulently amended the work stage completion criteria in the payment claims…'; 'Chateau misled the Court that served documents in accordance with an agreement between the parties….'; 'both affidavits by [Chateau's solicitor] contain fraudulent statements and false information…'. I am satisfied there was no proper basis for them.
6. On 18 February 2014, the Court of Appeal dismissed Mr Zepinic's amended notice of motion, stating at [22]: [Mr Zepinic's] affidavit accuses Chateau Constructions of fraudulent conduct and "deliberately and knowingly perverting the course of justice and obstructing the administration of public justice". There is no basis in the material before this Court to support those statements
7. Mr Zepinic tried again. On 30 April 2014, he filed a further notice of motion, this time seeking to set aside the orders of the Court of Appeal made on 18 February 2014, as well as certain further orders made on 3 April 2014.
8. In his supporting affidavit filed on 30 April 2014, Mr Zepinic made the following allegations. There was no proper basis for them: 1. '…Chateau continuously and willingly abused the system in order to achieve a benefit by deception and had perverted the course of justice. Unfortunately, in doing this quite freely without having any consequences they misled the courts providing false and fraudulent evidence. On the other hand, some staff and officers of the court fall short of the standard of competence and diligence in their duties while dealing with the Chateau's applications'; 2. '[t]here is a history that the Chateau and their legal representatives had abused the system and misled the Court in regard of filing and serving documents'; 3. '[o]n or around mid-September 2009, the Chateau commenced proceedings at the Supreme Court of NSW with the alleged 'Calderbank' letter fraudulently submitting to the Court that the letter was delivered to the respondents …. Chateau did not provide 'Affidavit of service' or any evidence to 'prove' the fraudulent statement'; 4. '[t]he Chateau's legal representatives also somehow have obtained the bogus and falsified orders/Judgment made by the staff of the Court … nor who had entered these falsified orders/Judgments. However, these falsified papers Darke J has found admissible [sic]'; 5. '[o]n 13 September 2013, based on bogus and falsified papers submitted by the Chateau's legal representatives, Darke J entered orders/Judgment against Milla Zepinic who has never been served with any document, nor ever had any appearance at the Court (annexed hereto and marked '11'). Even more scandalous, Darke J entered the Judgment of selling a property on which Milla Zepinic does not have the proprietary interest, and the owner of the property (who left Australia in 2007) has never had any contractual obligations with the Chateau [sic]'; 6. '[n]eedless to say how much embarrassing and disgraceful would be for the Court and for the judicial system in general, to disclose to the public and media the above stated in para 20 (a - h). Apparently, the Court must take some action to clean own backyard from those staff and the officers of the court who abused their positions and who are not fit and proper persons to engage in legal practice'; 7. '…Chateau's legal representative misled the Court not disclosing that they by the leave of the court discontinued proceedings on 9 October 2013'; 8. '[t]he facts that the statutory requirements have not been fulfilled, the proceedings based on the fraudulent and false evidence submitted by the Chateau and their legal representatives have misled the courts and resulted an indisputable injustice and identifiable prejudice to the Appellant….'; and 9. '[n]eedless to say, the Chateau and their legal representatives have continuously, willingly and knowingly abused the system and misled the Court in order to obtain the benefit by deception and perverted the course of justice. At the same time, some staff and the officers of the court had fallen short of the standard of competence and diligence in executing their service'.
9. On 28 October 2014, the Court of Appeal dismissed Mr Zepinic's 30 April notice of motion stating that: No useful purpose would be served by summarising the material which has been supplied in support of the application. None of it comes close to establishing a sufficient cause for calling into question this Court's decision that Dr Zepinic's application to review the judgment of McColl JA in his favour should be dismissed. As was said in this Court's reasons of 18 February 2014, that application was based on a fundamental misconception.

The 2009 Charge Proceeding

1. Some years earlier on 22 September 2009, following the CTTT's finding in its favour, Chateau filed a summons in the Supreme Court seeking to enforce its charge over the Turramurra property. Eventually after much obfuscation and time wasting by Mr Zepinic, the matter was fixed for hearing on 3 December 2009. On that date, the Court made the declaration sought by Chateau and ordered Mr and Mrs Zepinic to pay Chateau's costs, including indemnity costs from 9 September 2009.
2. After the judgment, the Court (Slattery J) received a letter dated 24 November 2009 from Mr Zepinic. The letter contained the following allegations, none of which was justified: 1. 'physical attack on our daughters by Mr Malcolm McDonald and his son Alex', both of Chateau; 2. '[i]n December 2008 the Member of CTTT made decision against us totally ignoring produced evidence (exhibits) even relied on fraud and non-existing documents'; 3. '[w]e have been legally represented with perception that our lawyers and counsels acted more for the other party favour than representing us'; 4. 'on two occasions my wife was physically abused by Mr McNair and Mr McDonald from Chateau'; 5. '[t]here is no bigger crime than prosecute an innocent person and we are clearly asking what we did wrong than due to our background?'
3. On 15 December 2009, Mr and Mrs Zepinic filed a notice of motion. It was adjourned to 18 February 2010. At the hearing, Mr Zepinic tendered two volumes of documents including a number of supposedly genuine emails. None of the emails had been annexed to the statements or affidavits served by Mr and Mrs Zepinic in the CTTT. None had been produced in the CTTT, pleaded in the CTTT or referred to in Mr Zepinic's notice to the CTTT dated 19 September 2008. That notice purported to set out his detailed chronology of the relevant events. The relevant person at Chateau did not send or receive the emails and first became aware of them when they appeared in the volumes of documents tendered on 18 February 2006. The solicitor for Chateau also first became aware of the emails when he saw them on 18 February 2010 in the volumes tendered at the hearing.
4. At the conclusion of the hearing on 18 February 2010, the Court allowed the parties an opportunity to file supplementary submissions. Mr Zepinic's submissions contained the following allegations - Chateau 'misled' the Court; Chateau 'fraudulently' amended the work stages for the eighth progress claim and the ninth progress claim; Chateau 'falsely' submitted the ninth progress claim; Chateau 'fraudulently altered progress claims'; Chateau's solicitor made a 'false statement' to 'deliberately mislead the Court'; Chateau's solicitor made a 'false' allegation; Mr and Mrs Zepinic's former solicitor, Mr Roskov, made a 'blatantly false statement' in his email to Mr Zepinic dated 2 December 2009. There was no proper basis for any of them.
5. On 5 March 2010, Mr Zepinic provided submissions in reply. Among other things, they contained an assertion that a Mr Crumpton, another former solicitor of Mr and Mrs Zepinic, had engaged in 'professional misconduct'.
6. On 8 April 2010, the Court ordered, among other things, that the Turramurra property be sold. It stayed the order for sale so that the numerous costs orders against Mr and Mrs Zepinic could 'be enforced under the terms of the charge without argument'. On 15 April 2010, Mr Zepinic sent more submissions to the court. He degenerated further into hyperbole and preposterousness, stating that: 1. Mr and Mrs Zepinic's 'fundamental human and legal rights have been violated' by the Court which treated them in an "inhuman and degrading way" and they were 'not treated as equal before the law nor are they entitled to equal protection of the law'; 2. the order of the Court vesting the Turramurra property in a trustee was similar to an act of 'ethnic cleansing, if not even worse, than the atrocities [to which Mr and Mrs Zepinic] were exposed to in their country of birth; 3. Mr and Mrs Zepinic were not 'given a fair hearing in the determination of their rights and the Court obligations'; 4. Chateau's solicitor 'misled' the Court; 5. Chateau's solicitor 'deliberately mislead the Court'; 6. 'the statements given by [Chateau's solicitor] in his affidavit and in [counsel for Chateau's] submissions were not mischievous but fraudulent'; 7. Chateau tried to 'confuse the Court'; 8. Chateau's solicitor affidavit was 'calculated to deliberately mislead the Court'; 9. Chateau was guilty of criminal trespass and illegally entered the Property and Alex McDonald and David McNair (of Chateau) both 'physically attacked Mrs Zepinic'; 10. Chateau made a 'fraudulent and falsified claim'.
7. On 21 May 2010, the Court made various orders dismissing several interlocutory applications of Mr and Mrs Zepinic. In the following years, Chateau engaged in a lengthy process of having its costs assessed in the disparate proceedings into which it had been reluctantly drawn. Eventually, on 13 September 2013, the Court made orders lifting the stay over the sale of the Turramurra property, dismissed more interlocutory applications by Mr and Mrs Zepinic and made yet further costs orders against them. On 12 December 2013, a trustee was registered as the proprietor of the Turramurra property. On 15 November 2014, the property was sold by public auction to a third party.

Multiple Appeals - Charge Proceeding

1. Mr Zepinic's failure in the charge proceedings and the order for the sale of his property seemed only to propel him to new heights of litigation hysteria. On 8 October 2013, he indicated his intention to appeal and on 13 November he formally appealed. Chateau considered the appeal to be so hopeless that it applied to have it dismissed. The Court of Appeal agreed. On 1 July 2014, it dismissed the appeal and ordered Mr and Mrs Zepinic to pay Chateau's costs in a gross sum to be assessed by the Court. It also dismissed a separate summons seeking leave to appeal that Mr Zepinic had filed on 30 April 2014.
2. On 6 November 2015, Mr Zepinic filed another summons seeking leave to appeal from certain interlocutory orders made by Rein J on 18 December 2014. Chateau once again moved to have the proposed appeal dismissed. Once again the Court of Appeal agreed. On 22 March 2016, it dismissed Mr Zepinic's summons.
3. On the same date - 6 November 2015 - Mr Zepinic chanced his arm in the High Court of Australia. He filed an application for special leave to appeal from a variety of orders. On 9 March 2016, the High Court dismissed his application, stating that: The Applicants require an extension of time in which to seek special leave to appeal to this Court. A grant of an extension of time would be futile as the Applicants advance no arguable ground of appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal. An appeal to this Court would enjoy no prospect of success.
4. Four days later, on 13 March 2016, Mr Zepinic filed another application for special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia. Predictably, on 17 June 2016, it was dismissed.

Fresh Proceedings - 2016

1. In the meantime, on 31 March 2016, Mr and Mrs Zepinic commenced fresh proceedings in this court. This was a desperate, and in my view, dishonest move. The crux of the claim was that from a certain date, Nina Zepinic (the daughter) was the true owner of the Turramurra property. The statement of claim sought orders seeking to invalidate the trustee's sale of the property to the third party purchaser.
2. Both Mr Zepinic and Nina swore affidavits containing demonstrably false allegations that Nina had been the owner of the property since 15 June 2004. The affidavits and submissions also contained the now customary rag-bag of ludicrous and unsupportable contentions. They included propositions such as that the trustee who was the registered proprietor of the property 'fraudulently claimed equitable interest in the land'; Chateau 'misled the Court and perverted the course of justice'; the trustee took unlawful exclusive possession of the land; the trustee committed serious fraud; and that Chateau was in breach of domestic and international law.
3. Mr Zepinic was, by this date, so steeped in delusion that he applied for default judgment on his claim. On 5 September 2016, I dismissed the default judgment application as 'absurd' and dismissed the proceedings. As I have mentioned, my orders of 5 September 2016 resulted in two further hopeless and unsuccessful attempts at appeal to the Court of Appeal and the High Court of Australia. When those applications were dismissed, the door was finally shut; the curtain closed. There was no way forward. All that now remains is this application for orders pursuant to the Vexatious Proceedings Act and yet another application by Chateau for an indemnity costs order.

Legal Principle

1. There is no doubt about the applicable principles, which I will summarise for Mr Zepinic's benefit. Orders may be made under the Vexatious Proceedings Act if a person has 'frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings'. The meaning of that expression was considered by the Court of Appeal in Potier v Attorney General (NSW) [2015] NSWCA 129 and Viavattene v Attorney General (NSW) [2015] NSWCA 44.
2. In Viavattene, Leeming JA stated that the issue posed by the statutory term 'frequently' is not to be assessed merely by an arithmetic calculation: [49] In light of the fact that the Court must be satisfied that "the person has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australia", the interrelationship between proceedings which may in form amount to separate files with separate file numbers in the same court, is a matter of importance. The issue posed by the statutory term 'frequently' is not to be assessed merely by an arithmetic calculation.
3. His Honour emphasised that in order to address whether the conduct was vexatious, it is necessary for the court to have regard in detail to the circumstances in which each of the relevant applications was made: [67] The primary judge discerned a pattern, but in order to address whether the conduct was vexatious, it was necessary to have regard in more detail to the circumstances in which the applications were made. The adjournments were not, as a matter of substance, so numerous as the primary judge recounted. And, more importantly, an adjournment sought by an accused is very different from an adjournment sought by a civil plaintiff.
4. In Potier, Leeming JA described at greater length the threshold posed by the statutory test of 'frequently', and described the quality of the proceeding which made it vexatious, and the nature of the proceeding itself, as informing the assessment of frequency: [114] The power to make an order under the Vexatious Proceedings Act, is conditioned upon a court being satisfied that the person has 'frequently' instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australia. The meaning of a word like 'frequently' turns very much on its context; that is no different from many other protean words (such as 'adversely affect' and 'mistake': cf Independent Commission Against Corruption v Cunneen [2015] HCA 14 at [2] and [57] and CTM v The Queen [2008] HCA 25; 236 CLR 440 at [7]). It is not possible to articulate a precise test. However, the following two matters relevant to its construction for the purposes of this appeal may be noted. Each supports the conclusion that 'frequently' is a relatively low threshold. [115] First, the change in language from the predecessor provision (s 84 of the Supreme Court Act) of 'habitually and persistently' was deliberate, and plainly lowered the threshold condition. [116] Secondly, there are vexatious proceedings and vexatious proceedings. It is one thing to file urgent appeals or applications for judicial review which cause substantial disruption to courts and other litigants and participants in the legal system (for example, the adjournment of a trial), or to make serious allegations of fraud unfounded in the evidence. It is quite different to encounter some poorly known legal doctrine which denies reasonable grounds to the proceedings or renders them technically an abuse of process, or to file a series of applications for the annulment of decisions of magistrates (I have in mind the nine applications for annulment made by Mr Viavattene all listed and determined on the same day: see Viavattene v Attorney General (NSW) [2015] NSWCA 44 at [70]). That is to say, both the quality of the vexatiousness of a proceeding, and the nature of the proceeding itself, inform the assessment of frequency. [117] I can readily envisage circumstances where a litigant commences only a handful of large proceedings, making serious allegations without any proper basis, but which occupy a significant amount of time and resources of parties and the courts, which could satisfy the statutory test of 'frequently'. This illustrates the fact that '[t]he issue posed by the statutory term 'frequently' is not to be assessed merely by an arithmetic calculation': Viavattene at [49]. [118] Each of those considerations favour[s] 'frequently' being a relatively low threshold.

Disorder, Paranoia, Querulousness

1. It will be obvious from what I have said that I am more than satisfied that I should make the orders sought by Chateau. It is appropriate however to add some final observations. The phenomenon of the vexatious litigant is the subject of considerable psychiatric, not merely legal, discourse. It is generally subsumed under the diagnosis of 'delusional disorder' and sometimes referred to as 'querulous paranoia'. It is a disruptive and destructive medical condition, manifested by abnormal, usually obsessive, behaviour. According to some respected psychiatrists, it involves 'not just persistence but a totally disproportionate investment of time and resources in grievances that grow steadily from the mundane to the grandiose, and whose settlement requires not just apology, reparation and/or compensation, but retribution and personal vindication: Paul Mullen and Grant Lester, From Querulous Paranoia to Querulous Behaviour, Behavioural Sciences and the Law, 2006, Vol 24, 333-349 at 341.
2. It may well be, as some psychiatrists have suggested, that 'querulousness is a disorder of behaviour to which there may be a contribution from varying mixtures of mental disorder, vulnerabilities arising from both personality traits and social situation, contemporary sources of distress and disturbance and … the nature of the systems for resolving grievances': Mullen and Lester at 348. But I am concerned with the consequences of such behaviour, not its origins. I need not attempt a diagnosis.
3. In this case, and in many similar such cases, the litigant's enthusiasm and passionate engagement in his quest for supposed justice, obscures the essential unreality of his expectations; blinds him to the chaos that his pursuit has created; and renders him oblivious to the waste and expense that he has generated or the disproportionate court time that he has consumed. Such a litigant's level of pre-occupation, ruminative thinking, pedantic attention to the minutiae of his case and dogged persistence, serve only to hinder the efficient administration of justice. It is usually made worse by extravagant language, repeated assertions of fraud and the constant denunciation of the tactics or behaviour of the opposing party.
4. Mr Zepinic's conduct is an extreme example, but given his constant resort to exaggerated description and unjustified language, it is useful to recall the advice of Atticus Finch to his daughter Scout. She said: 'Atticus told me to delete the adjectives and I'd have the facts': To Kill a Mockingbird, Harper Lee, ch 7. And it is worth repeating my own words in McLaughlin v Dungowan Manly Pty Ltd (No 3) [2011] NSWSC 717 at [32]: …The promiscuous use of extravagant language tends to obscure the value that may exist in the underlying submission. It is timely to repeat the compelling wisdom of the words attributed to Lord Bingham of Cornhill by Lord Mackay of Clashfern in his address at the Thanksgiving Service for Lord Bingham; The Times, 26 May 2011: The effective advocate is not usually he or she who stigmatises conduct as disgraceful, outrageous, or monstrous, but the advocate who describes it as surprising, regrettable or disappointing.
5. What is clear is that Mr Zepinic, in his own right and on behalf of his wife and daughter, has become a 'vexatious' litigant in every sense of the word. Not only has he pursued one hopeless claim after another, but he has criticised or condemned his own solicitors and sought to disqualify judges who have made orders against him. His obsessive behaviour is wasteful and destructive. And it has been exacerbated by his dishonesty, which takes it to a new level of seriousness. It must be stopped. It is contrary to the public interest.

Orders

1. In proceedings No 2009/290598 I make the following orders: 1. Order pursuant to section 8(7)(a) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 that all proceedings in New South Wales instituted by Vitomir Zepinic and/or Milla Zepinic: 1. relating to or arising out of the subject matter of Consumer Trader and Tenancy Tribunal proceeding HB07/03657; 2. relating to or arising out of the subject matter of Consumer Trader and Tenancy Tribunal proceeding HB07/33225; 3. relating to or arising out of the subject matter of Supreme Court of New South Wales proceeding 2009/290598; 4. relating to or arising out of the subject matter of Supreme Court of New South Wales proceeding 2013/132492; 5. relating to or arising out of the subject matter of Supreme Court of New South Wales proceeding 2016/97515; 6. relating to or arising out of the construction contract entered into in or about February 2006 between Vitomir Zepinic and Milla Zepinic and Chateau Constructions (Aust) Limited; and/or 7. relating to the property known as 34 Turramurra Avenue, Turramurra, New South Wales, being the land comprised in folio A/348843, including, but not limited to, the sale of that property completed in or about December 2014, are stayed. 1. Order pursuant to section 8(7)(b) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 that Vitomir Zepinic, also known as Vito Zepinic, is prohibited from instituting proceedings in New South Wales: 1. relating to or arising out of the subject matter of Consumer Trader and Tenancy Tribunal proceeding HB07/03657; 2. relating to or arising out of the subject matter of Consumer Trader and Tenancy Tribunal proceeding HB07/33225; 3. relating to or arising out of the subject matter of Supreme Court of New South Wales proceeding 2009/290598; 4. relating to or arising out of the subject matter of Supreme Court of New South Wales proceeding 2013/132492; 5. relating to or arising out of the subject matter of Supreme Court of New South Wales proceeding 2016/97515; 6. relating to or arising out of the construction contract entered into in or about February 2006 between Vitomir Zepinic and Milla Zepinic and Chateau Constructions (Aust) Limited; and/or 7. relating to the property known as 34 Turramurra Avenue, Turramurra, New South Wales, being the land comprised in folio A/348843, including, but not limited to, the sale of that property completed in or about December 2014. 1. Order pursuant to section 8(7)(b) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 that Milla Zepinic is prohibited from instituting proceedings in New South Wales: 1. relating to or arising out of the subject matter of Consumer Trader and Tenancy Tribunal proceeding HB07/03657; 2. relating to or arising out of the subject matter of Consumer Trader and Tenancy Tribunal proceeding HB07/33225; 3. relating to or arising out of the subject matter of Supreme Court of New South Wales proceeding 2009/290598; 4. relating to or arising out of the subject matter of Supreme Court of New South Wales proceeding 2013/132492; 5. relating to or arising out of the subject matter of Supreme Court of New South Wales proceeding 2016/97515; 6. relating to or arising out of the construction contract entered into in or about February 2006 between Vitomir Zepinic and Milla Zepinic and Chateau Constructions (Aust) Limited; and/or 7. relating to the property known as 34 Turramurra Avenue, Turramurra, New South Wales, being the land comprised in folio A/348843, including, but not limited to, the sale of that property completed in or about December 2014.
2. In proceedings No 2016/97515 I make the following orders: 1. Order pursuant to section 8(7)(a) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 that all proceedings in New South Wales instituted by Vitomir Zepinic and/or Nina Zepinic: 1. relating to or arising out of the subject matter of Consumer Trader and Tenancy Tribunal proceeding HB07/03657; 2. relating to or arising out of the subject matter of Consumer Trader and Tenancy Tribunal proceeding HB07/33225; 3. relating to or arising out of the subject matter of Supreme Court of New South Wales proceeding 2009/290598; 4. relating to or arising out of the subject matter of Supreme Court of New South Wales proceeding 2013/132492; 5. relating to or arising out of the subject matter of Supreme Court of New South Wales proceeding 2016/97515; 6. relating to or arising out of the construction contract entered into in or about February 2006 between Vitomir Zepinic and Milla Zepinic and Chateau Constructions (Aust) Limited; and/or 7. relating to the property known as 34 Turramurra Avenue, Turramurra, New South Wales, being the land comprised in folio A/348843, including, but not limited to, the sale of that property completed in or about December 2014, are stayed. 1. Order pursuant to section 8(7)(b) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 that Vitomir Zepinic, also known as Vito Zepinic, is prohibited from instituting proceedings in New South Wales: 1. relating to or arising out of the subject matter of Consumer Trader and Tenancy Tribunal proceeding HB07/03657; 2. relating to or arising out of the subject matter of Consumer Trader and Tenancy Tribunal proceeding HB07/33225; 3. relating to or arising out of the subject matter of Supreme Court of New South Wales proceeding 2009/290598; 4. relating to or arising out of the subject matter of Supreme Court of New South Wales proceeding 2013/132492; 5. relating to or arising out of the subject matter of Supreme Court of New South Wales proceeding 2016/97515; 6. relating to or arising out of the construction contract entered into in or about February 2006 between Vitomir Zepinic and Milla Zepinic and Chateau Constructions (Aust) Limited; and/or 7. relating to the property known as 34 Turramurra Avenue, Turramurra, New South Wales, being the land comprised in folio A/348843, including, but not limited to, the sale of that property completed in or about December 2014. 1. Order pursuant to section 8(7)(b) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 that Nina Zepinic is prohibited from instituting proceedings in New South Wales: 1. relating to or arising out of the subject matter of Consumer Trader and Tenancy Tribunal proceeding HB07/03657; 2. relating to or arising out of the subject matter of Consumer Trader and Tenancy Tribunal proceeding HB07/33225; 3. relating to or arising out of the subject matter of Supreme Court of New South Wales proceeding 2009/290598; 4. relating to or arising out of the subject matter of Supreme Court of New South Wales proceeding 2013/132492; 5. relating to or arising out of the subject matter of Supreme Court of New South Wales proceeding 2016/97515; 6. relating to or arising out of the construction contract entered into in or about February 2006 between Vitomir Zepinic and Milla Zepinic and Chateau Constructions (Aust) Limited; and/or 7. relating to the property known as 34 Turramurra Avenue, Turramurra, New South Wales, being the land comprised in folio A/348843, including, but not limited to, the sale of that property completed in or about December 2014.
3. In my absence, Chateau's application for costs on the indemnity basis and in a specified gross sum should be listed for hearing before another judge at a date to be fixed by the Registrar. I list the proceedings for mention in the Registrar's list on Thursday, 8 June 2017.

Amendments 26 May 2017 - Minor typographical errors paras 25, 40 and 51 DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 15 May 2018