3 At the hearing the defendant advanced its plea in relation to the charge, but the parties asked the Court not to determine the matter until the Court of Criminal Appeal had given its judgment in R v Thomson; R v Houlton [2000] NSWCCA 309. The parties later filed written submissions as to the principles established in that judgment, their application by this Court in various judgments and how that approach should be applied to the circumstances of this case.
4 This was the first prosecution of the defendant under the Act. The events in question occurred at a common user wharf utilised by the defendant and others, known as Throsby wharf. The wharf was operated by Newcastle Ports Corporation ('the Corporation'), which leased the wharf on a single shift basis to users including the defendant.
5 Mr Hodgkinson of counsel, appearing for the defendant, drew attention to a number of factual matters.
6 On the day of the accident the defendant had obtained use of a part of the wharf. Other users had also obtained access to the wharf on that day. The Corporation retained control of the wharf, including the safety infrastructure in place there.
7 While the defendant accepted that its plea to the charge had been properly entered, it was submitted that the responsibility of the Corporation for the safety infrastructure at the wharf in the circumstances of the defendant's hire of a part of the wharf on the day in question, was a matter relevant to the amount of the penalty to be imposed.
8 Evidence was led as to safety measures which the defendant had put in place at another wharf, Koorang No 2, which it operated and where it had the responsibility for the safety infrastructure. This included reference to the health and safety procedures manual which there applied, including in relation to access and designated walkways. Attention was drawn to the fact that such safety measures were in place at Koorang, but not Throsby wharf, a matter of some significance, it was submitted, given the common user nature of the latter wharf.
9 The defendant's health and safety manual made clear that there were steps available, which could have been taken at Throsby wharf in relation to access to the working site, which would have prevented the accident, but which were not taken by the Corporation.
10 One of the consequences of the accident had been that the defendant no longer used the Throsby wharf. Immediately after the accident the defendant's health and safety committee had met to consider what had occurred. Its report led to an internal review of safety procedures by the defendant, which involved the retention of an external safety provider. As a result, five safe working procedures were specifically formulated for the defendant's Newcastle operation, which had been implemented at Koorang and Throsby, while it was being utilised by the defendant. Those procedures achieved the removal of pedestrians from the area in which forklifts carrying containers were operating. The approach adopted was that the utilisation of a spotter was not appropriate, that causing a risk to safety of a different kind.
11 It was submitted that given the common user nature of Throsby wharf, it would be accepted that pedestrian traffic at the wharf was a matter within the control of the Corporation at the time, not the defendant's.
12 Reference was also made to an earlier circumstance when an injury had occurred at Throsby wharf. On the day in question, while the wharf had been hired by the defendant, it had not in fact been using it. On that day, the Corporation had opened the wharf for the day and had allowed the friends and family of those sailing on a naval ship moored at the wharf access to the wharf. It was submitted that the circumstance put into context the way in which the Corporation controlled access to the wharf.
13 Reference was also made to General Safety Rules developed after the accident by the MSB Hunter Ports Authority, which owned the wharf and the Corporation. An access gate at the wharf was closed, so that access to the site and traffic coming onto the site could be regulated by the Corporation.
14 Reference was also made to a booklet developed by the defendant for provision to new employees, which was also being distributed to existing employees, in order to focus attention on safety matters, as well as new emergency procedures, which included a direction about remaining in the cab of a vehicle during waiting periods. There was also evidence of the steps taken by the defendant to inform the WorkCover Authority of what it had done in order to rectify the factual circumstances which had given rise to the accident. These were taken in response to notices issued by the Inspector.
15 It was also submitted to be relevant to penalty that here there was an early plea of guilty and clear co-operation by the defendant with the WorkCover Authority. In utilitarian terms court time had been saved as a result. Discussions between the parties led to the withdrawal of a number of summonses, which also evidenced the co-operation which had been afforded.
16 As to culpability, it was submitted that the position of the Corporation was relevant. Some of the matters referred to in the agreed statement of facts were within the control of the Corporation and not the defendant. This was relevant to an assessment of the nature and quality of the offence with which this defendant was charged. It would be accepted that in the circumstances of the offence the culpability of the Corporation was greater than that of the defendant. The Corporation had been prosecuted, but the prosecution was awaiting trial.
17 Reference was made to the decision in WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Barber ) v Softwood Holdings Limited t/as CSR Timber Products (1999) 89 IR 40. It was submitted that while there were some similarities in the circumstances there under consideration with those which arose in this case, there were differences. These included that in this case there was no direct linkage between the person injured and the defendant. This was relevant when consideration was given to steps available to a defendant to assist someone injured. There was, for instance, no opportunity to repeat steps already taken by the direct employer.
18 In Softwood Holdings, a penalty of $60,000 was imposed. It was submitted that this provided guidance in this case, where the maximum penalty was $500,000, not $550,000.
19 It was further submitted that in this case of a first offence by a defendant which had operated wharves for many years, its record would be regarded as an excellent one. The industry plainly had inherent dangers, as did forklift operation itself. It followed that there was no need for an element of specific deterrence in any penalty imposed here, even though it was accepted that an element of general deterrence also had a role to play in the imposition of any penalty.
20 As to the defendant's record, it was also submitted that it would not be overlooked that the defendant had moved a significantly large number of containers over very many years, not just from ship to wharf, but also from wharf to ship and otherwise around the wharves, without prosecution under the Act. It was in the light of that record that the departures from safety in this matter were to be judged.
21 For the prosecutor it was submitted by Ms Thompson of counsel that the defendant had been charged with one particular failure, namely failing to ensure that measures were in place to ensure that restricted access existed to areas where the defendant's forklifts were operating at the Throsby wharf.
22 The primary matter to be considered was the objective seriousness of the offence charged or in other words, its nature and quality. The position was that Mr Giles had left his vehicle, had located some twist locks in a single half height container on the wharf, had climbed in to retrieve them and then climbed out backwards, so that he was standing between a number of containers, when the container he had climbed out of was bumped by the driver of the forklift, an employee of the defendant.
23 The driver could not see where he was going, given the containers he was moving. Bumping was the work method in place for locating containers at the wharf. The driver was not aware of Mr Giles' presence and did not check whether anyone had entered the site. Neither the defendant nor the Corporation had procedures in place restricting access to the site or any reporting measures when access was given.
24 The system of entry to the site was inherently dangerous and was compounded by the forklift operation. The operator had limited, if any, relevant vision, leading to the practice of bumping.
25 The safety of Mr Giles could have been secured by restricting access to the site. The risk of injury, in these circumstances, was obvious and could have been prevented by use of measures such as barriers, or the forklift carrying only one container, so as to give the forklift driver visibility. The failure to put in place simple and available measures used at the defendant's other wharf at Throsby, which was a temporary worksite, exacerbated rather than mitigated the seriousness of the offence.
26 While the defendant relied upon its good record, it couldn't be ignored in this case, so it was submitted for the prosecutor, that in some cases a good record followed upon good luck, not good management. Relevant to this submission was the procedures manual on which reliance was placed. Many of the procedures there seemingly applying to the defendant's restricted areas, were readily available to have been implemented at the Throsby site.
27 It was submitted that under the Act the defendant had an obligation to provide safe working methods and to take positive steps to ensure that this was achieved. The fact that a forklift driver with limited sight came into contact with someone who had strayed into the area where the forklift was being operated highlighted the nature and quality of the offence in question.
28 It was accepted that the defendant was entitled to have its plea taken into account, as well as its co-operation with WorkCover. The prior record and subsequent steps taken by the defendant were also relevant, but had to be balanced against the strength of the case against it.
29 It was also accepted that there was a shared culpability between this defendant and the Corporation, but it was submitted that they each had with different areas of responsibility. The defendant had its employee working with a forklift in a manner which posed a clear risk to safety, with no readily available steps taken to address obvious risks.
30 It was also accepted to be relevant that the defendant had not only responded to the particular circumstances of the accident itself, but had reviewed its entire operation, having regard to the problems which had been highlighted.