Ground of appeal
9 The sole ground on which the court has been asked to revisit the applicant's sentence is that evidence of "real significance" to the sentencing proceedings was not brought to the attention of the sentencing Judge as a result of which a miscarriage of justice has occurred.
10 The simple matter at issue here is assistance that the applicant had provided to the authorities. It seems by a combination of mismanagement and oversight the sentencing court's attention was not drawn to a letter of assistance which had been prepared by the officer-in-charge of the investigation into the offence committed by the applicant.
11 The applicant sought to place before this court the letter of assistance (Exhibit 1 Confidential) and three affidavits which sought to explain the circumstances in which the letter of assistance had not been placed before the sentencing Judge.
12 The Crown opposed the admission of this material on the basis that no miscarriage of justice had occurred in the sentencing procedure, and that therefore the admission of the evidence was not justified. Alternatively, the Crown submitted that, should the material admitted, its reception ought not lead, in the particular circumstances of the matter, to a lessening of the sentence imposed.
13 In the event, the court ruled that the material should be admitted. The court did so on the basis that it would be unfair to the applicant to deny him the opportunity of arguing that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred because of the unfortunate circumstances that led to the material not being placed before the sentencing court. It was the Court's view that the interests of justice required that course to be followed. (Many v R (1990) 51 A Crim R 54)
14 Mr O'Sullivan argued that the assistance provided to the authorities was significant. However, the material placed before this Court suggests that the conviction of another person resulted and so far as it can be ascertained, the offence must have been of a relatively minor nature. The person concerned was sentenced to a nine month custodial sentence with a non-parole period of six months. I have difficulty in seeing that any discount allowed for assistance would have been any greater than 10%. Indeed, it is difficult to see that it would reach that level. This consideration, although not determinative, reflects the position that any further discount would have been of a very minor nature. In practical terms, given the structure of the sentence imposed on the applicant, it would have resulted in a reduction of no more than a few weeks.
15 A further question for determination in the present appeal is whether the public policy considerations dealing with assistance to the authorities require, in the present circumstances, that the applicant be allowed a further discount on sentence. There is no doubt that this is an important public policy consideration. In the present matter, however, it has the tendency to come into conflict with the fundamental statutory obligation of the court as directed in s 6(3) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912. That section requires the court to dismiss the sentencing appeal unless it is of the opinion that some other sentence, whether more or less severe, is warranted in law and should have been passed. The Crown's ultimate submission, as I have indicated, is that the sentence imposed here was so lenient that any further reduction of it would result in a sentence which was, in fact, unreasonably disproportionate to the offence.
16 In my opinion, the Crown submission must carry the day in the present matter. This was undoubtedly an objectively serious offence carried out for a clear commercial purpose. It was a relatively large scale domestic operation. The sentencing Judge was correct in finding that the cultivation was a highly sophisticated one and that the offence was not an isolated instance or occurrence. There was a justification for the sentence ultimately imposed - two years and six months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 12 months - but it was a very lenient sentence indeed.
17 For these reasons, I would conclude that this is not a case in which the court should intervene to reduce the sentence. The circumstances of the case, especially the leniency of the sentence and the minimal nature of the discount that might be given, satisfy me that, even with the element of the assistance, no lesser sentence was warranted than that which has been imposed.
18 In those circumstances, I would grant leave to appeal but dismiss the appeal against sentence. Those are the orders I propose.
19 Buddin J: I agree with Whealy J