The broad test which is sometimes expressed is that, while the meaning of an ordinary English word which is used in its ordinary and not some technical, commercial, trade or other special (for example defined) sense in a statute or document having legal effect is a question of fact, the construction of the statute or document (or the material part of the statute or document), i.e., the ascertainment of its legal effect, is a question of law: see, for example, Life Insurance Co. of Australia Ltd. v. Phillips [1925] HCA 18; (1925) 36 CLR 60 at 78 per Isaacs J.; Australian Gas Light Co. v. Valuer-General [1940] NSWStRp 9; (1940) 40 SR(NSW) 126 at 137 per Jordan CJ; Neal v. Secretary, Department of Transport [1980] FCA 45; (1980) 29 ALR 350 at 361-362; Collector of Customs v. Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty. Ltd. [1993] FCA 456; (1993) 115 ALR 1. However, the cases show that the distinction for which that test provides cannot always provide a solution and, even when it can, is often difficult to apply in practice. For example, if a statute uses words "according to their common understanding, the question ... whether the facts as found fall within these words", is one of fact, not law: Hope v. Bathurst City Council [1980] HCA 16; (1980) 144 CLR 1 at 7, per Mason J, citing Brutus v. Cozens [1972] UKHL 6; [1973] AC 854. Hope also accepts, at p. 8, citing New South Wales Associated Blue-Metal Quarries Ltd. v. FCT [1956] HCA 80; (1956) 94 CLR 509 at 512, that the "common understanding of ... words ... is a question of fact." However, it is a question of law when words used in a statute (and, by implication, any other document having legal effect) are used "in any other sense than that which they have in ordinary speech": Hope at p. 8, citing Associated Blue-Metal Quarries at pp. 511-512. Importantly, the proposition for which Brutus is cited in Hope only applies if the conclusion that the "facts fall within [the] words" is available on the evidence; it is a question of law "whether the material before the court reasonably admits of different conclusions" with respect to whether or not the statutory provision (or other provision having legal effect) is met: Hope, again at p. 8 citing Associated Blue-Metal Quarries at p. 512. A conclusion that such a provision is met without evidence which "reasonably admits of" that conclusion is consequently a mistake or error in law: cf Azzopardi v. Tasman UEB Industries Ltd. (1985) 4 NSWLR 139; Harrower v. Craig [1992] NTSC 127; (1992) 109 FLR 80; Luu v. Renevier [1989] FCA 518; (1989) 91 ALR 39 at 47; Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Teo (1995) 57 FCR 194, 199ff; Re McIntyre; Ex parte Community and Public Sector Union (1995) 131 ALR 689 at 703ff; Lim v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (Federal Court of Australia, Full Court, NG 919/94, unreported judgment 8 August 1995); cf Mahon v. Air New Zealand (1984) AC 808 at 820-821.