Williams v Douglas

1. (1919) 26 C.L.R. 265. 2. (1919) 26 C.L.R. 265. 3. (1908) V.L.R. 645. 4. (1919) 26 C.L.R. 265.

It is plain that these provisions are founded upon the principle that a person who is closely connected by some transaction of an objective description with gold and deals with it either by sale or analogous dealing or by having it in his control and possession should have the onus thrown upon him of accounting for his connection with the gold. If the word "possession" were given the extended meaning of which it is capable in the law it would include many cases of constructive possession where the real connection of the accused with the gold was ambiguous and uncertain, and where it would not be fair to throw so great an onus upon him. In the context it therefore appears right to construe the words "possession or control" as referring to de facto possession and actual control and not to extend the word "possession" to constructive possession.

The result is much the same as if the word "actual" had been written before the word "possession," but de facto possession is a conception which is itself much more extensive than that of physical custody. It is wide enough to include any case where the person alleged to be in possession has hidden the thing effectively so that he can take it into his physical custody when he wishes and where others are unlikely to discover it except by accident. The present case therefore depends on a question of fact, namely, whether the applicant had hidden the gold under the bath. It seems clear enough that whoever hid it there chose an effective hiding place and that when concealed there the gold was at his command. The fact that at some periods of the day the bathroom might be in use by other persons, so that for the time being the applicant could not obtain access to it, is unimportant. It is not as if he was entirely excluded from access to it for any lengthy period. Even if the applicant had not himself hidden it, it would be enough if an accomplice had done so with his knowledge, or after hiding it had communicated the hiding place to him for the purpose of enabling him to find the gold. The difference between the view of the magistrate and that of the Full Court is simply upon the proper inference to be drawn, and the magistrate appeared to be of opinion that there were reasonable hypotheses consistent with someone else than the applicant or his accomplice having hidden the gold. Possibly the magistrate may have taken the view that an accomplice may have hidden the gold but failed to acquaint the applicant with the hiding place.

These are not questions on which it would be proper to give special leave to appeal, and that would be a sufficient ground for refusing the application. But in any case the view of the Full Court upon the question of fact seems preferable to that of the magistrate. The magistrate's opinion involved not a reasonable hypothesis, but merely a speculative hypothesis. For these reasons the application should be refused. The Supreme Court awarded to the complainant the costs of the appeal from the magistrate to that court. The correctness of this exercise of the discretion of the Supreme Court was contested but that is not a matter upon which special leave would be granted.

The phrase in the section we are called upon to interpret is "possession or control." Possession does not mean actual physical possession or manual detention. "Suppose I request a bystander to hold anything for me, it still remains in my possession. So also possession may be required or retained over goods which are in the manual detention of a third person": R. v. Sleep [1] , per Willes J. And the phrase possession and control denotes the right and power to deal with the article in question. In the instant case the question resolves itself into one of fact. In any given case it is necessary to take into consideration all the circumstances and the nature of the thing the subject of the inquiry. In the circumstances of this case as the accused claimed the gold when it was "discovered" I consider that the inferences which can be drawn are that the accused knew that the gold was concealed under the bath, that it was placed there by himself or an accomplice and to use the words of Dwyer C.J. that "he could have got it when he wished." He had it as effectually under his control or his de facto possession as if he had locked it in a box in the bathroom, a box of which he and he alone had the key, or if you like he and an accomplice alone had keys.