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[2000] FCA 1512
Federal Court of Australia
2000-10-27
Hill J
Original judgment source is linked above.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT 1 Before the Court is an application by Hugh Jenner Wily ("Mr Wily"), the trustee of the bankrupt estate of the third respondent, Michael John Fuller ("Mr Fuller"). Mr Wily seeks, inter alia, a declaration that from 16 October 1986 and at all times thereafter St Helier Trustee Company Limited ("St Helier") was the trustee of a bare trust, the sole beneficiary of which was Mr Fuller, so that the assets of that trust (and specifically a loan made by St Helier as trustee on or about 22 August 1990) to Mr and Mrs Wilkinson ("the Wilkinsons"), the second respondents, formed part of the bankrupt estate of Mr Fuller and vested on his bankruptcy in Mr Wily. 2 The Wilkinsons do not dispute that a loan has been made to them by St Helier on or about 22 August 1990 but allege that St Helier, in making that loan, did so as trustee of the Vilnius Trust, a trust of which Mr Fuller was not a beneficiary at all. If the submissions of the Wilkinsons are accepted, no interest in the loan to them vested in Mr Wily on the bankruptcy of Mr Fuller. 3 The claim now brought by Mr Wily was but one among a number of claims pleaded in Mr Wily's statement of claim, filed on 28 May 1998. The proceedings, as originally commenced, included St Helier as a respondent and made claims against that company. At some stage a settlement was arrived at between Mr Wily and St Helier and in the result St Helier ceased to be party to the proceedings.
The background facts 4 The following account of the dealings involving Mr Fuller and St Helier is largely derived from documentary evidence tendered on behalf of Mr Wily and is not substantially in dispute. 5 As at October 1986 the documentary material makes it clear that Sovereign Trustees Limited, as trustee of the Chinook Trust, an offshore trust, was about to receive an amount of $US 3,000,000 from the proceeds of sale of options in Independent Resources Limited, an Australian public company. Just how the Chinook Trust came to be entitled to receive that amount is, however, much less clear. There is reference to the transaction in the transcript of the examination of Mr Fuller under s 81 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ("the Act") and in the transcript of proceedings conducted in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal pursuant to an application by Mr Fuller brought under s 149Q of the Act. It must be said that Mr Fuller's answers to questions put to him on both occasions were often vague and it is possible to reach the conclusion that he was deliberately elusive. In the result it is difficult to be certain precisely what happened. I have little doubt that Mr Fuller knew a great deal more about the transaction than appears in the transcripts. 6 Mr Fuller and Mr Wilkinson, along with another person, a Mr Cook, were the directors of Gloucestershire Investments Pty Limited ("Gloucestershire"). Gloucestershire was the trustee of a unit trust known either as the Gloucestershire Unit Trust or the Gloucestershire Investment Trust. The units in this unit trust were held by trustees of a number of discretionary trusts the beneficiaries of which were members of the family of Mr Fuller, Mr Wilkinson, an accountant who also acted for Mr Fuller, and Mr Cook. There were six such discretionary trusts, two associated with each of the persons just named. Gloucestershire had previously underwritten the issue of options by Independent Resources Limited. On issue, the options were undersubscribed so that Gloucestershire, as underwriter, was required to take up options to the extent of the undersubscription 7 Although the evidence is far from clear, it seems that Mr Wilkinson arranged for Gloucestershire to sell the options to a company in Guernsey at what was said to be market value. At some stage, when the options had become valuable, they were sold through brokers. In the result there was a profit of $US 3 million. Whether the company which purchased and sold the options was Sovereign Trustees Limited, the trustee of the Chinook Trust, or whether there was some other interposed entity is not known. All that is known is that in some way the Chinook Trust became entitled to the profit. 8 Although the trust deed of the Chinook Trust was not in evidence, it was alleged by Mr Wily and not disputed by either Mr Fuller or the Wilkinsons that the terms of the trust deed constituting the Chinook Trust were similar to the terms of the trust deed constituting the Vilnius Trust, the relevant provisions of which are later set out. Although, as will be seen, the beneficiaries named in the deed constituting the Chinook Trust were charities such as the Swiss Red Cross, the contemplation was, it may be inferred, that by the addition at a later point of time of other beneficiaries the assets of that trust would find their way to benefit four families, including the Fuller, Wilkinson and Cook families as well as the family of a Mr Somes. There is nothing to suggest that Mr Fuller was named as a beneficiary of any of the Australian discretionary trusts or of the Chinook Trust. In the transcripts to which reference has been made Mr Fuller would have one believe that Mr Wilkinson was the guiding mind of the transaction and that he, Mr Fuller, knew little about it until a meeting in October 1986 which he attended and which is dealt with later. I would doubt that Mr Fuller was kept by Mr Wilkinson in such a state of ignorance. 9 In or around September 1986 Pennant Pacific Resources Inc, a United States corporation not in any way associated with the Fuller/Wilkinson interests, entered into an agreement with Gloucestershire under which it was to acquire units in the unit trust and 50% of the shares in Gloucestershire. The transaction took the form of the American company acquiring by subscription inter alia new units in the trust for $5,000,000. Documentation associated with the transaction indicates that prior to September 1986 Gloucestershire had sold all its convertible options and had only shares in Independent Resources Limited. This transaction seems to have nothing to do with the $US 3 million which reached the Chinook Trust. 10 Ultimately, all that is certain is that Mr Fuller, either in his own right or otherwise, had no entitlement to the amount of $US3,000,000 and that the Chinook Trust received the amount. No submission was made on behalf of Mr Wily, or for that matter, any other party, that it was relevant to understand how it came about that the Chinook Trust became entitled to receive the $US3,000,000. 11 Subsequently an agreement was reached by Mr Wilkinson, Mr Fuller, Mr Cook and Mr Somes that the share of trust assets relating to Mr Somes would be segregated from the remaining assets and be held for the ultimate benefit of Mr Somes. Accordingly on 14 October 1986 Sovereign Trustees resigned as trustee of the Chinook Trust so that it could act as the trustee of another trust for the ultimate benefit of the family of Mr Somes. In its place, St Helier was appointed the new trustee of the Chinook Trust. 12 On 15 October 1986, a meeting was held at the offices of St Helier. In attendance at that meeting were Messrs Fuller, Wilkinson and Cook as well as Sheldon Cordell, a solicitor from London who acted for Mr Fuller, and two officers of St Helier, Morris Evans and Sydney Holley. A minute of this meeting records: "It was agreed that four new Declarations of Trust be created and for the assets comprising the Chinook Trust namely, the cash funds and the bearer shares to be appointed out, or advanced to the four new Declarations of Trust as follows: -
The submissions 43 For Mr Wily it was submitted that the course of dealing outlined above between Mr Fuller and St Helier demonstrated that St Helier routinely gave effect to each and every instruction of Mr Fuller, acknowledging in so doing that Mr Fuller was the real beneficial owner of the trust assets administered by St Helier. It was thus submitted that the Court should declare that the assets which St Helier purported to hold upon the trusts of the Vilnius Trust were really held upon a bare trust in favour of Mr Fuller as the sole beneficiary. 44 It was submitted by Mr Fuller, first, that he should cease to be a party to the proceedings and, secondly, that St Helier was a necessary party to the proceedings, but had not been joined, or more accurately had initially been joined but had ceased to be a party. Without St Helier as a party it was submitted the proceedings were not properly constituted and should be dismissed. Further, Mr Fuller joined in the submission, made on behalf of the Wilkinsons, that the evidence did not in any event establish that St Helier held assets on a bare trust for Mr Fuller. 45 Finally, it was submitted on behalf of the Wilkinsons that as Mr Wily had not submitted that the Vilnius Trust was a sham, it took effect in accordance with its tenor, so that the assets of that trust, including the loans made by St Helier to the Wilkinsons, were held upon the trusts of the deed establishing that trust and not for Mr Fuller.
Should St Helier be a party? 46 The fundamental rule is that in an action to recover trust assets or, in the case of a trustee who has advanced trust money to a debtor, in an action to enforce repayment of that advance, the proceedings should be brought in the name of the trustee. Where the trustee refuses to institute such proceedings, a beneficiary may commence those proceedings either in his or her own name or in the name of the trustee. Where the beneficiary takes proceedings in his or her own name the trustee should be joined as a respondent to those proceedings. That rule is set out in the following passage from Jacobs' Law of Trusts in Australia at 690-1 as follows: "[W]here a trustee refuses to institute proceedings against a debtor or to recover trust property, the beneficiary may wish to institute proceedings himself, either in his own name or in the name of the trustee. The rule here is that the beneficiary may sue in his own name only where the relief sought is in the equitable jurisdiction of the court and even then only where the circumstances are exceptional. If they are not exceptional or if the proposed action is to be commenced in the common law jurisdiction, the beneficiary's remedy is to sue the trustee for the execution of the trust and then apply for the appointment of a receiver and for leave to sue in the name of the trustee of the receiver… Where there are special circumstances and the relief sought is in the equitable jurisdiction of the court a beneficiary may take proceedings in its own name, the trustee and other beneficiaries being added as defendants." (emphasis added) 47 The learned authors of Jacobs refer to Sharpe v San Paulo Railway Co (1873) LR 8 Ch App 597 at 609-10 where James LJ said: "I came to the conclusion very clearly, that a person interested in an estate or trust fund could not sue a debtor to that trust fund, or sue for that trust fund merely on the allegation that the trustee would not sue; but that if there was any difficulty of that kind, if the trustee would not take proper steps to enforce the claim, the remedy of the cestui que trust was to file his bill against the trustee for the execution of the trust, or for the realisation of the trust fund, and then to obtain a receiver to use the trustee's name, who would, on behalf of the whole estate, institute the proper action or the proper suit in this court." 48 Both the passage from Jacobs and the quotation from the judgment in Sharpe v San Paulo Railway Co were referred to with approval in Ramage v Waclaw [1988] 12 NSWLR 84 by Powell J. 49 While it is true that the present is not a case where the trustee of a trust is seeking to recover a trust asset, or seeking to obtain payment of a debt owing to the trust I think the same principle must apply where there is a dispute among beneficiaries as to the beneficial ownership of trust property. The substance of the present proceeding is a claim by Mr Wily as trustee of the bankrupt estate of Mr Fuller that he is entitled in equity to be repaid the loan to the Wilkinsons. If St Helier, as trustee, so it is alleged, of the Fuller Bare Trust were not a party to the proceedings, it would not be bound by the outcome of the case. Thus even if it were not necessary as a matter of law that the trustee be a party, it would be appropriate as a matter of discretion for the Court to require that the trustee be joined as a party. 50 When the matter was raised, not surprisingly, senior counsel for Mr Wily submitted that the proceedings should be amended by joining St Helier as a party and that leave should be given to amend the application and statement of claim to permit this, even if, as he submitted, it was unnecessary that this be done. It was submitted for the respondents that leave should not be given at this late stage, especially where St Helier had originally been a party to the proceedings, but had been removed as such by consent. 51 After hearing argument I announced to the parties that as presently advised I was of the view that St Helier was a necessary party but that before deciding whether or not to grant leave to join St Helier, notwithstanding that it had been dismissed as a party at an earlier stage in the proceedings, I would consider the merits of Mr Wily's claim and deliver an interim judgment dealing with that on the evidence presently before me. Only if I was of the view that Mr Wily could succeed on that evidence in establishing that the loan to the Wilkinsons was held by St Helier on a bare trust for Mr Fuller would I entertain an application to join St Helier again as a party, a course which would subject the parties both to additional expense and delay. Both counsel and Mr Fuller were content with this course. 52 Before turning to other matters it is necessary to say something about the circumstances in which St Helier in fact ceased to be a party to the litigation. 53 The present proceedings commenced in May 1997. St Helier was a respondent to those proceedings. Mr Wily claimed that a loan made by St Helier to a trust styled the Mutley Trust on 24 November 1986 was made in breach of trust, that a subsequent waiver of that loan was of no effect or made with the intention to defraud Mr Fuller's creditors and was void under s 121 of the Bankruptcy Act or was ultimately ineffectual since St Helier was trustee of the Mutley Trust. Mr Wily reached a settlement with St Helier which was reflected by an order made by the Court on 15 February 1999. The terms of that settlement are unknown. The order made as a consequence of the settlement was that the claim of Mr Wily be dismissed as against St Helier. It is possible that Mr Wily and St Helier gave mutual releases. Again, that is something of which the Court and the parties other than Mr Wily are unaware. These circumstances demonstrate why it would be undesirable, unless it is truly necessary that St Helier once more be joined as a party to the proceeding.
Should Mr Fuller remain as a party to the proceedings? 54 By virtue of Order 6 Rule 9 of the Federal Court Rules the Court has a discretion, either on application by a party or of its own motion to order that a person cease to be party. Counsel for Mr Wily submitted that the discretion should not be exercised in the present circumstances to remove Mr Fuller. It was argued that Mr Fuller had, from the moment the case had been commenced to the present time, been content to take a quite active role in the proceedings and that it was now too late for him to apply to have the proceedings dismissed as against him. Secondly, it was argued that Mr Fuller was seeking to gain a forensic advantage in having the proceeding dismissed as against him in that, without Mr Fuller as a party, Mr Wily would not be able to get into evidence the transcript of Mr Fuller's examination under s 81 of the Act. 55 The matter is somewhat unusual in that ever since the proceedings commenced no remedy has been claimed against Mr Fuller, nor has Mr Fuller at any time until the hearing sought to have the proceedings dismissed as against him. On 13 January 1999 in an interlocutory judgment I noted then that it was hard to see why Mr Fuller was joined as a party other than that he had an intellectual and perhaps emotional interest in the proceedings. As I then said, there may be cases where it is appropriate that a bankrupt be a party to proceedings by a trustee in bankruptcy to recover the property of the bankrupt for the benefit of creditors, for example, where there could be a surplus in the estate after creditors were paid in full. That was not, however, the present case. Further I pointed this out orally to Mr Fuller on more than one occasion. On each occasion Mr Fuller appeared more than happy to remain a party. It may be presumed that he saw an advantage to himself in this course. 56 In argument, reference was made to the decision of a full Court of this Court in Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v Donnelly (1998) 82 FCR 418. That case concerned an action by a trustee in bankruptcy against a secured creditor for funds received which were alleged to be the property of the bankrupt's estate. In the proceedings before the primary Judge, the trustee in bankruptcy had joined the bankrupt as a party. The bankrupt had been examined under s 81 of the Act and it was sought to tender a transcript of that examination. A question which arose on appeal was whether the joinder of the bankrupt as a party was an abuse of process, it being argued that the bankrupt had been joined solely for the purpose of admitting into evidence the transcript of the s 81 examination. There was, however, no evidence before the Court that the joinder was motivated by that purpose. 57 It was held that the primary Judge had not erred in joining the bankrupt. The judgment at one point treats the issue as being whether the primary Judge erred in not removing the bankrupt as a party. For present purposes the issues involved would be the same. The Court said: "So far as the bankrupt is concerned, the trustee's case rested on serious allegations against the bankrupt, which, if established in criminal proceedings, would exposed him to a penalty of imprisonment: see Bankruptcy Act, s 265(1)… In these circumstances, it was not an incorrect exercise of the judge's discretion to permit the bankrupt… to continue as [a party]." 58 Reference was made by the full Court to News Ltd v Australian Rugby Football League Ltd (1996) 64 FCR 410 at 523-5 as to the relevant tests to be applied in determining whether a person should be a party. The present case is somewhat unusual in that in prior interlocutory proceedings before me Mr Fuller had sought to argue that his bankruptcy was invalid because the act of bankruptcy was based upon a non compliance with a bankruptcy notice relating to a debt arising from a judgment of this Court entered without jurisdiction and based upon the Corporation Law: cf Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 163 ALR 270. Although I rejected the argument I pointed out in a judgment dated 23 December 1999 to Mr Fuller that it was open to him, if he wished, to seek an annulment of his bankruptcy, but subject to the discretion of the Court. Should Mr Fuller take that course and an annulment be granted it would be open to Mr Fuller to claim that the assets held by St Helier were held either on a bare trust for him or on the trusts of the Vilnius Trust. Clearly it would be desirable that both Mr Wily as trustee of Mr Fuller's bankrupt estate and Mr Fuller both be bound by the outcome of the present proceedings, just as it would be desirable that St Helier as trustee be bound. 59 As a matter of discretion, I would therefore reject Mr Fuller's application. He has had plenty of opportunity during the interlocutory stages of these proceedings to apply to be dismissed as a party. At no stage did he attempt to take advantage of any opportunity so to do. His application now is, it may be inferred, motivated by the desire to obtain a forensic advantage, namely of securing the inadmissibility of the s 81 transcript. Indeed, no attempt was made by Mr Fuller to contradict this. On the other hand, Mr Wily had, until the date on which the matter was set down for hearing, proceeded on the basis that there was available to him as a method of proof, material in the s 81 transcript. There is a possibility that an order dismissing the proceedings against Mr Fuller at this late stage would operate unfairly to Mr Wily. 60 In case I should be of the view that the proceedings should be dismissed against Mr Fuller because no relief was sought against him, senior counsel for Mr Wily applied to amend the application in the present proceedings to seek declaratory relief against Mr Fuller. In effect the amendment sought a declaration that the property held by St Helier upon trust, i.e. the loan to the Wilkinsons, was held upon the Fuller Bare Trust. The proposed amendment was opposed, substantially on the basis that it had come at a point too late in the proceedings. Had I been of the view that the proceedings should be dismissed as against Mr Fuller because no relief was sought against him, but that otherwise Mr Wily would be entitled to succeed, I would have exercised my discretion to permit amendment to the application on the basis that the amendment raised no new substantive issue between the parties. As this is not the case, and as the amendment would ultimately be futile I have decided to refuse to permit the amendment and I so order. It may be remarked that at the end of the day the admission into evidence of passages from the transcript was of no consequence anyway. No submission was sought to be made by the Trustee based upon the transcript. All that a glance at the transcript shows is that in answering questions about the Vilnius Trust and its dealings Mr Fuller approached the task with a considerable lack of candour.
The substantive issue - was there a Fuller Bare Trust? 61 The real issue in the case is whether the loan made by St Helier to the Wilkinsons was, as at the date of Mr Fuller's bankruptcy, held upon a bare trust for Mr Fuller as senior counsel for Mr Wily submits, or whether, as the Respondents submit it was held upon the trusts of the Vilnius Trust. 62 It is important to note here that it is not suggested that the trust deed establishing the Vilnius Trust was a sham in the legal sense of that word: cf Sharrment Pty Ltd v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (1988) 18 FCR 449. An instrument, or a transaction will be a sham if there was a common intention of the parties to it that the instrument or transaction was a disguise for some other and real transaction or no transaction at all. The onus would lie upon the trustee in bankruptcy to establish that a trust deed apparently validly entered into was but a facade or a disguise. Once it is accepted that the deed establishing the Vilnius Trust was not a sham the case for Mr Wily really amounts to no more than a submission that because Mr Fuller exercised a remarkable degree of control and direction, it necessarily followed that St Helier, which generally observed his directions, held assets upon trust for Mr Fuller. It is important here to recognise, as indeed Sharrment makes clear, that control is not necessarily to be equated with ownership, particularly equitable ownership. 63 The starting point in an analysis of the relationship among St Helier, Mr Fuller and the Wilkinsons is the profit made on the sale of the options in Independent Resources Limited. It is conceded, as I have already noted, that this profit accrued to St Helier in its capacity as trustee of the Chinook Trust. It was also conceded by senior counsel for Mr Wily in opening that the terms of the Chinook Trust were either the same or similar to those which governed the Vilnius Trust. That is to say, the only beneficiaries specifically named in the trust deed were charities. More importantly, Mr Fuller was not named as a beneficiary in the trust deed. 64 There are two possible ways that the assets of the Chinook Trust were thereafter dealt with by St Helier. The first is that St Helier, acting as trustee of the Chinook Trust exercised the power in the Chinook Trust deed to apply the assets of the Chinook Trust to another trust having as a beneficiary at least one of the persons named as a beneficiary of the Chinook Trust. The second is that St Helier acted in flagrant breach of its obligations as trustee of the Chinook Trust and applied the whole of the assets of that trust by thereafter holding them as trustee for Mr Fuller. 65 As has already been noted there was power in the Vilnius Trust deed (and the Chinook Trust deed is conceded to be in similar form) to apply the assets of the Chinook Trust to another trust having at least one beneficiary in common with the Chinook Trust. Thus Clause 2(1)(c)(ii) of the deed provided: (1) The Trustees shall during the Discretionary Period have the following powers of dealing with the capital and income of the Trust Fund which they may exercise from time to time at their absolute discretion: (a)… (b) The Trustees may pay transfer apply or deal with the whole or any part of the capital to or in any manner which is in their opinion for the benefit of all or any one or more of the Beneficiaries (c) In the exercise of the power mentioned in paragraph (b) above the Trustees may (without prejudice to the width and generality of that paragraph) (ii) transfer or cause to be transferred the whole or any part of the capital of the Trust Fund to another trust created either by the Trustees or by any other person in any part of the world provided the Trustees are satisfied that the transfer is for the benefit of all or any one or more of the Beneficiaries and notwithstanding that such other trust is governed by a law different from the proper law applicable to this Trust or contains trusts powers and provisions (discretionary or otherwise) in favour of persons or objects other than the Beneficiaries." 66 St Helier was a professional trustee. I would not lightly infer that it would act deliberately in breach of trust. Indeed, when later it was requested to apply the assets of the Vilnius Trust to another trust for the benefit of Mr Wilkinson, St Helier refused to do so because, there being no common beneficiary, it would have been in breach of trust so to do. The more likely situation is that St Helier acted in accordance with the provision in the Chinook Trust deed in terms similar to clause 2(1)(c)(ii) of the Vilnius Trust deed and applied the assets of the Chinook Trust to itself to hold on the terms of the Vilnius Trust deed, those terms being virtually identical and referring to the same persons or entities as were named as beneficiaries in the Chinook Trust deed. 67 If St Helier, holding upon the trusts of the Chinook Trust were to purport to have resettled the assets of the Chinook Trust upon itself as bare trustee for Mr Fuller, as senior counsel for Mr Wily would suggest, not only would it have acted in breach of trust, but also Mr Fuller, having notice of the terms of the Chinook Trust would in equity hold those assets upon constructive trust for the benefit of the beneficiaries of the Chinook Trust and upon the terms of that trust. Hence, the purported attempt would be legally ineffective. The assets would not, as Mr Wily would submit, become part of the bankrupt estate of Mr Fuller, but rather would continue to be held under and upon the terms of the Chinook Trust deed. 68 It can readily be inferred that Mr Fuller had notice of the terms of the Chinook Trust, if only because when the resettlement occurred, it was done on the instructions of Mr Fuller who was present at the meeting of 15 October 1986, along with Mr Wilkinson and Mr Cook. Clearly the initial arrangement involving Gloucestershire, Sovereign Trustees and other entities was negotiated among the same parties including Mr Fuller and Mr Wilkinson. Whatever steps were taken to ensure that the Chinook Trust became entitled to receive the $US3,000,000 were taken by Mr Fuller and Mr Wilkinson with or without Mr Cook and Mr Somes. 69 Accordingly whichever possibility one accepts the result is that the assets that were formerly held on the terms of the Chinook Trust (or, at least one third of those assets) became as and from 15 October 1986 held by St Helier upon trust for beneficiaries other than Mr Fuller. 70 It is true that, except as stated earlier, St Helier thereafter acted in accordance with Mr Fuller's wishes. There was nothing in the provisions of the Vilnius Trust deed which in any way referred to a memorandum of wishes. On the face of that trust deed, St Helier was legally entitled to disregard Mr Fuller's wishes. No doubt there was an understanding between St Helier and Mr Fuller that it would in fact heed those wishes and comply with them, at least so long as it would not be in breach of trust in so doing. The concept of a memorandum of wishes is not unusual in tax havens such as the Channel Islands. It may be that a court in equity might, having regard to the circumstances in which a trust such as the present comes into existence, compel the trustee to act in accordance with such a memorandum. It may, in an appropriate case, be the situation that a person who has the power to nominate his or her wishes could be held to have a power of appointment, particularly if that person could nominate who the beneficiaries of the trust might be, including himself or herself. It may be that such a power of appointment might be held to be property of the bankrupt and vest in the trustee in bankruptcy. These questions do not arise here. Any such argument was eschewed by senior counsel for Mr Wily. It is accordingly not necessary to seek to address it. 71 For these reasons I am of the view that the debt owed by the Wilkinsons was not held by St Helier upon a bare trust for Mr Fuller. I would accordingly dismiss the application and order Mr Wily to pay the costs of the Wilkinsons. Mr Fuller was unrepresented. He made no attempt to have the proceedings dismissed against him until the hearing and in these circumstances there should, in my view, be no order made in respect of any costs he may have incurred. I certify that the preceding seventy-one (71) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Hill.
Counsel for the Applicants: M Cashion SC, J Chippendall
Solicitor for the Applicants: M D Nikolaidis & Co
Counsel for the Second Respondents: S Tilmouth QC, C Caldicott QC
Solicitor for the Second Respondents: Caldicott & Co
Dates of Hearing: 17, 18 & 19 July 2000
Date of Judgment: 27 October 2000
Wily (as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Fuller)
Fuller
(1998) 82 FCR 418
(1996) 64 FCR 410
(1988) 18 FCR 449
(1999) 163 ALR 270