And also (at 476):
In the case of an offence under s 15(1) of the OH & S Act, there are a number of factors which may tend to establish the existence of an objectively serious offence. It will be a serious offence where there is an obvious or foreseeable risk to safety against which appropriate measures were not taken, even though such measures were available and feasible: see Inspector Hannah v Wonar Pty Ltd (unreported, Fisher CJ, CT90/1214, 30 June 1992) at 9. The gravity of the consequences of an accident does not, of itself, dictate the seriousness of the offence. However, the gravity or otherwise of the potential risk to safety flowing from a breach is relevant as a measure of the gravity of the breach and the culpability of the defendant; see Tyler v Sydney Electricity (1993) 47 IR 1 at 5.
8 In the present case there are a number of objective features which are called into account in assessing the gravity of this offence. The above analysis of the worksite operation reveals there was a forseeability element to this breach of the Act and the words of Walton J, Vice President become relevant. In Department of Mineral Resources of New South Wales (Chief Inspector B R McKensey) v Kembla Coal and Coke Pty Ltd (1999) 92 IR 8 said (at 27):
Whilst the reasonable forseeability of an accident may not be relevant to the question of liability under the Act (see Drake Personnel Ltd t/as Drake Industrial v WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Ch'ng ), the degree of foreseeability is a significant factor to be taken into account when assessing the level of culpability of the defendant. The existence of a reasonably foreseeable risk to safety which is likely to result in serious injury or death is a factor which will be relevant to the assessment of the gravity of the offence: see Camilleri's Stock Feeds (at 700); James Moore v Vibro-Pile (Aust) Pty Ltd (unreported, Hungerford J, CT96/1163, 28 May 1997, at p17) and The University of Sydney (at 16).
9 In assessing the objective seriousness of this offence and the foreseeable risk to the safety of workers the following matters become relevant. The defendant knew the rubber seal had a limited life span, the defendant experimented with alternative materials but returned to rubber seals because alternative materials proved to be even less reliable; the defendant did not introduce a systematic replacement of the rubber seals while knowing of their regular failure; the defendant relied upon its employees to identify a failure in the seal before requiring it to be replaced. It is relevant to note the words of the shift maintenance fitter, Mr Ross Boughton who inspected and replaced the fitting after the event. He said:
. . . the fitting was one of the worst I had ever seen, it was badly corroded and was covered in green residue.
. . .
In my experience with these fittings the rubber seals and the two wings are always a problem. The seals last only a matters (sic) of a few days.
10 Evidence further revealed the defendant was able to redesign the application of the rubber seal to the coupling and introduce a systematic preventative maintenance system after the accident. It is noted since this new system has been introduced there has been no further gas leaks. In assessing the gravity of this offence what is revealed is that a simple proactive procedure would have obviated a major risk of injury. Since the accident greater endeavours have been made. The company has reversed the fittings on the rubber tubes and the fluxing tubes so the Kalmia couplings (the female section) is attached to the rubber tube and the male operation is attached to the end of the fluxing tube. This leads to the wear on the rubber seals being significantly reduced. Further, the male portion of the Kamlock coupling is now replaced each time the tube is replaced. There is a reliable and routine inspection of the coupling now undertaken. This inspection is insisted upon.
11 At the time of the accident the defendant had in place to ensure safety at the worksite a detailed procedure known as a Current Best Practice ("CBP") for work being performed. The CBP was regularly updated. Had the CBP been followed by Mr Mellon, the company submits, he would not have sustained any injuries at all. The company submits it is not appropriate for the court to use Mr Mellon's injuries as a gauge of the seriousness of the offence as the company had other measures in place which, had they been followed by Mr Mellon, would have mitigated against the seriousness of the offence. However, as was said in Tyler v Sydney Electricity (1993) 47 IR 1 (at 5):
The gravity of the damage or injury actually resulting from breach does not, of itself, dictate the amount of penalty. However, the gravity or otherwise of the potential risk flowing from breach and its foreseeability are clearly relevant as are the measure of gravity of the breach itself and the measure of culpability.