Delay
52 It is clear from the sworn testimony of Mr Sezonov, the general manager of the group which comprises the Foundation, SAF and WIL, that the applicants were aware of IBM's use of the mark P-TECH in a manner which they now contend infringes WIL's registered trade mark or contravened the ACL, from mid-2018.
53 In his affidavit affirmed on 15 July 2019 Mr Sezonov deposes that, from mid-2018, he "became aware of an instance in which IBM or IBM US use the mark 'P-TECH' in a manner suggesting it was … the owner of the mark …". He further deposes that on 1 June 2018, Ms Suh of IBM in New York wrote to Mr Wyman at the Foundation, requesting that the Foundation transfer its trade mark to IBM. He then says that IBM subsequently started "to engage in self-promotion and a marketing campaign claiming credit for the success of the Australian P-TECH Program". After referring to what he described as "the breakdown" of the Foundation's relationship with IBMA and IBM, Mr Sezonov then lists various alleged uses of the Foundation's mark by IBM and IBMA, from December 2018 until May 2019.
54 In his first affidavit affirmed on 1 July 2019, Mr Sezonov further deposes that in January 2019 he was told by the Foundation's New South Wales based P-Tech program manager that she had heard that IBM had met with the New South Wales Department of Education, and had engaged in discussions about the P-Tech program. Having been told that, Mr Sezonov, procured (so it must be inferred) the Chairman of the Foundation to write a letter dated 30 January 2019 to the General Counsel of the New South Wales Department of Education, including as follows:
It has recently come to the Foundation's attention that your Department was approached by IBM Australia in the latter half of 2018 regarding the potential of establishing new P-Tech partnerships in New South Wales in 2019 …
We further understand that representatives of the Department visited existing P-Tech partnerships in Port Stephens and Wyong in November 2018, and that the Department has provisionally approved the establishment of a new IBM-led P-TECH partnerships at Riverside Girls High School for 2019 (and potentially others) with announcements expected in the coming weeks.
…
I write to inform you that the [Foundation] owns (through its related entity Workplace Institute Ltd) the P-TECH name and trade marks in Australia (No 1768414), the domain, Facebook and Twitter accounts.
…
Therefore, without prejudice, I am writing to request a meeting, as a matter of urgency, to discuss this matter and seek clarification on the status of this potential announcement before the NSW Government makes any commitments …
…
55 It is apparent from that letter that the Foundation believed that IBM had approached the New South Wales Department of Education to expand the P-Tech programs into new schools and that there had been provisional approval of that course by the Department.
56 As senior counsel for IBMA submitted, it is telling that the Foundation did not also write to or otherwise contact IBM or IBMA, nor did it cause to be initiated any court action with respect to the conduct that they apprehended was occurring until mid-June this year.
57 Having heard no response to his 30 January letter, on 8 March 2019 the Chairman of the Foundation again wrote to the General Counsel of the New South Wales Department of Education, relevantly in the following terms:
I refer to my previous letter to you … to which I did not receive a reply. The failure to respond to the issues raised in my Letter, which were expressed to be time-sensitive, is unacceptable.
Mr Simon Whatmore, on behalf of [the Foundation], has advised me through his multiple telephone discussions with you and your staff that you have been unable to confirm whether or not:
(a) representatives of the Department visited existing P-TECH partnerships in Port Stephens and Wyong in November 2018; or
(b) the Department or Minister of Education has provisionally approved the establishment of a new IBM-led P-TECH partnership at Riverside Girls High School for 2019 or any others (sic) in NSW.
…
I hereby put you on notice that the Foundation has, through its legal advisers, issued IBM Australia with a cease and desist letter in respect of breaches by IBM Australia of the Foundation's intellectual property rights, including its registered trademark (No. 1768414) …
…
Any announcement of a P-TECH partnership by the NSW government could potentially breach the Foundation's intellectual property rights, including a pre-existing right to use the name P-Tech in Australia.
…
For the avoidance of any doubt, the Department, government, [and] Ministers Office … is hereby put on notice that any such P-Tech announcement would likely be in breach of the Foundation's intellectual property and a cease and desist letter issued to IBM Australia.
58 As senior counsel for the respondent submitted, that letter shows that the Foundation was aware of conduct in respect of which it brings this proceeding in January this year. It is also clear, from the terms of the cease and desist letter set out below, that the Foundation had been aware since March 2019 of the causes of action available to it in respect of the conduct of which complaint had been made to the New South Wales Department of Education. The cease and desist letter is a letter from the solicitors for the applicants to solicitors for IBM and IBMA, dated 1 March 2019. Relevantly it provided as follows:
…
As your client is aware our client owns and uses the names P-TECH and Pathways in Technology (the Marks) in Australia. It has lodged trademark applications for same … In addition, our client has registered the trademark No. 1768414 (in classes 35 and 41) with the priority date of 3 May 2016 (the Trademark), which incorporates the Marks.
…
Recent behaviour by your client has made it clear we need to re-state some of the key facts in this dispute and remind your client it has no right to use the Marks in Australia and doing so is a breach of our client's rights, at common law and pursuant to the Trade Marks Act and your client's conduct is also in breach of sections 18 and 29 of the Australian Consumer Law.
…
IBM USE OF THE MARKS IN AUSTRALIA
…
It is important to understand that until mid-2018 when it became apparent a dispute had arisen, your client was involved in only one of the pilot sites in Australia (namely Ballarat). At that time, it had no involvement in any other sites and your client's media coverage which suggest otherwise is misleading and deceptive.
IBM'S BREACH OF OUR CLIENTS MARKS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
…
Our client has become aware of a number of instances where your client has used Marks in a manner which suggests that it is the owner of the Marks in statements about the P-TECH Australia pilot which are just plain false, deceptive and misleading. These include:
…
Approaching the NSW Department of Education to discuss implementing a P-TECH program in NSW schools utilising our client's Marks.
…
IBM claiming responsibility for ownership of the Australian schools operating the Pilot and using the name P-Tech in various articles …
…
Your client's conduct can only be described as misleading and deceptive to the public, schools, industry partners and the Australian government (Commonwealth and State) … The conduct amounts to:
(a) A breach of the Trade Marks Act 1955 (Cth)
(b) Commission of the tort of "passing off"; and
(c) Contravention of sections 18 and 29 of the Australian Consumer Law in that you are falsely or misleading representing (sic) to others that your client's program are (sic) those of our client and/or are of a similar style or model of our client and/or that your client's services are affiliated with or connected with our clients.
…
Your client has falsely promoted itself in Australia and throughout the world as the party responsible for the implementation of a P-TECH Model in 110 schools.
…
59 The 1 March cease and desist letter goes on to demand certain undertakings, the substance of which is the same as the relief sought in this proceeding. The letter continues:
If this matter cannot be resolved on the terms outlined above, and your client fails to provide the undertakings or having provided them, fails to comply with them, our client may commence proceedings against your client without further notice, seeking the full range of remedies available to it …
60 The IBM entities' lawyers responded to the cease and desist letter by letter dated 8 March. That letter, among other things, rejected each of the claims made on behalf of the Foundation and put IBM's case that it is the author and owner of the relevant marks in the United States; that it is the author, first user and owner of the marks in Australia in relation to educational, vocational and related services; that use of the marks in Australia by SAF has been use of the marks on IBM's behalf and with IBM's consent in relation to the P-Tech model; and that IBM did not permit or authorise WIL or SAF to file any applications to register any trade mark incorporating the marks.
61 To adopt the submission made on behalf of the respondent by senior counsel: "Now, notwithstanding that complete rejection of their claims, the applicants, following receipt of this letter on 8 March 2019 did absolutely nothing for 3 months. They did not do a single thing more before writing to IBM's solicitors with a further cease and desist letter on 6 June 2019".
62 Further, as senior counsel for the respondent also submitted, during that three month period IBMA intensified its activities and took further steps to expand the P-Tech program in Australia, including by making future commitments involving third parties. In particular, during the 3-month period it determined the locations of the NSW P-Tech Schools and met with their principals. Further, the expansion of the P-Tech Model to the NSW P-Tech Schools was publicly announced. IBMA provided a P-Tech flyer to potential industry partners for the NSW P-Tech Schools and commenced discussions regarding the Proposed Qld P-Tech Schools. IBM also hosted a "Think Summit" in Sydney, during which there was a P-Tech panel discussion.
63 The 6 June 2019 cease and desist letter repeated the claims that IBMA had engaged in conduct that was misleading or deceptive and had infringed the marks, and that the alleged misuse of the applicants' intellectual property in the P-TECH name and trade mark would cause the applicants significant, and inestimable, damage. The letter also repeated demands for written undertakings to cease the relevant conduct and demanded a response within 7 days. The letter is exhibit AES-20 to the affidavit of Mr Sezonov affirmed on 1 July 2019.
64 The IBM entities' lawyers responded by letter dated 11 June 2019, in which, among other things, it was pointed out that the letter of 6 June related to matters which had been the subject of a dispute between their respective clients, and the subject of correspondence, for a period in excess of 10 months.
65 This proceeding was commenced on 17 June 2019.
66 The applicants have not proffered any explanation for the delay, other than to say that before deciding to commence this proceeding the Foundation had not been "fully aware" of the nature of the discussions between IBMA and the Department of Education in New South Wales or that IBMA was seeking to implement the P-Tech model. In my view, that submission is not consistent with the emphatic assertion of rights, and the demands made, in the first cease and desist letter, and I do not accept it.
67 In the absence of any sufficient explanation for the delay in commencing the proceeding, (which could have happened in early March this year, rather than mid-June), and in the absence of any additional explanation as to why the claim for interlocutory relief was not pressed until mid-August, in my view, that is, along with the considerations concerning the balance of convenience and the status quo that I have dealt with above, a further reason as to why injunctive relief sought by the applicants in this case should not be granted. As Campbell J said in Capgemini US LLC v Case [2004] NSWSC 674 at [40]:
If interlocutory relief is to be sought, it should always be sought promptly: Zuellig v Pulver [2000] NSWSC 7 at [36] - [37]. The court is always entitled to use, as a litmus test of the seriousness of the infringement of a plaintiff's rights which is occurring, how fast the plaintiff reacts to the infringement of its rights. It is not only as an example of the equitable doctrine of laches that delay is relevant on an application for an interlocutory injunction; it is also as an admission by conduct about how serious the infringement of the plaintiff's rights is. Thus, it is a matter which goes to the balance of convenience and not merely to the question of whether there is a serious question to be tried, which might be met by a defence of laches at the trial.
68 The passages from the judgment of Rolfe J in Zuellig to which Campbell J referred are as follows:
Each case must, of course, be judged according to the facts. However, in the present case there was no acceptable reason, so far as the evidence has disclosed, why the plaintiff did not move several weeks before it did. As Young J observed in Network Ten Limited v Fullwood (4 December 1995 - unreported):-
"Finally, the Court expects in cases of interlocutory injunction that people will act promptly. As I sit here in this duty list, if a person has let a week go by it is only in a very strong case that I can be persuaded to grant an injunction or grant short service because if a person is to seek an injunction it should be sought promptly."
Subsequently his Honour said, after considering certain submissions in relation to this matter:-
"However, there is a separate principle that on an interlocutory injunction the Court in its discretion will refuse the injunction if there has been delay which is not adequately explained. I do not consider that the delay has been adequately explained in this case. Accordingly, in my view, the defendants are ahead on this second matter."
69 The applicants relied on the decision of Goldberg J in Nintendo Co Ltd v CARE [2000] FCA 1538; (2000) 52 IPR 34 for the proposition that delay should only tell against an applicant if, during the period of delay, the respondent has substantially altered its position. They rely on the following passages at [25]-[27]:
25. The applicants first became aware of the existence of the Da' Super Mario character in or about August 1999. Information was conveyed to the American Nintendo company in or about August 1999 or shortly thereafter and nothing seemed to occur until February 2000 when the applicants were instructed by the American company to send letters of demand to the interests who were involved with the Da' Super Mario character. The delay between August 1999 and February 2000 has not been explained. Between February 2000 and June 2000 there was a further delay but that delay has been explained in part by the need for the applicants and their solicitors to be satisfied that the activities of the wrestler were being continued and to identify the particular parties involved. In this respect I note that the second respondent was only registered as a company on 11 May 2000, on which date the first respondent became a director of that company.
26. Between June 2000 and October 2000 there has been further delay but that delay has been explained by the solicitor for the applicants by reference to negotiations and discussions which occurred between the parties in relation to seeking to resolve the issues which had arisen and by the applicants seeking to obtain undertakings from the respondents which would be sufficient to obviate the necessity to have recourse to court proceedings. Delay of itself is not a disentitling factor: Wickham v Associated Pool Builders Pty Ltd (1986) 7 IPR 392 at 400. Nevertheless delay must be considered in the context of the circumstances which have occurred because if the delay has caused the respondents to alter their positions substantially in relation to the manner in which they have conducted their affairs, incurred liabilities, and incurred costs, that would be a matter to be taken into account in deciding whether or not interlocutory relief should be granted.
27. Although there has been delay, that delay does not appear to have caused the respondents to have acted substantially in a way which has resulted in prejudice if I am now to grant interlocutory relief. It does not appear that they incurred substantial costs in the interim period which will be thrown away if an interlocutory injunction is now granted. Nor does it appear that there will be a need for substantial alteration to their manner of carrying on their activities or presenting the structure of their activities or their business. Although costs may be incurred in having to prepare fresh posters or fresh promotional cards displaying the wrestlers for distribution, those costs would be well protected by an undertaking as to damages.
70 I do not read those passages, however, to mean that there is any inflexible rule that delay will not tell against an applicant for interlocutory relief, absent the showing of prejudice by a respondent. Like all discretions, whether or not an interlocutory or interim injunction should be granted, depends upon the facts of each case, and the particular nature of the need for a court to intervene, or not, pending the final determination of the rights of the parties. In my view, there is no reason why, in an appropriate case, delay of itself may (not must) be fatal. See Meagher, Gummow and Lehane's Equity Doctrines and Remedies, Fifth Edition, 2015 at [21-375] ("Obviously if the delay is coupled with some such factor as the intervention of third-party rights or prejudice to the defendant, an interlocutory injunction should be refused just as a final injunction should be refused. But authority is not wanting that on an interlocutory application - where different principles apply from those which would be applicable on a final hearing - mere delay of itself can (not must) be fatal. Why should a court grant urgent relief when the plaintiff's tardiness in applying for it casts doubt on the reality of the alleged injury?"). In any event, as I have described above, in this case IBMA has taken various steps in relation to further implementing the P-Tech Model in schools in NSW and Queensland during the period of the early March to mid-June delay. And the rights of third parties are also obviously implicated here. As counsel for IBMA submitted, the grant of an interlocutory injunction may result in the P-Tech Model not being implemented in the NSW P-Tech Schools until after trial, and would result in a delay in rolling out the P-Tech Model for the Proposed Qld P-Tech Schools, as a result of which students, schools and the education community would lose the substantial benefits to be obtained from the P-Tech Model.