I note that in an English High Court case, Pope v Gould (HM Inspector of Health and Safety, 20 June 1996, unreported but cited at p44 of Redgrave's Health and Safety, 1998, Third Edition) it was held in England, under the equivalent of s15, that it is not a sufficient defence for an employer to demonstrate that he had instructed the employee to operate machinery in a particular way and the employee had not followed his instructions. There, it was held, that the legislative provision was not concerned solely with the giving of instructions; rather it imposes upon the employer positive duties in relation to ensuring safe systems of work and safe machinery. It was held not to have been sufficient for instructions of a health and safety nature merely to have been given to employees; an employer must also ensure that those instructions are carried out (see also Haynes at 181-182, Kirkby at 53 and McMartin at 8)."
31 The force of these observations applies equally in the present case. If, as the defendant contended, he had given instructions to Mr McDonald and Mr Rowling to work on removing the concrete from around the site of the leak, he had an obligation to ensure that those instructions were carried out and he should not have left it open for Mr Rowling to believe there was no objection to entering the outlet pipe.
32 Mr Scott put a submission to the effect that the defendant had issued instructions to Mr McDonald and Mr Rowling on 24 June that the work to be done the following day was to clear the concrete from around the leaking pipe. I have dealt with this instruction insofar as Mr Rowling was concerned. But Mr Scott contended that having received the instruction Mr McDonald, as the supervisor, had a responsibility to see that it was carried out and that, in effect, it was Mr McDonald's responsibility to ensure that Mr Rowling did not go off "on a frolic of his own". Mr Scott relied on State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Dawson (1990) 37 IR 110. In Dawson , of course, there was no suggestion that the appellant had not laid down safe systems of work to be followed by supervisors and others. It was found that there was a failure by the foreman to adhere to the safe working procedure that had been laid down. In the present case there was no evidence of a safe system of work to be followed by supervisors or any one else within the defendant's undertaking. The fundamental failure lay with the defendant, not any supervision.
The exposure to risk was at the defendant's place of work
33 That the Mount Keira project, which encompassed the site of the pumping station and the reservoir site where the accident occurred, was the defendant's place of work, was not put in issue in the proceedings and properly so, in my opinion. A Full Bench in WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Keenan) v TAFE Commission (1999) 92 IR 251 at 262 said each case under s 16 of the Act raising an issue as to the 'place of work' must be determined upon its own facts and circumstances. However, the Full Bench acknowledged that an employer (and I would add self-employed person) may carry out its undertaking remote from its principal or primary place of operation. I note also the decision in Mainbrace Constructions Pty Ltd v WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Charles) [2000] NSWIRComm 239, where the Full Bench adopted a broad construction of 'place of work'. In this case I find that the scene of the accident at the reservoir site was a place of work for the purposes of s 16(2) of the Act.
Failure to ensure persons not exposed to risks
34 It is not in issue that Mr Dewar died in the way he did. However, the accident that caused Mr Dewar's death does not establish the commission of an offence: State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Dawson at 120-121; Haynes v CI & D Manufacturing Pty Ltd (1994) 60 IR 149 at 156; Drake Personnel Ltd t/a Drake Industrial v WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Ch'ng) (1999) 90 IR 432 at 449 per Wright J, President and Walton J, Vice President. There must be shown some causal nexus between the breach of statutory duty and the fact of detriment to safety: Dawson at 121; Haynes at 159 and Drake Personnel at 449-450; WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Peter Hannan) v Bitupave Limited, trading as Boral Asphalt [2000] NSWIRComm 50.
35 In Haynes the Full Court said at 158-159:
The stated purpose of the OHS Act being "to provide effectively for the safety, health and welfare of all persons in all workplaces" in which "enormous reforms in worker safety, health and welfare" will be achieved in "the protection of workers in their employment from all risks resulting from factors adverse to health" by placing "responsibility on employers to ensure that they operate in such a way as not to endanger their employees" may only be seen in the manner stated by us. The general duties created by the OHS Act, such as in ss 15 and 16, are clearly directed, we think, at obviating "risks" to safety at the workplace; it would therefore be wrong in considering whether an alleged breach of those general duties had been made out in any particular case to reason from the actual occurrence of an accident, even though causing death or injury, as the necessary detriment to safety and as to which a causal connection was to be shown. The accident itself may well, and probably does, manifest the existence of a detriment to safety and will, no doubt, be some measure of the degree of severity of the detriment; but, it seems to us, it is to the essential ingredients of the offence charged which one must attend by assessing the objective facts causing the detriment to safety and the causal connection therewith of the employer.
36 In WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Glass) v Kellogg (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 1) (2000) 101 IR 239 his Honour said at p 253:
Many decisions of this court and its predecessors have demonstrated that the mere occurrence of an accident causing injury to an employee is not in itself sufficient to establish the commission of an offence under s15(1). It is necessary to establish both a relevant "failure" on the part of the employer and a "causal nexus" between the conduct of the defendant and the consequent risk to the health, safety and welfare of its employees: see McMartin : Drake at 34; Cullen at 209; Dawson at 120-121; Haynes at 156-157: and Kirkby at 49-50. There must be a causal connection between the alleged conduct of the defendant and the alleged risk, that is, the alleged failure must cause the detriment to the safety of the person concerned: WorkCover Authority of NSW v Maitland City Council (1998) 83 IR 362 at 377.
37 It seems to me, therefore, that I need to consider firstly, whether there had been a failure on the part of the defendant as alleged in each of the particulars of the charge. Secondly, if there was a relevant failure, whether there was a causal relationship between that failure and the consequent risk to the health or safety of persons not in the employ of the defendant occasioned by their presence in Inspection Pit No. 7 and in the outlet pipe. I have to be satisfied of this beyond reasonable doubt.
38 The alleged "failures" of the defendant to ensure that persons not in his employment were not exposed to risks to their health and safety are set out in the particulars of the charge.
39 The allegation in particular (a) was that the defendant failed to ensure the effective isolation of water at Inspection Pit No. 7 whilst persons were carrying out work inside the Inspection Pit and outlet pipe. The defendant took no steps to ensure that Inspection Pit No. 7 and the outlet pipe would not become inundated with water while Messrs Watson, Dewar and Rowling were carrying out work in the Pit and the pipe. Because of that failure to do so these three persons were exposed to risks to their health or safety. The defence to this failure on the defendant's part was that he did not know that any person intended to carry out work in the Pit or enter the outlet pipe and that, in accordance with his instructions, he expected that the work to be carried out on 25 June was the clearing of concrete around the leaking pipe. However, in response to the defendant's concern about ensuring that there was a proper seal where the leak had occurred, a proposal was put to him that someone should remove the straub coupling and spigot valve connector in the Inspection Pit and go inside the pipe to make an internal inspection. The defendant thought this was a good idea, although the defendant said he issued no directions to implement the proposal and did not think anyone would seek to implement it. Clearly, however, Mr Rowling left the meeting with the defendant on 24 June thinking either that he had approval to proceed with the proposal or thinking that as no objection had been voiced against the proposal it was all right to implement it the following day.
40 The defendant had a duty to ensure that persons not in his employ were not exposed to risks to their health or safety. In describing the duty imposed by s 15(1) of the Act, the Full Bench in Drake Personnel Ltd t/a Drake Industrial v Workcover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Ch'ng ) (1999) 90 IR 432 at 449 stated :
This Court and its predecessors have frequently emphasised the breadth of the duty imposed by s 15(1) of the OH&S Act: see, for example, WorkCover Authority of NSW (Inspector Piggott) v Capral Aluminium Ltd (1998) 82 IR 468 at 478 and WorkCover Authority of NSW (Inspector Egan) v ATCO Controls Pty Ltd (1998) 82 IR 80 at 85. The duty imposed by s 15(1) on employers to ensure the health, safety and welfare at work of all their employees is an absolute duty. In Carrington Slipways Pty Ltd v Callaghan (1985) 11 IR 467 at 469-470, Watson J said:
"I am satisfied that the legislative intention contained in the new Occupational Health and Safety Act 1983, is quite clear.
Had the legislature intended to restate the common law obligations devolving on an employer to take reasonable care for the safety of his employees, it would have been open for it to have adopted wording such as that which appears in regulations under the Industrial Safety, Health and Welfare Act 1972 (SA), where in reg 4 the phraseology used is "shall take all reasonable precautions to ensure' ( see Smith v Elliott Bros ( 1980 ) 26 SASR 138) . . . .
In their context and purpose, there would appear to be no reason to make any implication that the words 'to ensure' are to be construed in any way other than their ordinary meaning of guaranteeing, securing or making certain.''
41 I see no reason in construing the statue that the word "ensure" as it is used in s 16(2) should be given any different meaning to the same word in s 15(1).
42 I also refer to the decision of Wright J, President in Ferguson v Nelmac (1999) 92 IR 188 where his Honour said at 210:
As to the obligations imposed by s 15 it is pertinent to observe also the comments of Hill J in WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Egan) v ATCO Controls Pty Limited (1998) 82 IR 80 at 85, which are equally applicable in this matter although his Honour was dealing with proceedings under s 16 of the Act:
"This case is yet another illustration of the need for employers to exercise abundant caution, maintain constant vigilance and take all practicable precautions to ensure safety in the workplace. It is essential that the approach should be a pro-active and not a re-active one; employers should be on the offensive to search for, detect and eliminate, so far as is reasonably practicable, any possible areas of risk to safety, health and welfare which may exist or occur from time to time in the workplace."