FACTS
18 The evidence supports the following factual findings.
19 Before 2009, the Growers had achieved batch rates of up to 6.4 batches per year.
20 There had been no material change in the circumstances of any Grower reducing that Grower's capacity to take and rear chickens throughout 2009 and 2010.
21 None of the Growers experienced any disease or bio-security issue affecting that Grower's capacity to take and rear chickens throughout 2009 and 2010.
22 While some Growers may be more efficient at cleaning out their sheds than others, nothing in the circumstances of any Grower in 2009 or 2010 supports an inference that any Grower required materially longer than the period of 10 days for the cleaning out of the sheds.
23 Steggles places chickens with growers in batches. The chickens are also collected from the growers by Steggles in batches, although Steggles' practice includes "thin-outs" by which chickens may be collected from a batch in a sequence. The arrangements for the placement and collection of batches of chickens are planned weeks and even months in advance, although the planned arrangements may be changed depending on circumstances.
24 Steggles classifies chickens into different weight categories. At the Beresfield processing plant the relevant categories are small (1.75 kg ALW), medium (2.10 kg ALW), large (2.75 kg ALW) and big (3.50+ kg ALW). The growing periods for these categories are different. Small birds need a growing period of about 35-36 days. Medium birds need about 39-40 days. Large birds need about 48-49 days. Big birds need about 53-56 days. The growing period means the period from the first chick in the batch being placed in the shed to the last chicken in that batch being removed from the shed. It does not include the clean-out period, which, as noted above, is generally 10 days.
25 Steggles controls the process (including the timing) of placing chickens with and collecting them from growers. It also controls the process by which it determines its requirements for chickens in different weight categories. Accordingly, subject to the capacity of any particular grower, Steggles controls the number of chickens that a grower grows in any given year and the number of batches in which those chickens are grown.
26 An annual batch rate of 6.3 requires a growing period of no more than 48 days and a clean-out period after final collection of a batch of no more than 10 days. This means that if a grower were to achieve an annual batch rate of 6.3, the chickens grown would have an ALW of no more than 2.75 kg (that is, they would weigh no more than the average live weight of chickens in the "large" category).
27 In about 2004-2005, Steggles designated the Beresfield processing plant as a "small bird" plant. During that period the Growers did not grow birds with an ALW of more than about 2.4 kg.
28 Baiada took over Steggles in late July 2009. The principal decision-makers of Baiada and its related companies are Simon Camilleri, the general manager of Baiada Pty Limited, and his brother John Camilleri, the managing director of Baiada Pty Limited. Simon Camilleri explained that, as Steggles is owned by Baiada, he and his brother are also the principal decision-makers for Steggles. Mr Camilleri gave evidence that, at the time of the takeover, he and his brother considered that Steggles were growing both too many chickens overall and too many chickens at the smaller end of the range. Baiada's business model involves maximising every kilogram of meat that can be produced from each chicken. One element of that model is producing more chickens at the larger end of the scale. Although this business model is not documented, there is no reason to doubt that Simon Camilleri's evidence about the business model accurately reflects Baiada's approach to its business, including the Steggles business.
29 As part of the integration of the Baiada and Steggles businesses, Baiada closed its processing plant at Pendle Hill in August 2009. Simon Camilleri explained that one consequence of the closure of the Pendle Hill plant was that approximately 150,000 big birds (that is, birds with an ALW of 3.5 kg or more) were processed at Beresfield rather than Pendle Hill. In his oral evidence Mr Camilleri explained another consequence of the closure of the Pendle Hill plant. The evidence was as follows:
In making the decision that you did to process birds through Beresfield [scil] that had not come from the Hunter Valley Growing Group, in the second half of 2009, you had no regard whatsoever, did you, to clause 7.4 of the contract you had with the Hunter Valley growers? Not correct.
You made no attempt, did you, to give them any preference at all over anyone else; that's right, isn't it? Not correct.
If you had wanted to give them preference over others, all of the birds that were grown outside by other growers and processed through Beresfield [scil] could have been given to them in 2009, couldn't they? Yes. However, you would have sent 30 other growers to the wall and put them on the sword, who have brought the business from 1950 to where it is today. So it was a short-term shortfall of supply that the Hunter Valley Grower Groups, which we made up through compensation so they're not out of pocket, and we have got a sustainable outcome now with them growers and the Hunter Valley growers going full speed ahead.
Well, this was a consequence, Mr Camilleri, of a commercial decision by Baiada to close the Pendle Hill processing plant, wasn't it? That's correct.
And when you made the decision to close the Pendle Hill processing plant, you knew, didn't you, that a consequence would be a reduction in the annualised batch rates for the Hunter Valley Growing Group, didn't you? For a short term only.
And you were prepared to wear the consequences of that in terms of whatever the contractual obligation happened to be in Baiada's commercial interests, weren't you? And that we did through payment of compensation.
30 The compensation to which Mr Camilleri referred in his evidence is the damages Steggles paid the Growers pursuant to the earlier judgment.
31 Mr Camilleri also gave evidence about the effect of Baiada's business model generally on the Growers. His evidence was as follows:
MR GYLES: All right, I will put it another way. You're not saying, are you, that you were seeking to maximise the annualised batch rates for the Hunter Valley growing group at the back end of 2009, are you? Categorically, yes.
Well, how can you explain, then, the batch breaks at the end of 2009 were up to 30 or 40 days between batches? How much time do you have?
Well, are you? Two factories: one at Beresfield, one at Pendle Hill. One closes so you've got double the capacity you go from one plant. Physically, Beresfield doesn't have that capacity until we change and rationalise our business, and over the last six or nine months we have done that. So categorically, we have - we have been determined to increase our productivity and I think it's demonstrated over the past 18 months of takeover, where we've gone from an 80-day cycle down to a 64-day cycle.
But what you're really saying, Mr Camilleri, is because of matters external to the Hunter Valley growing group and the Beresfield processing plant, is that birds which would otherwise have been processed through the plant from the local growers came from other growers, agreed? In addition, as well.
In addition to what? I beg your pardon?
In addition to what? In addition to what the Hunter Valley growers were growing.
[…]
And so when you came in with your business model, which you told us yesterday, although not documented, is something that you and your brother have come up with, was to grow larger birds, all right? No, our document - our business model is to maximise every kilo we can produce off any particular chicken. So to maximise our average live weight, that's our model. Not to just grow large birds.
All right. But whatever the reason, the consequence is, you end up growing birds that were larger than were being grown before? That is correct, sir.
And what we see from the documents here, that so far as these growers go, we see the consequence of that decision not reflecting itself on the ground until, as you have said, some time beyond March of 2010? According to these documents, it's around March or even a bit sooner, depending on the grower. I just went through all of them.
[…]
Now, if that's right, obviously enough, any business strategy that the growers grow larger birds had not reflected itself in the - in practice by the end of 2009, had it? We were only in control for three or four months.
I'm not being critical at all― Right, okay.
―in this, Mr Camilleri. I'm not - what I'm really putting to you is that you came in in August 2009, agreed? Yes.
You had various things going on, including the closure of Pendle Hill? Yes.
Agreed? Yes.
That caused problems for you because it gave you an excess of shed capacity which you had to deal with in the way we discussed yesterday? Correct, sir.
You then, with your brother, came up with the business model for reasons you have just expressed to change the average live weights of the birds you were growing? That's right.
In terms of what was, in fact, happening on the ground, we don't see, in 2009, this group of growers being asked to grow or being required to grow large birds in any significant volume, do we? In the short term, no.
No? But if you look further through these documents, it shows that they were.
All right. But that's beyond March 2010? It's within that period I spoke about yesterday, that short term period, that six to nine months period.
Right. So is what you're saying that as you have read those figures, that from about March 2010, the number of large birds that these growers were required to grow were increasing? Yes. There's also that transitional period.
Right. So it must be the case, then, mustn't it, that if the decision that was made to grow large birds didn't reflect itself in these particular group of growers growing large birds until about March of 2010, that the reason that their batch rates were reduced in 2009 and the first part of 2010 was not related to the growing of large birds. That must be the case, mustn't it? The reason their growing cycles were reduced is because we had two factories; one of them closed. We had an abundance of growers for a short period of time, which was about six months, until we converted a lot of the Sydney growers to growing another species, be it free-range. They were probably growing the large birds for the Beresfield plant at that time. So by March, the Hunter Valley growers and the rest of the growing group were probably growing large birds, and that's what's indicated in this document.
Okay? So there has been that transitional period where we have rationalised both businesses into one.
But what I was putting to you was that to the extent that the batch rates were reduced in 2009 and up until March of 2010, for this group of applicant growers, that wasn't because they were being asked to produce large birds, was it? Not in the short term
Well? But that was our strategy for the business.
But can you just listen to the question. I'm not - I would just like you to answer the question, which is this. You would accept that for 2009 and for the period up until about March 2010, to the extent that these growers had lower batch rates, it was not related to them being required to grow larger birds, was it? No, there was - they were - Steggles were producing too many smaller birds.
But to the extent that the justification for the reduction in batch rates is a business model that required the growing of larger birds, that didn't, in fact, happen with these growers until - I think you have agreed - about March 2010? That is correct, yes.
All right. Now, so far as why the batch rates were lower in the period up until August 2009, you simply wouldn't know that, would you, because you weren't there? For the first period of 2009?
August 2009? Beyond my knowledge.
[…]
You know that the batch rates in the back end of 2009 were well below six batches, don't you? Yes, that's correct.
Right. And that's the reason that there was a claim made that you spoke about yesterday? A make-up payment or a compensation payment, correct.
So batch rates were - sorry, you would agree the batch rates were lower than six, right? Agreed.
In the back half of 2009? Yes, agree on that.
We also see that the breaks between batches were uncharacteristically long at the back end of 2009? We can agree on that.
Right. And there is very likely to be a correlation between the two, isn't there, that the reduction in batch rates is very likely… ? Definitely. It goes hand in hand.
32 Mr Camilleri also gave this evidence:
MR SIRTES: If you only grew small birds with the tunnel growers, what impact would that have on the Steggles business?
[…]
THE WITNESS: In answer to the question, I have two impacts. First of all, it will generate too many small birds for our market or our demands, and therefore creating over capacity. And the second thing, we will be left with a shortfall of large birds to meet our market.
33 Both parties took issue with aspects of Mr Camilleri's evidence. Steggles submitted that it could not be said that Baiada's business model had no impact on the Growers until March 2010. As the growing period does not end until the last chicken is collected, growing even one large or big bird in a batch will extend the growing cycle for that batch. In addition, the documentary records show some longer growing cycles in late 2009 being experienced by some of the Growers. The Growers objected to Mr Camilleri's evidence about the impact on Steggles' business if the Growers were allocated the capacity to grow only smaller chickens. In summary, they characterised that evidence as mere assertion, unsupported by either reasoning or any objective evidence, and indeed as inconsistent with the documentary evidence available. The Growers said this part of Mr Camilleri's evidence could not be given weight as anything more than a statement of his own belief about the impact.
34 The documentary records support Mr Camilleri's evidence about the changes to the growing periods of chickens placed with the Growers. Steggles' documents record the batches delivered to each Grower in 2009 and 2010, the number of days in the growing period (both excluding and including the clean-out period), and the number of days that the Growers had "spare capacity". Steggles' documents disclose that:
1. While individual growing periods varied, in 2009 all of the Growers had an average growing period of less than 50 days (not including the clean-out period). The average growing period (excluding the clean-out period) for each Grower in 2009 was 47.4, 47, 44.6, 48.2, 42.4, 38.2, 43.8, 48.6, 49.2, 43.8, 47, 46.2, 44.75, 48.4, 47.5, 45.2, 45.6, 46.4, 46.5, 45.4, 46.75, 47.6, 46.4, 45.8, 42.25, 49.8, 46.2, 45.6 and 49.2 days. Across all Growers the average growing period was thus 46 days in 2009. Only six of the Growers had a growing period that, on average, exceeded the 48-day period necessary to achieve an annual batch rate of 6.3 and, in those cases, the excess ranged from 0.2 to 1.8 days longer than the 48 days.
2. In the latter half of 2009, the Growers generally experienced significantly more days when they were neither cleaning out their sheds nor growing chickens in them than was the case in the earlier half of that year. Furthermore, all of the Growers had a number of these "spare capacity" days over the course of 2009. The number of spare capacity days for each Grower in 2009 was 66, 54, 74, 43, 56, 66, 68, 48, 50, 87, 65, 81, 64, 47, 62, 75, 62, 73, 63, 65, 49, 51, 80, 53, 74, 58, 68, 63 and 32 days.
3. In 2010, the average growing period for the Growers increased as compared to 2009. The average growing period for each Grower in 2010 (excluding the clean-out period) was 55.6, 56, 56.75, 52.2, 53.4, 51.8, 53.4, 55.8, 56.4, 56.5, 56.5, 56, 52, 55.4, 53, 56.25, 55.25, 56, 56.5, 53, 56, 48, 53, 56.8, 51.25, 56.5, 56, 51.6 and 55.8 days. Across all Growers, the average growing period was thus 54.6 days in 2010.
4. As in 2009, all of the Growers had days in 2010 when they were neither cleaning out sheds nor growing chickens in them. The number of spare capacity days for each Grower in 2010 was 37, 35, 59, 45, 30, 24, 45, 36, 33, 47, 53, 42, 34, 38, 37, 50, 104, 59, 62, 50, 83, 75, 54, 31, 90, 42, 36, 57 and 35 days.
35 The documentary evidence lends weight to Mr Camilleri's evidence that the impact of Baiada's business model (involving growing larger chickens) was not generally apparent until about March 2010. While a few of the Growers may have experienced one or more growing periods greater than 48 days in 2009, that experience was not representative of the Growers generally. Nor was the length of these longer growing periods greatly in excess of 48 days. By March 2010, however, Baiada's move towards growing larger chickens was generally creating longer growing periods for all of the Growers. The average growing period for the Growers thus changed from 46 days in 2009 to 54.6 days in 2010. This represents a shift from the Growers mainly growing smaller chickens (that is, chickens with an AWL of less than 2.75 kg) in 2009 to growing larger chickens (that is, chickens with an AWL of more than 2.75 kg) in 2010. And as Mr Camilleri explained, "once a farm has to grow a large bird, its growing cycle will always be [an average of] 55 days plus clean out, even if most of the birds in the cycle are small birds and are removed from the shed earlier in that cycle."
36 Mr Camilleri's evidence about the hypothetical impact on Steggles' business if the Growers grew only smaller chickens must be accepted as accurately conveying his perception of that impact. While that perception is entitled to some weight given Mr Camilleri's role in the business, it is apparent that his perception was not supported by any objective material, such as data reflecting the demands of Steggles' customers and how those demands are met across the Steggles business. Insofar as objective evidence was available, it supported Mr Camilleri's evidence about the implementation of Baiada's business model but did not permit any conclusions to be drawn about the potential impact of any change to that business model. Hence, in 2009 Steggles (using its own interpretation of its data) processed only 437,426 larger birds at the Beresfield plant. In 2010 that number increased to 4,045,000 larger birds. This clearly supports Mr Camilleri's evidence about the shift to producing more chickens at the larger end of the scale. Mr Camilleri's evidence about the business model is also supported by a summary data sheet which Steggles prepared. This data sheet shows the following:
1. In 2009 the Growers grew 65.74% of all the chickens processed at the Beresfield plant (19,0901,497 out of a total of 29,042,401 chickens). In 2010 that percentage decreased to 51.19% (17,613,534 out of a total of 34,409,425 chickens).
2. In 2009, of the chickens the Growers reared, 95.66% had an ALW of 2.1 kg or less, 4.12% had an ALW of between 2.1 and 2.75 kg, and 0.22% had an ALW of over 2.75 kg. In 2010, of the chickens the Growers reared, 49.71% had an ALW of 2.1 kg or less, 37.74% had an ALW of between 2.1 and 2.75 kg, and 12.55% had an ALW of over 2.75 kg.
3. Of the 28,604,975 chickens with an ALW of up to 2.75 kg processed at the Beresfield plant in 2009, the Growers reared 19,049,005 or 66.59%. Of the 30,364,425 chickens with an ALW of up to 2.75 kg processed at the Beresfield plant in 2010, the Growers reared 15,403,037 or 50.73%. Putting it another way, growers other than the Growers reared 9,555,970 or 33.4% (in 2009) and 14,961,388 or 49.3% (in 2010) of chickens processed at the Beresfield plant with an ALW of up to 2.75 kg. While my calculation of the number of these smaller chickens reared by other growers in 2009 differs from that of the Growers (9,555,970 compared to 9,621,058), this difference is immaterial to the damages claim, which is based on the Growers' capacity to grow a proportion of the smaller chickens processed through the Beresfield plant but grown by other growers.
37 The data sheet thus shows an increase in the number of larger chickens being processed at Beresfield in 2010 by comparison with 2009. It does not show, however, a decrease in the overall number of smaller chickens (that is, chickens with an ALW of up to 2.75 kg) being processed there. In absolute terms the number of smaller chickens being processed in fact increased from 28,604,975 to 30,364,425. Expressed as a percentage, these smaller chickens represented 98.5% of all chickens processed at Beresfield in 2009 and 88.2% of all chickens processed there in 2010. What the data sheet does disclose is that, compared to other growers rearing chickens for processing at Beresfield, the Growers have been allocated a decreased share of the smaller chickens processed at the Beresfield plant. As noted above, the percentage share of the Growers in the rearing of smaller chickens decreased from 66.59% in 2009 to 50.73% in 2010, whilst the overall number of smaller chickens being processed at Beresfield increased (again as noted above) from 28,604,975 in 2009 to 30,364,425 in 2010. The difference, as noted, was made up by other growers who increased their overall percentage share of smaller chickens grown for processing at Beresfield from 33.4% in 2009 to 49.3% in 2010.
38 If the Growers had reared all chickens processed at the Beresfield plant with an ALW of up to 2.75 kg to their respective capacities, then the Growers have calculated that they would between them have reared an additional 3,635,983 chickens in 2009 and 4,396,007 chickens in 2010. Steggles did not dispute this calculation.
39 In the light of this evidence it appears that the demand for smaller chickens (with an ALW of up to 2.75 kg) being processed through Beresfield in fact increased between 2009 and 2010 (the production being about 6% greater in 2010 than 2009). The demand for larger chickens simply increased far more. Larger chickens, however, remained a lesser percentage of the overall chickens processed at Beresfield, amounting to some 1.5% and 11.8% of the total number of chickens processed at Beresfield in 2009 and 2010 respectively.
40 Subject to one matter, there is no evidence from which it might be inferred that any particular circumstance prevented Steggles from arranging its business of allocating and collecting chickens in a manner that enabled the Growers to rear the same overall percentage of smaller chickens for processing at Beresfield in 2010 as in 2009, or some greater or lesser percentage capped only by the shed capacity of each of the Growers. The one matter which is disclosed by the evidence is that Baiada's decision to close the Pendle Hill plant in August 2009 meant that it had a surplus of growers. The evidence discloses that Baiada tried to preserve the financial viability of the growers who previously provided chickens for processing at the Pendle Hill plant by allocating to those growers batches of chickens for processing at the Beresfield plant. This strategy remained in place until about March 2010. Otherwise, the implementation of Baiada's business model did not result in an overall decrease in the number of smaller chickens being processed at Beresfield. To the contrary, and as indicated, overall demand for smaller chickens increased in 2010 as compared to 2009.
41 All of this evidence, including the evidence of the detailed planning necessary to ensure the system of allocating chickens to and collecting them from various growers meets customer demand, indicates that the consequence (posited by Mr Camilleri) of the Growers being permitted to grow only smaller chickens (with an AWL of up to 2.7 kg) - namely that it would "generate too many small birds for [Steggles'] market or [its] demands", and leave it with "a shortfall of large birds to meet [its] market" - might result only if no other adjustment was made throughout the system. It is plain from the evidence that not only is the system flexible enough to allow Steggles to allocate to the Growers the capacity to grow only smaller chickens (if Steggles wished to do so), but that this very flexibility in the system resulted, in 2010, in the Growers being allocated a substantially reduced percentage of the overall (increased) number of smaller chickens processed at the Beresfield plant.
42 The Growers have said that, had more chickens been made available to them in 2009 and 2010, they would have taken the additional chickens insofar as the capacity of their sheds allowed. Nothing contradicts their evidence and it is accepted.
43 Finally, insofar as I have referred to Baiada above, it should be understood that the evidence supports the inference that Baiada runs the business of Steggles. In that sense, decisions of Baiada affecting Steggles are decisions of Steggles itself. Conduct of Baiada affecting Steggles is conduct of Steggles itself.
44 These are the facts established by the evidence. The next question is whether the Growers have thereby proved that Steggles has breached cl 7.4(a) of the contract and, in any event, whether the Growers are entitled to rely on these facts to prove breach given the way in which they pleaded their case.