JUDGMENT
Introduction
1 His Honour: The purposes of this judgment are (1) to provide reasons for an order I propose to make referring the substantive dispute between the parties for external mediation, and (2) to summarise what I know of the matter in order to assist the mediator.
2 This is essentially - or, at least, it started out as - a dispute between two neighbours about relatively routine or minor drainage works, but, if this court has ever seen a case of civil litigation gone seriously wrong, this would be it. Final orders were made in March 2004 (by McClellan J), but there are four extant Notices of Motion now before the court, more than five years later.
3 Related proceedings between the parties are presently also running in the District Court. Warringah Council is a party to those District Court proceedings, but not to these Land and Environment Court proceedings. In addition, this court has been told that Mrs Young intends separately suing her former legal representatives over what has occurred.
4 I have declined to hear and determine the Notices of Motion, insisting that the legal representatives try to reach some agreement on a dispute resolution process which can be accepted by the parties and sanctioned by the court. Both sides contend that they have at various stages sought to initiate a mediation process, without success, and, in September 2003, before the court had the statutory power to order a mediation, Cowdroy J ordered a settlement conference which did not succeed.
5 Section 22 of the Land and Environment Court Act 1997 ("LEC Act") clearly imposes on this court an absolute duty, in every matter before it, to resolve "completely and finally … all matters in controversy between the parties", and to avoid "all multiplicity of proceedings concerning any of those matters". It is my considered view that now reopening these class 4 proceedings so that the parties can simply reagitate the original dispute in a further adversarial hearing will not achieve that s 22 objective in respect of the "matters in controversy" between these parties.
6 The present parties to these apparently completed proceedings have appeared before me on seven occasions this year, and the court has on those occasions expressed a strong inclination to invoke its power under Part 4 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 ("CP Act") to refer the proceedings to a mediator, with or without the parties' consent, pursuant to s 26. Part 4 applies to class 4 proceedings in this court (CP Act s 4(1) and Schedule 1). Section 26(1) relevantly provides that:
"If it considers the circumstances appropriate, the court may, by order, refer any proceedings before it, or part of any such proceedings, for mediation by a mediator, and may do so either with or without the consent of the parties to the proceedings concerned."
7 Section 27 (also in Part 4) imposes a duty on the parties "to participate, in good faith, in the mediation" so ordered. In the absence of any specific rules or practice directions in this court regarding referral of matters to mediation, I have had regard to the Supreme Court's "Practice Note SC Gen 6", published on 17 August 2005. Paragraph 7 of that Practice Note makes clear that "the parties themselves may, at any time, agree to mediation, nominate a mediator and request the court to make appropriate orders". Under par 15, the person to be appointed as a mediator must consent to being so appointed, and agree to comply with both Part 4 of the CP Act and of the Practice Note. Paragraph 18 suggests three alternative forms of order, and par 19 sets out a "Joint Protocol" regulating (1) the appointment of a mediator selected by the court in the absence of an agreed nomination (see also pars 10 and 23-30), and (2) the provision of basic referral information, at the instigation of the plaintiff/applicant, but by the Registrar. Section 28 of the CP Act regulates the payment of the costs of the mediation either by agreement among the parties or by order of the court.
8 The powers conferred on the courts by Part 4 of the CP Act are quite straightforward, and are frequently exercised, for example, in the Supreme Court. The preference, if not the usual course, is for the Judge to make a simple order referring the matter to a named mediator, outline some of the circumstances which make the order appropriate, and grant liberty to apply, e.g. Lidoframe Pty Ltd (as Trustee for Logan Cypress & Framing Trust) v State of New South Wales. [2006] NSWSC 1262.
9 The Part 4 option had little appeal for the respondents while the applicant maintained a charge of contempt of court against them, but she has indicated to the court (on and since 12 May this year) that she will withdraw the contempt prayers from among the relief sought in her Notices of Motion currently before the court.
10 Understandably, the respondents would prefer the contempt proceedings to be formally disposed of (by consent and/or withdrawal). They have also sought, without success, an undertaking from the applicant, if not to bring no further charges, at least to the effect that any discussions, correspondence, or expert report(s) involved in any settlement negotiations will not be used by her as the basis for any further contempt proceedings. As Mr Wright, counsel for the respondents, said (T26.3.09, p5, L25-29):
"it is very expensive to prosecute contempt and is not conducive to the settlement of a dispute where one party might otherwise be able to enter into free and frank discussions about resolution if it did not have hanging over it or them the risk of conviction and punishment for contempt ".
11 I make it absolutely clear that the question of contempt is not referred to mediation.
12 In their May 2008 exchange of correspondence (fols 71-78 of Mr Stern's affidavit dated 20.2.09) the respective current solicitors for the parties (Mr Muriniti for the applicant, and Mr Stern for the respondents) made some tentative suggestions in either direction as to a "practical approach … to resolve … the existing drainage problem" which Mrs Young says confronts her because of the Kings' actions. Mr Stern said (fol 72):
" The District Court proceedings essentially seek relief for matters that were already the subject of the Land and Environment Court proceedings. As such, your client is now precluded by the principle of res judicata from re-agitating those issues in the District Court (an alternative way of expressing this position is that your client's rights merged in the orders of 17 February 2004 (as amended on 19 February 2004)). In my opinion, the District Court proceedings should be struck out or alternatively permanently stayed. There is no reason to just have these proceedings temporarily stayed as the inherent flaw in the commencement of these proceedings will not be remedied by any possible orders or action that could be taken in the Land and Environment Court. I, therefore, recommend that the District Court proceedings be dismissed (with costs) and that the parties meet (on a without prejudice basis) to see if they can resolve the impasse that has developed in respect of the orders made in the Land and Environment Court".
13 On 17 November 2008, Mr Stern wrote a lengthy, detailed and open letter of offer to Mr Muriniti, "as a means of resolving finally this long running dispute".
14 The contents of those letters of May and November 2008 have been the subject of further close consideration in recent times, and agreement to an order for mediation has been reached.
15 The parties have also agreed upon a mediator to whom the matter can be referred (the Hon Mahla Liane Pearlman AO, a former Chief Judge of this court), but there remains much argument about the detailed arrangements, for example, whether independent experts should be engaged to assist in the process, and what materials should be provided to her. The court's preference is to formally refer the matter to the mediator and allow her to direct the process in consultation with the parties.
16 Warringah Council is a key player in finding a resolution of the dispute between the parties, and has indicated that it:
(1) is prepared to be joined as a party if these proceedings are reopened, and, happily,