14A.The method for carrying out the work was devised and implemented by Nelmac. Nelmac employees performed the work and were supervised in the performance of the work by other Nelmac personnel.
15. At the time of the inspection the fourth opening from the west had a temporary sheet of ply over it with no timber bearers under the plywood. The first and third openings from the west had two timber bearers in the opening with one bearer under the join in the plywood. The formwork had been completed and the plywood nailed to the bearers to complete the third bay. The centre piece of plywood had been placed in the first opening however it is unclear if the plywood had been nailed to the bearers.
16. At the time of the inspection, the second opening from the west had a temporary sheet of plywood over it. There was one timber bearer in the opening positioned 250mm from the existing formwork deck. Marks on the concrete girders within the opening and 250mm from the southern edge of the opening seems to indicate that another bearer with metal brackets may have been positioned there. (See photographs 7, 10 & 11).
17. A plywood sheet had been cut for this opening and placed onto the bearers. This was confirmed as a sheet of plywood and terrafirma was seen falling from the opening at the time of the accident. (See photographs 12 & 13). During the inspection a plywood sheet was observed at the base of column two under the second opening. This plywood sheet when measured indicates that it was purposely cut to fit the opening.
18. The inspection of the plywood indicates that it had not been recently nailed. The few nail holes in the plywood did not match the placement of the timber bearers nor did the plywood around the holes look to be recently penetrated by a nail. There were no nails in the timber bearer still in the opening and on the ground or in the plywood.
19. At the base of column two, four timber bearers were observed. One was broken into two pieces. The break in the timber appeared to be fresh and a number of stone pieces were observed imbedded into the timber possibly caused by a fall from a height. (See photographs 15, 16 & 17). This bearer was joined together and placed into the opening that Poi fell through by Inspector P Fox and Inspector T Cassel. It fitted the opening.
20. A number of metal brackets were observed near the timber bearers used to hold the bearers in position on the concrete girders. (See photographs 1, 2, 18 & 19). One of the brackets had a 50mm nail protruding through a pre-drilled hole in the bracket. The pointed end of the nail appeared to be as new, whereas the head end appeared rusty indicating it had only recently dislodged from its position.
21. It was revealed that, on the day of the accident, Mark Poi had been requested by Noel Alcock to obtain some 'terrafirma' material to place over recently poured concrete.
22. Mark Poi has obtained the 'terrafirma' carrying it in a bundle in his arms and walked along the completed section of the bridge beside the 27 ton crane situated on the bridge. He has walked onto the formwork deck stepping over steel reinforcement bars, and unsuspectingly stepped upon the unsecured plywood, the plywood and bearers moved within the penetration causing him to fall through the bridge surface.
23. Also, other employees of Nelmac Pty Ltd were working around these openings with the task of closing them up with timber bearers and plywood, none of the employees were wearing any type of fall restraints. This would mean that at some point these persons would have been exposed to an opened penetration in the deck with a fall to the gully below.
24. Alcock was working approximately 4 metres west of the bay where Poi was said to have fallen through, while Findley and Hibberd were working approximately 3 to 4 metres to the east and Scott was located approximately 30 metres to the north of that same area.
25. Fahey was working approximately 60 metres to the north at the base of the bridge structure with a view of the underside of the bridge.
26. It is also clear that there was no fence or barrier around this work area while each and possibly more than one of these openings were exposed at some point. This allowed others who were not directly working on these openings to walk pass or over these openings.
27. An Industry code of practice, (Safety Line Systems) was kept on site in the office, but was not followed. Noel Alcock stated that "at that point in time, work was not life threatening."
28. Nelson McIntosh visited the construction site once a month to once every six weeks or whenever he was needed by the workers.
29. On the site was the representative of the defendant, Steven Budd. Budd was employed by the defendant as site superintendent. Mr Budd commenced work at 7:30 am on 4 April 1996 but he was not told about the particular work involving the penetrations being performed on the 3rd or 4th of April. It was not part of his on-site function to be consulted about how work was to be performed, as this task remained that of Nelmac.
30. Steven Budd was authorised by the defendant to issue site directions regarding safe work practices and release any hold points on the construction of the bridge. The general duties of Steven Budd were the regular surveillance of the contractor's processes and work standards to ensure that the specifications and process requirements were being met.
31. As part of the defendants supervision of the construction site, a site diary was used by the defendant to record the "works in progress" and "discussions with contractor", including "site instructions" given. Attendance at the work site by the defendant's representative (Mr Budd) was sometimes daily or every two to three days.
32. It is alleged that the defendant, Roads and Traffic Authority of NSW has breached section 17(1)(a) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act, in that, on the 4th of April 1996 at Myrtle Gully, the defendant, being in control, to any extent, of non-domestic premises, to wit, the concrete bridge construction which had been made available to persons (not being the defendant's employees) as a place of work DID FAIL to ensure that the premises were safe and without risks to health contrary to Section 17(1)(a) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act, 1983, in that it did not provide such supervision of the site as may have been necessary to ensure that persons could not fall from areas of the bridge construction site to the ground below.