See also McCurry v. FCT 98 ATC 4487 and the cases therein cited.
121 In my opinion, the enterprise in which Mr and Mrs Tesoriero engaged, although elaborate in its legal structure, was nothing more than a concerted "plan, design or programme of action" put into effect by the venturers to achieve a commercial purpose. The whole of the venture, as embodied in the structure of corporation, partnership and trust, was an undertaking or scheme for the purposes of s.25A(1) ITAA.
122 The second issue to which Mr Budai had to address himself was: whose intention is the determinative intention for the purpose of ascertaining whether the undertaking or scheme is a "profit-making" one under s.25A ITAA?
123 The ITAA does not define what constitutes a "profit-making" scheme or undertaking. Section 25A does not make it clear whether, if a taxpayer engages in an enterprise with others, the character of the enterprise as a profit-making scheme or undertaking is determined by reference to the taxpayer's own dominant purpose in engaging in the enterprise, or by reference to the dominant purposes of all or a majority of the participants in the enterprise. A third possibility is that, as far as the taxpayer's liability to assessment is concerned, the character of the enterprise should be determined by examining whether, by its very nature, it is such as to be calculated to produce a profit. All three possibilities are, in my opinion, available as a matter of construction of s.25A.
124 Probably, as a matter of reality in most cases, it will not matter which of the possibilities is selected because they will all produce the same result. For example, if three participants in an enterprise have agreed upon a plan designed to produce profits and a fourth participant, knowing of that plan, decides to join the enterprise then it will be tolerably clear that the fourth participant joined the enterprise for the purpose of participating in the profits which the agreed plan was designed to produce. It will not matter what the fourth participant protests to the contrary.
125 Neither party was able to refer me to any authority which answers these questions.
126 Fortunately, I do not need to determine the proper construction of s.25A. It is sufficient for the purposes of this case to decide whether a competent accountant could have come to the view which Mr Budai expressed as to whose purpose was relevant in determining the character of the CUT.
127 Mr Budai's advice was founded upon a construction of the second limb of s.25A(1) which determines the character of an undertaking or scheme by reference to the actual intentions of all those engaged in it, not by reference only to the purpose of the taxpayer who is merely one of the participants. This happens to accord with the view of Mr Elkan, a tax expert called by Mr and Mrs Tesoriero, who regarded the critical intention as that of Zelino as Trustee of the CUT, that intention being discernible from the intentions of the directors, who were either the venturers or their representatives.
128 Mr McGee, another tax expert called by Mr and Mrs Tesoriero, was of the contrary view. In determining whether the profits from the CUT were assessable as arising from a profit-making undertaking or scheme, he regarded the intention of Mr and Mrs Tesoriero alone as relevant.
129 In the absence of a clear intention in the text of s.25A, in the absence of authority directly upon the point and bearing in mind that Mr and Mrs Tesoriero's two experts disagree on whose intention is relevant in the circumstances of this case for the purposes of s.25A, I conclude that a competent accountant could reasonably hold either of the competing views.
130 Which of the two views is correct is, probably, of no consequence in the end result. It will be seen that in giving his advice to Mr Tesoriero in early July 1988, Mr Budai, in fact, was covering both possible views. He was, in effect, saying to Mr Tesoriero that it did not matter whether the relevant intention was that of all of the venturers or of Mr and Mrs Tesoriero alone, because the evidence clearly demonstrated that Mr and Mrs Tesoriero had the same intention as the other venturers.
131 The fundamental question is, therefore, could a competent accountant in Mr Budai's position, knowing the facts which he knew, have reasonably formed the opinion that, whatever the venturers including Mr Tesoriero might say, there was a substantial body of evidence which would indicate to the Commissioner that the venture was a profit-making undertaking or scheme and that profit-making was the purpose of Mr and Mrs Tesoriero in entering into it.
132 In my view, there was ample evidence known to Mr Budai as at July 1988 showing that all venturers, from the very inception of the venture proposal in mid-1984, intended that all townhouses would be sold at current market prices, some to the venturers and the remainder to outsiders, that the profit thereby derived would discharge the costs of construction and that, hopefully, a cash surplus would be distributed to the venturers. The cash surplus would have the effect of reducing the acquisition cost of those townhouses purchased by the venturers. In other words, I am satisfied that there was evidence available to show that the result which the venture actually achieved was the result which all the venturers intended and hoped to achieve when they decided to commit to it.
133 I have referred to only a sample of this evidence in paragraphs 52 to 72 above. Some of the documents which I have referred to had not been seen by Mr Budai as at July 1988, but their content must have been the subject of many discussions between the venturers at which Mr Budai attended, and all the documents repeat a consistent pattern showing what the intentions of the venturers were from the outset. Many other documents supporting Mr Budai's conclusion were referred to in his affidavit and in Ex.B1. It would be unduly tedious to refer to them all.
134 A competent accountant in Mr Budai's position, believing that such evidence would be available to the Commissioner, would be justified in forming the view that the Commissioner could well assess the profits of the CUT coming into the hands of the venturers as having arisen from the carrying on or carrying out of a profit-making scheme or venture under the second limb of s.25A ITAA. The profits would be represented by cash in the hands of those venturers who had chosen not to buy townhouses for themselves. In the case of those venturers who had bought townhouses, the profits would be represented by the reduced cost of the townhouses after taking into account the cash surplus distributed to those venturers.
135 To support such a view Mr Budai had not only his own understanding of s.25A ITAA but had also had the advice of Mr Cullinan in August 1986 that the venturers' scheme could be viewed by the Commissioner in the same way as the Kratzmann scheme. Further, Mr Budai had Mr Cullinan's written advice of 27 October 1986 repeating the admonition that no matter what the venturers or any of them claimed were their intentions in embarking upon the venture, the Commissioner and the Courts would look at objective matters such as how many townhouses were sold and to what extent the cost of the townhouses purchased by the venturers was reduced by the profits made by sales to outsiders. Mr Cullinan's written advice made it clear that he himself had reservations as to whether the Commissioner and the Courts would accept the venturers' statements as to their intentions.
136 I conclude that Mr Budai was not negligent in advising Mr Tesoriero and, through him, Mrs Tesoriero that, in his opinion, they and the other venturers would be liable for tax under s.25A ITAA on the profits derived from the CUT.
137 In arriving at this conclusion I have not overlooked the evidence of Mr Elkan and Mr McGee, the tax experts called by Mr and Mrs Tesoriero. Mr Elkan was of the view that the profits of the CUT did not arise from a profit-making undertaking or scheme and were therefore not assessable in the hands of Mr and Mrs Tesoriero. As I have noted, Mr Elkan's view was that it was the intention of Zelino which was material in determining the character of the venture.
138 I can give no weight at all to Mr Elkan's evidence, for the obvious reason that what was the intention of Zelino, represented by the intention of the venturers constituting its Board of Directors, was a question of fact for the Commissioner or the Court to determine, not one for expert opinion. Mr Elkan accepted at face value what he was told by Mr Tesoriero - he made no independent investigations to satisfy himself as to the truth of what he was told. Clearly, he did not see many of the documents which would have been of great interest to the Commissioner. For example, he did not recall seeing the memorandum written by Mr Tesoriero and Mr Gagliardi in about August 1984 (paragraph 45) or Mr Budai's letter to Mrs Zanin dated 15 August 1984 (paragraph 42). When shown those documents, he admitted that the former would have been material to his consideration as to the purpose of the venture and that the latter would probably have made a difference to the views he formed as to that purpose.
139 Mr Elkan did see enough of the documents, however, to warn Mr White, in a letter of 17 July 1991, that a tax audit of Mr and Mrs Tesoriero could not be contemplated. Further, he said that having read Mr Tesoriero's files, he was of the view that "there is information in them which, if discovered by the Tax Office, would make it possible to come to the view that some participants may not have shared Peter's purpose, despite what they said in loan applications or elsewhere. This is an issue that must be treated with the utmost caution."
140 Likewise, I have not given any weight at all to the evidence of Mr McGee. He was of the view that it was the intention of Mr and Mrs Tesoriero alone that was material in determining the character of the undertaking or scheme carried on by Zelino. Like Mr Elkan, Mr McGee relied upon what he was told by Mr Tesoriero and upon a very small number of highly selective documents provided to him by Mr Tesoriero.
141 In the result, the first allegation of negligence referred to in paragraph 21 above fails.
The venturers' fraudulent tax scheme
142 According to Mr Tesoriero, at the conclusion of his discussion with Mr Budai in early July 1988, Mr Budai proffered the suggestion that he "come up with something" that would minimise or eliminate tax. According to Mr Budai, the conversation was in the following terms:
"Tesoriero: 'Can't you find a way to help us?'
Budai: 'I've looked at every legal way that I could think of.'
Tesoriero: 'The important thing is not to get caught. Just see what you can do.'
Budai: 'I'll see what I can come up with.'"
143 According to Mr Budai, he had a similar conversation with Mrs Zanin on 21 June 1988. Mrs Zanin told him that she did not think that any of the other venturers would be "too fussed" about whether Mr Budai's ideas involved illegality.
144 In their evidence as to who originated the proposal for a fraudulent tax scheme, Mr Budai and Mr Tesoriero were each endeavouring to shift blame onto the other. Bearing in mind the alacrity with which Mr Budai prepared his various fraudulent proposals and the enthusiasm with which they were implemented by Mr Tesoriero, I am of the view that neither was at all resistant to the idea of fraud, although Mr Budai later went through the motions of ethical propriety.
145 By the end of July 1988 Mr Budai had prepared five "Alternatives" as to the manner in which the venturers' tax position could be treated on the basis of accounts of the CUT to be drawn up as at 30 June 1988. The first "Alternative" was to disclose and treat properly in the Trust's accounts all the transactions of the Trust. The second to fifth "Alternatives" escalated in degree the falsity of the accounts to be prepared and the complexity of the evasion mechanisms to be employed but at the end of the day, whichever of Alternatives 2 to 5 was employed, each of the venturers was intended to receive a distribution of profits from the CUT equal to what that venturer would have received if the accounts had been properly drawn up.
146 "Alternative 2" provided that the actual prices for townhouses sold to venturers would not be shown but, rather, the prices would be shown at values for those townhouses appearing in a valuation report of Jones Lang Wooton made in August 1985, less 2%. All other transactions of the CUT were to be properly disclosed.
147 "Alternative 3" provided that not only were the prices at which townhouses were sold to venturers to be understated as in Alternative 2, but various payments from the CUT to venturers, which would otherwise be assessable as income in their hands, were to be "camouflaged so that they [would] not be traceable" .
148 "Alternative 4" incorporated Alternative 3 and added the proposal that the legal title to Lots 3 and 4, which had been purchased by Mr and Mrs Tesoriero, remain with Zelino so as to enable a representation that those townhouses had not been sold as at 30 June 1988, thereby reducing the profits of the CUT. Mr and Mrs Tesoriero would gain control of Zelino and the CUT by acquiring the shares in Zelino and the ordinary units in the Trust held by the other venturers. Lots 3 and 4 would be effectively owned by Mr and Mrs Tesoriero but would retain their capital gains tax exemption, having been acquired by Zelino prior to September 1985.
149 "Alternative 5" incorporated Alternatives 3 and 4 and added the proposal that the title to Lot 2, which had been purchased by Mr Socini, likewise remained with Zelino so as to enable the representation that three of the townhouses had not been sold, thereby reducing even further the profits of the CUT. Mr and Mrs Tesoriero would acquire the units in the CUT of all other venturers save Mr Socini. Mr Socini, also, would derive the benefit that his townhouse would retain its capital gains tax exemption until he chose to sell it.
150 Alternatives 2 to 5 made no provision for two of the townhouses which Mr and Mrs Tesoriero had bought, namely Lots 11 and 12. According to Mr Budai's evidence, which I accept, Mr Tesoriero had by this time determined that Lot 11 would be shown, falsely, as having been purchased by his mother as her principal place of residence, whereby he himself would not be subject to land tax nor would Lot 11, when sold, attract capital gains tax. The title to Lot 11 was therefore to be registered in his mother's name. Lot 12 was to be the principal place of residence of himself and Mrs Tesoriero.
151 Mr Budai says, and I accept, that he explained Alternatives 1 to 5 fully to Mr Tesoriero in late July and early August 1988. He explained that the benefits of Alternatives 4 and 5, which involved Mr and Mrs Tesoriero acquiring the units of other venturers in the CUT, was that those venturers who sold their units in the Trust would account for their profit as capital gain, not income. Mr and Mrs Tesoriero would benefit in that their townhouses would remain within the CUT and would retain their capital gains exemption as Zelino had "acquired" those townhouses prior to the introduction of capital gains tax.
152 Mr Budai says, and Mr Tesoriero agrees (T265.25), that when he explained the alternatives to Mr Tesoriero in July and August 1988 he made it very clear that Alternatives 2 to 5 were not tax avoidance or minimisation but "evasion of tax through fraud" which was clearly illegal. He gave Mr Tesoriero a photocopy of the relevant page of the CCH Master Tax Guide which set out the penalties under ss.8P and8T of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 for making false statements in tax returns. The penalties, which included substantial fines, double tax and up to twelve months imprisonment, were not sufficient to deter Mr Tesoriero.
153 The other venturers were also shown Mr Budai's Alternatives 1 to 5 in August 1988 and Mr Budai gave them the same explanation which he had given to Mr Tesoriero, together with copies of the CCH Master Tax Guide pages showing the penalties for tax fraud. They, like Mr Tesoriero, were undeterred.
154 In mid-August Mr Budai prepared draft accounts for the CUT as at 30 June 1988 upon which the income tax returns for each of Alternatives 1 to 5 would be based. From these accounts he prepared a schedule setting out the effect of each of the Alternatives on each venturer. On or about 23 August 1988 each of the venturers received his or her own schedule but not the schedule of any other venturer.
155 On 24 August 1988 Mr Budai had a telephone conversation with Mr Tesoriero in which Mr Tesoriero pointed out that under Alternative 3 he would pay no tax, but under Alternative 5 he would have to pay tax on about $271,000. When asked why he should choose Alternative 5, Mr Budai said that the choice was not Mr Tesoriero's alone: under Alternative 3 Mr Tesoriero, Mrs Zanin and Count Sassoli would benefit, but not the other venturers; all venturers had to agree if any Alternative other than Alternative 1 was to be adopted. Mr Tesoriero protested that it was not fair that he had to pay tax and others would not. Mr Budai said that he would try to come up with something else.
156 Mr Budai then prepared Alternative 6, which affected only Mr and Mrs Tesoriero and Mr Socini. He provided Mr Tesoriero and Mr Socini with Alternative 6 and with amended schedules showing how that Alternative affected their respective tax positions.
157 Mr Tesoriero and Mr Budai agree that on 25 August 1988 Mr Budai explained Alternative 6 to Mr Tesoriero in detail. Alternative 6 was essentially the same as Alternative 4, with some variations: Mr and Mrs Tesoriero were to acquire Mr Socini's units in the CUT after 30 June 1988 rather than being shown to have acquired them prior to 30 June; the CUT was to pay a "management fee" to Mr Socini of about $50,000, which would reduce the disclosed profits of the CUT even further. The nett effect of Alternative 6 would be that Mr and Mrs Tesoriero would pay tax on about $140,000, whereas if a proper accounting and disclosure were made they would have to pay tax on $430,000. Mr Socini (who was also a tax client of Mr Budai) was said to have available tax losses so that he might be willing to agree to Alternative 6.
158 As with every other matter arising amongst the venturers, the adoption of a fraudulent tax scheme was the subject of protracted squabbling from August to December 1988. The disagreement had nothing to do with whether or not any venturer would be party to a fraud; it was all to do with whether one was getting more out of the fraud than another.
159 Several versions of the fraudulent accounts for the CUT were prepared by Mr Budai as he made fine adjustments to Alternative 6. Eventually, he produced a version showing figures to be received by each venturer by way of a final distribution with which all venturers were prepared to agree. These are the accounts for the CUT for the period ended 16 December 1988.
160 At a meeting on 14 December 1988 the venturers or their representatives signed a copy of the 16 December accounts by way of acknowledgment that they agreed with the amount shown therein as the amount to be distributed to each venturer by way of final distribution of the proceeds of the venture. Mr Tesoriero signed the accounts for himself and on behalf of Mrs Tesoriero; Mr Pringle, Count Sassoli's accountant, signed for Count Sassoli's company, Feangil; Mr Danieletto signed as Mr Socini's attorney; Mr Gagliardi signed for his company, Danza; and Mrs Zanin signed on behalf of Beila.
161 At the meeting Mr Budai distributed to each of those present a set of documents, comprising a page headed "The Facts" and a number of bogus minutes of directors' meetings of Zelino. Mr Budai told those present to study the documents carefully as they contained the representations that all of them would have to make in their tax returns and in the event that there was a tax investigation. The document entitled "The Facts" contained a summary of a series of Zelino directors' meetings, never in fact held, which would be necessary in order to effect Alternative 6. The meetings were all shown to be held between 13 January 1986 and 5 July 1988.
162 Mr Tesoriero does not dispute that "The Facts" stated in the document bearing that title are false, that the minutes of the purported directors' meetings referred to therein are bogus, and that he knew that at the time that the documents were given to him: Tesoriero affidavit, 16 April 1988, para.90.
163 I accept Mr Budai's evidence that he explained the fraudulent scheme to all of the venturers or their representatives before they signed the 16 December accounts for the CUT. I specifically reject Mr Pringle's evidence that he was not aware of any fraud or error in the accounts which he signed on Feangil's behalf. When confronted with statements in the accounts which he admitted he must have seen at a glance were wrong, he said that he could give no explanation as to why he had signed the accounts: see T219.1-221.5. His demeanour when giving this evidence, coupled with the inherent improbability that he gave no attention to the accounts which he, as Count Sassoli's accountant, was called upon to sign, convinced me that he was not telling the truth when he said that he was unaware that the accounts were false.
164 On 16 December 1988 the venturers received payment of their final distributions. The amount each venturer received is shown in the 16 December accounts on the page headed "Notes to the Balance Sheet" - this was the page of the accounts signed by or on behalf of the venturers. The amounts to be distributed are shown under the heading "Other Current Liabilities - Unsecured Loans At Call". That description of the payments to the venturers was false in itself, but it was merely one of a multitude of false statements in the accounts, to the knowledge of all venturers. What was important to the venturers when they signed the accounts was their own distribution figures - what Mr Budai had done otherwise in falsifying the accounts was a matter of indifference to them.
165 It is now necessary to summarise the effect on the venturers of the implementation of Alternative 6. Mr Budai was careful and precise in his evidence as to how he manipulated the CUT accounts to produce distribution figures which were acceptable to all parties and yet provided a completely false basis of accounting which the venturers could use to falsify their tax returns.
166 Mr Budai prepared a set of accounts showing "what really happened" in the transactions between the venturers and the CUT so as to explain what he had done to manipulate the figures ultimately appearing in the 16 December accounts signed by the venturers. The accounts showing "what really happened" as compared with the accounts prepared in accordance with Alternative 6 are at pp.3300-3321 of Ex.B1. His evidence in explanation is at T944-957, T965-969, T971-982 and T984-990. That evidence was not seriously challenged.
167 The effects of Alternative 6 as implemented are summarised in paragraphs 168 to 177 below.
168 It was misrepresented in the bogus Zelino minutes of 13 January 1986 and in the sales figures contained in the false CUT accounts that on 13 January 1986:
• special rights units had been issued to Mr and Mrs Tesoriero for the acquisition of Lot 12 at a price of $637,000 whereas the true price agreed to be paid for that townhouse in November 1986 was $923,496 (after adjustments;