Young & Young v Attorney General of New South Wales

Supreme Court of NSW|2024-03-20|Before: Kunc J

Summary

The plaintiffs wish to give legal effect to their objection to being part of civil society under the rule of Australian law. If there is a way by which that can be done, they have not found it. For the reasons which follow, on the application of the defendant Attorney General (AG) each proceeding will be struck out with costs.
Each of the plaintiffs (to whom I shall refer without disrespect as Shaun and Kyle) has filed a summons naming the defendant as "His Majesty the King as represented by the Attorney General for the state of New South Wales". By motion in each proceeding, the AG seeks orders that each summons be dismissed or struck out pursuant to Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR) Pt 13, r 13.4 or Pt 14, r 14.28. Save for referring to the applicable plaintiff, Shaun's and Kyle's documents filed in each proceeding (including in response to the AG's motions) are identical. In these reasons I shall refer only to Shaun. However, each reference should be read as including Kyle.
The AG's motions came before me in the Applications List. Each of the plaintiffs appeared for himself. Mr C Gardiner, a Solicitor Advocate in the Crown Solicitor's Office, appeared for the AG and was the author of the AG's submissions in support of the motions.
In accordance with directions which I made, each of the plaintiffs filed (identical) submissions in response to the AG's submissions. The parties then agreed at a directions hearing on 15 March 2024 that I should determine the motion on the papers.

"a birthright estate (equitable estate), the priority equitable interest to lands (dominion) from the Creator/God (Yahweh) by and through my co creators (mother and father), with said equitable estate identified by my God given 'Christian name" • That, by virtue of the registration of his birth, this 'birthright estate' was 'deposited' with the Registrar General; • That the registration of his birth resulted in the creation of a legal estate (consisting of, or connected to, their surname), held in trust by the Crown; • That all interests in the estate were abandoned by the failure of the plaintiffs' parents to express any trust relationship or give directives in relation to nominating the plaintiffs as beneficiary of the trust or appointing the monarch as trustee; • That, by voluntarily engaging with various government agencies under the name reflected in their birth certificate, they "voluntarily undertook trusteeship of the legal title as trustee ex maleficio, which "further confirmed the abandonment" of the equitable estate. Further, they "unknowingly assumed possession of Crown property" by using their surname "merged" with his "God given" name; • That the plaintiffs seek to be discharged from the trusteeship of the legal title and return it to the Crown, and consequently restore their original position within the equitable estate; 15. The plaintiffs assert that they are claiming their beneficial interests in the 'birth event' recorded by the Registrar General in their birth certificate, such to "serve the Creator/God (the Father/Lord) in my birthright estate." They further assert that they are "no longer in need of any guardianship", seeks to expunge their name from electoral rolls so as no other party may execute his will with regards to the power of representation, namely parliamentary representation.

Consideration

What follows is derived from, and reflects an acceptance by the Court of, the AG's submissions.
The "birthright estate" which appears to lie at the heart of Shaun's claim is not an estate known to law or equity. It is certainly not something which is brought into existence by the act of registration of a birth or is evidenced by a birth certificate. In Llewellyn I determined that a birth certificate, either in and of itself or by its registration, does not create or evidence anything which the law would recognise as a "security". Similarly, the Court finds that a birth certificate, either in and of itself or by its registration, does not create, evidence or alter any kind of property or right in property known to Australian law, whether in law, equity or otherwise.

Conclusion

Shaun's claim is predicated upon the existence of an estate or interest in property of a kind that does not exist under Australian law. There is therefore nothing which can be the subject of the various estates or interests referred to in the summons.
It follows from the preceding paragraph that the requirements of both UCPR Pt 13, r 13.4 and Pt 14, r 14.28 are clearly satisfied. The Court finds that the summons discloses no reasonable cause of action within the meaning of either rule.
Pursuant to UCPR r 13.4(1)(b), in relation each of Shaun and Kyle's proceedings, the orders of the Court are: 1. Summons dismissed. 2. The plaintiff is to pay the defendant's costs of the proceedings. 3. Liberty to the defendant to apply on or before 4 April 2024 by email to the Associate to Kunc J in relation to any special costs application, including for costs to be assessed as a gross sum.

DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 20 March 2024

(NSW), the Trustee Act 1925(NSW)

(NSW), the Conveyancing Act 1919(NSW)

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