11 As I pointed out during the hearing, this Tribunal is a creature of statute and, whilst it has broad powers, its jurisdiction is limited to that conferred by the VCAT Act and by the enabling enactments, of which the FTA is one. VCAT may be a decision-making body not bound by the rules of evidence, and with a statutory obligation to conduct proceedings with as little formality and technicality as a proper consideration of matters permits. However, its essential jurisdiction must be established, and, however tempting it might be to determine what might appear to be a simple factual matter in a prompt, economical and hopefully fair way, that cannot be done if the jurisdiction so to do does not exist.
12 Whilst the relevant provisions of the FTA do not specifically require the existence of a contract, the nature of consumer and trader disputes may be such that a contract frequently, if not almost invariably, lies at the heart of the dispute. However, it is not spelt out as a statutory prerequisite. What is required pursuant to s.107 of the FTA is a dispute arising between a purchaser or possible purchaser of goods or services and a supplier or possible supplier of goods or services in relation to a supply or possible supply of goods or services. The terms "supplier" and "purchaser" are defined in s.3 of the FTA, and they basically mean the person who has or is to supply the goods or services and the person to whom they have been or are to be supplied. The terms "goods" and "services" are also defined in the same section, and such things as the performance of work and the provision of facilities are included. "Supply" is also defined, and includes the provision, granting or conferring of services.
13 Wizardry is claiming against Applecross pursuant to the provisions of the FTA. However, the material placed before me would indicate that there was no agreement, arrangement or understanding that Applecross would provide either goods or services to Wizardry. There was no contact or contract between the two. Wizardry purchased the semen from Van Heurck. Van Heurck paid the hire fee of the canister to Applecross and left the semen with it. Semtech, pursuant to an arrangement with Wizardry, engaged Allied Express which collected and transported the semen.
14 Given that Wizardry reimbursed Semtech in relation to the fee charged by Allied Express, it may be argued that Semtech, in engaging Allied Express, was acting as an agent of Wizardry. But does this take the matter any further as far as Applecross is concerned. Arguably, via an agency arrangement, Allied Express may have been providing the service of transportation of the canister to Wizardry. However, it is not against Allied Express that Wizardry is claiming. Applecross, at the request of and as a result of payment from Van Heurck, may have provided to him a canister that was not fitted for, or was ill-prepared for, the task which it was to perform. However, it is not Van Heurck that is claiming against Applecross. Nor is Wizardry alleging that Van Heurck was its agent in arranging the provision of the canister or that he was paying the hiring fee on its behalf. It might be argued that, as a term of the purchase of the semen, Van Heurck had an implicit obligation to supply it in a fit and proper condition to Wizardry. Wizardry is not claiming against Van Heurck. It may well be that, as asserted by Semtech, fault, in the form of negligence, can be sheeted home to Applecross. However, that would be fault on the part of what could be described as a third party. It is not fault on the part of a person who is to supply goods or services to the entity now making a claim against it.
15 This is a most unfortunate situation. As I pointed out from the bench, Wizardry may well have a claim which, pursuant to the provisions of the FTA, can be brought against Semtech. However, as we have already heard, Semtech will almost certainly deny responsibility and point to negligence on the part of Applecross. In the present application, Wizardry could fall between stools.
16 Mr Stirling stated, and I accept, that it gave him no great pleasure to be arguing a technical point in a matter which lent itself to a relatively simple determination on the merits. However, as I have stated, matters of jurisdiction cannot be ignored.
17 Unfortunately for it, Wizardry's claim against Applecross does not seem to me to be one which can be brought pursuant to the provisions of the FTA. Therefore, this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to hear it. In those circumstances, it is not necessary for me to move on to the arguments concerning the Service and Execution of Process Act, but it seems to me that Wizardry also faced difficulties there. If a contract between it and Applecross does not exist, s.48 of that Act may well have posed problems for Wizardry in relation to proper service upon Applecross. However, in the circumstances, a ruling in this regard is not required.
18 The end result is that I am of the view that this Tribunal does not possess the jurisdiction to hear the application which Wizardry has made against Applecross. Accordingly, that part of its claim is dismissed. In addition to reserving liberty to apply, I shall reserve the question of any ancillary orders that may be sought.