(2) Aggravating factors
The aggravating factors to be taken into account in determining the appropriate sentence for an offence are as follows:
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(d) the offender has a record of previous convictions,
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51 As well, s 21A(4) of that Act provides:
The court is not to have regard to any such aggravating or mitigating factor in sentencing if it would be contrary to any Act or rule of law to do so.
52 The Court of Criminal Appeal dealt with this issue in R v Brett Walker [2005] NSWCCA 109 where Johnson J (Giles JA and Hoeben J agreeing) said:
[27] Section 21A(4) of that Act provides that the court is not to have regard to any such aggravating or mitigating factor in sentencing if it would be contrary to any Act or rule of law to do so. It has been held that the effect of s.21A(2)(d) and (4) is to require the court to apply the common law principles in Veen v The Queen (No. 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465 with respect to use of a prior criminal record on sentence: R v Johnson [2004] NSWCCA 76 at paragraphs 32-37; R v Wickham [2004] NSWCCA 193 at paragraph 24. In R v Shankley [2003] NSWCCA 253, Howie J expressed the principle in Veen (No. 2) as follows (paragraph 31):
"The effect of the prior criminal record of the offender, where it is relevant to sentencing, is not to increase the objective seriousness of the offence committed but rather that 'retribution, deterrence and protection of society may indicate a more severe sentence is warranted'."
[28] The applicant submits that the sentencing judge erred in treating the applicant's record of prior convictions as an aggravating factor in this case. Counsel for the applicant submits that the record was relevant, but was not a factor which aggravated the offence. It was pointed out that, despite the applicant's lengthy criminal record, he had only one prior conviction for supplying a drug and that was in 1983. Further, it was noted that at the time of his arrest in June 2003, he had been out of custody for more than three years and had been convicted of only two offences, both of which were dealt with by way of fines.
[29] Apart from a recital of the applicant's criminal record, and a reference to the applicant's concession that his criminal history was "appalling", the only reference to the applicant's criminal record by the sentencing judge was that contained in the passage set out in paragraph 25 above.
[30] The Crown submitted that, applying Veen (No. 2) , the applicant's criminal record, which included convictions for possession, use and supply of prohibited drugs, was such that personal deterrence had to be given more significance than would otherwise have been the case: R v Berg [2004] NSWCCA 300 at paragraph 29. It was submitted that the applicant had not demonstrated that the sentencing judge's treatment of his criminal record was otherwise than in accordance with the applicable principles.
[31] I am not persuaded that error had been demonstrated in this case in the use by the sentencing judge of the applicant's criminal history. As in Berg , there were parts of the applicant's criminal history which the sentencing judge would have been entitled to take into account in accordance with the principles in Veen (No. 2) .
[32] It should be observed, however, that a passing reference to s.21A(2)(d) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, without reference to the precise manner in which the sentencing judge takes that factor into account on sentence, is unsatisfactory. A failure to explain the manner in which the factor is taken into account does not enlighten the sentencing process, in a manner which s.21A appears to have been designed to achieve. Nor does it inform the offender, the Crown and the community of the use which the sentencing judge has made of this factor. In a case where the offender's criminal history is not capable of attracting the principles in Veen (No. 2) , error may be demonstrated which affects the sentencing process. It is important that sentencing judges keep firmly in mind the limited purpose for which an offender's criminal record may be taken into account, in a manner adverse to the offender, in the exercise of sentencing discretion.
53 To the extent the defendant's prior convictions are before me, I do not consider they should be relied upon to increase the objective seriousness of the offence before me but rather as a factor relevant to considerations of specific deterrence in accordance with the principles in Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465 at 477.
54 On behalf of the defendant it was submitted that, in all the circumstances, it had a good safety record given that it operated twenty four hours a day, seven days a week with a total of 236 employees at that particular worksite. It should be noted that, overall, the defendant operates throughout Australia with five sites in New South Wales.
55 The prosecutor acknowledged in submissions that the defendant entered its plea at the first available opportunity and is entitled to a discount on that basis. In assessing the impact of the plea, the Court is guided by the decision of R v Thomspon; R v Houlton (2000) 49 NSWLR 383, the principles of which are well settled and need no elaboration. I assess that discount at twenty five per cent.
56 There are a number of subjective factors that further operate in the defendants' favour. In addition to the comprehensive remedial efforts as detailed above, the defendant has cooperated fully with WorkCover in its investigation into the matter. Further, the defendant has taken the accident very seriously and commendably recognises it's responsibility for the failings and acted accordingly. It appears to me that the defendant has made all conscious efforts to ameliorate any defects in its risk assessment and safe work systems.
57 Considering those subjective factors identified, a further discount on penalty is warranted.
58 I should add one final comment. On behalf of the defendant, it was submitted that the nature and quality of this offence was such that the matter should have been dealt with before the Chief Industrial Magistrate in the Local Court where the maximum penalty is $55,000 rather than invoking the higher maximum penalty that bringing the proceedings before this Court establishes.
59 Such a submission is misconceived. In the first instance, the decision as to where to initiate proceedings is a matter for the prosecutor. Second, the Chief Industrial Magistrate must, in dealing with a corporation, take into account the maximum statutory penalty applying to the offence. Section 105(2) of the Act prescribes a jurisdictional limit and not a maximum penalty for any offence heard in the Local Court: see R v Doan (2005) 50 NSWLR 115.
60 Taking into account all the matters I have referred to, I determine a penalty in this matter of $105,000.